ML19308B913

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Transcript of 790725 Morning Hearing in Harrisburg,Pa.Pp 1-58
ML19308B913
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Issue date: 07/25/1979
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PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF
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COMMOWWEALTH OF PEIINSYLVANIA 3

mf HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE - THREE MILE ISLAllD In re:

Three Mile Island Hearing Verbatim record of hearing held in the Majority Caucus Room, Main Capitol Building, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on Wednesday, July 25, 1979 10:00 A.M.

iiON. JA!!ES L. PRICHT, JR., Chairman Hon. Eernard F. O'Brien, Vice Chairman Hon. Nicholas b. Moehlmann, Vice Chairman

,f]

lion. Eugene Geesey, Secretary V

MEHEERS I:0USE SELECT C0511TTEE - THREE MILE ISLAND Hon. Janes D. Barber Hon. Stephen I. Lehr IIon. Reid L. Eennett Hon. Joseph C. Manniller Hon. Kenneth E. Brandt Hon. Marvin E. Miller Hon. Kenneth J. Cole Hon. liarold F. Mowery, Jr.

Hon. Ronald Cowell Hon. Martin P. Mullen Hon. Mark Cohen Hon. Jeffrey E. Piccola Hon. William DeWeese Hon. Samuel Rappaport Hon. kudolph Dininni Hot 2. Stephen R. Reed Hon. Donald W. Dorr Hon. John E. Scheaffer Hon.

A.

Carville Foster, Jr.

Hon. C. L. Schmitt Hon. Stephen F. Freind lion. Ted Stuban hon. Ivan Itkin Hon. Noah U. Wenger Hon. William K. Klinganan lion. Paul J. Yahner ALSO PRESENT:

Reported by:

Dorothy M. Malone Fred Taylor, Counsel Harshall Rock, Asst. Director of Research Dorothy M Molome R.g; t...J p.of...;onal R po.t..

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nO Atso PmEsEur, ccone a)

Peg Foran Administrative Assistant l

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GeorgeEllis INDEX PAGE KEVIN MOLLOY, Dauphin County Director of 4

Paergency Management HELEN S. RANDEL, Vice Chairman of Lancaster 58 County Planning Commission JOHN HINNICR, Chaiman of Dauphin County Commissioner: 86 h

EARL REIDER, Dauphin County Cocunissioner 86 O

3 CHAIRMAN URIGHT:

The meeting of the House Select p

~

Committee on Three Mile Island will core to order.

Let's consider this a shirt sleeve committee today and take your j ackets off.

Yesterday the coccittee heard from the civil defense and other officials from Lancaster County, the county for the trial case of Three Mile Island.

Today we are to hear from the Civil Defense Director of Dauphin County, the county northeast of TMI.

At our next recting vc will hear from York County, the county to the west of THI as well as witnesses from the counties far froni TMI, but near another nuclear plant in the lh Cornonwealth.

We also plan to hear from the host counties to hear how these counties' civil defense plans accorrodate those who rust be evacuated in tires of disaster.

Our first uitness today is Kevin Molloy, Dauphin County Director of Ercr,nency Management.

He will be joined, hopefully, within the hour by the Chairman of the Dauphin County Conmissioners, John Minnich.

Wednesday, today, is the day for the County Connissioners to reet.

Ten o' clock is the time they n:ect, so Mr. Minnich will join us during the morning session.

As we did yesterday, we will work straight through and we will hear Ms. Walden Randall of the Lancaster Planning (O,

v

4 Corcission when !fr. Molloy and Mr. Minnich have completed their testimony.

Fir. Molloy, will you rise to be sworn in please?

KEVIN !!OLLOY, called as a witness,

being duly sworn, testified as follows:

CilAIB! FAN WRIGHT:

I assume you ray have a statement that you would like to read?

MR. MOLLOY:

Yes.

CllAIP.MAZ! WP.ICHT:

All right, then we'll follow up with sore questions and answers.

MR. POLLOY:

The statement I am going to read, initially, I had prepared for the President's Commission. ' I have not had time to prepare a statement for this particular cotnittee.

I won't be abic to use it at the President's Commission, so with your indulgence I would like to read.it here.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, to express my views concerning the Three Mile' Island accident.

I Information, misinformation or the lack of tirely information was one of two major problems that was faced by our office during the crisis.

Information and the proper utilizatic>n O

5 of the chain of command are the two key ingredients in any emergency situation.

By proper use of these two elements, actions may be taken without any undue major problens for emergency workers and residents in a danger area.

During tinen of amergency, the County Office of Energency Preparedness, which is under ny direction, is the mainstream of official inEornation and connunication for emergency personnel.

Such information, is then generally channelled to the general citizenry.

Collectively, they rely on us to provide them with accurate, timely inforration.

For years, Dauphin County and others have operated on this basic principle through major fires, floods, plane crashes, a tornado A

and hazardous chemical train derailrents.

It has been our standard operating procedure and has proven invaluable in con.pleting any sudden emergency, with efficiency, safety and in a calm manner to workers and the general affected population.

This standard operating procedure could not function effectively without the chain of command.

The accepted chain of command is local to county to state to federal.

Information and request for assistance flows up or down this chain with little if any deviation.

When this procedure is followed, enerpencies are handled expeditiously and professionally.

Two major violations occurred during this particular s

)

l I

6 TMI incident.

The first was the lack of timely, official O

inforration.

The chain of command was disrupted because of a total breckdoun in accurate and tirely information from state and federal agencies.

The information we received from Pennsylvania Emergency !!anagerent agency ranged from "The plant is stable," or and I quote from a report received April 8, 1979 at 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />, "The three thermocouples that had readings between 400 degrees F are presently reading between 285 degrees T and 315 degrees F.

The central thermocouple (position 8 H) reading changed from approximately 375 degrees F to 455 degrees F and is now reading 453 degrees F, the only reading above 400 degrees F.

The venting of waste gas decay O>

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tanks, U-G-D-T, "A" and "E" to the containment building was resumed at 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br /> when the pressures of WCDT "A" and "B" were 32 and 30 PSIC respectively."

End quote.

The report also goes on to mention that the IUST level was 52%.

It would appear that unless one is a nind reader or nuclear engineer, the above reports tell us nothing.

By us, I mean the average citizen or eternency worker.

Incidentally, the lacter report that I just quoted was received April 8,1979, and spoke of events of April 6th and 7th.

Not very timely.

Information-wise, this was a unique learning experience.

From the utility; of course, we learned that they n%/

7 gkJ did have a problem.

Fron the national news media (for the most part) I learned that "the bubble had burst," "uns going to burst," "was dangerouc," "uns not dangerous."

I also learned that,"I was evacuated," "I was not evacuated," and I'm not sure, but I think I learned that if none of the other statements were correct, we should at least glow in the dark.

Uc were all fortunate to have had Harold Denton and others like him present at the plant and appreciated the news conferences he held to aid us in receiving what appeared-to be good information.

Unfortunately, the news conferences were untirely,

()

sporadic and the information was not officially handed down through the chain of corrand to energency workers.

Our Office and the local erergency offices had to rely on Governor Thornburgh's and Harold Denton's news conferences to be kept informed as to the conditions at Three Mile Island.

We were not even advised as to when these news conferences would be taking place.

It', sad to reflect back and to think that emergency persor aal who were, in fact, the persons in charge of any impend.ng evacuation had to try to keep an car tuned to a radio to get official information.

