ML19294B333
| ML19294B333 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1979 |
| From: | Goodwin C PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8002280199 | |
| Download: ML19294B333 (8) | |
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October 30, 1979
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Trojan Nuclear Plant C
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Mr. R.11. Engelken, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza 1990 N. California Blvd.
Walnut Creek, California 94596
Dear Sir:
This letter reports the results of examinations of piping supports inside Containment in accordance with Item 1 of R.11. Engelken's letter to C. Goodwin, Jr., dated October 3, 1979. Additionally, the results of examinations of all piping outside Containment is reported in accordance with Item 3 of IE Bulletin 79-14, dated July 2, 1979. As amended by the above-referenced letter, this response completes the inspection required by IE Bulletin 79-14 within 120 days.
Piping covered by Item 3 of the above-referenced letter will be reported after the next refueling outage.
The examination of pipe supports identified no discrepancies which would preclude system operability.
Deviations which were identified, but which do not affect system operability, are described in the attached report. All items of nonconformance will be resolved before return to power operations from the current steam generator outage.
Verification that as-built data has been properly input into the seismic analysis is being performed by Bechtel Power Corporation and Westing-house Nuclear Service Division.
FGE will submit a complete report on the 13002280 /
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Portland General ElectricCompany Mr. R. H. Engelken October 30, 1979 Page two results of this verification at the time the results of the inspections of remaining pipe supports inside Containment are reported.
Sincerely, r
C. Goodwin, Jr.
Assistant Vice President Thermal Plant Operation and Maintena nce CG/JLT/4kk2A5 Atta ch:nent Director Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:
Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Mr. Lynn Frank, Director State of Oregon Department of Energy
TROJ,t'i NUCLEAR PLANT PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC C0:1PANY IE BULLETIN 79-14 INSPECTION OF SAFETY-RELATED PIPING AND REVIEW OF SEISMIC CALCULATIONS e:
IE BULLETIN 79-14 RESPONSE DATED OCTOBER 29, 1979 1.
Introduction IE Bulletin 79-14 required that the results of the inspection of all safety-related systems be submitted within 120 days of the date of the Bulletin.
Subsequently, Mr. Engelken's letter to C. Goodwin, dated October 3,1979, modified that require-ment to inspect one train of redundant and nonredundant systems inside Containment during the next cold shutdown and required inspection of all remaining redundant systems inside Containment during the next refueling outage.
On October 12, 1979, Trojan was shut down for steam generator tube plugging.
During this outage, one train of redundant and nonredundant piping inside Containment was inspected.
The inspections on the remaining piping outside Containment were also completed.
This re po r t, which presents results of all examinations completed to date constitutes the response to item 1 of the Engelken to Goodwin letter and partial response to Item 3 of the Bulletin. Verification by Bechtel and Westinghouse that as-built data has been properly input into the seismic analy-sis is still ongoing and the results of these verifications will be submitted at a later date.
II.
Engelken Letter to Goodwin (Item 1)
Request:
All piping supports, to which Bulletin 79-14 is applicable, and one system in each set of redundant systems and all nonredundant systems inside the Containment Building (and therefore normally inaccessible) are to be examined in accordance with Item 3 of the Bulletin during the next Plant cold shutdown.
Response: The results of inspections inside Containment per Item 1 of the Engelken to Goodwin letter are presented in Attachment A.
III.
120-Day Action Item (Bulletin Item 3)
Request:
In accordance with Bulletin Item 2, inspect all other normally accessible safety-related systems and all normally inaccessible safety-related systems.
Within 120 days of the date of this Bulletin, subuit a description of the results of this inspection.
Response
The results of inspections inside Containment per Item I of the Engelken to Goodwin letter are presented in Attachment A.
The results of inspections of all piping outside Containment (excluding piping covered in the 60-day re po r t dated August 31, 1979) are presented in Attachment B.
IV.
60-Day Action Item Supplement Report (Bulletin Item 2)
The examination results for accessible Train A outside Con-tainment have all been reviewed by Bechtel.
Minor deviations with the "as-built" isometrics were found which were easily resolved through engineering evaluations.
About 25 percent of the isometrics require reanalysis. About 50 percent of the isometrics requiring reanalyses have been completed, and four supports have been identified that require modification.
The as-built condition of these suppots do not affect system operability.
The modifications to these supports will be completed prior to or during the next refueling outage.
Although we have identified several isometrics which require rea nalysis, the results of our review so far confirm our original conclusion that the as-built conditions do not significantly vary from those upon which the original calcu-lations were base d.
In no instance, however, has our review resulted in what we would consider to be a significant safety problem.
V.
Conclusion With all but one train of redundant piping systems inside Containment. inspected, no nonconformance has been identified which precludes system operability.
All nonconformances will be resolved prior to resumption of power operations.
Confir-mation that the as-built data has been properly input into the seismic analysis at Bechtel and Westinghouse is continuing.
