ML19308B007

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Unusual Event 269/73-13:on 731108,during Monthly Test of Engineered Safeguards Sys Channel 6,engineered Safeguards Valve FDW-108 Failed to Close.Caused by Slow Solenoid. Solenoid Replaced
ML19308B007
Person / Time
Site: Oconee Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/07/1973
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19308B002 List:
References
RO-269-73-12, NUDOCS 7912120765
Download: ML19308B007 (1)


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DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1 UNUSUAL EVENT REPORT UE-269/73-12 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS VALVE VDW-108 Description of the Incident On November 8, 1973. Engineered Safeguards Valve FDW-108 failed to close during a monthly test of Engineered Safeguards System Channel 6. This valve serves to isolate the sample line from No. 1B steam generator in the event of Engineered Safeguard System actuation. Regulatory Operations, Region II, was verbally notified of the incident on November 8, 1973.

Corrective Action Instrument technicians checked out the system immediately, but no problem was found. The valve operated properly on six successive trials. The valve was checked once a day for proper operation during November 9-11, 1973 and functioned properly each time. On November 12, 1973, local observation revealed some hesitation in valve operation. During successive operation, it was noted that the hesitation seemed to be the result of the slow operation of a solenoid which functions to admit opening air to the pneumatic operator of a valve. This solenoid was replaced and the valve FDW-108 was successfully tested for proper operation.

Safety Analysis FDW-108 is a pneumatic isolation valve on the sample line from steam generator 1B and closes on signal from Channel 6 of the Engineered Safeguards System.

Engineered Safeguards System Channel 6 is actuated from high reactor building pressure. On the same sample line, there is an electric motor-operated isolation valve, FDW-107, which is actuated by redundant Engineered Safe-guards System Channel 5. In the event that FDW-108 had failed to close during Engineered Safeguards System actuation, reactor building isolation would have been provided by the redundant valve FDW-107 actuated by Engineered Safeguards Channel 5. This incident did not affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

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