ML19308B608
| ML19308B608 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1979 |
| From: | Gossick L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Hobson T ENERGY, DEPT. OF |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308B609 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001160394 | |
| Download: ML19308B608 (28) | |
Text
-
o
. DISTRIBUTION COPIES:
% cket No. 50-320 H. Denton J. Mullin de Nh? PDR E. Case Attorney / ELD Local PDR D. Muller G. Ertter ED0 6723 EDO r/ f D. Vassallo M. Groff NRR r/f F. Schroeder P. Kreutzer, LA SEP/TMI r/f D. Eisenhut D. Dilanni TMI Site r/f R. Tedesco C. Nelson L. V. Gossick R. Vollmer R. Reid T. Rehm
' Collins TERA X. Cornell
. Miner V. Stello f ts. Tina C. Hobso, DEC 311979 Director Office of Consumer Affairs Departmep+
Jnergy Washington, DC 20585
Dear Ms. Hobson:
I am writing in response to your letter to Commissioner Hendrie dated June 25, 1979, with which you submitted a list of questions posed by the Civic Club of Suburban Harrisburg, expressing the club's concern about the Three Mile Island accident.
I regret that this answer to your letter and questions has been delayed.
The accident and its consequences have created a substantial increase in the agency's workload, which has prevented us from responding to you as promptly as we would have liked to.
Commissioner Hendrie has asked me to respond to your letter in view of the fact that there are now adjudicatocy proceedings for Three Mile Island, Unit 1, underway before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
Under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) rules of practice, Commissioner Hendrie and the other members of the Commission will be called upon to review the Orders and decision of the Licensing Board, and hence, it would not be appropriate for him or other members of the Commission to comment on the matters raised in your letter.
The answers to the 29 questions you submitted to Commissioner Hendrie are attached as an enclosure.
I hope that you find these answers helpful and adequate to fulfill the needs of your consumer publication.
Sincerely, Oris:inal signed by R. G. SO ee V. Gossick Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
Answers to 29 Questions r
/
D/ntfSupport RV'ollmer 12/I5/79 l
DDCh)
SMiner'%
LWR-3 NRR NR ED0s./
j 4
O I
W0liu ECa HD n
12/g/79 12/g/79 1
/79 12/ /79 12/[79 3
800116039f 1N
E J
\\'
j 1.
Will reactor 2 (Three Mile Island 2) ever go back on line? Will the utility be allowed to turn reactor 1 (Three Mile Island 1) back on sitting next to a broken reactor?
A.
Any estimate at this time as to whether or when TMI-2 might be returned to operation is subject to considerable uncertainty.
Studies recently completed by General Public Utilities Service Corporation (GPU) indicate that TMI-2 could possibly be, operational by the summer of 1983, based on completion of the recovery operations discussed in the following paragraph, and on resolution of the technical issues that are currently defined.
However, that date for anticipated operation of TMI-2 is speculative because (a) of issues that have arisen as a result of the investigations of the TMI-2 accident by the Presidential Commission and the NRC, (b) of the facts that the recovery operations may uncover could prolong or inhibit restart, and (c) of the-fact that the legal'and social acceptability of a restart of THI-2 is difficult to assess at this time.
Based on current information, however, we are not aware of any physical difficulties that would prevent restoration of TMI-2 to operational status.
With regard to possible future operations of TMI-1--as you know, the Commission, on July 2,1979, ordered that TMI-1 remain in a cold shutdown condition until further Order by the Commission.
That Order also states that a public hearing would be conducted prior to the THI-1~ restart.
The Commission believes that public participation is important prior to any restart for TMI-1.
w--
.. e 2
On August 9, 1979, the Commission issued an additional Order on TMI-1 specifying the basis for the Shutdown Order and the procedure to govern the hearing on TMI-1 restart.
On the basis of this hearing, the Commission will ddtermine wnether any further operation of TMI-1 will be permitted, and if so, under what conditions.
It should be noted that the Commission Order on TMI-1 requires' additional action items on the part of the licensee which were not required in the confirmatory orders to the licensees of all other Babcock & Wilcox reactors similar to TMI-1/2.
2.
News said GA0 said each reactor should have an on-site NRC person; with 70 active and 100 being built, is the training and salary of both NRC and utilities good and high enough to have good safety people?
A.
In May 1977, the NRC adopted a resident inspection program.
The first resident inspectors were assigned to 15 operating reactor sites during the summer of 1978.
