ML19305C609
| ML19305C609 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1980 |
| From: | Gallagher E, Knop R, Vandel T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19305C599 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-329-80-01, 50-329-80-1, 50-330-80-01, 50-330-80-1, NUDOCS 8003310145 | |
| Download: ML19305C609 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000329/1980001
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No.
50-329/80-01; 50-330/80-01
Docket No.
50-329; 50-330
License No.
Licensee:
Consumers Power Company
1945 W. Parnall Road
Jackson, MI
49201
Facility Name: Midland Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: Midland Site, Midland, MI
Inspection Conducted: January 8-11, 1980
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Inspectors:
E. Vandel
7 - //- Eh
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E. J. Galla her
2 - //- 8 0
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- ll.(' -
E. W.
. Lee
1/9/k'
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K. R.-Naidu
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Approved By:
R.
. Knop, Chief,
4
O
Projects Section 1
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Inspection Summary
Inspection on January 8-11, 1980 (Report No. 50-329/80-01; 50-330/80-01)
Areas Inspected: Review of procedures and observations of work for
electrical components; review of procedures, observations of work, and
records review for containment post tensioning activities; reactor coolant
pressure boundary and safety related piping welding activity observations
an records review; follow up review of previously identified noncompliance
and unresolved matters as well as 50.55(e) deficiency reports.
The
inspection involved a total of 92 inspector-hours on site by four NRC
inspectors.
Results: Of eleven areas reviewed during the inspection, two items of
noncompliance (infraction, lack of weldor qualification, and deficiency,
lack of records sign off) and one deviation (failure to implement a
commitment were identified in two areas.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
Consumers Power Company Personnel
B. Marguglio, Corporate QA Director
D. B. Miller, Site Manager
- T. C. Cooke, Project Superintendent
- D. R.-Keating, QA Mechanical Supervisor
- D. D. Balinsky, QA Electrical Supervisor
- B. H. Peck, Construction Supervision
- M. J. Shaeffer, Group Supervisor, QAE
- G. T. Black, Jr. , QA Engineer
- R. G. Wo11ney, QA Engineer
- R. Wheeler, Field Civil Engineer
- R. E. McCue, Project Testing
E. L. Jones, QA Engineer
P. K. Kyner, QA Electrical Supervisor
Bechtel Power Corporation Personnel
- A. J. Boos, Project Field Engineer
- W. L. Barclay, Project Field QC Engineer
- L. M. Brown, QC Engineer
- P. Corcoran, Resident Engineer
- L. A. Dreisbach, Project QA Engineer
- R. F. Schulman, Resident Civil Engineer
B & W Personnel
- V. N. Aagaonkar, Project Manager
- R. W. Shope, QC Supervisor
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting her on January 11, 1980.
The inspectors also contacted other contrac*' and licensee personnel
during the course of the inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(open) Noncompliance Item (329/78-03-03; 330/78-03-03) The NRC inspectors
reviewed the' interim and final reports relative to this matter. During
discussions with the licensee and Bechtel personnel, the NRC inspectors
determined that there was no documented evidence that the field engineering
recommendation in NRC 987 "to rework all fillet welds that have coarse
ripples, high crowns, excessive concavity or convexity, and where
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the base metal has been ground and grooved to unacceptable thickness" was
in fact accomplished. The contractor personnel after consultations stated
that an engineering review was performed on the above unacceptable welds,
and concluded the welds "as is" were acceptable. The NRC inspectors
informed the licensee that these welds will be reexamined during a subse-
quent inspection.
(Closed) Noncompliance (330/79-22-02) Control of welding material. The
inspector established that Bechtel supervising personnel and craftsmen
have been instructed the procedure requirements of handling welding rods.
(Closed) Unresolved item (329/79-17-01 and 330/79-17-02) Welder Qualifica-
tion Records. The inspector reviewed the qualification records of the
welders in question. It was determined that the errors have been corrected
and a discrepancy was also corrected immediately. Additionally, the
inspector randomly selected qualification records of 30 other welders for
review, with no further discrepancies being identified.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (329/79-24-01 and 330/79-24-01) B & W procedure:
The inspector reviewed the revised procedure No. 9-WG-107, Revision 3.
It was determined that the procedure has 'oeen revised to clarify the
handling of return unused welding material.
