ML19308B530

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RO 287/76-11:on 760818,125 Volt Dc Instrument & Control Batteries Not Load Tested.Caused by Administrative Failure to Meet Surveillance Requirements.Personnel Unaware of Tech Spec Change.Periodic Test Index Reviewed & Revised 761001
ML19308B530
Person / Time
Site: Oconee 
Issue date: 09/03/1976
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19308B524 List:
References
RO-287-76-11, NUDOCS 8001090532
Download: ML19308B530 (2)


Text

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.g DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 3 Report No.: RO-287/76-11 Report Date:

September 3, 1976 Occurrence Date: ' August 18, 1976 Facility:

Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence:

Failure to load test 125 VDC instrument and control batteries Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 80 percent full power Description of Occurrence:

(Refer to Duke Power Company letter of August 23, 1976 to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.)

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of this incident was an administrative failure to meet surveillance requirements. Also, although the due date for this particular test was correctly identified, the printout which lists the completion dates for surveillance procedures contained various erroneous data, making the determination of overdue completion dates difficult.

In addition, the personnel familiar with the performance of the discharge test were unaware of a change to Technical Specifications which made the test an annual rather than a refueling outage requirement.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Even though the required test was not performed by the specified date, the 3CA and 3CB batteries were properly maintained, and the daily and monthly surveillance tests verified that the batteries were in good condition.

The successfully completed discharge tests performed af ter the incident confirmed that the batteries would have performed their required function during the period they were considered inoperable.

It is concluded, therefore, that the health and safety of the public was not affected by

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this occurrence.

Corrective Action:

A task force has been formed to review and revise the periodic test index as follows:

1.

Technical Specification requirements will be examined to assure complete coverage and. proper updating, i

l 2.

The format of the program printout will be evaluated to determine if changes are necessary in order to make it more useful and meaningful.

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. s 3.

Station Directive 3.2.2 will be revised to make certain that FSAR and Technical Specification changes are included in the periodic testing schedule.

The above will be completed by October 1, 1976. Until that time, all supervisory personnel have been instructed to maintain close monitcring of surveillance requirements'.

It is anticipated that implementation of these actions will prevent recurrence of this occurrence.

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