At present, there are resident inspectors at about 30 of these sites.
When the program is fully implemented in September 1981, there will be a resident inspector assigned to each operating power reactor.
Each resident inspector will serve a tour of duty at an assigned plant, followed by rotation to another site, an NRC regional office, or NRC headquarters.
NRC has been able to attract well qualified inspectors.
Those persons qualified to be hired as inspectors receive intensive training that con-tinues throughout their careers.
NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement has a Training Branch devoted exclusively to keeping inspectors current
.o 3
on technical developments in their field.
It is likely that future funding will assign a higher priority to the recruiting and training of resident inspectors.
With regard to your concern on the utility's being able to attract good safety people, NRC's Lessons Learned Task Force (formed to identify and evaluate safety concerns originating with the TMI-2 accident that require licensing actions) recommended that a professionally qualified individual with training in nuclear engineering (or a related science) and training in plant design and transient response whose primary concern would be plant safety be assigned to each shift.
Metropolitan Edison has alreacy agreed to provide such a person on each shift at TMI-1 if and when the unit is allowed to go into operation.
And we expect in the near future that such a person will be assigned to each shift in all operating nuclear power plants.
3.
How did they determine in (the) first place that Three Mile Island was safe because (in spite of the fact that) the Susquehanna frequency has bad floods? How high does the flood water get? What erosion protection is there? What about all the other control buildings even if (the) reactors themselves are strong enough to withstand floods and tree debris in bad floods?
A.
The determination that the TMI site is reasonably safe from the effects of river flooding resulted from (1) a hydrological site evaluation performed by the Metropolitan Edison Co., (2) an NRC staff review of Met Ed's evaluation, and (3) independent hydrological site evaluations.
These assessments were described in an NRC staff Safety Evaluation Report issued in September of 1976.
4 i
The maximum recorded height of floodwater was 300.36 feet abo.e mean sea level (MSL), which occurred in June 1972 during tropical stom Agnes.
l The plant grade elevation at the TMI site is 304 feet above M5L at the north end of the island and is protected to 304 feet above MSL to tne south.
In the event the river reached 303 feet above MSL, approximately three feet above the recorded maximum, the reactors and plant would be placed in an emergency shutdown and cooldown condition.
The levees surrounding TMI are protected against water erosion by riprap, a fcuncation of irregularly shaped stones and concrete that shield the levee.
Tne riprap foundation is designed to protect against the effects of hign-water and wind-wave activity during high-water periods.
Finally, a'.1 safety structures, including reactor control rooms, are designed to resist the effects of natural events, such as flooding.
4.
Does groundwater level of the Island enhance chances of steat explcsicas if meltdown happens? Heard that groundwater might effect explosior.s and seers an Island sure has groundwater.
A.
I interpret the question to mean that if, as a result of a meltdowr., :ne.
melted material comes in contact witn groundwater, the rapid generaticn of steam will result in an explosion.
In order for this to cccur a number of things would have to happen; first, heat removal from the reactor core would have to be lost so that the fuel in the reactor wo.id melt.
Next, the melted fuel would have to melt through the reactor vessel, which has at least a five-inch-thick steel wall.
Then the ma erial would have to melt through 14 feet of concrete mat before cocing i c:ntact with the bedrock, before in turn coming in contact with the groundwater.
As you can see, the chances of i.nis happening are very remote.
5 With regard to the probability of a core melt and its hypothetical conse-quences, NRC studies were done on March 30-31, 1979, using relative probabilities (high, low, medium).
The studies focused more on the sequences which could lead to a core melt than the actual probabilities of a melt occurring.
Core cooling from natural circulation was not assumed.
The overall probability of a core melt appeared to be relatively low.
However, if one postulates such an event and at some time molten fuel at high temperatures comes in contact with groundwater, l
NRC's " Reactor Safety Study" (WASH-1400) concluded that the consequences would be limited to the vicinity of the melt..
5.
P. R. (Public Relations) man from the utility talked to their ladies club in March.
(before or after March 28, 1979?) Showed slides and referred to storage area for used fuel as a swimming pool type thing, on site.
What is radioactivity of the stored stuff, how much is there? How safe is it if there are further accidents? Will stuff coming out of Number 2 be stored along with the other stuff?
A.
The radioactivity contained in the spent fuel from Unit No.1 of the TMI plant, or any LWR reactor, comes from fission products and neutron induced radionuclides in the uranium-oxide fuel itself, and from neutron activation products in the metal structure of the fuel assembly.