I
(Closed) Unresolved Item (329/79-24-02) Ground out in pipe: The inspector
reviewed a Bechtel letter to Consumers Power Company dated January 3, 1980
stating that the ground in the pipe was examined and no mimimum wall thick-
ness was violated. However, why and when it was ground was undeterminable.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (330/79-22-01) Design changes after work is
complete: This item became an item of deviation (Section I, paragraph
8).
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Section I
Prepared By:
E. W. k. Lee
Reviewed By:
D. H. Danielson, Chief
Engineering Support Section 2
1.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping - Welding Material Control
(Units 1 and 2)
a.
Review of Documents
The inspector reviewed the following documents:
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(1) Babcock and Wilcox Construction Company (B & WCC) Procedure
No. 9-QPP-118, Revision 1, " Procurement of Weld Filler
Material".
(2) B & WCC Procedure No. 9-WG-107, Revision 3, " Storage
Handling, and Issuing of Welding Filler Metals".
(3) B & WCC Procedure No. 9-QPP-108, Revision 4, " Receiving
Inspection".
(4) Receiving Inspection Reports and Material Certification
for ER-316L welding rod with heat No. 74781 and lots
No. 30707, No. 23709, and No. 29615; heat No. 464182 and
heat No. 761590.
It was determined that the above documents met the PSAR, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and the applicable code requirements,
b.
Control of Materials
The inspector toured B & WCC welding material issuing station.
It was determined that (1) the welding materials are properly
identified and segregated; (2) the temperature of the rod ovens
is maintained; (3) records are properly kept; and (4) issuance
and return of welding materials are controlled in accordance
with the approved procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
2.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping - Observation of Work
Activities (Unit 2)
The inspector observed the following welding activities:
Reactor Coolant Pump No. 2P-51C Pump Gasket Drain System Weld
a.
No. 2 on drawing No. FSK-M-2CCA-58-5.
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b.
Pressurizer System Weld No. 7.
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c.
Incore Instrument Piping Weld No. F8, No. F10, No. F23, and No.
F24.
It was determined that (1) work was conducted in accordance with
traveller; (2) proper welding materials were used; (3) welding
procedure requirements were met; (4) work area was free of weld
rod-stubs; and (5) physical appearance was acceptable.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping - Visual Examination of
Welds (Unit 1)
a.
Visual Examination
The inspector visually examined the completed welds of the
Reactor Coolant System Welds No. J1-1, No. J1-2, No. J4-1, No.
J4-2, No. J4-3, No. J4-4, No. JS-1, No. J5-2, No. J6-1, and
No. J6-3.
It was determined that (1) weld surface finish and appearance
were acceptable and there was no evidence of wall thinning due
to grinding; and (2) arc strikes and weld spatter were not
evident,
b.
Review of Records
The inspector reviewed weld data sheets for the Reactor Coolant
System Welds No. J1-1; No. J1-2; No. J4-1; No. J4-2; No. J4-3,
and No. J4-4.
It was determined that (1) the records indicated specified
inspections were completed; and (2) records are clear and
legible.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
-4.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping - Welder Qualification
(Units 1 and 2)
The inspector established that B & WQC procedure for welder
a.
qualification has not-been revised since the last review.
(IE
Inspection Reports No. 50-329/79-17 and No. 50-330/79-17,
paragraph 3).
b.
The inspector reviewed the randomly selected qualification
records of fourteen welders who performed welding on welds
stated in paragraphs 2 and 3b. of this report.
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It was determined that the above documents met the requirements of
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ASME B & PV Code Section IX except welder I.D. 624. The inspector
established that this welder welded on thickness exceeding his
qualified range. This_ condition is an item of noncompliance as
identified in Appendix A. (329/80-01-01; 330/80-01-01)
5.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping - Observation of NDE
Activities (Unit 1)
The inspector observed magnetic particle examination of the Reactor
Coolant System Weld No. J6-1.
It was determined that:
(1) surface
condition was acceptable; (2) procedure requirements were met, (3)
personnel were properly qualified and (4) equipment used was currently
calibrated.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Safety Related Piping - Observation of Welding Activities (Unit 1)
The inspector observed the welding of Make-Up and Purification
System Weld No. 37C1 on drawing No. M603 sheet 9.