A report will be submitted to the NRC upon completion of the inspection of remaining pipe supports inside Containment.
JLT/4kk2A7 ATTACllMENT A TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT INSPECTION OF SAFETY-RELATED PIPING SUPPORTS INSIDE CONTAINMENT DURING OCTOBER 1979 IE BULLETIN 79-14 An examination of piping support inside the Containment was conducted in accordance with Item 1 of R.11. Engelken letter to PGE dated October 3, 1979.
The scope of the examination included one train of each set of redundant systems and all nonredundant systems inside Containment (including two loops of each four-loop system).
Results Generally, the piping conforms with the as-built drawi ngs.
Of the items inspected, as discussed below, seven nonconformances were identified.
Several minor deviations f rom design drawings were identified which were resolved through preparation of Drawing Change Notices (DCNs) or Mainte-nance Requests (MRs).
The utilization of DCNs and MRs ensures that ninor deviations and maintenance problems identified in the field could be processed in accordance with existing Plant procedures and resolution can be verified.
Approximately 75 DCNs have been prepared, indicating minor deviations between drawings and the as-built condition of the Plant.
These DCNs received a preliminary evaluation by engineers onsite and have been determined not to represent a system operability problem.
A forually documented analysis of each DCN will be completed by the Bechtel Power Corporation and/or the Westinghouse Nuclear Services Division. The majority of these DCNs depict hangers which slightly exceed location tolerances or piping lengths slightly out of dimensional tolerances.
In addition to DCNs, several MRs were issued to resolve maintenance items on existing systems.
The most frequent item identified was the readjustment of supports to correct loading. The work initiated by MRs will be completed prior to return to power operations f rom the current steam generator outage.
The seven nonconformances were.dentified during the walkdown, none of which represented a system operal *.lity problem.
These nonconformances are described in detail as follows:
1.
A snubber on the 3-in. pressurizer relief piping was found with two out of four base plate anchor bolts nonfunctional.
Analysis of the remaining two bolts indicated that the support would not h:tve failed, and the operability of this system would not have been af f ected.
The snubber has been correctly reinstalled.
2.
A feedwater pipe-whip restraint was found to be improperly shimmed in the cold position.
Interaction between the
a feedwater pipe and improperly shimmed pipe whip restraint caused a rigid seismic restraint on the "A" loop feedwater line to pull out of the floor, thereby making this rigid seismic restraint inoperable. Reanalysis has shown that the rigid seismic restraint is not required to ensure
'perability of the system during a seismic event.
The failed rigid seismic restraint is being replaced with a seismic snubber restraint.
3.
Concrete expansion anchors on the B loop RCS hot leg restraiut were found to be 5/8-in. diameter, whereas the pipe support detail specified 3/4-in. diameter expansion anchors.
Analysis of the pipe support installation has determined that the existing 5/8-in.
concrete expansion anchors were adequate.
The support would not have failed with the 5/8-in bolts and the operability of this system would not have been affected.
The support will be used as originally installed.
4.
Four supports were found to be missing or partially missing on the following lines:
a.
3/4-in. RC-250lR-12-650 (H-148) Reactor Coolant System drain piping, b.
3/4-in. SI-250lR-22-653 (H-281) Safety injection test line, c.
3-in. RC-151R-1-1 (H-24) Reactor Coolant System seal water return line relief valve piping, d.
3/4-in. EBE-6-652 (H-567) steam generator blowdown sample line.
In each case, the support will be reinstalled prior to power operations even though engineering evaluations have shown that the systems would have remained operational without the supports.
All of the above cases will be resolved prior to resumption of power ope ra tions.
CMD/JLT/4kk2A17 a
ATTACHMENT B IROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT IE BULLETIN 79-14 INSPECTIONS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT The walkdown of all the piping outside the Containment has been com-pleted with the exception of the CVCS demineralizer vessel vaults.
The activity in these demineralizers created dose rates in excess of 30 rem /hr.
The pipe chases leading to these demineralizer vaults and the separate shielded valve galleries were inspected.
Piping in these vaults is small, isolable and f ailure of this piping would not affect reactor shutdown.
The "A" train accessible and nonredundant accessible piping was addressed in the 60-day report.
The discussion below covers inspection results for all remaining piping outside Containment.
One nonconformance was found.
This nonconf ormance was on the "B" loop of Containment Spray System and involved a missing restraint. Analysis has shown that system operability was not affected with the restraint missing.
The restraint ha s been installed to take the original design loads.
The inspection reports have been reviewed for nonconformances.
As w(th other 79-14 inspections, all minor discrepancies will be processed ir the form of Maintenance Requests (MR) and Drawing Change Notices (DCN).
These will be identified and processed following completion of the in-Containment inspections evaluation. Verification of seismic analysis input da ta by Bechtel Power Corporation will follow MR and DCN processing.
e e
JLT/4kk2A19