ML19305A528
| ML19305A528 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1979 |
| From: | Baunack W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908300104 | |
| Download: ML19305A528 (45) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
I il In the Matter of:
21 IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW Si of Mr. Walter H. Baunack Reactor Inspector 4'
5l l
6j i
71 8l 1
ailer #203 3!
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10I Middletown, Pennsylvania lli i
May 7, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13 June 28, 1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 14!
1 146 IS}
(Tape Numcer(s))
161 17!
r 18i 201 i
1 21!
6 I
NRC PERSONNEL:
7 22!
i Mr. Tim Martin D
23{
Mr. Bcb tiarsh 24 25't
!l 853 301 t
f 1.
MARSH:
The date is May 7, 1979.
The time is 9:05 a.m. and I'm Bob 11 2i Marsh, and I'm an investigator with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 3
assigned to the Region 3 office, Chicago, Illinois.
This morning we are at the Region I offices in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. for the 4l 5
purpose of interviewing Walter H. Baunack, Mr. Baunack, this interview 6
regards your observations while at Harrisburg, in connection with the TMI incident, March 28.
To start, I would like the other people in 7
the room to identify themselves and if they would spell their last 8
name.
g 10 MARTIN:
Tim Martin.
I 12!g MARSH:
Tim, what's your position?
14l l
MARTIN:
I am a Reactor Inspection Specialist, Performance Appraisal 151 Branch, located in Region I.
16' 17 MARSH:
OK, and that constitutes the occupancy of the room.
There is three of us in here, and myself, Bob Marsh, and Tim Martin are both 19I with the investigative team.
Walt, if I may, why don't you just start 20 just for the record give us a little bit of a capsule summary of your 21 background, your experience with the NRC?
22 23 BAUNACX: Well, I ha>e been working with the NRC since 1971.
I spent 24 about four years as p oject inspector on pressuri::ed water reactors, 25 i
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853 302 i
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I 2
1.
and three and a half years on boiling water reactcrs.
Currently assigned to Nuclear Support Section, for probably a year and a half, 2
3 r something like that.
That's essentially how long I've been with the Commission.
4 5
MARSH:
Ok, Tim, I'm going to turn it over to you at this point, I 6
know you've got some questions that you want to start off with.
7 8
MARTIN:
Walt, I know you've run over these questions many many times g
and had to answer them alot of times, but I'd like to again have you 0
describe to us, how you got on site March 28, approximately what time, and describe to us where you went, what you saw and, I'm going to break in when I have some questions, if you don't mind, and we'll try to keep it running as a scenario, though.
15j BAUNACK:
Ok, I left tha office here about 9:00.
Smitty and I drove 16l i
down in his car and we got to Three Mile probably about 11:00 in the morning, quarter to 11 somewhere around 11:00. We went right to the north gate, the north Jate, they let us in fairly fast. We went to 19i i
the Unit 1 Control Roon.
Higgins and Gallina had already been there 20' and they had made arrangements to go to the Unit 2 Control Room because 21 you needed masks at the time.
The Unit 1 Control Room--it seemed like 22 Unit 2 Control Room us under control, I think she's down to 500 23 pounds, somewhere like that, apparently cooling down--so initially we 24 thought things were pretty much under control.
Then somehow high 25 f
l i
f
3 1.
activity came about, and we did not have masks so Smitty and I were 2'
asked to leave again, because everybody was donning on mask's and they had run out of masks. We left and they sent us up to the transformer 3
station for check out.
Smitty had on his nylon pants so he picked up 4
a lot of radon and we had to wait for him to cool off a little.
So we 5
6 stayed there maybe an hour, an hour and a half.
We went up to the information center to make arrangements for getting back in.
And I 7
w uld say, by 3:00 in the afternoon we were back in the Unit 2 Control 8
Room.
Next time we went in, we went right to Unit 2 Control Room.
g And I forget, Higgins might have still of been in there at the time.
O So then we just maintained telephone contact to HQ and Region I.
Smitty basically stayed on the phone and I primarily stayed out in the Control Room.
I don't really know what plant conditions were at the time but I remember there was, I think, no reactor coolant pumps operatir.g right.
They had pressurizer level, they were having trouble 16;l with letdown.
So that was the problem, you know, maintaining level, with probably pumping in more through the seals than they knew what they were letting down.
Letdown was through relief valve into the 18(
l holdup tanks, which were filling up.
19 20 MARTIN:
Walt, when you arrived initially in Unit 1 Control Room, who 21 was in charge there?
22 23 BAUNACK:
In the Unit 1 Control Room?
24 25 i
853 304 i
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.I 4
MARTIN:
Yes.
y 2'
BAUNACK: We went to the Shift Supervisors office where there were 3
several of our people in there.
You know, we were getting updated as 4
5 what the status was so we did not-you're talking about in charge t
6 7
8 9
BAUNACK:
Probably the Shift Supervisor was all, because everybody 10l else was over in Unit 2.
Although, now I think Jim Seelinger was in 11 Unit 1.
Yeah, in fact I'm pretty sure Seelinger was in Unit 1.
Probably at that time, nobody realized that the problem was as signifi-cant as it was, and Unit 1, I think was starting up, getting ready to l
go on the line, that's probably why Seelinger was in there.
15i 16{
MARTIN:
Ok, was there any move during this event to get Unit 1 back 17 on the line. Were they still progressing, trying to get Unit I started 18l up?
19l 20 BAUNACK:
We were mostly trying to get information on Unit 2, so I 21 think they were probably going along normally on Unit 1, maybe they 22 put a hold on where they were, but I think they were up to temperature 23 and pressure.
24l 25 I
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853 305 I
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5 MARTIN:
You didn't see them do any rod drop tests or anything else li like that?
2 31 4'
BAUNACK:
No.
5 6.
MARTIN:
Ok, when you arrived in Unit 2 around 3:00 p.m., what was the status there? Who was in charge? What kind of things were going on 7
that you can remember?
g 9f BAUNACK:
Well, like I say, I think there is no reactor coolant pumps 0
g running.
I think cooling was, well, interminently maintaining level I think by alternately opening and closing the stop valves and relief valves.
Does Is that pretty much jive with that?
14l 15l MARTIN:
Yeah, very much so.