It was determined
that (1) work was conducted in accordance with traveller; (2) proper
welding materials were used; (3) welding procedure requirements were
met; (4) work area was free of weld rod stubs; and (5) rhysical
appearance was acceptable.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Review of Quality Control Inspection Record (Unit 2)
The inspector reviewed the Quality Control Inspection Record of the
Service Water System Spools No. OHBC-19-S-619-6-6 and No. 2HBC-88-S-
619-6-1 and valve serial No. D0061-1-3. It was determined that r,n
August 21 and 22, 1979, both flanges of the valve were unbolted and
then re-bolted. The inspection records indicated that the internal
surfaces on the spools were inspected for cleanliness but not the
valve. Upon questioning the licensee's contractor, the inspector was
informed that the internal surface of the valve was inspected for
cleanliness but failed to date and signed off on the record. This
condition is an item of noncompliance as identified in Appendix A.
(330/80-01-02)
8.
Design Changes Made After Completion of Work Activities (Unit 1 and 2)
During the inspection of October 10-12, 1979, (IE Inspection Reports
No. 50-329/79-22 and No. 50-30/79-22) the adequacy of tracking the
design changes after work activities have been completed was in
question.
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During this inspection the inspector reviewed a letter from Bechtel
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Power Corporation to Consumers Power Company dated November 23,
1979.
Paragraph 4 of the above letter states, that, " Assurance that
the change is implemented is provided by:
a.
Field Engineering monitoring of in process work.
b.
Final system walkdown by Field Engineering.
Piping configuration review by Quality Control per QCIR P-1.00.
c.
The inspector was also informed by the licensee's contractor that
each field engineer may have his own informal method of tracking
such a change. The inspector was shown a punch list which was ini-
tiated in November, 1979. The inspector asked how and when was the
punch list prepared. The licensee's contractor stated that, " Punch
list is prepared as a result of (1) awareness of item requiring
system completion (including design change of completed work) and
(2) as backup by physical walkdown. The punch list can be prepared
approximately six months prior to system turn over to the licensee.
The inspector stated that none of the above methods provides a
positive way of tracking design changes and assuring that completed
-work is modified in accordance with the design changes.
Furthermore, the inspector established that there is no procedure
for handling design changes made after completion of work. This
condition is an item of deviation as identified in Appendix B.
(329/80-01-02; 330/80-01-03)
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Section II
Prepared By:
K. R. Naidu
Reviewed By:
D. W. Hayes, Chief
Engineering Support Section 1
1.
Review of Quality Assurance Implementing Procedures for
Instrumentation Units 1 and 2
The inspector reviewed Bechtel specification J-218 (Q) Revision 7,
titled, " Technical Specification for installation fo field mounted
instrumentation for Nuclear Services" which outlines the requf.rements
for the installation of field mounted instruments, procurement of
installation materials and layout detailing, fabrication, and instal-
lation of instrument mounting structures, tubing trays, and tray
supports. The inspector determined the following:
Safety related instruments are listed in Specification J-705
a.
(Q)
b.
Receipt inspections are performed to Quality Control Instruction
(QCI) R-1.00 and the results documented in the relevant QCIR.
Nonconforming components are identified during receipt inspections'
c.
cursory visual inspections and are performed to identify shipping
damage and verify whether the relevant documents have accompanied
the shipment.
d.
QCI I-1.10 outlines the installation requirements for instruments
and the results are documented in the relevant QCIR.
Some of
the salient points inspected are:
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(1) Tube cleanliness
(2) Bending of impulse lines
(3) Material identity
(4) There is no specific requirement to verify conformance
_ ith the separation criteria, based on the assumption that
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the drawings reflect separation criteria. The NRC inspector
stated that if the drawings were wrong then the QC inspectors
may not pick up design oriented problems. The licensee
agreed with the tmC inspector and initiated to revise the
QCf to emphasize separation criteria verification. Pending
review of the revised QCI and QCIR, this matter is considered
unresolved.
(329/80-01-03; 330/80-01-04)
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Paragraph 5.3.4 of the specification provides the formula for
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flexibility requirement as
L_= 15.63 without considering dis-
placement
'. Pending the correction of this formula, this
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item is considered unresolved. (329/80-01-04; 330/80-01-05)
g.
Welding and NDE activities are performed to QCI/W-1.00 and the
results are documented in QCIR/W-1.00A.
2.
Observation of Installed Instruments Units I and 2
The inspector observed that the following instruments had been
installed in Units 1 and 2:
At elevation 656' Unit 1 Containment Reactor Coolant Loop A Hot Leg
Flow Transmitters.
