ML19296B860
| ML19296B860 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1980 |
| From: | Wilson B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19296B831 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002220272 | |
| Download: ML19296B860 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION peFORETHEATOMICSAFETYANDLICENSINGBOARD In the Matter of SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT Docket No. 50-312 (SP)
(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
)
Station)
)
NRC STAFF TESTIMONY OF BRUCE A. WILSON ON CONTROL ROOM DESIGN (Board Ouestion 31)
Q.
Please state your name and your position with ;he NRC.
A.
My Name is Bruce A. Wilson.
I am an employee of the U. S. Nuclear Regu-latory Comission assigned to the Operator Licen::ing Branch.
From May 1979 until December 1979 I was with the Systems Group of the Bulletins and Orders Task Force.
Q.
Have you prepared a statement of professional qualifications?
A.
Yes. A copy of this statement is attached to this testimony.
Q.
Please state the nature of the respocsibilities that you have had with respect to the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station.
8002220 2 72_
A.
I was responsible for reviewing part of SMUD's responses to the Commis-sion Order of May 7, 1979. Specifically, I reviewed their procedures to ensure that their revised procedures were in accordance with the require-ments of the Order and complied with the Small Break Loss-of-Coolant Acci-dent Guidelines that were developed by B&W.
I also conducted an audit of some of Rancho Seco's operators and senior operators to evaluate the training they had received concerning the TMI-2 accident and the result'ng impact at Rancho Seco.
Q.
What issue are you addressing in this testimony?
A.
I am addressing Board Question 31, which states:
Board Ouestion 31 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has a control room configuration which is poorly and inadequately designed for plant operators to avoid a loss-of-feedwater transient, and there-fore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitions and the public.
Q.
How could a control room, and Rancho Seco's in particular, be configured for plant operators to avoid a loss-of-feedwater (LOFW) transient?
A.
The configuration of the control room has very little effect on whether or not a LOFW transient will occur. One unlikely means by which the con-figuration may have an effect, however, is if controls for valves and
-pumps are located in areas where accidental actuation of them is possible.
In my opinion, the Rancho Seco control room is configured such that this accidental actuation of feedwater controls is very remote.
Q.
Can the control room configuration have any effect on the operators' ability to diagnose and respond to a LOFW7 A.
Yes. A study undertaken in connection with the "TMI Special Inquiry" has shown that the TMI-2 control room design was a highly probable contri-butor to the accident. NUREG/CR-1270," Human Factors, Control Room Design and Operator Performance at Three Mile Island 2."
A Human Factors En-gineering Test and Evaluation (HFE T&E) was performed on the TMI-2 control room and was compared with studies of two other similar vintage control room designs. These evaluations included labels, markings, controls, displays and measures, and work space.
In all evaluations and comparisons the TMI-2 control room was judged very inferior.
Q.
Specifically, what factors in control room design would affect the operators' ability to respond to a LOFW transient?
A.
One of the significant factors that was identified was color coding. The color red was found to have 14 different meanings, while green and amber had 11 each.
Panel layout was also identified as being very important.
Controls and indications for system components should be logical and con-sistent. A significant number of violations of this principle were found at TMI-2, in particular, the arrangement of the emergency feedwater controls and displays (see Figure 5, NUREG/CR-1270, Vol.1).
Q.
How does the Rancho Seco control room compare with TMI-27 A.
A formal HFE T&E would have to be performed at Rancho Seco for an accurate comparison.
I believe such a study would show Rancho Seco to be far superior. The Rancho Seco Station Manual specifies control room criteria.
Several of the criteria are the following:
,1.
Arrange controls, indicators, recorders and alarm indicators in functional groups and in a functional sequence wherever practicable.
2.
Use uniform types and arrangements of control devices for similar functions wherever practicable.
3.
Arrange the safety features devices on the panel in such a manner that the operator will have all necessary controls for a given system in a functional grouping.
The NRC presently has no regulations or criteria pertaining to the concept 1/
of Human Factors Engineering in control room design ~ 6nd, therefore, we do not know the degree of planning and effort that went into the Rancho Seco control room. However, on the basis of a comarison with other con-trol rooms it appears the Licensee devoted considerable attention to its design.
O.
Do you think the Rancho Seco control room is designed to provide sufficient information and controls for the operators to safely respond to a loss-of-feedwater transient?
1] 'NUREG-0660 contains a draft Task Action for Control Room Design (Action I.D.1), including proposed development of standards,
5-A.
I have spent a limited amount of time in the Rancho Seco control room during the site visit of June 1 and 2,1979 in response to the Conmission Order. However, I have spent a good deal of time at the B&W simulator, which is fashioned after the Rancho Seco control Room. On the basia of this experience and having been in or conducted operator examinations in 35 different nuclear power plant control rooms, I would rate the Rancho Seco control room design among the best. During the week of February :0, 1980 I will be conducting operator examinations at Rancho Seco and will evaluate the control room configuration and the ability of the reactor operator applicants to respond to a loss-of-feedwater transient. This evaluation may be included in supplemental testimony.
O e
G
BRUCE A. WILSON PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS I am a Reactor Engineer in the Operator Licensing Branch, Division of Project Management. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
I am responsible for developing, preparing and administering examinations for applicants for reactor operator and senior reactor operator licenses.
I am assigned to the Power and Research Reactor Group, which is primarily responsible for administering examinations on Combustion Engineering and Babcock & Wilcox designed reactors in addition to research reactors.
I received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering in 1966 from Syracuse University and a Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering in 1967 from the University of Washington.
In 1967 I entered active duty with the United States Air Force and was assigned
'o the 10 Megawatt Nuclear Engineering Test Facility (NETF), Wright Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio. From 1967 to 1968. I was a Project Engineer in the Experimental Branch where my primary function was to design and perfore s!*ety analyses of in-core irradiation test experiments.
From 1968 to early 1970, I was Chief, Reactor Engineering Section, where I perfomed safety analyses for reactor modifications and safety limit bases for technical specifications. During this period. I was certified as a Reactor Operator snd Shift Supervisor at the NETF by the Air Force Directorate of Nuclear Saft 7 From 1970 to 1971, I was assistant to the Chief, Operations and Maintenance Division during the final decommissiuning and entombment of the facility.
In 1971, I was transferred to the Amed Forces Radiological Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland.
For eight months, I was Project Manager in the Accelerator Division and then transferred to the Reactor Division, where I was Assistant Physicist-in-Charge of a TRIGA Mark F reactor.
I received a Senior Reactor Operator's License for this facility from the U.S. Atomic Energy Comission (AEC) and was primarily responsible for experiment safety review, technical specification revision and training.
In October 1973, I resigned my commission with the Air Force and joined the Operator Licensing Branch of the AEC. From May to December 1979 I was assigned to the Systems Group of the Bulletins & Orders Task Force.
My functions on this Task Force were to review and approve the Small Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) Guidelines developed by Westinghouse and B&W, and to insure that the applicable facilities have developed emergency pro-cedures incorporating these Guidelines. Finally, I audited the operators and training records to determine that sufficient training had been conducted regarding the SBLOCA phenomenon and the revised emergency procedures.