{
16' BAUNACK:
Cause like I say, you loose track of time, you know, where we were at the time.
But the big interest was in getting a reactor coolant pump running--well, not the big interest--between letdown and 19l the reactor coolant pump, maintaining pressurizer level.
20l j
21 MARSH:
Just let me interject your reference.
Does it five with that, 22 you're making reference to the draft time line that the investigative 23 team was put together.
24 251 l
l 853 306 f
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6 BAUNACK:
Cause I've got temperatures and pressures and things like 1
2; that, you know, written down for various times, but it looks like the first one I have down is for 7:00 p.m.
And we had T hot there, it was 3
560, so we know she was hot, right, and I think at that time there was 4
5 reactor coolant pump running and there was problem with makeup and n
letdown--well, letdown.
61 7
^#9 8
9 BAUNACK:
Gary Miller, you would say, was in charge.
11 MARTIN: What was Gary Miller doing during this period of time?
13 BAUNACK:
Well, he and the Shift Superintendent and Shift Supervisors f
were all at the console, looking at their indication, trying to see 15i what to do with it.
16' 1
17' MARTIN:
Who was with Gary Miller at the time, do you remember?
18; i
19I j
BAUNACX:
Gee, I don't remember.
i 20l l
21{
MARTIN: Were readings being taken using decade boxes or resistance 22 boxes or movable boxes?
23 24 25 853 307 i
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7 11 BAUNACK:
In the control room?
2 MARTIN:
Did you see any connections or taking readings other than 3
4l through normal panel indications?
5 BAUNACK:
6 Well, we were basically on the front panel. If any of that was done, it was done on the back panels.
I wasn't particularly 7
conscious of any extra readings, or anything like that, being taken.
8 9'
MARTIN:
To your knowledge, was anyone using the primary temperature 10 recorder information that would be located on the left panel as you face the console?
13 BAUNACK:
Near where the pressuizer indications are?
i 15' MARTIN:
Actually on the back panel, on the vertical panel over there.
17 BAUNACK:
There were quite a few people in there, right, and exactly I
what everybody was looking at, you could'nt possibly tell for sure, so 19 whatever I said, I wouldn"t be sure.
20 21.
M. TIN:
Did it appear that people were stationed at certa 4 indicators,.
22 panel alarms and things like this to observe trends?
23 24 25 853 308 l
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8 1
BAUNACK:
Whatever trends there were, I'd say, were relatively slow at 1.
the time.
I don't think that it merited anybody special standing 2
3 there watching it from that point of view.
The pressurizer level was 4
a big interest, obviously everybody was looking at that.
And several f the recorders were pulled out so we could get a better trend over 5
6 the long period.
7 MARTIN:
Who was giving direction to the Control Room Operators, at g
this time?
g 10 BAUNACK:
I think Gary Miller, but you know, many people were involved in it.
12 13 MARTIN:
Directly, or through his supervisor?
15 BAUNACK:
Alot of the actions were taken by committee, sort of.
16}
Everybody was discussing what the problem was and what would be the 17 best thing to do.
But I'd say the Shift Supervisor was the final man, 18 giving the final instructions to the man pushing the switch.
19{
20 MARTIN:
Where were the decisions made.
We understand that there were 21.
litte caucuses that occurred and...?
22 23 BAUNACK:
Yeah, there were alot of decisions made, right.
Some big, 24 some small.
Many of them were made right in front of the console.
I 25 i
l 853 309 l
l'
9 think Toole was in there too and this time.
But now you know don't 1.
2, hold me to these, like I say I have forgotten the times and things, l
but there were a number of supervisory people, in there in addition to 3
Cary.
4 5
MARSH:
Could you approximate the number of people present in the Unit 6
2 Control Room when you arrived?
7 8
BAUNACK:
The number of people present versus the number of people g
actually involved in the problem probably differed by quite a bit.
10 111 MARSH:
How many people could you say were present in the Control Room?
13 14l 15l BAUNACK:
It is a relatively large Control Room with back panels.
I'd i
say 20 to 25 might be a good number.
16l 17 MARSH:
And did that numbv.* stay relatively constant during your tour 18{
in the Control Room or did it go up or down?
19 20 BAUNACK: Well, I was there for a week, so obviously, it went up and 21 l
down during that time, but I was always there in the daytime and in 22' the daytime normally there 5..s sre people around than at night.
23 24 25 853 310 i
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10 MARSH:
Ok, let's bracket into the first 6 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> that you were 1
2 present in the Control Room.
Did that number stay up around 20, or 3
did it go much higher, or did it drop down to much less?
4 BAUNACK: It would be a guess, but I'd say probably around 20.
We 5
stayed within a narrow group of people.
We were trying to find out 6
exactly what was hapoening to the plant and trying to relay the informa-7 tion back.
So we did not deal with alot of the peripheral people.
8 Health Physics had a fairly good establishment at the door there--
g there was probably 5 or 6 people there who we essentially didn't deal 10 with at all.
And there's quite a bit of going back and forth looking at prints and that type of thing. And getting back on the telephone.
13 MARTIN: What kind of telephone links were they using to the outside 15lj world?
16i I
BAUNACK:
They, the licensee, or us?
18l MARTIN:
Yes, the licensee.
19\\
20 BAUNACK:
They had their telephones at the Shift Supervisor's desk.
21 22 MARTIN: Were they using a speaker phone or...?
23 24 25l 3jj Br7xs i
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11 BAUNACK:
There was a speaker phone in there and it was used on occasion, 1.
2 but weather it was used right then, I don't know.
I know, every 3!
morning--well, we're really talking now Thursday morning--I think 4
Herbein and Miller were on the phone, the speaker phone, for a while I know, and I think that's when the decision was made to shut down Unit 5
I*
6 7
MARTIN:
Ok Walt, I want to concentrate on the day of the event.
And 8
I'd like to look very closely at this period, from the time you arrived g
in Unit 2 Control Room until we got the first reactor coolant pump 0
running.
I believe you have some data there, around 7:00, that you collected.
12 13 BAUNACK:
Yeah, I have readings here 7:00, 7:10, 7:20, 7:30, and then l
again 9:35, 9:50.
15' 16 MARTIN:
Could you read some of those numbers for us so that we could get them taped and recorded.