In the vast majority of cases, we had not heard reports because we were so busy and concerned uith the safety of over 200,000 people in our county

.n __.....__-. _ n _.

8 and we were still following, the chain of connand.

Tire and time again, reports were heard by the public and local per-sonnel on the news and our of fice would receive inquiries to confirm or interpret those reports.

Unfortunately, in rany cases, we were not in a position to do so.

Emergency personnel listening to neus conferences on radio and TV to receive information on such a serious situation; rather sad state of affairs.

The. second najor breakdown concerns the ever important decision raking process.

Once again, it appears that agencies and persons trained to act in crerrency situations that could include evacuation were by-passed and sore decisions

()

and discussions were held behind closed doors.

For Three !!ile Island related incidents, the basic standard operating procedure is as follows, Met-Ed, which is the utility, of course, notifies the staff duty officer at Pennsylvania Emergency Managerent Agency and the Dauphin County Office of Energency Preparedness.

The duty officer at Pennsylvania Emergency Managetent Agency also notifies the County and Bureau of Radiological Protection.

In turn, based on information received fron the utility, the Bureau of Radio-logical Protection recommends what action should be taken.

This is then passed down the chain of command, llad this procedure A()

9

,p been adhered to, proper infornation in all likelihood, would v

have been greatly improved and with nuch lens confusion.

It appears that decisions were made at higher levelt of governn'ent concerning the health, safety and welfare of the residents of Dauphin County.

k'e,in county and local government,

were apparently cxcluded fron, that process.

Cormon sense would indicate that neither federal or state officials are as familiar with our county structure, as do we who live and work in this county on a daily basis.

F,y structure, I rean the geography, familiarity of energency personnel and the behavior and attitudes of local residents.

Therefore, it is beyond my corprehension, that county and local officials were not asked

(')

for such valuable input as a part of the decision making procesc To illustrate my point, I quote from portions of copies of the NRC transcripts of March 30, 1979:

!!r. Denton :

"He did advise the State Police to evacuate out to 5 miles."

End of Ouote.

We who are faciliar with our evacuation plan must ask why were the State Police called to initiate an evacuation?

The prire notification nFencies are Dauphin County Office of l

Emergency Preparedness or Pennsylvania Energency Management Arency.

Another portion of a conversation from the l'ucicar 9

10 Regulatory Commission transcripts:

7sC Mr. Collins:

"My thought on it, just sort of a gut feeling, up to 10 miles, at about three say twenty-two and a half degree sectors uhich is, say 70 degrees wide, I would think they would be able to get them out inside of an hour, at the most two."

Mr. Galinsky:

"Are you talking about Harrisburg too?"

Mr. Collins:

"I would have to include that, if it went toward Harrisburg."

Mr. Calinsky:

"Let me ask you, do those three counties include Harrisburg?"

Q Mr. Collins:

"Let's see, Harrisburg is in which county?"

(Mumbling to himself, obviously looking at a map)

"Yes, Harrisburg is in Dauphin County."

Obviously, a total lack of knowledge of the geography of this county.

Once again, had the chain of command been followed, such unnecessary conversation would have been avoided and precious time would not have been wasted.

I personally am not familiar with Mr. Collins,,

and had he called me concerning an immediate evacuation, more precious time would have been wasted in deternining his authority to order an evacuation.

Once again, a rather sad h

11 Q

intrusion on the chain of corrmand.

Basically, through the entire incident the chain of commaand information-wise, went something like this:

Top Elock:

TMI/NRC/Corvernor's Office, at the top block, the next block was %e news tredia and the public and last but not least, the Pennuy'":ni a Errergency !!anagernent Agency and county and local emergency personnel.

Time and time again, we complained to Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, and othet-state officials, but of ten tirnes to no avail.

These problema can and must be corrected.

To the committee members and residents of Dauphin County, I would emphatically state that the vast majority of the emergency service personnel are convinced that they could have and in the future will accor plish any task or nission put before them for the safety of the people we serve.

BY CHAIRMAN WRIGHT:

Q.

May we go back to your corments in regard to the procedure for notification.

If I understood correctly, the utility is suppose to notify, and I think you said PEMA, and the county, Dauphin County Emergency Management, is that correct,

the way I understood it?

'O y

12

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A.

Right.

Q.

They notified both at the same time?

A.

I am not an artist, but I drew a couple of diagrams here to give you sone idea of what the normal procedure would be if they have an incident down at Three Itile Island.

They are to notify the county that an incident has occurred and also the staff duty officer at PEMA and then they also notify the Bureau of Radiological Protection, etc.

In addition, the-State Energency Manapenent Agency also notifies the county.

So you have a dual system of the county being notified of an incident at the site.

7g Q.

Let's go back a shade and rake sure I understand.

V The initial phone call is to be made by Metropolitan Edison?

A.

Right.

Q.

To PEttA and to Dauphin County?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

I don't understand why Dauphin County versus -- is TN1 in Dauphin County?

A.

Yes, the facility is in the lower end of the county.

Q.

Just about on che dividing line between Dauphin and Lancaster. As I understood it yesterday, you notified Lancaster County?

Y

13 A.

Yes, sir.

-s

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v Q.

Rather than Met-Ed notifying then?

A.

I also on the rorning, Uednesday morning, I also got in touch with York County and Lancaster County.

This is part of my procedure to nahe sure they had been notified in addition --

Q.

Part of your procedure, is this the procedure that you initiated or is this the procedure laid down by --

A.

A procedure that I initiated.

After the initial notification that an incident occurs,.the flou of information then chances screwhat.

Pe would not necessarily be contacted by the utility, but any further inforr.'ation would to directly to PEMA or to the Bureau of Radiological Protection and then ultimately the information should flou down to us and then we can pass on to the locals.

Q.

The procedure that you designed and initiated, accepting responaibility of notifying the adjacent counties, was that donc with the approval of PEMA?

A.

PEMA was aware of it.

Q.

Uns aware of it?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Is there a procedure that PEMA approved that procedure, I mean, was it in writing?

Is there a plan book 9

14 n

filed with PEMA?

U A.

Yes, they have a copy of it and there was never any objection to it.

But I assume they would also notify the surrounding counties.

That was j ust one way of raking sure they were notified.

Q.

Do you know if a similar procedure exists in those parts of the Commonwealth where there are other nuclear plants?

A.

I don't know for a fact, but I am assuming the other counties also have them.

Q.

What I am leading to is this, a standardization of procedure, but I suppose in all honesty you have some difficulty in knowing the answer to that one?

,~

'~'

A.

I couldn't answer that, right.

CHAIRMAN URIGHT:

I will pass for the Ecment.

Questions?

Representative Reed.

BY REPRESENTATIVE REED:

Q.

Kevin, with regard to the Commonwealth's role in the TMI incident how uould you generally characterize the operation of state government in connection with handling TMI, adequa te, inadequate, good, fair, poor?

A.

It could use a little improving...See, I think one of things that has to be understood here, when you say what was the response of state governnent?

Well, we are talking several

15

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different agencies.

He are talkinE PEMA, State Police, PennDOT x..

the Governor's Office, etc.

The biggest problem uith the state agencies, and I think I have indicated previously,it was the lack of information, which even you, being from the county, you are well aware of the troubic that we did have, j us t the total collapse of the chain of command of flow of information above the county level.

There is just no way that energency personnel should have been listening to the radio or television to find out exactly what-is going on.

