ML19305D305

Forwards Response to NRC 800219 Request for Info Re Environ Qualification of Containment Pressure Transmitters & Qualification Test Rept on Three Model 386A Differential Pressure Transmitters & Remote Sensors, Vols 1 & 2

ML19305D305
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	04/08/1980
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	Baer R, Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19305D306	List: ML19305D305 ML19305D310 ML19305D313
References
NUDOCS 8004140348
Download: ML19305D305 (4)

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DUKE POWER COMPANY Powen Dunmixo 422 SouTn Cucacu Srazer, CitAut. orts. N. C. asa42 wiwau o, PAanca. ea. April 8, 1980 SCE Petti0reet 7t L E PosO N E: Ante 7C4 Srsam pocovetices 373-4083 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. Robert L. Baer, Chief Light Water Reactor Branch No. 2 Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 ,

Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370

Dear Mr. Denton:

Attached is Duke Power Company's response to the request for information contained in Mr. Robert L. Baer's letter of February 19, 1980 concerning environmental qualification of containment pressure transmitters. Also included are three copies of the qualification test report for the con-tainment pressure transmitters and sensors.

Mr. Baer's letter of February 15, 1980 requested Duke Power Company to evaluate the McGuire Class 1E equipment qualification program against the guidelinen of NUREG-0588. It is our intention to submit this information according to the following schedule:

1. Equipment inside containment. May 5, 1980

2. Equipment outside containment exposed June 6, 1980 to high energy line break environment.

3. Equipment outside containment exposed July 7, 1980 to loss of EVAC environment.

Items 2 and 3 above include all Class 1E equipment located outside the con-tainment with the exception of equipment located in the control complex. The environment in the control complex remains within a normal range for all pos- p tulated accidents because this area contains no high energy piping and be-cause it is served by a redundant Class 1E HVAC system. The ability of the $d; Class 1E equipment located in the control complex to function in its normal, controlled environment is demonstrated by its continued operation and/or by jff periodic tests. Additionally, no equipment has been identified for which aging mechanisms in a controlled environment are not amendable to assessment by routine in-service inspection, surveillance, and/or periodic testing. g 60041 W .(

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director April 8, 1980 l Page Two  :

Duke's response to Mr. Baer's letter of March 7, 1980 which requested additional information on hydrogen skinner and containment air return fan motors will be submitted consistent with the above schedule, i.e. on May 5, 1980.

V y truly yours I

i Q a.g w b. '

William O. Parker, Jr.

GAC:ses Attachments  !

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MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION Environmental Qualification of Containment Pressure Transmitters Wyle Laboratories test report 43904-1 (Volunes I and II) documents the testing i performed on two Barton Model 386A/351 and one Model 386A electronic pressure transmitter. This document also contains the test results and supports our conclusion that the transmitters are qualified for use as containment pressure transmitters.

Pressure Spike or Ringing Phenomena Westinghouse test of the Barton Model 351, as reported in WCAP-9157, shows a pressure spike or ringing occurring between 59 and 111 seconds into the test.

Pressure was approximately 67 PSI with spikes up to approximately 93 PSI.

Westinghouse initially concluded that the phenomena was attributable to the limited size of the test chamber and that the spike would not occur in the large containment.

The hydraulic fluid used by Westinghouse as a fill for the 351 sensor assembly was distilled water. We feel the pressure spikes were possibly caused by rapid uneven heating or flaching of the distilled water in the capillary, rather than the limited size of the test chamber. This matter was discussed with representa-tives of the NRC Staff by Westinghouse in a meeting on January 29, 1980 and similar conclusions were reached concerning the observed pressure spike.

The Barton Model 351 tensor assemblies used by Duke for containment pressure are filled with Dow lorning 704 diffusion pump fluid.

point of 2210C (430 F) at atmospheric pressure. Since This the fluid has a flash worst case post acci-dent containment temperature will not exceed 340 0 F, flashing will not occur.

The test conducted by Duke and reported in Wyle Laboratories test report 43904-1 shows that two Barton Models 351 with Dow 704 fill were subjected to a post acci-dent test of 3400F. Transmitter output was continuously monitored visually for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and no pressure spikes were observed attributable to flashing.

When used in pressure 0 gauges, Dow Corning 704 may crystallize if subjected to temperatures below 21 C (69.8 F). Duke will provide trace heating for contain-ment pressure transmitter installations to prevent crystallization.

Other Anomalies Test Report 43904-1 lists four anomalies which occurred during the testing. The discussion below addresses each of the anomalies and supports Duke's position that these transmitters are acceptable for their intended function. ,

Anomaly No. 1 Abnormal output on the upper end of the scale during i post radiation functional cesting.

The manufacturers published reference accuracy is t 0.5% full scale at 800F.

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Radiation effects result in an additional 5.0% error for radiation dosages up to l

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7 5 x 10 redo (Grmma). The McGuire transmitters were subjected to 2 x 108 rads making the expected deviation greater than 5.5% due to higher radiation dosage.

Since these transmitters are located in the annulus (outside containment), the cumulativeradiapiondosagetowhichthetransmitterswouldbeexposedismuch less than 5 x 10 rads. It is conc?.uded that this anomaly was not cause for rejection of the transmitter.

Anomaly No. 2 t

Random spikes on high voltage output of transmitter S/N 102 during LOCA test.

On completion of LOCA testing and prior to post accident functional test, techni-cians were able to reproduce these spikes by moving the lead wires at points external to the test chamber. Moisture was also observed exiting from the test chamber at the lead wire penetration. Post test inspection confirmed that erratic behavior of test item No. 2 can be attributed to cracked external lead-in wires with moisture causing shorting. The external lead wire configuration used during testing does not reflect a true installed configuration. Therefore, it is concluded that this anomaly does not represent a failure of transmitter S/N 102.

Anomaly No. 3 Temperature fluctuations during test period.

The redundant safety controller for the steam solenoids dropped out eight (8) times during the 24-hour test period, causing the temperature in the sensor chamber to drop by as much as 50 F for short periods of time. The total time involved is approximately 38 minutes. The technician involved reset the con-troller each time, but neglected to correct the controller set-point to a higher temperature to prevent the recurrence of this condition. This anomaly occurred after the 3400F temperature phase of the test and was attributed to test equip-ment malfunction rather than specimen malfunction. Since the highest temperature phase had been completed and the added temperature excursions increased to some degree the conservatism of the test, this anomaly did not jeopardize the validity of the test data.

Anomaly No. 4 Spike on high voltage output of transmitter S/N 103 during LOCA test.

This anomaly is the same as that experienced with test item S/N 102 with the exception that the spike was limited to a single surge of longer duration. The cause of the spike and evaluation of effect on transmitter qualification is the same as of Anomaly No. 2.

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