The types of radia-tion are beta and pamma (primarily from fission and activation products),
and alpha and neutrons (primarily from the neutron-induced nuclides and spontaneous fission in the contained fuel).
The spent fuel from TMI-1 in that reactor's spent-fuel pool amounts to about 200 spent-fuel assemblies.
'9 6
Spent-fuel storage pools are generally in excess of 20 feet deep and are built to withstand the effects of earthquakes. There are no postulated accidents at one reactor that could have an effect on another's spent-fuel pool.
Even the evacuation of personnel from one reactor, because of an accident at an adjoining reactor, would not jeo ardize the safe operation of the first reactor's fuel pool.
Currently, Met Ed is working on proposals for decontamination and plant recovery procedures, including those pertaining to the handling of the damaged spent fuel.
These proposals, when completed, will be reviewed by NRC and the results of the review will be made available to the public.
We expect that damaged TMI-2 fuel will either be stored in the TMI-2 fuel i.
pool or shipped offsite for inspection, testing, and evaluation.
6.
Some guy said Feds were going to recycle that spent fuel to get it out of Harrisburg. What is the status of that? When does it happen? How much does it cost? Who pays?
A.
" Recycle" refers to the step used to separate fissile material (uranium and plutonium) from fission products and other wastes' in spent fuel to reconstitute it into fresh reactor fuel.
The current United States policy prohibits reprocessing, however.
Further, the question does not make apparent whether " spent fuel" refers to that being stored at the TMI-1 storage pool, that in the damaged core of TMI-2, or botn.
In any case, not only is fuel reprocessing barred in L
.O 7
che U.S., but there are also no away-from-reactor storage pools available to receive even undamaged spent fuel assemblies, except at Federal facil-ities operated by the Department of Energy.
This latter possibility cay be the " Fed" operation referred to.
The costs of handling the damaged TMI-2 fuel will be covered by the costs of the overall recovery program being developed by the licensee.
The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission has ruled that Met Ed's customers would be free from the expenses associated with the TMI accident, except for a portion of the purchased power.
At the present time, the damaged TMI-2 facility has been removed from the rate base of the utilities t
involved.
7.
What are they going to do with water in plant?
A.
Regarding the release of contaminated water, except for releases of liquids containing only low or nondetectable levels of radioactivity to the Susquehanna River, such releases are not currently permitted.
Before such releases take place, the impact will be evaluated by the NRC and the evalua-tion will be made available to the public.
By this course of action, we will assure that a thorough assessment is completed prior to release of the contaminated liquids and that the health and safety of the offsite pcpula-tion will be protected.
t
8 As a result of releases cantaining only low or nondetectable levels of radioactivity, the levels of radioactivity in the Susquehanna are indis-tinguishable from existing background levels at public water supply intakes from the river.
These levels have been confirmed by independent measurements made by the NRC, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
i P
The Commission has recently authorized use of EPICOR-II water treatment P
systems for processing the waste water stored in tanks in the auxiliary building.
This processing will clean up the water to the extent that it will not pose further risk to the public or to operations personnel.
Before any of the decontaminated water is disposed of, NRC will issue an environ-mental assessment that will be made available to the public.
8.
Can the buildings themselves be contaminated by the radioactivity?
If so, how long will it stay radioactive?
A.
The interior surfaces of the containment building, the auxiliary building, and the equipment contained therein, are contaminated through contact with water bearing variable amounts of soluble, and possibly suspended insoluble, forms of fission products such as tritium, strontium,- molybdenum, ruthenium, iodine, tellurium, cesium, barium, and lanthenum.
The inner surface of the containment building may be contaminated with materials like iodine and cesium that condensed from the water. vapor.
Draining the contaminated water from these buildings will remove a major portion of the radioactive mate-rials.
After draining, building interiors and equipment will be cleaned
F 9
to remove deposited contamination.
Since the radionuclides originally present were beta gamaa emitters, no additional radioactivity will occur.
Hence, radioactivity will stay in both buildings only as long as it takes to drain and decontaminate these areas.
9.
How can a Harrisburg resident ever have trust and faith in Met Ed again?
A.
Only residents of the area around tne TMI plant can respond to such a questien.
Mcwever, the NRC has taken a numcer of actions to protect the health and safety of offsite populations.
For example, the release of radioactive gases are not currently permitted.