Many heard reports from different people that have testified before the comrittees already that this has been a raj or problem.

I can only echo that.

The sad part of the

,9 whole thing, as far as I am concerned, is a system already existed for the passing of inforration, it has for years, it has worked in the past.

There was.lo reason why it should not have been folloued this time.

That is, once again, local to county to state to federal government.

The system is already in existence.

Q.

In Dauphin County, under your direction, prepared an evacuation plan for the five nile radius area around TMI in'approximately 1977 if my remory serves ne correctly?

A.

'75 I think was the initial and then we changed the arount.

9

16 Q.

I recall previous correspondence with you on that O.

subject back in '76 '77 uhen, of course, we all knew an accident at TMI was not possible.

At what point were you informed by the PEMA personnel or anyone else that the twenty mile radius evacuation was being considered?

A.

It would have been Saturday morning to the best of my knowledge.

If I could say something, you know, some of the questions I cannot give specifics right now because it has been four raonths.

Q.

Do you recall how you were notified on Saturday, March 31st?

A.

It would have been by telephone.

In addition, Saturday morning, some time Saturday morning around 9:30 I believe we were having a meeting with the local directors in the five mile area and we sent a representative from our office up to pick up some information the state had concerning ten mile information, twenty mile information.

Q.

So, in other words, you found out from the PEMA people on Saturday, March 31st at approximately 9:30 a.m. that the Commonwealth at that point was considering a twenty mile evacuation and that you should plan accordingly?

A.

That is correct.

O

17 Il Q.

Understand one of the major interests of this v

committee is to find out how well the state government handled itself in this whole business of Three !!ile Island.

That is the reason I am asking these questions.

Then assume as of that point you began planning c nuch broader evacuation plan of ten or twenty miles?

A.

That is correct.

All day Saturday that was what our efforts were geared tovards.

Q.

Do you believc that the five mile evacuation could have been carried out in an orderly and safe manner?

A.

Yes.

r3 Q.

How much advnnce notice would you have needed to U

put your personnel out on the street and robilize other resources in order to carry thct out, the five mile evacuation?

A.

I think in a matter of a couple of hours if it had just been strictly the five mile incident, would have been sufficient.

Understanding with: the five mile evacuation we are talking strictly inter-county movenent which left us with extra resources, of course, on the northern end of the county and the southern part of the county plus the State Police, as an exanple, could have brought in adequate personnel to assist the local police.

In nddition, we had resources from Cumberland County that were available.

Once it got to the ten mile and

18 twenty mile, then it was out of the county.

It was a whole different ball game.

Q.

I assume that you prepared the ten and twenty mile evacuation plan simultaneously once you got the word that five miles was no longer, in the opinion of PEMA, going to be adequate for a potential evacuation.

At what point, how many hours or days later was it that you had made sufficient plans for a ten and twenty mile evacuation that in fact could have been implemented?

A.

Okay, we came up with what we considered our first rough draft, a worhable plan, which obviously would need refine-ment.

I have it on the log here.

Once again, this log isn't necessarily that accurate, but it was on Sunday morning at about 12:30 in the morning that we had our ten and twenty mile done t6 our satisfaction.

We felt it would have worked.

Q.

If it would have been necessary, you could have implemented it?

A.

Right.

Q.

Could a ten and twenty mile evacuation have been safely implemented in an orderly fashion do you believe?

A.

I feel it could have.

You have a couple of keys to the movement of that large amount of personnel.

I think the biggest key, of course, is the traffic situation.

As long as D

19

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you can keep traffic moving and do not have any major massive road blocks, you are in pretty good shape.

Part of the problem or what could have been a problem, of course, we were assignad extra National Guard troops in the event the order had been given.

The problem that we saw was the fact that it would have taken six hours to get to their stations and then another hour or so down into our area.

The particular unit that was assigned to us was from either Milton or Sunbury, I don't remember off the top of ny head.

It was from up in that particular aren, k'c would like to have seen the unit, at least on stand by, in their armory.

I think that would have been an g

intelligent move.

d Q.

liow much advance notice did PEMA indicate to you that you would have in the event that an evacuation was ordered "

A.

Initially, over the first couple of days no indica-tion of any specific amount of time.

It seems to me as though maybe late.on Sunday or later on in the week we got notification it would have a minimum number of hours, eight or I don't remember what the exact finure was.

Q.

On Sunday, April 1st, at approximately 12:30 a.m.

you were, at that point, sufficiently prepared to go into the ten or twenty mile evacuation if that were necessary.

I assume you then notified PEMA of your readiness capability?

oy

20 A.

Uell, we kept then advised as best we could for

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the simple reason we had people from PEMI assigned to our officc We were in constant contact with them because we were going to host counties and we were working very closely with them.

So PEMA was keeping tabs on uhat we ucre doing.

Q.

Well, was it Lauphin County that actually made up Dauphin County ten and tventy mile evacuation plans?

A.

Yes.

Where the state acencies care into play, if I could say this right nov, and of course, Curberland _and the other counties were working on their particular plans.

To cite one example, each county picked a general direction they were going to go in reintion to the plant.

One place where we would s_)

have had a problem was our initial plans called for the rove-nent of sone people down the turnpike, westbound.

Cumberland, of course, was using that.

So PennDOT had to straighten that particular situation out.

That is mainly where the state agencies core into play.

Q.

Did the opening of the schools on Monday, April the 2nd, complicate matters for you?

A.

Yes.

He felt that in view of the uncertainty of the situation up until that point and there still sceced to be quite a lot of uncertainty, to the best of my recollection, that we would have preferred the schools to stay closed so we

21 would have buses available.

The request for extra buses that

,x i

we nade to PEMA tras based on the fact that we were going to havc local school buses available.

REPRESEtiTATIVE REl'D:

I have no further questions.

Only one corrent to Mr. olloy, I'r. Chairran, that would be I happen to know of "r.

Jolloy's expertise and I know of his faciliarity with the various acts related to Ercrrency Manage-rent, Civil Defense, as the laytran would know.

I would recommend to Kevin that in the next week or so if he has any particular thoughts rich recard to how existing state law ouz,ht to be avended to deal with sore of the situations you are referring to, I would recormend that you prepare those

nJ recotrendations, send ther to the chairnan and he in turn util share them with us.

CIIAIRMAN URICET:

Representative Gcesey.

REPRESEMTATIVE CEESEY:

No questions.

CHAIPJfAN FRIGliT :

Representative Piccola.

BY REPRESENTATIVE PICCOLA:

Q.

I: e v i n, I got fror your testirony, I got the irpression it is your feeline that the e::isting system er existing chain of corrund is adequate if it functions properly.

Is that a fair assessr:ent?

A.

Yes, if it is folloued, it is quite effective.

It

22 r-has been used for many disasters in the past.

The reason you L)s set up a chain of command is to follow it.

Q.

It is also your opinion, I take i t from your remarks, that the chain of command in this case did not functior.

properly?

A.

No, above the county level, once again, information--

wise, you have to understand there are basically two chains of command, one for request for assistance and one for information flow.

Above the county level there was just a total collapse.

Once again, nany tires we would get a call from somebody who just heard sonething on the rcdio or TV and asked us to verify or comn.cnt on it.

Obviously, we coutin ' t, we didn't have time O-to listen to the radio.

So we would get on the phone and call PEMA, the state agency, and say, we just heard.

In rany cases, they hadn't heard it.

They would have to check it out and-get back to us, etc.