1 FT -0101A2
IFT - 0101A4
At elevation 656' Unit 2 Containment Reactor Coolant Loop B Hot Leg
Flow Transmitters.
2FT - 0201B3
2FT - 0201B4
2FT - 0201B5
2FT - 0201B6
Reactor Coolant Loop A Hot Leg Flow Transmitters
2FT - 0201A2
2FT - 0201A4
The inspector observed that in Unit 2 the tubing had been installed
to the above instruments, but were being dismantled because the
separation criteria was not met. The installation was according to
drawing FSK-JC2-0037 (Q) sheets one to four. Discussions with licensee
personnel indicate that the drawings reflected neither the separation
criteria nor Project Engineering approval, both of which are specified
in Paragrpah 5.3.7 of the Specification J-218 (Q). On January 11,
1980, prior to the conclusion of the NRC inspection, the licensee
-initiated NCR M-01-4.0-002 to document the.follesi.ng nonconforming
conditions:
That the-drawings FSK-JC2-0037 -(Q) sheets 3 and 4, illustrating
a.
the instruments tubing routing for flow transmitters 2FT-0201B1,
B2, B3, B4, B5, and B6 have violated separation criteria specified
in Section 5.3.7 of specification J-218 (Q) Revision 8.
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b.
That the tubing for the above transmitters was installed according
to the above drawings even though the drawings were not approved
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by the Bechtel Ann Arbor Project Engineering as required by
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Paragraph 4 of Section 8 of the Specification J-218 (Q).
Per Mag review on the corrective action, this matter is considered
unresolved. (329/80-01-05; 330/80-01-06)
3.
Review of Electrical Specifications Units 1 and 2
The inspector reviewed Babcox and Wilcox Specifications08-101.
8000003-02 for Nuclear Instruments and Reactor Protection Systems.
The inspector determined the following:
Design criteria specified the following salient requirements:
a.
(1) Single failure criteria
(2) Redundancy
(3)
Independancy
(4) Loss of power
(5) Manual protection system trip
(6) Equipment removal
b.
The following standards are referenced:
(1)
IEEE 279-1971 criteria for protection system for Nuclear
Power Generating Stations (NPGS)
(2)
IEEE 323-1971 qualifying Class 1 electrical equipment for
NPGS
(3)
IEEE 344-1971 seismic qualification for Class IE electrical
equipment for NPGS.
The inspector requested the licensee to provide additional
c.
information on the following matters.
(1) A paragraph in the middle of page 7.2-19 Revision 18,
dated February, 1979, of the Midland FSAR reads, "The
isolation device circuits possess the same flame retar-
dance, maximum operating temperatures.
.as the remaining
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protection system internal circuitry." Since IEEE 083
(type test of class IE electrical cables.
.for NPGS) has
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not been referenced in the design specification, the
inspector requested information as to whether other re-
quirements were imposed to meet flame retardance require-
ments for the internal cables.
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(2) The above paragraph continues to state, "The tests and
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analysis of the isolation device circuits permit less than
six inches of physical _ separation." The licensee was
requested to ascertain and provide information as to who
reviewed these tests and analysis.
(3) The licensee was requested to obtain clarification whether
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the term " isolation device circuits" used in the above
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paragraph included internal. wiring to the isolation devices
which will preclude intermingling of protective and control
function wiring.
Pending the availability of the information requested in
the above three paragraphs, this item is considered unresol-
ved.
(329/80-01-06; 330/80-01-07)
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Section III
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~ Prepared By:
E. J. Gallagher
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Reviewed By:
D. W. Hayes, Chief
Engineering Support Section 1
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1.
Containment Prestressing System (Unit 2)
During this inspection the containment prestressing system procedures
quality records and inspection and testing personnel qualifications
were inspected. In addition, specific allegations that were reported
to the Region III NRC office on January 7, 1980 regarding prestressing
system equipment calibration records, stressing sequence, qualification
of inspection personnel and prestressing work activities were addressed
during this inspection,
a.
Procedures
The inspector reviewed the following procedures for containment
prestressing work activities:
(1)
C-2, Revision 13 (Nov. 9, 1979), Technical Specification
for post-tensioning system including FCR C-1986 (revised
stressing sequence) and FCR C-2079 (revised stressing
sequence) to drawing C2-170-3. Both of these field
changes to the stressing sequence were reviewed and discus-
sed with the Bechtel design engineer since the stressing
sequence is different than what is normally specified. It
was shown that design control measures were in effect for
the review and approval of the subject stressing sequence
changes.