In addition, as noted in our response to question 7, the releases of radioactive water, except for
[
releases of liquids containing only low or nondetectable levels of racio-activity to the Susquehanna River, are not currently permitted.
Before
[
such releases take place, the impact will be evaluated by the NRC and the evaluation will be made available to the public.
By this course of action, we will assure that a thorough assessment is completed prior to reiease of the radioactive liquids or gases.
With regard to possible future operations of TMI-1--as you know, the Commission, on July 2,1979, ordered that TMI-l remain in a cold shutdown condition until further Order by the Commission.
That Order also states that a public hearing would be conducted prior to the TMI-1 restart. The I
Commission believes nat public participation is important prior to any restart for TMI-1.
10 The answers to questions 1 and 2 elaborate on specific NRC actions that bear on Met Ed's future behavior.
10.
Did Met Ed lie to NRC and the people?
A.
There were communication difficulties, which resulted in impairment of information being transmitted to the offsite management groups from the TMI control room.
As a result, confusing information was released.
Three specific deficiencies contributed to impair the release of accurate information:
Information (both data and plans) transmitted to offsite support groups, which had been hurriedly mobili::ed, suffered from time delays.
Thus, the offsite groups were dealing with limited data.
The individuals who had to provide data to offsite groups had con-current duties pertaining to the management of the emergency.
The emergency duties always took precedence, as would be appropriate.
The physical communications facilities were inadequate to handle the volume of information requests and transmittals that this kind of i
accident required.
Although the President's Commission on the accident announced that, "We f
do not find that there was a systematic attempt at a ' cover-up' by the sources of information," the NRC staff will reserve its assessment of TMI I
l
11 information-handling, and the resulting modifications to improve future handling, until the NRC's Special Investigation Team has completed its work.
11.
Is placing control of atomic energy in a profit-motivated utility company avoidable?
A.
The NRC has the responsibility to license nuclear power plants in the interest of public health and safety and protection of the environment.
wnetner tne license applicant is a profit-motivated utility, a munici-pally owned utility, or a Federal agency (such as the Tennessee Valley Authority), the NRC's authority consists of licensing actions, continuing inspection of plant, and the enforcement of regulations.
Changes in this country's free-enterprise system can stem only from the public's will and the resulting Congressional actions and, as such, become national policy.
- 12. Why should Met Ed customers be saddled with costs of both building these reactors and now repairing? Why shouldn't shareholders pay everything?
Metropolitan Edison (Met Ed) customers will not have to pay for any damages to or for the restoration of Three Mile Island, Unit 2.
The Pennsylvania Public Utility Comission, in a decision and order of June 15, 1979, ruled that customers of Met Ed and the Pennsylvania Electr.ic Company would b i free from accident expenses, except for those costs associated with purchasing power to replace power that would have been produced by the TMI facility.
12
- 13. Will the taxpayers now have to pay for this accident? Why?
A.
Money from general revenues has been and will continue to be used for Federal, State, and local government involvement in the accident and its consequences. Tax money has not been used to finance the cleanup, the addition of past-accident safety system, or facility alterations.
The impact of the TMI accident and shutdown on consumer rates for elec-tricity is covered in the answer to question No.12.
- 14. Why are all the other reactors.being licensed, when disposal of present waste problems has not been solved?
A.
Presently, reactor licensees and applicants are cocplying with NRC regula-tions for the handling of radioactive wastes generated during reactor operations.
Although regulations have not yet been extended to the disposal of spent fuel assemblies, there are regulations for the interim, on-site storage of spent fuel which are being complied with by current licensees.
The NRC believes that there is a clear distinction between permanent disposal of wastes and their interim storage.
The Commission must be assured that wastes generated by licensed power reactors can be safely handled and stored as they are generated.
But it is neither necessary nor reasonable for the Commission to insist on proef that a means of permanent disposal (as distinguished from continued storage under sur-veillance) can be accomplished safely when it is likely to become necessary.
13 Reasonable progress towards the development of permanent disposal facil-ities is presently being accomplished.
Under these circumstances a halt in licensing of nuclear power plants is not required to protect health and safety.
15.
Do you trust Met Ed or any other profit-motivated utility that has reactors?
A.
In granting construction permits and operating licenses, the NRC looks for an applicant's demonstrated compliance with NRC regulations for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, in terms of the health and safety of plant personnel and the public, and of the protec-tion of the environa.ent. After operations begin, these considerations continue to be met by the Commission's program of inspection and enforcement.