Uhereas, if the information had flowed fron the site to, as an exanple, the Bureau of Radiological Protec-tion, from there to PEiA, then it could have gone up and dot n the chaih of 'comaand pr'o'perly.

Q.

In your opinion, what was your rost useful or beneficial source of information looking back at it now from what you know new and the information you received at the tice?

What would you say was your rost useful source of information?

O

23 Uns it pEMA?

gL)

A.

In some cases, yes.

In sore cases, well, the local news media, of course, was very cooperative with us.

We found out many things from then.

I can't say given one preference over the other.

O.

Could you conrent briefly on how your local chain of command worked within Dauphin County?

Did you get coopera-tion from the locals or were there some problems developed there that might be rectified?

A.

For the most part, we had excellent cooperation from the locals.

A lot of then had not taken time to write emcreency plans, despite urging over the years that they do so, rm

(_)

and care up with sona plans rather rapidly.

Once again, the biggest complaint there was the lack of official information which they should have gotten from us.

It was very frustrating to them.

We had a meeting of the fire chiefs of all the fire companies in the county to update them on what was going on and our procedure that they were to follow in terns of evacuation, where they would park their equipment and things of that nature.

And they very strongly obj ected to the fact that they were not getting the proper information.

One of them suggested that perhaps if they surrounded the State Capitol and sounded all their sirens, someone would pay attention to them and get them

24 information.

7_

t/

CIIAIRMAN WP.IGHT :

One of them did.

LY REPPISENTATIVP. PICCOIA :

Q.

You indicated that there were sote rovernnent local units did not urite evacuation plans.

Is there any nandate in state law or other law that requires ther to do it?

A.

Uell, without just talking about a written plan as such, you are kind of getting in a little bit larrer area.

The lau basically says that every runicipality must have a local civil defense director.

t.11 the runicipalities follow that procedure.

They say, hey, you are the civil defense director.

In the past, there has never been any training requirement.

There has been a lack of interest in many cases on the part of the local elected officiels who reconrended the individual to be the civil defense director and he gets no local support or anything.

There is very little financial support fron either the state or the federal levels for the locals.

Once again, there has really been no incentive.

We have conducted meetings I have been in Dauphin County since April of '74 and in those five years conducting sore local training sessions, there are scre local directors I have not seen in five years.

And it got to the point we held rectings in the upper end of the county and the lower end of the county and they still wouldn't core.

25 Pe sent letters to local officials saying,

,_s x'/

basienlly, r,1 vine ther a carbon copy of a letter we would sena, to a local director navinr there is r.oing to be a recting on such and suc': a date uith the host and sone of the local people would say to the director have you rene to the rectinPs or not.

f.nd even no response there.

Out of the 40 directors in Dauphin County, we have about, prior to the incident, ue had about ten actively involved directors.

The other ones just did not have the time.

Q.

Fron your rcrarks then I would take it it night be appropriate that state covernrent provide sore incentives to local povernment to beef up the civil defense plans.

_ J A.

One part of that problen is with the new law, now t

they are finally requirine that local directors cust attend traininr serinars, etc., or they will be removed.

The one part that bothers ne about the new lau is it says that if a local director is not appointed in a, and I forget what the exact wording is, basically a reasonable length of tire, that one would be appointed for the locals.

I still would like, I don't

(

know what anybody's definition of a reasonable length of cine is.

To ne, in view of the fact that this is a person that is going to be dealing with an emergency, I think a week is sufficient.

To somebody else they nicht think, well, we'll 9

i 26 give them a ronth to do it.

I think that is an area that has i

to be checked into.

If the local officials don't want to appoint sonetody to fill ir, c vaccncy rather rapidly, then it should be done for then.

It is an e:.:trer:ely important position ns far as I m concerned, j

RL'PFESEUTATIVE TICCnLA:

Thank ycu, I hnve no

]

further quer.tions.

CFAIR'O 'T '.:r" ~P" Prpresentative Stuban.

4 DY PIPRESEI'TATIVL STUSA" Q.

Levin, who drew up 'rour plan and who approved it?

A.

The initial ore thnt we did several years ago?

Q.

P.ight.

l

]

A.

I drew it up and ::ent it to the local pcopic, the l

state agency, etc., for any incut that they mi;-ht have or --

J Q.

Was there any input in your plan uith the utility 1

or --

I A.

" ell, we had talked and coordinated with the utility i

to make sure the notificction procedure uns -- everybody; was in agreenent on that.

Q.

Hoc about the Euclecr Regulatory Connission?

A.

No, othcr than tentifying before them once, I never had any contact with the NRC that I recall.

Q.

Would you feel now, after the experience here, that.

n,..

27 we need a uniform plan?

A.

L' ell, I think it is quite obvious, especially in view of what happened, you Pnow, around the state and around the country that we are going to have to.: ore up with -- it wouldn't necessarily all be uniform.

It's going to vary from county to county, area to crea, they should all come up with a good sound plan.

I don't know if I necessarily agree with the action taken by the US recently where they rade the statement that if nuclear power plants did not have county plans or state approved plans, they would he shut down.

I agree with that except I don't agree with where they said the NRC is going to have to approve the plans.

Shuchs, they couldn't even follow O

a simple one that I did.

Q.

You don't think the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should approve the plans?

J A.

I think they should bc a part of the group that approves it.

It should be the Federal Emergency lianagement Agency.

Up until this point, it has not been shown to me that the NRC has any great expertise in emergency planning < 'as far as civilian population.

I am not talking about what they do on-site.

But I think any state plan should be approved, as I say, by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, perhaps, with input from the URC, but not left to the URC alone.

b,

~~

^

28 Q.

Following a littic bit along Steve's vein, you are Q

putting sone input into vi,atever laws should be changed or whatever legislation is needed here.

Do you think possibly it uould benefit the state now to ask you people to sit down that have been civil defenso directors within this area and expertise, sit dmm with PET'A and possibly people from the utilities and the Nuclear Rerulatory Cornission and core up with sone uniforn standards of procedure of reporting on down?

A.

I think that.is going to have to be done.

We had a recting recently up at PEMA I?cadquarters, I would say uithin the past two or three weeks, in which the NRC was there and the counties that were involved and we errlained what we felt

)

was wrong, what was done vrong during this particular incident and our suggestions to correct i t.

I am sure there will be other meetings.

Q.

Would you disprove of Three Mile Island reopening i

without a uniform type of plan, a better reporting system and 4

who has the contand of what takes place if they do fire up l

again?

i A.

Well, once cgain, as far as a reporting system goes, a reporting system is in place as far as I am concerned if everybody vill just follou it.

That is basically what I can say about the reporting system.

I think, unfortunately, you

29 know a lot of people are trying to reinvent the wheel here.

Following the incident, it appears everybody and his brother wants to be notified.

It can get a little bit out of hand making 800 phone calls as opposed to just following an existing chain of command.

I call the local director, it is the local director's responsibility to tell his local government officials,

etc.

That is his responsibility, part of his job.

If he is doing his job properly, if the chain of command is functioning properly, everybody will get the proper information.

There is no need for putting hot lines in 40 municipalities in Dauphin County.

That would be totally ridiculous.

You know, not to pick on anybody or single anybody out, let's just take the City of Harrisburg as an example.

Now assune-that they call me, then the utility would be responsib1'ei. for calling the Mayor and then five or six i

members of council or however many they have.

You take that and multiply that times seven supervisors in this township, everybody wants to call there.