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The inspector requested to be notified if any further
changes to the stressing sequence occur.
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(2) C-146 Revision 3B (October 11, 1979), Field Installation
Manual, including FCR's Nos. 2188, 2187, 2185, 2184, 2175,
2172, 2166, 2062, 2048, 2047, and 2041.
The inspector indicated a conflict between FCR No. 2062
and 2185. FCR 2062 approved the adjustment of both over-
stress value and lift-off value in the event of broken or
missing tendon wires. This was concurred with INRYC0 via
telex dated August 21, 1979. Subsequently, FCR 2185 was
issued which requested a clarification whether both over-
stress and lift-off should b
sted or just overstress
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value. Bechtel Engineering re%
i with approval of
adjusting only the overstress v..ue. Because of this
discrepancy the inspector requested a telecon'with Bechtel
Engineering.
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It was explained that the first FCR 2062 was in error and
FCR 2185 was to rectify that apparent error. There are no
further questions on this matter at this time.
The inspector also requested justification of the revision
to germit grease temperature to be increased first from
180 F to 210 F and subsequent to three nonconforming
conditions to be increased again to 250 F.
Specification
C-4gwasshowntopermitmaximumgreasetemperaturestobe
250 F without any deleterious effects on the grease material.
b.
Qualification of QC Inspectors for Prestresssing Work
During a May 14-17, 1979 inspection (Report No. 329/79-10;
330/79-10) this NRC inspector had indicated to the licensee
that none of the Bechtel QC inspectors to be assigned the
inspection of the containment prestressing system had any prior
related work experience on prestressing systems. At this time
no work had begun on the prestressing system.
During a follow-
up inspection on September 11-14, 1979 (Report 329/79-19;
d
330/79-19) this inspector issued an item of nomeompliance in
that the licensee's contractor failed to meet the requirements
of Regulatory Guide 1.58 and ANSI N45.2.6 in that the QC inspec-
tors permitted to inspect the prestressing system were not
qualified to the requirements of the regulatory guide.
Following the above, this inspector was requested by the licen-
see to re-evaluate the qualifications of the assigned inspectors.
The NRC inspector developed a series of questions based on the
requirements of the Prestressing Field Installation Manual. The
licensee administered this examination to the QC inspectors.
The results are documented in NRC report 329/79-22; 330-79-22.
The results indicated that a number of assigned inspectors did
not have a clear understanding of the requirements and therefore
were not qualified.
Subsequent to the above, a meeting was held in the Region III
NRC office in Glen Ellyn on October 25, 1979. The results of
that meeting are documented in NRC report 329/79-23; 330/79-23.
During this inspection, this inspector in conjunction with the
licensee's representative administered a practical examination
to eight QC personnel to demonstrate their ability *3
inspect
prestressing system buttonheads. The QC inspectors were required
to inspect 12 buttonheads for head dimensions, eccentricity,
and crack influence and record the results of their inspection.
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The results of this. practical examination indicated that seven of
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the eight QC inspectors understand how to inspect buttonheads.
However, it was clear that one of the assigned QC inspectors was
unable to perform the inspections on buttonheads. This individual
has been previously identified in Report 329/79-18; 330/79-18 as
Individual "A" and later identified in report 329/79-22; 330/79-22
as Individual "B".
The licensee has directed Betchtel to remove the individual from any
further quality control functions.
In addition, the licensee is reviewing the records to determine the
inspections performed by the individual to determine what reinspec-
tion is necessary.
This matter remains open and will be followed during subsequent
inspections.
In addition, the inspector is to witness any reinspec-
tion of completed work.
c.
Calibration of Prestressing System Jacks and Gauges
(1) Prestressing Jacks
The following prestressing jacks have been used during the
course of prestressing work activities:
Jack Type
Calibration Date
Prescon #1
8/1/79
Prescon #3
8/1/79
Pine #9363
8/30/79
Pine #9365
8/30/79
Dugdeon #8780
10/16/79
Dugdeon #8778
10/16/79
Dugdeon #8779
11/16/79
Dugdeon #8783
11/16/79
Dugdeon #8784
11/16/79
The specific allegation that the above jacks were not
properly calibrated by the INRYC0 was investigated. This
NRC inspector discussed the calibration procedure with
representatives from INRYC0 quality assurance group in
,
Melrose Park, Illinois.