18 19 BAUNACK:
Yeah.
1630 looks like the first one I have--it looks like 20 560 pounds probably in the pressurizer and 590 T hot.
I have here, B 21:
has a bubble.
I think were saying the B steam generator, probably at 22 the time, our best guess was that there was a bubble in the B steam 23 generator.
24
"'I 853 312
12 MARTIN:
g Are you talking about in the primary side or secondary side?
2 BAUNACK-Secondary side.
No primary side, primary. ~
3 4
MARTIN:
Thank you.
5 6{
MARSH: Walt, what you're making.'eferende to, are these you original 7
notes?
8 9
8AUNACK:
Yeah.
These are--that's why there are no times or occasions, like here I fiave 1630.
Other notes are just numbers with no times I don't even know what they are in some cases, but I'm also sure some of 12 these are in response to questions that we got on the telephone, where I wrote down the numbers without anything going along with them.
14j l
151 MARSH:
In case it hasn't been said, be and preserve those and...
16 17 BAUNACK:
Yeah, but you see the condition their in.
There will be 18-'
l some worthwhile information, but there's alot of information that I 19l have no idea what it is.
And we have T hot for 7 p.m. 7:10, 7:20 and 20 7:30 and, at 560, 557, 556, 548.
21 22 MAR 1]:
Walt, are those numbers off a chart recorder?
23 24 25 853 313 i
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13 8AUNACK:
Yeah, the chart recorder right in the front.
7 l
2:
MARSH: Were they taken by yourself or were they called out and you 3
just...
5 BAUNACK:
...I think it's just the temperature indicator.
7 MARTIN:
So this is just a dial indicator and not where it's actually 8
recorded on a trend chart.
And what were those numbers again, Walt, and at what times?
10 11 BAUNACK:
T hot 7 p.m., I have 560; 7:10, 557; 7:20, 556; 7:30, 548; and T cold for the A and the B.
I tell you what, if you want to write these down why don't you write them down up here.
14 1
15l 16l MARTIN:
These times also correspond?
17 BAUNACK:
Right, coming down this way.
18l 19 MARTIN:
Alright, then at 7:00 p.m. we have a T cold on the A loop at 4
20 360; on the B loop-220; at 7:10 we have a T cold on the A loop of 380, 21 and on the B loop-240; at 7:20 we have an A loop T cold of 390, and a 22 B loop of 240; at 7:30 we have a T cold A loop of 410, and a B loop of 23 220.
Walt, what are these numbers here?
24 25 853 314 k
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14 BAUNACK:
Pressurizer pressure.
1 l
2' MARTIN:
Alright, for the record pressurizer pressure is 2300 constant 3
4 f r all those readings.
5 6
That's each of those time periods tnat you mentioned earlier?
MARSH:
7 BAUNACK:
That's affirmative.
I don't know what they'd run.
Now, I 8
guess I started logging--see, we come down here at 7:40, 7:50, 8:15, g
8:40 and 9:15.
So, you know, there's a lot of numbers.
I think, if 0
you want to get them, why don't we get them later.
12 MARTIN: What I'll do, if you don't mind is we'll get a xerox of this one page and...
1 52 BAUNACK:
And thi-- all this information right went back on the telephone 16 to HQ.
That was the principal reason for getting it.
18, MARSH:
Alright, during this period, Walt, the primary system was 19 pressurized. What was the licensee attempting to do at this point?
20 21 BAUNACK:
Establish makeup and letdown--that was part of it--and get a 22 reactor coolant pump running.
23 24 25l u5.7
.T 15 0
l
d 15 gj MARSH: What problems was he having in establ,ishing makeup and letdown?
2:
BAUANCK: Well, letdown flow--well, they essentially lost letdown 3
fl w.
4 It appeared they had lost letdown flow.
For a while it was releaving ut through a relief valve to the holdup tank.
And as a 5
g result of that they were afraid they were putting more water in than 7-they could let out, so pressurizer level was increasing.
I think prior to that they'd been controlling letdown with the relief valve, g
the stop valve on the relief valve, the relief valve still hung open.
g 10 MARTIN:
The relief valve that you are referring to is the electromatic relief valve, located on top of the pressurizer.
13 BAUNACK:
Right.
I 15l MARTIN:
During this period, was there a normal letdown flow through the letdown coolers?
17 18 BAUANCK:
Yeah, it was a normal flow path, but there are number of 191 l
bypasses which they tried to get open.
One bypass--the intent was to
. 201 I
try to get it opened, but I don't remember whether this was that 21!
afternoon or the next morning.
But because of high radiation readings 22 in the area, you couldn't get that bypass open.
They had what bypasses 23 they could have op;n down at the makeup tank.
24 25 i
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16 MARTIN:
I see.
You had indicated that they may have changed the 1:
2, pressure in the makeup tank to assist in establishing letdown flow?
3 BAUNACK:
I think Thursday morning, didn't they drop the pressure in 4l the makeup tank?
5 6
MARTIN:
I'm not sure.
8 BAUNACK:
I think there was also a release associated with that.
They g
had another release on Thursday morning, didn*t they?
11 MARTIN:
I'm unaware of one.
There may have been one.
I have not looked at that record.
13 14 BAUNACK:
I'm sure, you go through the records.
And I think there was 15 a release associated with that drop in the pressurizer volume control, 16:
or on the makeup tank.
17 18j MARTIN:
Were you continuously in the Control Room from the time that 19l
~
l you arrived, around 3:00 p.m., until these readings were taken at 20' 7:00?
21 22 BAUNACK:
Yeah, with the exception of the back room, right, the Shift 23 Supervisor's office and the telephone.
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17 1
MARTIN:
Understood. When you originally arrived the pressure was 2
relatively low in the primary system.
3 BAUNACK:
I got a 560 pounds here at 1630, and I don't know whether 4
5 that was pressurizer pressure or not; and I got a 590 for T hot.
It 6
w uld probably be primary system pressure.
7 MARTIN:
Given the...
8 9
BAUNACK:
This one has become suspect, because, well, here we're 10 saying 1900, 2200 and then we're down to 1300, 1180, 1050.
Do they look like your numbers?
13 MARTIN:
Ah, yes they do...