You know, the whole thing would get out of hand.

We already have the existing system.

It worked during Agnes, it worked during Eloise, it worked during the flood out in Johnstowr. basically, it worked during the tornados.

You know, it has always worked if everybody would O

30

-)

just follow it.

v Q.

Then what you are saying is the plan is there but maybe it ought to be brought out and reviewed every now and then so people know where they stand and whose position is what and who takes comnand?

A.

Right, part of the thing that we do at the' training seminars that the s tate-does, at the training seminars-the coun :y directors go to and at the local meetings we hold, is we keep telling the people that this is the chain of command, this is how you get assistance, what you need, etc.

It is reviewed constantly.

It is very basic and conmon sense.

Q.

Do you feel that any plant that is under construc-G

' 'l tion in the State of Pennsylvania should be licensed to be fired up without scme uniform plan ready to go and approved by the state and other people?

A.

I think there should be an approved plan first.

We are in a position now where apparently this can be done and let's do it.

It's a lot better to do it, you know, at a leisurely pace rather than under combat conditions like we did it.

Q.

You would be willing to give of your expertise and knowledge that you gained in this crisis to the other communities around and to the state?

9

31

(~'s, A.

Most certainly, we have talked to other counties,

\\_/

we have talked to other states, ue have had calls from all over the nation.

For that ratter all over the world, I have had French delegations, Japanese, etc.

Anybody that wants to ask, etc., we are more than happy to share our experiences with them.

REPPISENTATIVE STUEAN:

That is all I have. cot.

CHAIRMAN URIGHT:

Representative Brandt.

REPRESENTATIVE EUAliDT:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BY REPRESENTATIVE DRANDT:

Q.

Just following up on that, Mr. Molloy, were you involved with any type of hearings or any knowledge of the

(

')

issue at TMI in regards to your job prior to the incident on March 28th?

A.

Yes, I have testified before the NRC concerning.

our five mile plan.

Q.

When was that, like a year ago or more than that?

A.

I think it was '76 or '77.

Q.

It was prior to the. incident, right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

I would like to follow up, on your chart there, your chain of conrand, is that the uay it is suppose to work, is that what you are telling us?

A.

Right.

That is the way we feel it works in any

32 m

()

type of a disester situation.

Q.

In responac to Representative Recd's question of how you would assess the state you put all the state agencies in one basket when you responded to that question?

A.

Well, you knou, once again let's just take PEMA as an exarple, the state egency.

Pealistically, as far as the inforr.ation flow is concerned, it was poor.

However, it was something that was out of their control; it was out of their hands.

However, in our dealings with PDIA with we are going to need 50 extra buses or we are going to need X nur.ber f x, of National Guards, etc., the cooperation was excellent as Cl usual.

So you run into kind of a strange situation.

They were well aware of our dissatisfaction with the lack of information.

There was nothing they could do about it.

Q.

So in regard to state agencies you put the-Governor's Office, Radiological Bureau and PEMA all in the same how would you assess the Governor's Office action in this situation?

A.

L' ell, you know, the only thing I can really say there is I don't feel that the Governor's Office handled the information flow well at all.

You know, once again, it was 1

really Sad.

You had to understand, and a couple of the members

33 of the cotrittee cere dotm in ny office during this particular incident, we were extrerely busy, very busy, under a lot of pressure and we did not have tino to listen to the radio and TV,

etc.

Yet this is the way the information was coring out of the Governor'n Office.

It was not being given to PLTA, who could have filtered it down to us, etc.

.So inforr'ation-wise fron the Governor's Office I felt it left a lot to be desired.

O.

That is sort of contrary to what some of the feeling was, particularly down in the Middletown area about the Covernor's Office as far as once he got Denton, etc.

Do you think it turned it around somewhere along the line?

A.

Well, once agcin it was great to have ilarold Denton g

(_,;

here and he did an excellent job.

But, shucks, I think they should have told us what was going on before they went and told the rest of the uorld.

Uc were involved in a disaster situation Many, many tires we vould get phone calls and they would say liarold Denton just said on the six o' clock news.

I didn't have tire to listen to the six c' clock nous.

Ubat good was.that doing me?

Middletown, they were fortunate, because llarold Denton was holding press conferences right down in the Middle-town Eorr agh building.

Of course they were happy.

Uhat about the Mayor of liarrisburg or what about Susquehanna Township where they weren't holding, a press conference?

Again, they were c

\\

t

34 7s hearing it third hand, etc.

Mr. Denton did an excellent job,

(_)

etc., but it still it vaan't done right in teres of passing information to crergency workers.

]

Q.

Following that chain of command, how many civil defense directors did you have involved in the TMI incident?

A.

Well, we have 40 nunicipalities, local runicipalitics, in the county.

The vast majority of municipalities were involved.

Uc, of course, have the lower end, the ones that were actually involved in the evacuation plan.

Q.

Ilow many were actually involved in the five mile radius?

A.

Well, we had all of the local directors, Londonderry

)

Doyalton, Middictown and Lower Suatara and liighspire.

Q.

They were all involved?

A.

They were all definitely involved.

Uhat happened if the incident progressed and went out to 20 miles, basically what you had was half of the county was in the danger zone and the upper end of the county, those directors vere involved as hosts, the vast majority of the local directors were involved.

Q.

In regard to your plan,

.sv rany personnel would it take to implement your plan, your evacuation plan?

A.

You mean as far, well, like in my office alone we l

operate with --

A)

(-

L

35 n.

I?o, I rean, ho.7 reny neople vould it take to r.et (n!

x_/

cverybody out, take e rn c' ins, tal:e a five nile radiun, that's a crall onc?

A.

Well ve'11 enke a 20 riile zone as an enarple.

Uc had approxiratelv 100 :!ational Ct ards assirned to un.

/. Lout three-cuartern of ther t,ould !mvc l cer out in the ficid.

Un had an extra 122 < tate Policercon.

Ve are talkinr a couple thousand people in a 20 rile zene, but that includes the local volunteers, etc., plus the outside help for traffic control, etc.

Q.

You are talkinr sonowhere between two and three thousand people to ivpler.cnt that 20 nile radius plan just for l

i

'/

Dauphin County?

A.

Rir.ht, I ueuld feel that.

Q.

Just one nore thing, "r.

Chairrnan, on the civil defense directors in the neu PLI".A act, it said local CD directors, they n;ust attend or be renoved.

Whc rer.ovea thee, who has that authority, the local n.unicipall.ty?

Do you have any a 2thority in that?

A.

I can only give you, I assun.e, that if they don't start showing up at the training serinars that I would notify the state to find out enactly what is the proper irocedure.

I don't know off the top of 'my head.

9

36

(^)

Q.

The reason I nn asking thic is because it cccc out v

yesterday that the local elected officials are quite involved with the neu PD'A /tet, ruch r: ore than prior to civil defense, regular civil defense directors.

Once the local nunicipality appoints a civil defence director or an emergency ranagement director, rmat he be approved or certified by anyone cbove that level?

A.

The local governrent of ficials recorrend the appointrent, the ultimate appointrent is by the Governor's Office.

Q.

By the Covernor's Office?

A.

P.ight.

I was recorrended by the county commissioners as an exarple and appointed by the Governor.

The local directors, once arnin, they are approved by the Governor clso.

We have several new local directors as a result of this particular incident.

Ri.ht now we are waiting for the forral f

letter of appointtent from the Governor's Office for that.