For additional comments on this question, see the answers to questions 2, 4, and 11.
- 16. Why did it take so long for NRC to seemingly react?
A.
Although the President's Commission on the TMI accident recommended that
" Emergency plans must detail clearly and consistently the actions public officials and utilities shouic take in the event of off-site radiation doses resulting from release of radioactivity," there was no indication in the report that the NRC took undue time to react.
l l
14 Chronologically, the onset of the accident (main turbine trip) occurred at 4:00 a.m. on WednesQy, March 28, 1979. At 6:56 a.m. (26 minutes after the reactor's core had lost water cover), the utility declared a Site Emergency.
At 7:04 a.m., the first call was put into the NRC's Region I Office, taken by an answering service.
At 7:24 a.m., the utility i
declared a General Emergency.
At 7:38 a.m., the Region I Duty Officer answered the TMI call, NRC's first notification of the accident. At 7:45 a.m., contact was made with NRC Headquarters, as the Reactor Operations anc Nuclear Support Branch Chief was notified af the General Emergency.
f At 8:00 a.m. (22 minutes after first notification), the NRC Region I f
Director ordered activation of the Regional Emergency Center, and 10 minutes later, communications were established between the NRC Region I Incident Response Center, Met Ed, and the Headquarters Office of Inspec-tion and Enforcement.
By 8:39 a.m., one hour after first notification, a permanent communications line was established between the NRC Region I Incident Response Center and the NRC Headquarters Operations Center.
At 8:45 a.m., two teams of NRC Region I inspectors were dispatched to the TMI plant site. They arrived at TMI beginning at 10:05 a.m.
So you can see that as soon as we were notified of the emergency, we responded as quickly as possible.
j
- 17. What's total radioactivity we've been exposed to? Should we avoid x-rays?
I A.
A report entitled, " Population Dose, and Health Impact of the Accicent at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station," NUREG-0558, assesses the health impact on approximately two million offsite residents within 50 miles of i
15 the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant.
Technical staff members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Environmental Protection Agency, who constituted an Ad Hoc Dose Assessment Group, prepared the report.
The report estimates that the dose to the average individual within 50 miles of Three Mile Island was about 4 mrem, while the dose to the hypothetical maximally exposed individual offsite was less than 100 mrem.
Both of these doses are less than the ar.ount of natural radiation received in one ye (about 125 mrem) by individuals living in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The report concludes that the offsite doses associated with the accident from March 28 to April 7,1979, represent minimal risks of additional health effects to the offsite population.
Therefore, there is no need for special consideration before receiving any medical diagnostic exposure to radiation.
- 18. Will the threat of off-site contamination exist after cold shutdown?
A.
Cold shutdown means the reactor has been shut down and ccoled to about the temperature of the surrounding environment.
Except for the radio-active materials that decayed, any radioactive materials that are on tne site prior to cold shutdown will still be there unless removed.
Therefore, the possibility of off-site contamination would still exist at cold shutdown.
However, the NRC has taken a number of actions to minimize the possibility of offsite contamination and to protect the health and safety of the offsite populations.
16 For example:
(1) The release of contaminated water, except for the release of liquids to the Susquehanna containing only low or nondetectable levels of radioactivity, is not currently permitted.
See the response to Question No. 7 for additional details.
(2) The release of cortaminated gas from the containment building is not l
permitted.
(3) Recently the Commission authorized the use of EPICOR-II for decon-taminating the waste water stored in tanks in the auxiliary building.
The processing of this water will not remove all of the radioactivity, but will clean up the water to the extent that it will not pose further risk to the public or to operations personnel.
In addition, before any of the decontaminated waste water is disposed of, NRC wiil issue an environmental assessment and give the public an oppor-tunity to comment on a proposed disposal method.
(4) The Commission has ordered that an Environmental Impact Statement be prepared for the decontamination and clean up operations for TMI-2.
19.
Did nuclear fission (not' chain reaction) continue to take place after the original incidence? If not where did the heat continue to come from?
A.
A small amount of scontaneous fission does occur in spent fuel, whether it's residing-in the core of a shut down reactor or in a spent-fuel storage pool.
Almost all of the heat generated in the fuel, however,
17 results from the decay of fission and activation products, a condition called heat-of-decay.
When these later radionuclides decay, they emit beta and gamma radiation along with heat energy.