INRYC0 Calibration Procedure QA 9.1.6 states that, "if
less than 66% of the readings are used in the computation,
the ram will be recalibrated." INRYC0 explained that
readings below 1000 PSI are omitted per procedure and that
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of the remaining readings are used.
This is included in
the procedure in that, "During computation of large rams,
usually in excess of 250 tons...the first reading of 1000
PSI will always be deleted from the calculations and will
not be considered in the tolerance check on the 66% accept-
able readings noted below.
Based on a review of the calibration records, readings of
500 PSI and 1000 PSI were deleted as permitted by the
procedure. In addition, readings of 2000 and 3000 PSI were
deleted. However, this still permits more than 66% of the
readings to be effectively used in calculating the ram
area. Therefore, the allegation that readings were being
omitted is correct; however, this is acceptable per the
INRYC0 procedure.
The calibration records noted above were reviewed and
found to meet the INRYC0 procedure for calibrating pre-
stressing jacks. INRYC0 indicated that the procedure being
used for Midland is QA 9.1.G, Revision 1, dated March 5,
1979.
It was also noted that the calibration record did not
include the theoretical ram area as an entry on the form
for Prescon Jack #1 and #3, Dugdeon Jack #'s 8780, 8778,
8783 and 8784. Discussion with INRYC0 QA indicated that
this information was neglected from the form; however, was
available and corrections would be made to the form.
INRYC0 indicated revised calibration records would be sent
to the licensee and NRC office. This item remains unresolved
pending corrections of calibration records.
(329/80-01-07;
330/80-01-08).
(2) Prestressing Gauges
The inspector observed comparison of prestressing gauge
No. N-601 and N-1113 to the master gauge. The calibration
comparison meets the required tolerance of 0.5% of maximum
gauge reading.
Gauge N-17 was identified as being out-of-tolerance or
December 15, 1979 in that the-gauge was out 400 PSI at
each increment of calibration. The gauge was returned to
INRYC0 and a nonconformance report 2812 issued to document
the occurrence.
This NCR is open and will be reviewed
when resolved.
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d.
Reviaw of Nonconformance on Prestressing System
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The inspector reviewed nonconformance reports relative to the
prestressing system. The following is a list of those nonconfor-
mance reports reviewed:
NCR NO.
STATUS
2842
open
2841
open
2806
closed
2812
open
2757
open
2750
open
2735
open
2689
closed
2688
closed
2683
closed
2678
closed
2655
closed
2641
closed
2638
closed
2616
closed
2583
open
2582
closed
2559
closed
2505
closed
2383
open
2382
closed
2373
closed
2205
closed
Nonconformance reports identified as open are to be reviewed
during a subsequent inspection to review the resolution.
e.
Closure of Reportable 50.55(e) on Tendon Lengths
,
The Final Report on the Unit 2 containment Building prestressing
tendons was received by the RIII NRC office on October 31, 1979
(HOWE 281-79). The notification dealt with prestressing system
tendons that were shipped to the site with indeterminate wire
lengths. Tendons were fabricated by INRYC0 at their Wiremill
. facility in Florida. All of the suspect tendons have been
rejected and removed from the construction site. In addition,
corrective action has been taken to adjust the fabrication
equpment that caused the deficiency to occur.
Additional inspection effort on this issue is documented in NRC
Report 329/79-19; 330/79-19 (page 3). This reportable deficiency
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.
.
is considered closed. Continuing inspections will be performed
in this area.
No items of noncompliance were identified in the above areas.
Unresolved Matters
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncomp-
liance or deviations. Unresolved items identified during this inspection
are discussed in Section II and III of this report.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in the Persons
Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection. The scope and
purpose of the inspection were outlined along with the summarization of
the results. The licensee representatives acknowledged the indicated
results. The NRC inspector also emphasized that the review of Bechtel's
quality records needed improvement. Examples indentified by the NRC
inspector are unresolved items (qualification of welders 329/79-17-01)
and the item of noncompliance during this inspection (missed signoff on
Quality record). The inspector noted that other recordkeeping deficien-
cies were identified by the licensee during their audits.
e
6
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!