Q.

Is that just in place since this new PEMA Act has been established?

A.

That was always the procedure, the Governor's Office always appoints the local directors.

Q.

They are not officially recognized as the CD director until they are approved by the Governor's Office?

9

37

(}

A.

Not officially.

REPRESENTATIVE BRANDT:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT:

Fred Taylor.

LY MR. TAYLOR:

Q.

Mr. Molloy, if I can.just for a second, you contioned several times in your answers to some of the questions by members of the committee about the National Guard, you said now you were assigned 1500 National Guardsmen?

A.

We were assigned 800 National Guards.

They were from the Milton area, Sunbury area.

Q.

You expressed soce dissatisfaction with the fact

()

that the unit that was assigned to you was not local, is that right?

A.

Well, I couldn't quite understand why we have.

units in the Harrisburg area that they were not assigned to us.

It just seems a little bit more logical.

I want to make one point clear, that we have absolutely no complaints with the National Guard unit that was assigned to us and the military personnel in our emergency operation center was first class as far as we are concerned.

However, based on talking with the military representatives that were in our EOC, we felt it would take them from the time rN they have the word to come into the county, it would take them V

l i

38 approximately eight to ten hours before they would be in the county.

Ue felt that was too long.

Uc would like to see ther at least in the arnories.

Q.

In other words, are you suggesting that if we were to use the local National Guard group, which I think has the arrory at Herr Street or the bypans, that would have been more beneficial to your operction?

A.

It perhaps could have been.

Q.

Just one thing for clarification.

Yesterday we heard from the Mayor of Lancaster ubo said he had evacuation plans in place for the City of Lancaster.

I have a little bit of confusion in my mind, if the City of Lancaster has an evacuation plan and the county has an evacuation plan and the state has an evacuation plan, how they coordinate with each other.

I am wondering if you can answer the question as to how, let's say, Harrisburg, the Borough of Dauphin, I!crshey, Bressler, Oberlin, etc., coordinate with you and then how you coordinate with the state?

A.

I think the important point to remember here is the planning really starts at the local level.

It is a local responsibility.

Basically, what transpired, as an example during THI, is the local municipalities figured out traffic routes to get them to the rajor interstate roads.

Then they

^\\

l

./

i

39 vould tell us that this is their traffic pattern.

Uc would O

cor. pare theirs against, we'll say Middletown arainst liighspire, 4

to nahe sure there vere no conflicts, thinrs of that nature.

They would survey their cornunity and see if they needed X nutiber of buses, 20 buses.

If they had ten on hand and needed J

ten nore, they would give us a call and ue would make efforts to supply buses.

Basically, each reunicipality is responsible for doing a survey of the coter. unity hazard analysis of their ormaunity to see what can go wrong in a community, to see what actions are being taken and what types of support they would 1

need.

Once we have that inforration, then we crank it up to the state.

)

Q.

Well, does the information, let's say, the City of 11arrisburg has an evacuation plan which requires everyone to take off towards 11ershey.

Is that coordinated with your county plan?

A.

Yes.

Uhat we vould have to do there is to go over, as an example, we have West llanover,1:ast !!anover, all the communities out that way, and nake sure there is no conflict with the traffic flow.

If there is, to resolve them and to I

make corrections to the local plans.

Q.

My real question is is that coordination between the city or the boroughs, the nunicipalitien, the local n

l l

l

40 cunicipalities, and the county mandated or is that strictly a cooperation thing between all of them and you?

A.

Well, it is what we are suppose to be doing.

It is the way it should be done.

Q.

Is it being done that way?

A.

Not neces<arily, because as I indicated earlier, in some cases the local municipalities did not have any types of emergency plans.

Q.

As the county civil defense director, county emergency planning director, do you have any, you know, authority to get these connunities organized into submitting plans to you which could then be put into the county plan?

A.

The five years I have been here I think I have done everything but offer then rr.oney to draw one up.

Some of them, see, the problem with civil defense, once again, ve have been operating under antiquated laws.

It is not a very popular subj ect.

!!obody wants to spend money or any time.

Nobody,it just seemed we don't care about civil defense or emergency preparedness.

MR. TAYLOR:

Thank you very much.

EY CHAIRIIAN WRIGl:T:

Q.

You indicated that in the past the chain of command perforced and performed well.

You centioned Agnes and a few i

41 other catastrop,hes,. but it did not this time.

I assuce that when the crisis was behind us and there was sotr.e titre to ask questions and register criticists or raise a little bit of heck with PD% and people at the state level that you probably did Did you ever get a satisfactory explanation as to why it so.

didn't work quite the satte this titre as it has in the past?

If you did, can you share those answers with us.

A.

Ue did not necessarily wait until the incident was over before we started registering our displeasure.

At one point the Licutenant Governor did come down to our office at the Dauphin County Courthouse and we indicated our dissatisfac-tion with the ranner in which it was being handled in terns of the flow of information.

Uc were sick and tired of hearing stuff on the radio and not through the official sources and things of that nature.

He indicated that efforts would be made to improve the information flow.

The infortr.ation flow did not necessarily improve.

I cannot speak for the Governor's Office as to why they handled the flow of information that way.

I don't know why they did.

The only thing I can say is I didn't approve of the way they handled the situation.

We indicated that quite strongly to the Lieutenant Governor during the incident, twice.

Q.

Would you say criticisms concerned a voice at the

42 level below t h 'e Governor, Lieutenant Governor to Colonel llenderson and other staff people?

A.

Yes, they were ucll auare of our displeasure.

Q.

Uhat kind of responses did you get fron then?

A.

We are doing, the best we can, we are giving you the information we have, we are having the same problem you are.

Q.

They were having the same problem as you, why were they having the problem?

A.

Because, once again, they were not getting information.

Q.

From who?

A.

From the Covernor's Office apparently.

They were Ak/

finding out about it the same way we were, after the fact.

They would hear on the newscast, etc.

Q.

Can you give us a couple of examples of the kind of information you were hearing on the radio and you were not getting through the official chain of command?

A.

Well, it has been four months since the incident.

I think just to cite an example, you know, there was a release

~

down at the site, as an exanple, somebody called us and said, we just heard there was : there was.

We would say, well, we cannot confirm it.

We would call PEMA and we'd say we have j ust got a report there might have been a release down at the site.

43 Somebody just heard it on the news.

Was there or wasn't there?

Q In many cases they would say we will have to get back to you, we don't know.

They didn't have information either.

The bubble was a good erarple.

Ve received calls that people would say, we just heard on the radio that the bubble is going to burst or something of that nature, it uns extrernely dangerous, etc.

We would call PERS and say, what is the story?

Once again, if they had not heard a report, they did not know what was going on either.

Q.

Let us use the example of the release, the unplanned release at TMI, that somebody or you heard on the radio prior to getting official knowledge.

Do you have any idea where the tredia got their inforcation from?

Did they get it from the site, did they get it from Metropolitan Edison, from up'here?

A.

Once again it appears they were getting their infortr.ation from the Governor's Office because the inforr.ation from the site, etc., scered to be channeled to the NRC and the Covernor's Office.

Those were the two agencies that were releasing information.

That is where the vast majority of information came from.

Q.

The CD Emergency Management Director of Lancaster County yesterday indicated that the present law, present PEIM Act, delegates the responsibility for training the local O

44 directors that is below the county level to the county director and that this was a change in the law from the preceding law which apparently gave the state the responsibility for training everybody.