The decay rate drops l
quickly after reactor shutdown, with a corresponding rapid reduction of I
heat generation.
- 20. Why on earth was a key valve (the one that could let the gas out) designed so it could only be operated by a human?
A.
Pri:r tc the T"I-2 sccident, there was no requirement for automatic vent-ing of the reactor coolant system high points.
The noncondensible gases in the TMI-2 reactor coolant system were removed by degassification (spray and vent) in the pressurizer and makeup tank.
The NRC now requires an automatic vent valve in all pressurized water reactors.
- 21. Can customers other tha'4 Met Ed be assessed costs in correcting the problem?
A.
Refer to the response to question 12.
- 22. Why didn't they have warning lights to let workers know valves were shut off?
A.
In the case of the emergency feedwater valves, which were closed at the onset of the THI-2 incident, indicator lights were provided on the control panel to show whether the valves were open or closed.
From the NRC report
" Investigation into the March 25, 1979, Three Mile Island Accident by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement" (NUREG-0600):
-O 18 "The Unit 1 Shift Supervisor arrived in the area at about 0408 hours0.00472 days <br />0.113 hours <br />6.746032e-4 weeks <br />1.55244e-4 months <br />, noted the low steam generator levels, and stated the concern of no apparent delivery of feedwater.
Simultaneously, the operator had noted the emergency feedwater header isolation valves (EF-V12A and V128) closed.
The operator announced the condition, and simultaneously opened both feedwater header isolation valves (EF-V12A and V128).
The operator stated that he had looked at the panel valve lineup twice before discovering the valves to be closed.
The first scan of the panel was made standing close to the panel and leaning over the console, possibly obstructing his view of tne lower valve (EF-V128). The upper valve (EF-V12A) indicator light (green for closed) was covered by a caution tag hanging from the main feedwater i
pump 1B miniflow valve (V16B) control station."
23.
Are you sure that the manufacturer (B&W) of this reactor has not done i
same things to other reactors? Why aren't all the other reactors they designed shut down?
A.
The NRC has taken a number of actions with respect to all nuclear power plants as a result of the Three Mile Island incident.
Specifically, full-time inspectors have been assigned to each operating plant utilizing Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) pressurized water reactors like those at Thraa Mile Island.
In addition, all these plants were shut down and the licensees t
of each plant were instructed to provide the Commission with additional information about their facilities.in light of the Three Mile Island inci-dent. After review of the information provided, orders were issued t the licensees that required them to make immediate plant modifications, t provide additional operator training, and to reverse certain operating a
t s
19 procedures.
Additional long-term actions were ordere: to further upgrade certain plant systems, and operator training and procedures. All of these plants, except of course the Three Mile Island plant, have complied with the orders and have been permitted to resume operation.
In addition, licensees ;of all operating plants utilizing pressurized water reactors have been instructed to take specific actions with regard to the status of certain equipment, plant procedures, operator actions, ano facility cesigns.
Licensees of all operating plants, including those utilizing boiling water reactors, have been instructec to provide us with additional information with regard to their facilities in light of the Three Mile Island incident.
4 The Commission is currently reviewing the information provided. As soon as the review is complete, orders for modifications, as appropriate, will be issued to provide additional protection to the health and safety of the public.
In addition to the actions outlined above, as a result of TMI-2, studies were initiated in the areas of emergency preparedness, operator licensing reassessment, loss of feedwater event, small-break loss-of-coolant acci-dents, and lessons learned from the accident.
In a number of areas work has progressed to the point where additional licensee requirements have been recommended. A number of these recommendations nave been approved and efforts have been begun to implement them.
20 24.
Does NRC have guidances about the number of plants that are allowed in a geographical area? Aren't there any excessive number running and planned in Harrisburg?
A.
Currently, the two units at TMI are the only nuclear reactors in the Harrisburg area, and we are not aware of any future plans to build addi-tional nuclear units wi-hin a 50-mile radius of the city.
At the present time, neeertheless, the NRC has no regulation or policy that would, in effect, limit the number of nuclear power plants in a geographical area. Tne NRC regulations, in fact, permit more than one plant on a site.
Tne general NRC considerations for this policy are that normal operations or accident conditions _t a specific site would have no adverse effects on operations at other sites in the area.
As a result of NRC licensing requirements, nuclear plants are designed such that there is a high degree of isolation between systems that contain radioactive materials in adjacent plants, e.g., by massive concrete structures.
