ML19292B843
| ML19292B843 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Catawba, Wolf Creek, Byron, Seabrook, Limerick, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Waterford, Comanche Peak, Midland, 05000000, Shoreham, Crane |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1984 |
| From: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Gilinsky, Palladino, Roberts NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-17, REF-GTECI-SY, TASK-A-17, TASK-A-17-33, TASK-AS, TASK-BN84-033, TASK-BN84-33, TASK-OR BN-84-033, BN-84-33, NUDOCS 8401190068 | |
| Download: ML19292B843 (8) | |
Text
M3 Ob f.
February 16, 1984 Docket Nos.
50-289,483,443/444, 382,50-275/323,440/441 352/353,329/330,322, 247/286 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chaiman Palladino Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
TASK ACTION PLAN FOR USI A-17 " SYSTEMS INTERACTION PROGRAM" BOARD NOTIFICATION (EN 84 33)
In accordance with the NRC procedure for Board Notification, the enclosed Task Action Plan for USI A-17 is being provided directly to the Commission for information. This information is applicable to all nuclear power plants. The appropriate Boards and parties are being inforned by copy of this memorandum.
Infomation on the subject of USI A-17 was previously provided in Board Notifications 83-17, 44, 57, 105 and 126. The enclosed Task Action Plan for USI A-17, recently approved by staff management, contemplates development of the staff's technical resolution of USI A-17 by the end of fiscal year 1985. A schedule of program milestones appears on page A-17/17 of the Plan.
[c,,n:
c' Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing, NRR
Enclosure:
Memorandum dated 1/9/84 (T. Speis (NRC) to DIST' H. Denton (NRC)) Forwarding Task Action Plan, N005
" Systems Interaction in Nuclear Power Plants (Task A-17)", January 1984 i
ORB #4 ORBf4 AD:DL
/qD Glainas * * '{b :p DEis i1Iut JVpdVliet/jm JStolz
- 02Tl\\f84 02/9 /84 02/ 9 /84 C2{(,/84
' p cus concurrence.
C 840H 90068
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Docket Nos.
50-289,483,443/444, 382,50-275/323,440/441 352/353,329/330,322, 247/286 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Robert';
Commissioner Asselstine Cammissioner Bernthal FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Iicensing
SUBJECT:
TASK ACTION PLAN FOR USI A-17 " SYSTEMS INTERACTION PT.0 GRAM" BOARD NOTIFICATION (BN 84 33)
In accordance with the NRC procedure for Board Notification, the enclosed Task Action Plan for USI A-17 is being provided directly to the Commission for information. This information is applicable to all nuclear power plants. The appropriate Boards and parties are being informed by copy of i.his nemorandum.
Informatior; on the subjttt of USI A-17 was previously provided in Board Notifications 83-17, 44, 57, 105 and 126. The enclosed Task Action Pltn for UCI A-17, recently approved by staff management., contemplates development of the staff's technical resolution of USI A-17 by the end of fiscal year 1985. A schedule of program milestones appears on page A-17/17 of the Plan.
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing, NRR
Enclosure:
Task Action Plan, " Systems Interaction in Nuclear Power Plants (Task A-17)",
January 1984 ORBf
'RBf 4 **
- AD : DL* *
- D:DL JV iet/jm UStolz Glainas DEisenhut 02/
84 02/ 9 /84 02/ 9/84 02/ /84
- See previous concurrence
s g-Docket Nos.
50-289,483,443/444, 382,50-275/323,440/441 352/353,329/330,322, 247/286 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Commissioner Gilinskv Commissioner Rober'.s Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION (BN 84-
) TASK ACTION PLAN FOR U51 A-17 " SYSTEMS INTERACTION PROGRAM" In accordance with the NRC procedure for Board Notification, the enclosed Task Action Plan for USI A-17 is being provided directly to the Commission.
The Boards and parties are being informed by copy of this memorandum.
The Task Action Plan, recently approved by staff management, contemplates development of the staff's technical resolution of USI A li by the end of fiscal year 1985. A schedule of program milestones appears on page A-17/17 of the Plan. The Plan relates to matters in issue in the TMI-1 Restart and other proceedings.
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing, NRR
Enclosure:
Task Action Plan, " Systems Interaction in Nuclear Power Plants (Task A-17)",
January 1984 e
D:DL 0
- 4 ORB 4-AD '
GL 4..as DEisenhut liet/jm JSpol Ji. 'j /84 2/
/84 2/
/84 2/
/84 2
DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR BOARD NOTIFICATION Byron Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-454/455 Dr. Richard F. Cole Callaway Unit 1, Docket No. STN 50-483 Mr. John T. Collins Catawba Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-413/414 Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.
Comanche Peak Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-445/446 Mr. Nicholas J. Cc tello Diablo Canyon Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-275/323 Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.
Limerick Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-352/353 Dr. Frederick P. Cowan Midland Units 1&2, Docket Nos, 50-329/330 Philip A. Crane, Jr., Esq.
