ML19305E594
| ML19305E594 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Mcguire, McGuire, 07002623  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1980 |
| From: | Lashawnna Lewis DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19305E591 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8005200089 | |
| Download: ML19305E594 (4) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD l
In the Matter of
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OUKE POWER COMPANY
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Docket No. 70-2623
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(Amendment to Materials License
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j SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear Station
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Spent Fuel Transportation and Storage
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at McGuire Nuclear Station)
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FURTHER SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY OF LIONEL LEWIS Q.
Have you examined the potential health effects associated with a successful sabotage?
A.
Yes, I have examined documents that have been publishbd in this field including, (NUREG-0194 Calculations of Radio-logical Consequences from Sabotage of Shipping Casks for Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste, February 1977; NUREG-0170, FES on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes, December 1977), and a Sandia Laboratory Study entitled " Transport of Radionuclides in Urban Environs:
A Working Draft Assessment" (SAND-77-1927).
I have also read the NRC Staff's April 18, 1979 memorandum to the Com-mission concerning " Physical Protection of Irradiated Fuel Shipments" (SECY-7 9-278).
This memorandum is premised upon the Sandia report and gave raise to the June, 1979 amend-ments to 10 CFR Part 73.
Enclosure B to the memorandum sets forth a summary of consequence estimates of health effects associated with a successful sabotage.
The summary presents estimates for both the rural and urban environments.
It
4
. assumes a 3 element cask and an assumed release of 100%
noble gases, 1.6% cesium, and 1% solids as respirable material.
It also assumes that the fuel has been decayed for 150 days.
Q.
Are the Sandia assumptions that you have referenced appli-cable to the proposed transportation of Oconee spent fuel to McGuire?
A.
No.
The Duke cask contains only one element which has been decayed for 270 days.
These differences would result in an effective release of 33% noble gases,.49% cesium, and.15%
solids when compared to a Sandia type event.
Q.
What effect do these assumptions have in estimating health effect consequences?
A.
If one consults the sensitivity study in the Sandia report, one finds a case similar to the magnitude of the release for the Duke cask.
The release fraction for this case is:
50% ncble gases,.4% cesium, and.1% solids.
See Sandia 1927, Table 5 fn. 4 at p. 195.
The consequences for this release are:
early fatalities - 2/3, early morbidities -
30/63, latent cancer fatalities - 45/52.
See Sandia 1927, Table 7, Case 4 at p. 199.
Q.
How do these health effect consequences relate to the sum-mary of consequence estimates contained in the Staff's April 18, 1979 memorandum to the Commission?
A.
As can be seen, the latent cancer fatalities of 45/52 are well below the latent cancer fatalities of 220/270 given for rural situations in the NRC's Summary of consequence estimates.
The early fatalities of 2/3 are within the range of the 0.4/6.3 4.,
6
. given by the NRC for the rural environment.
Q.
What were the population densities assumed in the Sandia study?
A.
With regard to the consequence estimates contained in the April 18, ~1979 memorandum such figures were premised upon a successful sabotage occurring in an area with a p'opulation density of 42,000 to 115,000 per square mile.
This popu-lation density pertained to a grid, 10 kilometers by 10 kilometers.
Q.
Are you familiar with the population density surrounding that j
section of the proposed route which travels through Charlotte.
l A.
Yes, I am.
Q.
How does that situation compare with the case assumed in the Sandia report?
A.
In the Sandia study 100 cells of 1 kilometer by 1 kilometer were referenced.
The vast majority of these cells had a population density ranging between the 42,000 and 115,000 people per square mile.
If a sLmilar grid was prepared for Charlotte only 1 cell, i.e.,
the central city, would have a population density even approaching the Sandia population densities; the remaining cells would have an average popu-lation density of 2000-3000 per square mile.
Q.
What effect does the Duke situation have on health effect
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estimates?
A.
The limited population densities of Charlotte should result
o
. in health effects which are significantly lower than those associated with the densely populated area assumed in the Sandia report.
Q.
Are there any other factors that are important in assessing health effects and comparing them with those contained in the Sandia report?
A.
Yes, the early fatalities that I have previously referenced for the proposed shipment of Oconee spent fuel are likely to be even lower.
Early fatalities and early morbidities occur very close to the point of release.
The Sandia report gives mean and peak distances for early fatalities of 55m and 500m respectively.
See Sandia-77-1927, Table 9, fn.
2, p.
204.
The Sandia report gives the mean and peak distances for early morbidities of 104m and 500m respectively.
Id.
The early fatalities and early morbidities that I refer-l enced were based upon a sabotage occurring in an area with
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a population density of 42,000 to 115,000 people per square mile.
For Duke's case, the population in the immediate i
vicinity of the release is substantially lower.
In fact the area of maximum population density in Charlotte is approxi-mately 3 miles from the point of rele3se.
Therefore, the early fatalities and early morbidities for the Duke case would be much lower than the 2/3 and 30/63 resulting from the use l
of the Sandia report; and because of the lower source term, I
probably even lower.
April 14, 1980