15 BAUNACK:
...that you've run across.
Ok, so that was probably pressurizer pressure.
18 M%RTIN:
And I guess, obviously there must have been some overt decision 19 that took them from this low pressure up to this higher pressure.
20 21 BAUNACK:
That was the surprising thing.
When we left, we thought 22 things were pretty much under control.
Just before we left Unit 1 23 Control Room, I remember asking Seelinger, "What's the pressure now",
24 thinking that they would prcbably cooling down to come down on RHR.
25 l
853 318
18 And he said it was higher than what it had been before, I don't know l{
2 what it was, but quite a bit higher, because I remember saying, well 3
"geez, we're not making much progress".
4 MARTIN:
So you didn't here any discussion of why pressure was allowed 5
6 to increase to this level, or that, in fact, that they were shooting for this pressure?
7 8
BAUNACK:
I suspect they were trying to come lucir up in pressure, g
right, to prevent steaming in the core.
11 MARTIN:
Ok, but you don't have any knowledge of a decision that was made to do this?
13 14j BAUNACK:
Well, no. Wee when I was here, you see, pressure was back 15 j
up, so you assumed the core was working, the system was solid.
And I 16!
am quite certain what the assumtion was at this time was that core was wet, and that the bubble the was in 8 steam generator.
18' 19 MARTIN:
Did you happen to notice pressurizer level, during this 20 period of around 7:00, when you had the high pressure readings?
21 22-BAUNACK:
Yeah, I definitely noticed it because many times I remember 23 calling it in on the telephone.
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'l MARTIN:
00 you remember whether it was full or...?
2 BAUNACK:
I think running up--I was giving it to him basically in 3
4 percent of scale, which was around 75%, because at that time we weren't familiar with their numbers.
So 75% full, I think.
5 6
MRTIN:
Alright Walt. Were you there when they started the reactor 7
coo bnt pump in the B loop?
8 9
BAUNACK:
Yeah, initially bumped it once for a few seconds and then 10 went back...?
3 12 MARTIN:
Who directed that the pump be bumped?
14' BAUNACK:
Oh, wait a minute.
Ross was there too...
I 16j MARTIN:
Mike Ross?
18 BAUNACK:
Yeah, and Mike Ro:s, Gary Miller and possibly Toole was there too.
And anyway, the decision had been made to start the pumps so you had the choice, start and. leave it run, or bump it and see what 21 happens.
And the decision was made to bump it and see what happens.,
22 And you were looking at currents and flows...
23 24 25 o ~ 7, 320 Uds I.
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1 20 l
MARTIN:
What was the result of this bumping of the reactor coolant 1l 2!
P"*Pi l
3
.q It was a relatively short bump, right, maybe 5 seconds, BAUNACK:
somewhere in that range.
And everybody was satisfied and nothing S
6 strange was happening with the pump, you know, current readings, weird flow indications, anything like that.
7 8
i MARTIN:
I understand that there was a bit of elation in the Control g
Room after they had bumped the pump, and that things did look.rather 10l normal.
12 BAUNACK:
I don't know what you'd call elation...I think everybody was pleased that nothing tore up.3n the pump.
15j MARTIN:
Do you remember a.1y specific indications of improvement in 16' conditions as a result of bumping that pump?
18(
BAUNACK:
No, I don't know what you are trying to get at, but, you 19l know, the problems were still there, right.
But it would seem right 20 that getting the pump going would give you better cooling.
21 22 MARTIN:
Understood.
23 24 053 321 25 i
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21 1.
BAUNACK:
You know, I think that there still was a lot of feeling to 2
get the thing cooled down, get it down on RHR.
3 4
MARTIN:
Did they bump the pump again at soate later later time?
5 ;
BAUNACK:
No, they put the bump on the line shortly after that first 6
7 bump.
8 MARTIN:
Do you remember the approximate delay in the restart of the g
P"*P?
10 11 BAUNACK:
Like I say, you lose track of time.
If I had to guess, I'd say maybe three minutes, but that might be off by a half hour, for all I know.
To the best of my recollection, shortly after the bump, the pump was put into service and left in service.
16' MARTIN:
To your knowledge, did they make any special preparations for starting of the pump, or bumping the pump originally, and then when they decided to run it continuously, did they make any additinnal preparations?
20 21.
BAUNACK:
I don't know what you mean by preparations.
22 23 MARTIN:
Such as repressurizing the plant, referring to pressure j
24 i
temperature curves, verification of seal flow, things like this.
25 i
853 522 i
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e 22 1
BAUNACK:
Yeah, well, seal flow'and things like that was normally looked at.
2!
3 MARTIN:
You didn't see any special efforts underway here to make sure 4
5 that reactor coolant pump is going to run properly.
6 BAUNACK:
Yeah, all the interest was in seeing that the reactor coolant 7
pump was run properly, that she was going to continue to run.
8 9
MARTIN:
Did you see anyone, during your whole stay in Unit 2 Control 10 Room, ever refer to steam tables?
12 BAUNACK:
The pump curves, which to some extent are steam tables...
14 MARTIN:
They incorporate steam tables?
16!
BAUNACK:
Yeah, they were out and open on the operators desk.
We looked at them.a couple of. times.
19 MARTIN:
Did you see other people referring to them?
21 BAUNACK:
The fact that there out and open would seem like somebody 22 was referring to them.
23 24 25 033 323
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1 MARTIN:
Did you see standard steam tables?
2 BAUNACK:
I think you' re...
3 4
MARTIit:
5l I'm looking a Keenan and Keyes, or an ASME 1967 Steam Tables, r anything that would...
6 7
BAUNACK:
I didn't see anybody looking at one.
8 9
10 11 BAUNACK:
I think your probably trying to get at, did they realize they had a bubble in the reactor, is that what your talking about?
14 MARTIN:
I'm interested to know whether they know what the saturatation conditions were during this cent.
17!
BAUNACK:
Well, I think the fact that she was back up in pressure, that was the best they could do anyway.
And I guess they were holding 19l l
her pretty high pressure for a while there.
The bubble was usumed--
20 you knew you had a bubble too by--well, occasionally they tried to 21, spray here, it because, you see, the pressurizer pressure came down, 22 so once we started spraying the level would come up.
