ML19296C313
| ML19296C313 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Aerotest |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1980 |
| From: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Newacheck R AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002250558 | |
| Download: ML19296C313 (1) | |
Text
T/G pa nEc u o
UNITED STATES
$.j " f 8
NUC. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'-\\0 5
REGION V o, ff?J c#
1990 N. CALIFORNIA BOULEVARD
'\\
[
SUITE 202. WALNUT CREEK PLAZA WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNI A 94596 February 1,1980 Docket No. 50-228 Aerotest Operations, Inc.
3455 Fostoria Way San Ramon, California 94583 Attn: Mr. R. L. Newacheck President Gentlemen:
The enclosed Circular 80-02 is forwarded to you for information.
If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested actions, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
)ct A
R. H. Engelken Director Enclosures :
1.
IE Circular No. 80-02 2.
List of IE Circulars Recently Issued 8 00 2 25 0 SSS
SSINS No.: 6830 Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 7912190657 NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0!!'1ISSION OFFICE OF INSDECTION AND ENFORCE' TENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 D f,
}
9?
4 d
Februarv 1, 1980 dJ IE Circular No. 80-02 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STAFF WORK HOURS Description of Circunstances:
Studies indicate that with fatigue, especially because of loss of sleep, an individual's detection of visual signals deteriorates markedly, the tine it takes for a person to rake a decision increases and more errors are made, and reading rates decrease.
Other studies show that fatique results in personnel ignoring some signals because they develop their own subjective standards as to what is important, and as they betone more fatiqued they ignore more signals.
Inspections of personnel perfornance and training since the accident at Three Mile Island, have shown that in certain situations facility oersonnel are either reouired or allowed to remain on duty for extended periods of time.
Also, complaints have been received from some licensed nuclear power plant operators concerning the number of continuous hours they have been on duty.
Licensee management is responsible for providing a sufficient number of trained personnel who are in the proper physical condition to operate and maintain the plant.
Licensee management should review their administrative procedures covering the war king hours of nuclear nouer plant staff. These procedures should establish a sound policy covering workino hours for plant staff who perforn safety related functions (e.g., senior reactor operators, reactor operators, health physicists, auxiliary operators, I&C technicians, key maintenance personnel, etc.)
Subconmittee ANS-3 is currently developing criteria to address the subject of operator work hours. These guidelines will become a part of ANSI N18.7.
The NRC is also considering issuing requirements for administrative procedures that would control staff overtine.
Until either the ANSI Standard is issued and endorsed by NRC (via a Regulatory Guide) or separate requirements are issued by NRC, it is recommended that the following guidance be used. The guidance should be aoplied to all personnel performing a safety related function:
1.
Scheduled work should be linited to the following naxinum work hours:
a.
An individual should not be oermitted to work more than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> straight.
~.
IE Circular No. 80-02 February 1, 1980 Pace 2 of 2 b.
There should be at least a 12-hour break between all work periods.
c.
An individual should not work nore than 72-hours in any 7-day period.
d.
An individual should not work nore than 14 consecutive days withcut having 2 consecutive days off.
2.
In the event that special circunstances arise that require deviation from the above, such deviations should be authorized by the Station fianager with appropriate docunentation of the cause.
Plants should be staffed and schedules developed to operate such that exceptions are not recuired.
3.
If an operator is required to work in excess of 12 continuous hours, his duties should be carefully selected.
It is preferable that he not be assioned any task that affects core reactivity or could possibly endanger the safe operation of the plant.
No written resoonse to this Circular is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this natter, contact the Director of the aopropriate NRC Regional Office.
IE Circular No. 80-02 Enclosure February 1, 1980 RECEMTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Subject Date of Issued to Mo.
Issue 80-01 Service Advice for GE 1/17/80 All licensees of Induction Disc Relays nuclear power reactor operating facilities and holders of nuclear power reactor cps 79-25 Shock Arrestor Strut 12/20/79 All licensees and Assembly Interference holders of power reactor cps 79-24 Proper Installation and 11/26/79 All Holders of a Calibration of Core Spray Power Reacter CL or Pipe Break Detection CP Equipment on BWRs.
79-23 Motor Starters and 11/26/79 All Power Reactor and Contactors Failed Operating Facilities to Operate and Holders of Reactor cps 79-22 Stroke Times for Power 11/16/79 All Power Reactor Operated Relief Valves Operating Facilities and all Utilities having a CP 79-21 Prevention of Unplanned 10/19/79 All holders of Power Releases of Radioactivity Reactor OLs and cps 79-20 Failure of GTE Sylvania 9/24/79 All holders of Power Relay, Type PM, Bulletin Reactor OLs and cps 7305, Catalog SU12-11-AC with a 12V AC Coil 79-19 Loose Locking Devices 9/13/79 All Holders of Power on Ingersoll-Rand Pumps Reactor OLs and cps 79-18 Proper Installation of Target 9/10/79 All Holders of Power Rock Safety-Relief Valves Reactor OLs and cps 79-17 Contact Problen in SB-12 8/14/79 All Power Reactor Switches on General Electric Licensees with a CP Company Metalciad Circuit and/or OL Breakers