Uould you like.;o coment on that?

Do you think that should be changed?

A.

No, I think it is a good law.

It was a good chance to the o1.d law because it is, number one, requiring attendance by local directors.

They have finally got to start putting forth.

Most of the meetings that we have held with local directors in the past have been meetings that we have put on ourselves covering topics that the locals wanted to cover, thirgs of that nature.

So we have pretty much done that all along.

On occasion we have had state people come in and assist us getting programs, etc.

Once again, in the past we just have not been too successful in getting attendance at some of these things.

Now, hopefully, they are going to have to.

Q.

Another aren uhere I find a difference of' opinion between yourself and the people from Lancaster County was in the distribution of information in the chain of command between yourself and local government officials.

Yesterday we seemed to get the idea that they should be in direct communication from liarrisburg to public officials in the local comunity, particularly in the larger local comunities.

I think you

o,

45 indicated that, I think you indicated that this would become Q

a logistically impossible problem and in the chain of command as it exists now from PE:iA to you to local officials as desirable, is that correct?

A.

I think it could get out of hand.

You would be running telephone lines to 2500 nunicipalities in this Commonwealth.

You know, once again, if all the information would funnel into the county office, then it gets disbursed from down there.

It is much easier, as an exanple, for me and for the state agency to deal with 40 local directors than with 250 or 300 local elected officials that we have in this particular county.

I understand their desire to know and their

(%i U

need to know and I am not disagreeing with that at all.

I am just saying, gee, how much time is going to be wasted calling the Mayor of I!arrisburg, the Mayor of Lancaster, the various councilmen of this.

You know, they could just really get out of control.

Q.

Do you have the capability and the procedures for notifying at least one official in all four municipalities in Dauphin County within a reasonable period of time?

A.

All 40 directors, well, we have the telephone plus we would utilize the local civil defense directors.

Re have the resources available in terms of like the voter registration O>

s-

46 to find out who the current elected heads of government are, their home phone numbers and things of that nature.

Q.

You mentioned that you had visits from delegations from France and Japan, two countries with relative high concentration of nuclear power plants.

Uould you like to share any of those coerents?

Do they have CD programs?

Are they as good as ours, worse than ours?

Did you gain anything from talking with them?

A.

One of the delegations from France included the head of France Civil Defense, I don't knou the exact title of it.

It was encouraging to know he has a lot of apathy on his hands in terms of civil defense.

Once again, they were extremelt interested in such problems as the medical facilities as an example.

One does not just drain out a hospital, evacuate them.

It has to be done with a lot more thought in mind.

As an example, taking neonatal patients, people in intensive care, coronary care units and swapping them in a bed for bed capacity with hospitals out of the danger zone and things of that nature.

These were things that they had not l

thought of and drew quite a bit of interest.

They were also quite interested in the chain of comand and the responsibility of different levels of govern-l tient.

They were also extrerely interested in the fact that we O

..... _ ~ _

47 were publicly conplaining about the way the system functioned.

3O They could not quite get that the county was conplaining about the state and the state about the feds, etc.

It was rather shocking to ther that we were expressing our opinions on this.

CIIAIRI'AU URIGHT:

Representative Geesey.

BY REPRESEi;TATI\\T GEESEY:

Q.

If you were going to call in the National Guard for an evacuation plan, it is inevitabic that --

CHAIPl'AN FRIGHT:

You have to speak up.

BY REPRESENTATIVE GEESEY:

Q.

All right, if you were noing to call in the National Guard for an evacuation plan, it is inevitable that the public would find out about it.

What kind of local reaction do you think you would have if the people in Dauphin County found out that the National Guard was coming in to evacuate the county or some parts of the county?

A.

Once again, if the people were told the reason why the particular units are coming in and it is explained to them properly, I don't think it would be that drastic a reaction to it.

This is why I had indicated earlier that we would like to heve the units in the artories, etc., and that way you would not have created that big a problem.

l

48 There is an interesting thing to note, and if I r~s may I would like to right now, concerning many people have talked about the panic that was involved in this particular situation.

While I am sure there were some panicky. people 'for the most part, I think the vast majority of people were just frightened and deeply concerned.

I view panic as soteone

~

running around screaming and yelling and not being able to control themac1ves.

That sceced not to be the case.

During the particular incident, the weekend that it happened from Friday until Sunday, approximately 40 percent of the population of the 20 mile zone in Dauphin County left.

I am not sure what it was in York or Lancaster, etc.

But it is an interesting

()

statistic that we checked later on.

We are also the county communication center.

And from noontite on Friday, which I think was the 31st of March, until Sunday, which was April the 2nd, I believe, Sunday April 1st, we had a total of 12 motor vehicle accidents in the county that we dispatch, five of those involving injuries.

We took the same time frame a conth later and there were 18 accidents and we took the same time frame from a

time on Friday until Midnight on Sunday, two months before in the winter weather, and we only had 12 accidents.

So there was not this great huge panic that was indicated.

I think that 1

49 smrd was tossed around too freely during this particular incident.

I think the people in all of the counties involved not only the affected counties but the host counties, etc.,

everybody handled the situation extremely well.

Q.

Earlier you indicated that in your initial evacuation plan you had intended to utilize thL turnpike vent and later found out that Cumberland County, and I might add York County, would also be utilizing the turnpike west which complicated the situation.

Are you indicating that there was no coordination at the state icyc1 prior to TMI for evacuation routes?

A.

No, when I am talking turnpike, I am talking when we got involved in the ten and twenty nile incident.

Q.

I understand that.

A.

Okay, once again, basically, what all the counties did, we took, as an example, Dauphin County, we were going to the north because you had Lancaster and York going south.

We did have a couple of communities right near the turnpike that we decided to put them'on the turnpike.

When'we submitted our plan to the state and talked to them, that is when they saw conflict and coordinated it and straightened it out right off the bat.

Q.

When was that?

L

50 A.

It would have been on Saturday we were working on it.

Q.

After the incident at TMI?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Uns there statewide coordination at the state level for an evacuation plan prior to TMI?

A.

The state was aware of our five mile plan.

With our five mile plan ue would have been strictly involved in county.

So there wasn't --

Q.

You didn't answer my question.

Was there coordination at the state level ar.ong the counties involved that night have to evacuate prior to TIfI at five mile, at ten

()

mile, at any distance?

Was there any kind of coordination?

A.

Yer, there was sore coordination.

Ue, at the county level, of course, had worked in amongst ourselves, but we were also working through the state.

Once again, I think the thing that has to be kept in mind is that if it had been strictly a five mila incident, which we had planned for, each county would stay strictly within their own county.

Their request for assistance, entra assistance, would have gone to the state and they would have handled that.

REPRESENTATIVE GEESEY:

Thank you.

Gl! AIRMAN WRIGilT:

Representative Dorr.

.. L;-.

51 I)

REPRESENTATIVE DORR:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EY REPRESENTATIVE DORR:

Q.

Mr. Molloy, are you inc'.icating that there was no communication from PEMA in regard to updates on information such as certain things were happening at the site?

Are you complaining that when you asked questions you didn't get an answer?

A.

Well, we started getting reports over the teletype system.

I think it was Saturday night, but I am not positive.

Initially, we got them like every couple of hours.

The only thing it said was the plan't is stable.

Then until April 8th m

or something when they come out with this huge long report.

Our whole complaint was the people down at the site.