We'd spray, 23 right, because after the pump was going, you could spray again.
So 24l when you'd spray, it d: 1pped the pressure some.
But there was still 25 i
l
24 1
some thought to depressurizing.
And as soon as your pressure came 2
down a little bit, pressurizer level would come up, so you knew you 3
had some sort of vapor, or " Billy, the bubble", whatever you want to 4.
call, it in there, which confused the situation, or confused a normal 5
cool down, put it that way.
6l f
MARTIN:
7 When you arrived in the control room, around 3:00, trend recorders would show that we were at very low pressure.
In fact the 8
chart recorder from the plant would indicate that we were about 450 g
p unds.
Do you know what the licensee was attempting to do at this 10 time?
12 BAUNACK:
Yeah, to get the bubble out, to collapse the bubble.
That was the reason for coming back up in pressure, now that I think about i t.
15j 16 MARTIN:
Okay.
At around 1600, we had indications that they again attempted to depressurize the plant by opening the EMOV.
Do you remember any specific actions by the licensee to try to get down to 19l the decay heat removal pump pressure limits so that they could actually 20 operate the decay heat removal systems?
21 22 23 She wasn't coming down that fast in pressure, that going on BAUNACK:
decay was imminent.
So theta was not that much discussion about decay heat.. Because I remember la er, when we got the sample, that was when 25 I said, " hey you may not want to go c,n decay heat".
I i
853 325 i
25 MARTIN:
What sample was this, Walt?
1 2l BAUNACK:
That's the primary sample.
3 4
MARTIN:
5 What time was that sample taken, and do you have the approximate activities associated with?
6 7
BAUNACK:
I thought it was Thursday night.
Let me see, I've got it 8
written in here somewhere, but whether I have the time or not--I g
should have went through these notes earlier--Ok, I've got--remember they started pumping out that industrial sump.
That was another telephone hassle, you might say. We went back and forth on that.
I have here the results, EMR readingc. on the sample, but I don't have the time...But really, I can say, that's when everybody started realizing what a significant problem it was.
Up until there it would still seem 15l l
like it was nct that great a problem.
I think everybody knew there was some core damage, fuel damage, but not serious.
And the bubble, 171 too, was thought to be a steam bubble, not a noncondensable bubble.
18j u
MARTIN:
Because of the location of these notes sequentially, do you 20 believe that it would occur sometime that night after the reactor 21 6
coolant pump had started?
I 22 23 BAUNACK:
Oh yeah, it sas well after.
053 326 24 25
26 MARSH: What were the MR readings on the sample.
You indicated you 1
had them there.
2.
3 BAUNACK:
4 Ok, I had one millileter as a 100mR at 3 feet, and a 100 milliliter was 70 to 80/R or 1 foot, and 10 to 30/R at 3 foot.
I 5
think those were pretty much well publicized numbers.
Thev were given 6
on the phone and everything.
7 8
MARTIN: Well right, now we have two investigative teams: one that is g
looking at the radiological aspects of this, and one is looking at the operational events.
Ffor the operational people first, since I represent I
them, can you comment on anything that I haven't questioned you on, 12l that you feel might assist us in understanding this event?
14 l
BAUNACK: I don't know from what point of view.
From the operators 15l point of view, all right.
Well, I'm sure the reason for going back up in pressure was to get rid of a steam bubble.
Nobody had realized, 17 that it could be a hydrogen bubble.
18 19l
}
MARTIN:
You heard this discussed, Gary Miller and others, or...?
20' 21 BAUNACK:
Yeah, and we even looked at the elevation drawings. Well, 22 after awhile, I don't know how the information came out that the 23 l
bubble was in the reactor.
I don't know who made that decision or 24l t
where it came from, but after awhile, seeing people were looking at 25l l
853 327
27 y
the bubble from the point of view of being in the reactor.
And I 2
remember looking at the elevation drawings to see if this bubble grew 3
as pressure decreased, where it would go, and how to get rid of it, from that point of view.
And I think the'getting rid of it, gradually, 4
through makeup and lengthing off--ot was a gradual decision, it wasn't 5
I made just like that.
Alot of these decisions were not instaneously 6
made; they were made in groups and in meetings.
And the licensee was 7
v ry open.
We were involved in the discussions just as well as anybody 8
else.
9 10 MARTIN:
Understood.
Can you think of anything else that might assist us in understanding this event?
13 BAUNACK:
I don't know.
Try to more specific from what point of view.
14, The thermoccuplo of readings in there, they became important somewhere 15 along the line.
At least there was alot of interest in them, more 16.
from the NRC point of view, though, than the licensee's.
17 18 MARTIN: Were these thermocouple readings being taken at the computer 19 console, or were they being taken from some jacks in the back of the 20 room?
21 22 BAUNACK:
There were some taken locally.
The I&C was taking some 23 locally, I think, mostly to try to check to see that the computer was 24 giving good readings.
I guess there were some periods in there where 25 I
i I
853 328 l
- )
.9
28 1
they had gotten alot of question rarks, where they overranged the instrument.
I think they only read to 600 degrees, if I rpraber, 2,
3 something like that.. 700, whatever...anyway, I guess if you overrange it, she would print questions marks.
4 5
A IN:
I see.
6 7
BAUNACK:
So for a time there they had very little faith in it.
But g
then as it appeared that they were reading correctly, the faith in it g
became stronger and stronger.
0 11' MARTIN: Who was calling information at the computer console?
13 BAUNACK:
We were getting it ourselves.
i 15i l
MARTIN:
Ok, so the NRC people were punching up and asking for data to 16i come out of the...
17 18{
BAUNACK:
In getting these thermocouples data, we were getting that 19 ourselves almost every time.
20 21 MARTIN:
Ok, so you guys were trained in how to get this information 22 out of the computer.
Did these consist of maps and core thermocouple 23 maps, or what were they?
24 25 853 329 I
L
)
29 1.
BAUNACK:
No, they just read out.
You can punch in it any individual 2
thermocotJple right, or we put them in a groups so we can get maybe 14 3
r 15 that would print as one group, and then you have to ask for the 4
remainder of them individually.
51 MARTIN:
Since we're using the word we, there must have been another 6
[
inspector with you at this time.