These designs minimize the probability that an event in one plant can have an effect within an adjacent plant that is not coupled or connected to the first plant.
NRC regulations require that structures, systems, and components important to safety shall not be shared among nuclear power units un'ess it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions, including an orderly shutdown and cooldown of any other unit in the event
21 of an accident in one unit.
The sharing of structures, systems and components proposed by one unit must be determined to Le in conformance with this criterion before a construction permit can be issued for addi-r tional units at the same location.
l
- 25. Why isn't more money given to alternative energy sources including coal l
mine and coal air pollution safety?
A.
With respect to alternative metnods of energy production such as solar, wind, and geothermal, the Department of Energy is the Federal agency responsible for their research and development.
NRC's consideration of alternative methods of energy production is included in the Commission's assessment of the environmental impact of each nuclear power plant as part of the overall review of each utility's application for a construc-tion permit or an operating license.
To date, the NRC has concluded that alternative methods of energy production such as solar, wind, and geothermal are neither technically nor economically feasible to provice the required amount of power at the time it is needed.
Questions with respect to coal mine safety should be referred to the Bureau of Mines of the U.S. Department of Interior. The issue of air pollution safety in the burning of coal is the responsibility of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, i
i 1
t 22 26.
Why was Met Ed allowed to make statement Friday morn g, "the crisis is over," when it was only beginning?
A.
The NRC, in its nuclear regulatory, inspection, and enforcement role, has no authority to suppress or censor statements by licensees.
In addition, prior to the noon of Friday, March 30, 1979, and for some time following, operators and administrators at Met Ed, preoccupied with the TMI-2 accident, were pressured by State and Federal officials, as well as by the news media, for information tnat was generally unattainable.
However, as stated in " Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island" (NUREG-0600):
We do not find there was a systematic attempt at a " cover-up" by the sources of information.
Some of the official news sources were themselves confused about the facts and there were major disagreements among officials.
For additional information on this question, refer to the answer for question 10.
27.
Can you guarantee my children will not get cancer from the exposure they've had and the milk they'll be drinking?
A.
This question was addressed in the NRC report, " Population Dose and Health Impact of the Accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station" (NUREG-0558),
May 1979, which notes that iodine-131 was detected in milk samples from March 31 through April 4.
The maximum concentration measured in milk (41 pCi/ liter in goat's milk, 36 pCi/ liter in cow's milk) was 300 times lower than the level at which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would.
s 23 recommend that cows be removed from contaminated pasture.
Although it is impossible to guarantee that no one will get cancer as a result of these exposures, it is considered highly unlikely.
- 28. Why is a nuclear plant near people?
It should never, never be allowed near people.
A.
The license applicant proposes where he would like to construct an electric power station, nuclear or otherwise.
The NRC, as part of its licensing procedure, then assesses the suitability of the proposed site.
A major a
consideration for site suitability is population distribution around the i
proposed site.
NRC regulations governing reactor site criteria are given in the Code of Federal Reoulations, Title 10, Part 100.
Siting criteria are also speci-fied in the National Environmentai Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). An appli-cation to construct a nuclear power plant must demonstrate that the proposed site is in conformance with these criteria.
The regulatory guidelines also require designation of a low population zone around the site. Acceptability of the low population zone, as designated by the applicant, is based on radiation exposure computations and a determination that there is reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in behalf of the population within the low population zone in the event of a serious accicent.
Experience indi-cates that a low population zone radius of two miles is usually acceptable.
24 The regulations also provide that the closest boundary of the nearest population center of more than about 25,000 residents be at least 1-1/3 times the distance to the outer boundary of the low population zone.
Where large cities are involved, a greater distance may be required because of integrated population dose considerations.
The boundary of the nearest population center is determined upon consideration of popu-lation distribution.
The NRC uses numerical guides for determining population limits in the area surrounding a prospective plant site.
At the time of initial opera-tion, population density should average no more than 500 persons per square mile ove'r any radial distance from the site out to 30 miles.
At the end of the plant's life (nominally 30 years), the projected popula-tion should average no more than 1000 persons per square mile over any radial distance out to 30 miles from the site.
The Three Mile Island site was reviewed in accordance with and met NRC siting guidelines; Met Ed was therefore awarded a construction permit and an operating license.
The President's Commission in its report recommended revisions to NRC siting criteria and regulations, which we are.urrently reviewing.
We are also reviewing internal Staff concerns regarding population density to determine whether changes in siting criteria and regulations should be made.