They would get together and figure out what had transpired over the past few hours or something of that nature and then call a press conference.

We feel that they should have told PEMA as an example what was going on, what they were going to say to the media and let us know first.

Q.

Vere you ever officially notified or advised by PEMA or anybody else that designation of Harold Denton as sole official spokesren had ta' ken place or did you just become aware of that fact by --

(~)

hvI l

. l

52 A.

We just becarac aware of the fact.

I don't recall O

anybody specifically stating.

I think, you know, we just heard it on the news really.

Once again, we still feel, even though Mr. Denton was the official spokescan, he should have followed the chain of corvaand too.

Q.

Uould you normally expect your corrmunication from PDIA to corre in on the teletype?

A.

They can corac in either by teletype or telephone.

Q.

Then your corrplaint is that you feel it should have corre in on the teletype prior to the press conference?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was your corrrunication center or your evacuation center, whatever you call it, was that closed to the press during -the. incident?

A.

No, we allowed the press in.

Q.

Were they there consistently?

A.

Yes, I would say.

Q.

So that had infortnation come in over the teletype as to what was going on at the site, decisions that had been inade, etc., that inforncation vould have been available to the press by reason of it coraing into your center in advance of the press conference?

A.

We would not have released it to the press until we OY

53 (g

gave it to the locals.

V 1

Q.

Pardon re.

A.

We would not have released it.

As an example, if a teletype care over, there were some rerbers of the news nedia standing there, we would not have called a press conference.

14e vould have raade aure we got the information out to the locals as rapidly as possibic.

q.

Eut the press is there uhile you're doing this?

A.

There were certain areas that they weren't in.

As an exanple, our cormunication center, conc of then were going to tche pictures, but 'they were not henging around there as such.

O N'

Q.

ilow about on the teletype, would they have had access?

A.

That's in the cormunication center.

Q.

Also, I'., a little interested in your evacuation plan as it developed for the wider area.

I think you made the comrent that in effect was to take people away from TMI.

I assume maybe that, am 7. correct, that people say, to the west, northeast of TMI would go in an casterly or northeasterly direction cad those north would go north and those east-west would go west?

A.

liasically.

/%U

54 Q.

Was any consideration riven in the developtent of j

that plan to the clirr.atic conditions nnd did you or would you i

i recor2::end the develorirent of alterne.tive plann depending on the i

i wind conditions, etc.?

A.

I think the plans that arc in exis tence, obviously, have to be refined.

Since the particular incident, we have been uorking on, as an exarple, the hospital and t'h 1-n g s'.

1 of thct nature.

Constant refincront i:: roinr, on.

j q.

  • hat I ar interested in is vour thought with i

l respect to whether it should be recorcaended there chould be a i

Plan A and a Plan E for Dauphin County depending on whether the it i

vind is coning frora the southeact er yehether/ is coruing fron the I

northecst, northuent, whatever?

In nther words, is that poing j

to get too cornlicated, Plan A and Plin B, this tinc you take i

Plan B?

A.

I think that could r,et a little hit too corplicated.

i 0

The idea is to net as far avay fron the facility as possible.

j A.

.And tr.ake - sure the people are taken care of Yh'en they get where they are going.

EEPRESDJTATIVE DORR:

Thank you.

I CilAIM'1di URICliT:

Fred Tavlor.

4 4

r 55 LY liR. TAYLOR:

Q.

Kevin, junt a few more things to add on to what I said earlier.

You said you had 47 civil defense directors.

A.

Forty.

Q.

Forty, are rost of them volunteers?

A.

Yes, they n11 are.

Q.

Thev are all volunteer types?

A.

Well, a couple of the local civil defense directors are, as an exarple, the City of Harrisburg, he is in employed by the City of Harrisburg and in Lower Parton Township he is erployed by the township.

Eut I an quite sure if they did not have the other responsibilities they would not be hired strictly K_J as civil defense directors.

Q.

In the vain they are volunteers and ones that are being paid their salary would be commensurate, would be a

full-time job, is. that right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Running through the conversations we have had with most of the officials from the local energency planning agency, nunicipalities, etc., there has been thread, maybe I shouldn't say a thread, a rope, problem with cormunications.

You rentioned the fact that direct cornunications between your office and the other people would be rost beneficial.

Now p

I L

56 assucing, let's take Three Mile Isinnd as an exarple, I think O

you expressed there should have been cor:r.unications between the site of the accident, the state, the county and the city.

If we set up or if a telecomnunication systen could be set up sufficient to handle quick reactionary -- quick reactor corrunications between these groups, what type of system would you feel would be cost beneficial?

We centioned teletype, we talk about telephones, there is also the possibility of the shortwave radio, how the radio works?

A.

I think the communications to the state and county levels from the site right now is no rajor problem.

The problem, of course, is fron the county down to the local levels.

Now one thing that we have tried to do, we have encouraged in the past, we have a separate civil defense frequency in additior t

to our police and fire frequencies, we have encouraged local civil defense to get a two way radio as an example that we can be in instantaneous contact with them.

Unfortunately, ratching funds have not been there in the past and there has been no interest on the part of the local nunicipalities to spend the noney for civil defense, tie are in the process right now, we have a grant at the federal level.

I understand it is going to be approved for two way portanobile radios for our local directors.

Now this will give us instantaneous contact with r-k L

Y 57 them during any type of disaster si tuation.

If the local O

director is doing what he is suppose to be doing, he should be in the Eccrgency Operation Center.

If the local officials are following the game plan,they should also be in the Ercrgency Operating Center and therefore should be getting all their information about as fast as the local director is.

Q.

So you are surgesting radio communication between yourself and the local director?

A.

Hight.

We already have telephones, etc.

The other obvious choice ia radio cormunication.

See, we are going to the portamobile portable unit.

It can be used either way, in the vehicle, in your hand, etc.

We are waiting for federal

()

approval for some matching funds right now.

Q.

This radio system you envision, would that be on a special channel, special frequency?

A.

We have it on the -- it is on the low band, 46, 56 and it is strictly utilized for our civil defense people.

We have approximately three to four units on the system right now.

Q.

On that one frequency?

A.

Right.

We have some local directors that did buy radios.

MR. TAYLOR:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT:

We thank you.

You have been both

.O

%/'

58 g/

a frank and informative witness and ue greatly appreciate your

( '

being with us.

On behalf of the cormittec I say thank you.

And now we will take a short break before we get to our next witness.

(Erief recens.)

C11AIPJfAN URIGHT:

!!rs. Helen S. Randall, Vice Chairman, Lancaster County Planning Commission.

Iirs. Randall, will you stand and take an oath please?

HELEN S. RANDALL, called as a uitness, being duly sworn, testified as follows:

~l3

's CHAIRMAN URIGHT:

It is a pleasure to have you with us.

I know we r.et at Bainbridge, but it is a pleasure to have you back again and I assume you have a statement you would like to read.

MRS. RANDALL:

Yes, I do.

I appreciate this opportunity to testify to you as a follow-up to my testimony in Bainbridge on May 31, 1979, I

assume you are aware of my remarks at that time so I will not repeat them but tell you what I have found out since that tice which I feel may be of assistance to you.

We all now know two things:

nuclear facilities

i va#d,N t-h a

.e.t;;;r:p J AMES L. WRIG HT. Jn-

- Room 252.

MS MBE R House or REPmEstNT AthES COM MONWE ALTH OF PE NNSV LV ANI A I

For your information.

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