8 BAUNACK:
No, I think just Smitty and I were in there at this time.
g I
10 MARTIN:
Ok, this is Ray Smith and yourself.
11!
l 12!
BAUNACK:
Yeah, and Ray would spend most of the time on the phone, except many times they would come back with questions.
Rather than 15l!
try to explain it to Ray and I would get on the pnone talk to them.
i 16' MARTIN:
Ok, Wal t.
t 18t BAUNACK:
A certain number of parameters are always displayed on the 19; CRT.
20 21, I
MARTIN:
Recognizing that you are were very operationally oriented 22I during this time-you were responding to operational type questions, 23 do you have any insights or input tnat might assist the radiological 24 investigative team on things that were occurring, Health Physics 25i practices that you saw, maybe off the periphery, anything?
oa,; G0 u
i
30 1
BAUNACK:
No, Health Physics was not much--well, with the exception o.f 2
where to go and where you could go, like to open bypasses around the 3
filters and that, if I remember right, one of the reach rods was off.
4 It wa: probably a problem, because I wrote that down in my notes.
I i
5 remember thinking that it would really pay to keep a plant in first 6
class shape for when you have a problem like this.
And I remember 7
when they were discussing trying to go down and open that, they got as Close as they could, and I think they were reading six or seven g
hundred R in the area.
g 10 MARTIN:
You indicated that one area of the control room was occupied by Health Physics type people.
13 BAUNACK:
At the door there, they had set up a table.
Again, I'm I
saying I lost track of time, so I don't know whether this was that 15i j
first day or not.
But Health Physics was a big consideration in it all the time.
And what's the HPs name?
17 18' MARTIN:
Dick Dubiel?
19 20 SAUNACK:
Yeah, he was, I think, doing an excellent job.
He seemed to 21, be on top of everything.
22 23 MARTIN:
Was he actually in Unit 2 Control Room supervising the Health 24 Physics aspects of the recovery?
25 i
l 853 331 I
31 BAUNA_CK:
He was on and off in the Control Room.
y i
21 MARTIN: Would he consult with Miller or Ross or...
3 4
BAUNACK:
Yeah.
There was a lot of exchange of information among the 5
high level people, and as well as us.
We were kept informed at what 6
was going on, you know, and we were right with them.
And so there was 7
no hiding anything from us, nor was there anything that we didn't s'ee.
g That's why, you know, if you have specific question--the only thing you can't relate them to time, like what was done with the letdown system, all those--there is just no way of telling.
There were a number of different things tried.
And I don't know for sure how much of this they were logged cause I remember talking to Gary later.
I said, " gee you should probably start writing some of this stuff down",
i cause I'm not sure how well logs and things like that were being taken 15l at the time.
16 17 MARSH:
Did you notice anyone taking notes? Was there a record keeper 18 present?
19j 20 BAUNACK:
For a while there, I didn't notice anybody.
But yeah, the 21..
reactor operator was there, the two console operators were there.
But j
22 they were, to some extent, also involved in the discussions and what 23 was going on.
24 25l i
853 332 l
l 32 MARSH:
You initially...
1 2
BAUNACK:
I'm sure there was some notes taken, but how detailed they 3
4, were, I don't know.
Have you gotten a chance to look at the log book?
5 MARTIN:
Yes, we have.
6 7
BAUNACK: Were they very detailed or were there alot of open space?
8 9
MARTIN:
I specifically have not looked at it.
0 11 MARSH:
Walt, you arrived, you said, at what, about 3:00 in the afternoon the first day? Were there respirators being worn when you arrived?
14 i
BAUNACK:
I think we wore them up into the Control Room.
We could 15]
l take them off in the Control Room, if I remember right, I know we had to wear them on the way in.
17 18(
MARSH:
During the subsequent days, do you recall going back into 19l l
respirators at any time?
20l 21 BAUNACK:
Not in the Control Room, or maybe there was one day, one 22 case, where they said put them back on.
But I don't even remember 23 that, whether that was for sure or not.
I know we wore them to leave 24 and things like that, that r.ipht.
25; 053 333 i,
t w
33 MARSH:
O k.
You made reference to accessing the computer for the 1
2 thermocouple readings and that, you were there for, I think you said a week, a fairly long time afteIvards.
Ddid you have much experience 3
4 w rking with that computer during that week period? Were you in and b ut it, have reason to use it?
5 6
BAUNACK:
Other than for thermocouple readings, we did not use it for 7
too'much.
9 MARSH:
Can you give me some of feelings on the maintenance of that 11j!
machine--did it operate properly while you were in and about it, did 12i it constantly jam up?
13 BAUNACK:
No, no, it was operating, and a lot of other people were i
14{
using it, too.
15j 16 MARSH:
You observed no problems with that computer, specifically 17 l
paper feed...Do you recall it jamming up with paper at any time and 18{
having to be shut off for any period of time?
19 20l BAUNACK:
Not, not that I was aware of.
21 22 MARSH:
Are you aware of anyone else from the company discussing 23 problems with that computer regarding its failure to properly feed 24 paper?
25 I
l 853 334 i
t m
34 1
BAUNACK:
No.
I can't remember paper being a problem.
It seemed like 2,
we were getting all the information.
Well, Terry Harpster, he was 3
w rking it, you know, after the first or second day.
He got a kick 4
out of it, you might say.
5 MARSH:
Terry Harpster from Region III?
6 7
BAUNACK:
Yeah, and I don't remember him having any problem.
And we 8
were, as we called in the hourly readings, we would generally leave g
them on the desk there.
We had quite a stack of computer printouts.
10
~
In fact, I think we got mot of them right off the computer paper.
We weren't writing them down so, no, I don't know of any problems.
13 MARTIN: Walt, when you entered the Unit 2 Control Room, where did you station yourself initially--what part of the Control Room did you 151 I
occupy?
16' 17 BAUNACK:
For all practical purposes, we had the freedom of the Control 18!
l Room.
They were not adhering to any lines or anything like that.
We 19l l
just walked right in right into where the problem was.
I think Higgins 20 was in there when I got there.
So initially I got updated by Higgins, 21 and I might have went in and talked on the phone some.
And the rest 22 of the time I spent right out at the console...or back-- w'ierever you 23 wanted to go to get any information you wanted.