4
25
A.
Thyroid blocking agents, such as potassium iodide, are one possible means for reducing thyroid exposure during a nuclear accident.
Other means for reducing exposure include shelter, respiratory protection, and evacuation.
General distribution of potassium iodide has a number of limitations.
Potassium iodide is only effective if administered within about two hours after intake of radiciodine.
Consequently, it is necessary to either distribute the drug very quickly or to administer the drug prior to the release of radioactivity.
Since the effectiveness of potassium iodide decreases with time, it would have been necessary to administer daily doses throughout the course of the accident.
For low doses of radiation similar to those at Three Mile Island, the preferred response was either shelter or evacuation.
Whereas potassium iodide protects only the thyroid, ahelter and evacuation protect the total body as well.
r F.
o..w. e4 3.e-a -,-j,,.....
r-- - -- - - --
. - ~ -
.w %, 2,$
+
-e j
t
(
FROM:
ACTION CONTROL DATES CONTROL N f
g 4 N.t G7 Ut # g COMPL DEADLINE
// ld/ 73 V
OATE OF OCCUME{J' Iith4 C. fMGSGRe.D$r, ACKNCWLEOG M ENT g,,h 4[#
jffi cIn Cf LIM 1uwP Affair $
INTERIM REPLY l
.T O:
PREPARE FGH SIGNATudE j
OF-l C.MlCJ3'd3hdrid FINAL R EPLY. _ "
- f p CHAIRMAN t
FILE LOCyTION~I ! l',' lt.e 9 C EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OTHe A, OESCRIPTICN C LETTER CMEVO C AEPORT U OTHE9 SPEC:AL INSTRUCTIONS OR BEMARKS i
v..
W.; rescu.se to W,tkus ::f tne Civic clw ef :iu:ur::aa narrhtur; Utrs. Md
/ C
' ~ -
I ali4r) rdatig; to the I:il accia.c f
t CLASSIFIE3 CATA 1
f C OCb YENT,COdv NC. l lC LA ;5iF ICA !!O.N l I
'NUV'3 E't OF 3 AGES I
lCA T E G G r4 Y posTa:, acmsTav so.l l C..si
- ac rRo NC D-INE eszcs.E ;c; cats mFr.:A -c:a ec.T:Na LE3 aL Pauct m.a L j
. r. /
yaty-
- gs{cx Mse2NE
- T ;t OATE N Lh3 AL Gl.iCT
- 'id N} T; F N -
y --
g g
i h45*2 40?m8
- a$55 S~'$
~~c C.g1Cr.161\\
l c< '.
/A I
tr
(.. 7 ' '
i../
mgo cCw.4sNTs acT' F'-
I f
,n
-+.i AP_ }\\
T.j,.
-c 2
- T:L:.s T:c s: ' ::t.eeNes :
. va C
r.
i sac =o =v =2
/k en-Tp;; mecc;;R c,y 731 r.s
.,, y,,v s,
.u.
>.. + -
,1; 9
P m } 8 8 % j 3.%;b
'w gj r s
--- amgtn g,re pase=%ms b4 eI
?..T E D e~ V 4 e e.v C 6 '4 L C (L.e45V.
g 79-1935 6/29/79 ton, om s.
NRC SECRETARIAT TO: O commiss on.,
o.t.
XXD E mee. oir10per.
O con. couns.i O cons.ti.ison O soi.citor O eubi.c Affairs O secret.rv O
Tina Hobson Director incom.ng:
F rom:
Office of Consumer Affairs DOE To: Chairman Hendrie o.,,
6/25/79 sub nt:
Regnests respnnta tn RH H gnactinns nn TMI i
ac nnend hv (f ui,- l'1 gh gf gghgeh n Wa rri c hiern, D3, 3
X2 pr.o re reo y for s.gnatur. of:
s X@( cn.irm.n Date due Comm: July 18 O commiss.oner O eoo. cc. ct. sol, PA. sECY O s;gn.tur, biocx omiit.o XM a. turn origin.i of incom,ng oitn respons.
For d. rect reply *
~
a Rec'd Off. -m y y,,,,p D For.ooroon.i..ction o.t......
- 3 y.,j For information TifDI*******
O For r.comm.nd tion n.m.m.:
Cpys to:
RF, Rocovin TMI Task Force For the Commission:
Combs
- send three (3) copies of reply to secy Mael Facility Nac.2 ACTION SLIP