The Control Room 24 wasn't crowded--25 people in that Control Room is not a lot.
That's a i
large Control Room.
853 335 i
35 MARSH:
What about background noise levels, a lot of conversation 1
2 going n?
3 BAUNACK:
4!
A couple of times, especially during the watch change.
And the Shift Supervisor then put a clamp on it.
5 6l MARSH:
And how about the demeanor of the people, particularly on the 7
first day. Was it, do you feel it was a calm and cool Control Room?
g Were these people panicking? Or at what level would you put it?
g 10 BAUNACK:
There was no panic whatsoever.
If you' walked in just a stranger, you would say it was a normal plant shutdown, or something like that.
There was no panic or anything.
In fact, I would say I
everything that was being done was a considered action.
It was a 141 I
difficult time in the plant and...
15!
16i l
MARTIN:
Wer they using procedures, Walt.
Did they have procedures 17l l
out during this period of time?
18j
- 19f, BAUNACK:
There weren't using them, but there was no procedure covering this either.
21 22 I
MARTIN:
You didn't see any procedures out for a cooldown, or for 23 a....
24 25i i
t,
36 i
1;.
BAUNACK:
Normally, in our inspection effort, we look at procedures 2
and see the things that are going in accordance with procedures.
But n we didn't.
In this case, there was no point looking at a procedure 3
4 because you wouldn't be doing anything in accordance 'with a procedure, except you know operating the pumps, that type a thing.
In fact, you I
5 hear different stories as to why the reactor coolant pump was shutdown, 6
you know, in the first place.
And the person I asked, he just got out 7
the pump curve and said, "we were here on the curve", and he shut it 8
down; then later I heard because of vibration.
g 10 MARTIN:
Who would that person have been?
12 BAUNACK:
To my knowledge it wasn't shut down...Who was the person 14l!
that got out the curve?
15 MARSH:
Yeah.
l 16 17 l
BAUANCK:
Whoever was the reactor operator at the time.
18{
19l l
MARSH:
You don't recall specifically what it was?
20 21 i
BAUNACK:
No.
22 23 MARSH:
Do you recall what percentage of the time Miller spent in the 241 1
Control Room, speaking of Gary Miller now, versus what percentage of 25 the time he was back in the back office?
l 853 337 i-
37 1
BAUNACK:
Oh gee...
2 MARSH:
Well, let's take just the first day.
3 4l BAUNACK:
I'd say he spent 80% of his time in the Control Room.
I got 5
6 there from 3:00 in the evening till 3:00 that morning.
And I'd say, of that time, Gary Miller probably spent 80 to 90% of his time in the 7
8 9
MARSH.
9mmunication between Miller and his people--was it relatively 10 open, or did he have it established that it was filtered as it came on up to him and he conversed with a relatively small group of people.
Do you recall which...
14 BAUNACK:
It was 100% open, as far as I know.
15l 16 MARSH:
So there was alot of interchange between his people...
18(
i BAUNACK:
Many of the phone calls between Miller and Herbein were on 19 the speaker phone.
In fact, like I say, the decision to shut down 20 Unit I was made by Herbein.
I think it was Thursday morning.
Because 21i Miller asked him "what are we going to do with Unit 1", and he probably 22 said, "in view of the situation", or something like that, "I think 23 we'd better shut it down", words like that.
This is just an example, 24 right, everything was open.
M:ny times the, well we sort of set up 25l i
853 338
[
1
38 1
our headquarters in their Shift Superintendents office, and that was 2
also where they had held there meetings.
And they would go right 3
ahead and hold there meetings, free discussions, while we were on the 4
phone.
5 MARTIN: Walt, it's my understanding that sometime during the afternoon 6
7 of this sequence, Mr. Miller and Mr. Herbein left to--they had an g
appointment, I believe, with the state house.
Do you know of anything about tnis--do you have any knowledge of this?
g 10 BAUNACK:
Herbein, I didn't see Herbein.
I have no idea of what Herbein was doing.
I 13l MTRTIN:
Understood.
Did you notice that Miller left and was gone for l
a period of time or...
15i i
i 16 BAUNACK:
If I had to guess, which it would be is a guess, I'd say Miller was there all the time this first day.
19l MARTIN:
So he may have gone earlier in the afternoon, because you don't remember seeing him gone during the period that you were there.
22 BAUNACK:
No, but that is also not saying that he couldn't have went 23 for a while.
24 25 853 339
~
39 1l MARTIN:
Understood.
2 BAUNACK:
But I didn't know of him going.
If I had to guess, I'd say 3
4 he was here from, all along when I was there.
5 MARSH:
6 Ok, were at a break point here, I'm going to terminate this tape and turn it over.
The time is 9:49.
I'm reading 690 on the 7
meter, so at this time I'm going to break.
8 9
MARSH:
The time is 9:50. We're resumming with side 2 of the first 0
cassette of the interview of Walter Baunack.
I believe you still had 1 or 2 items, Tim.
13 MARTIN: Walt, I'm going to cut off here.
Is there any additional piece of information that you would like tn provide us at this time?
16 BAUNACK:
I think the seriousness of the problem was not recognized I
18 very early, so I think there was very little input from a level of management higher than Gary Miller.
Like GPU, I don't know when they i
19l l
got involved in it.
And I think had people realized what a serious 20l I
problem they had, they probably could have gotten more information 21 from other sources, other than the operating people.
I don't know i
22 either, when they secured a seal flow to the burning pumps in an 23 effort to help out with putting to much water in the reactor because 24 of the problem with letdown.
And I think there are alot of places 25 l
853 340 e
40 1
where information could have been gotten from either B&W of GPU earlier, 2.
had people realized what kind of a problem they had.
3 MARSH: Were you privy to any communications between the licensee and 4
5 s me of these other agencies, such as Babcock and Wilcox.
Do you recall overhearing any phone conversations or any other discussions 6
about them having talked to B&W, and if so, what time and what date?
8 BAUNACK:
Yeah, again I have to say I lost complete track of time...
g 10 MARSH:
To the best of your recollection.
12!
BAUNACK:
I would say, it certainly wasn't that first day.
I don't think there was too often much input from outside sources.
That's why 15l I think Gary was probably there all the time because he was making 1
most of the decisions--well he and his staff, not he personnally alone in every signal decision.
And I think Seelinger came in that therc l
that day, too.
I'd say most of his top people were there for that 18(
first day, but they were making most of the decisions.
As far as I 19 could see, now they may have been getting some words somewhere else, 20 but that first day it was basically site people making all the decisions, 21, I thought.
22 23 MARSH: What role did Joe 8. gan play? Any key role or just as another 24 advisor?
25 i
1,53 341 I
I t
41 1,
8AUNACK:
As another advisor, I'd say.
2 MARSH:
And Zewe, William Zewe.
3 4
BAUNACK:
Bill Zewe was there, I'd say, as another advisor and trying 5
to, do as much as he cou'ld.
I understand he was on watch when it 61 7
happened, is that right?
8 MARSH: We bel' eve that's true.
g 10 BAUNACK:
I didn't know--In fact, that was one thing we did very lii,tle in the way of talking about operator error and that type thing.
It just didn't seem like the time to do it.
14 MARTIN:
We're given the impression, Walt that the philosophy seemed 15l to be "let's not look back at how we got here, let's see how we can get out of this condition".
18?
BAUNACK:
Exactly, or to find fault with people for getting here.
.19 20 MARTIN:
There is very little retrospective on anybody's part.
21 22 BAUNACK:
I shouldn't say that, because you see in the notes here, 23 fairly early...We're going through what happened: lost polishers, 24i j
first turbine trip, reactor trip and so forth; and emergency feed came 25l i
I 853 342
42
~1 n and relief valve lifted and so forth.
Now this was sort of, somewhat 2
an attempt to find as to what happened, so you shouldn't say nothing was done.
3 4
MARTIN:
Thank you, Walt, for clarifing.
5 6
MARSH:
From the position of that in your notes, it's looking like 7
it's about the third page and it comes ight after where you were 8
marking times down...
g 10' BAUNACK:
It comes right after 10:55 in the evening.
12 MARSH:
So that would be at approximately 11:00 p.m. that night that I
they were at least into some analytical state as to what had happened, 14l 15l what was the sequence of events.
1 l
16l l
BAUNACK:
Yeah.
17 18{
MARTIN:
Do you have any feel for when you were recording this? Was 19{
i this a result of a Gary Miller and other conversation, or what?...Or 20 no recollection?
21.
22 BAUNACK:
You can tell it's between 10:55 and 12:00.
23 24 25l 8r)} }43 i
l i
l l
l 1
1.
43 MARSH:
7 Ok, Walt, as Tim indicated, if you have anything else that you w uld like to bring up or discuss, or anything you like to make a 2
matter of record, regarding these activities of the licensee for the 3
first couple of days, I'd like to turn the mike over to you for anything 4
y u'd like to discuss.
5 6
BAUNACK: Well, if I had to say anything, I think the operating people 7
didn't get enough offsite support.
That might be a bad way of putting 8
it, but I think they maybe could have gotten more.
Because we--the g
next day you'd go back and watch T.V., and it seemed like...well Herbein is a plant knowlegeable type, he seemed more interested in Television and things like that, than he was in his plant, which to me was a surprise.
And I would of thought they would of drawn more of an engineering staff in there earlier, because there were a lot of things that had to be evaluated, like putting the plant on RHR.
And I think it was probably the Commission, because I remember when we got that 16 sample going on the phone and saying " hey, you might not want to put 17 this plant on RHR", because I remember looking for the surveillance 18 test to see what the leakage was, and the routine, just to see what 191 i
type of problem we would be getting.
And I don't think the licensee 20' ever looked at that from that point of view.
I was talking to Teole 21.
he said, well, they would do a surveillance on it before they put it 22 on RHR.
23 24 m"7 344 r
2s I
44 MARSH:
Is there any particular time, in your mind, that you could 1
2 recollect that the full impact of what they were into began to be known to the operators and that, or is it that it grew gradually over 3
the day?
4 5
BAUNACK:
It definitely grew gradually.
Up until that sample, I 6
think, nobody realized the problem.
7 8
MARSH:
And that sample was taken, again, at approximately what time.
g Or is that the one we couldn't pin down the time on?
11 l
BAUNACK:
Whatever the time is, its well known, because we went and 12(
put it on the phone as soon as we got it.
So whatever that time l
was...just gradually, it became important to review procedures.
You 141 i
know, for awhile things were being done without procedures, and then 15l gradually the need for it and the importance...
16 17 MARSH:
At about what time during that week's stay, if it happened 18[
during that period, do you recall them getting back to a more orderly 19l or a more procedurally oriented approach to the operation?
21, BAUNACK:
I'd say, Friday or Saturday.
The sample was taken Thursday 22' evening, I'd say, sometime.
And I think up until that time, I don't 23 think anybody really realized what a problem they had.
That includes 24 the Commission, I think.
The one thing that surprised me, on the part 25 B51 345 l
l
l 45 1.
f Commission, was with all the problems this plant had, they were 2
concerned about discharging an industrial waste tank, when that plant 3
was sitting chere with the potential for a horrendous release.
I g
think it was not the time to be concerned about that industrial waste 5,
So that sort of made me think, anyway, people, even our people, tank.
did not realize what a problem that plant had.
You know, you look 6
back at the numbers now, too, and say " gee, that core was probably in 7
trouble, but I didn't recognize it, in all honesty, and neither did g
the people in the Control Room. Tto them and to everybody else, it g
seemed that the plant was pretty much under control.
They were considering 10 contingency plans, things like that, in the event she went solid on them, and stuff like that.
And they even had gone so far as to make the decision because they had cycled the stop valve to the pressurizer release valve.
So many times they didn't have any faith in it any 15l more.
So if they had to go solid, had to cool with it, they would j
open it once and leave it open, so as not to take a chance that it stick and close on them.
So many things were being considered.
18f i
MARSH:
Ok, that's all I've got.
Walt we'd like to say thank you for 19 your time and, your recollection.
If there is nothing else, the time 20 being 9:58, I'm going to terminate the interview and end at that time.
21 Thanks an awful lot for coming in. We appreciate how you.. 0k, the 22 time then is 9:58.
We're at 859 on the meter.
I'll be shutting it 23 down.
2.
23l:
853 346 L
L u