Palo Verde Units 2&3, Docket Nos. 50-529/530 T. J. Creswell, Esq.
Perry Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-440/441 Charles Cross, Esq.
Seabrook Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-443/444 Mr. Edward L. Cross, Jr.
Shoreham Unit 1, Docket No. 50-322 Gerald C. Crotty, Esq.
TMI Unit 1, Docket No. 50-289 Mr. James E. Cummins Wolf Creek Unit 1, Docket No. 50-482 Jordan D. Cttnningham, Esq.
Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esq.
Mr. John F. Doherty Atomic Safety and Licensing Howard L. Plau, Esq.
James B. Dougherty, Esq.
Board Panel Peter B. Bloch, Esq.
Ms. Jane Doughty Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Dan I. Bolef Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Appeal Panel Mr. Donald Bollinger Mr. Owen B. Durgin Brentwood Bd of Selectmen Ms. Louise Bradford Mr. Anthony F. Earley, Jr.
Director, Pennsylvania Ms. Nora Bredes Gary J. Edles, Esq.
Emergency Management Lawrence Brenner, Esq.
Eric A. Eisen, Esq.
Divuion of Consumer Counsel Mr. Glenn O. Bright Mr. Frederick Eissler c/o Mr. Barry S. Zitser Mr. Earl Brown Charles W. Elliott, Esq.
Docketing & Service Secti;n Herbert H. Brown, Esq.
Mrs. Juanita Ellis Document Management Branch Mr. William L. Brown Peter S. Everett, Esq.
MHB Technical Associates James E. Brunner, Esq.
Donald T. Ezzone, Esq.
Palmetto Alliance Dr. John H. Buck Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.
Region III, USNRC Ms. Martha 1.'. Bush Dr. George A. Ferguson Town Manager's Office Mr. Ronald C. Callen Mr. Zori G. Ferkin Town of North Hampton Dr. A. Dixon Csilihan David 5, Fleischaker, Esq.
Mark S. Calvert, Esq.
Mrs. Raye Fleming Ms. Marjorie M. Aamodt Mr. Calvin A. Canney Dr. Richard F. Foster Phillip Ahrens, Esq.
John G. Cardinal, Esq.
Leon Friedman, Esq.
Dr. George C. Anderson Sen. Allen R. Carter Eleanor L. Frucci, Esq.
Mr. Robert L. Anthony Doug Cassel, Esq.
R. K. Gad III, Esq.
Mrs. Elizabeth Apfelberg 6rian P. Cassidy, Esq.
Mr. Steve J. Gadler Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
A. Scott Cauger, Esq.
Joseph Gallo, Esq.
Maurice Axelrad, Esq.
Mr. Kenneth M. Chackes Mr. R. J. Gary Robert A. Backus, Esq.
Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
Ms. Sandra Gavutis Edward M. Barrett, Esq.
Ms. Diane Chavez Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Mr. Edward J. Bauer, Jr.
Myron M. Cherry, p.c.
Mr. Thomas V. Gerusky Charles Bechhoefer, Esq.
Mr. Donald E. Chick Stewart M. Gkss, Esq.
Kenneth Berlin, Esq.
Ms. Wanda Christy James P. Gleu gn, Esq.
Lynne Bernabei, Esq.
Mr. Mendall Clark Mr. Marc W. Got hmith Ms. Frieda Berryhill John Clewett, Esq.
Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy Mr. Samuel J. Birk Hon. Peter Cohalan Mr. Mark Gottlieb Mr. Richard E. Blankenburg David E. Cole, Esq.
Mr. Rand L. Greenfield DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR BOARD NOTIFICATION Byron Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-454/455 Mr. Chris Nolin Callaway Unit 1 Docket No. STN 50-483 Bruce Norton, Esq.
Catawba Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-413/414 Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
Comanche Peak Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-445/446 Dr. Hugh C. Paxton Diablo Canyon Units I&2, Docket Nos. 50-275/323 Spence W. Perry, Esq.
Limerick Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-352/353 C. Edward Peterson, Esq.
Midland Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-329/330 Ms. Roberta C. Pevear Palo Verde Units 2&3, Docket Nos. 50-529/530 Ms. Gail P. Phelps Perry Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-440/441 William L. Porter, Esq.
Seabrook Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-443/444 William C. Potter, Jr., Esq.
Shoreham Unit 1, Docket No. 50-322 Sen. Robert L. Preston TMI Unit 1, Docket No. 50-289 Dr. Paul W. Purdom Wolf Creek Unit 1, Docket No. 50-482 Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles Ms. Diana P. Randall Mr. Paul Rau Robert Guild, Esq.
Ms. Jane Lee Mr. John G. Reed Mr. Lee M. Gustafson Dr. J. Venn Leeds, Jr.
Ms. Marjorie Reilly Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
Mr. Howard A. Levin Harold F. Reis, Esq.
Dr. Jerry Harbour John Levin, Esq.
W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.
Mr. Thomas H. Harris David R. Lewis, Esq.
Joel R. Reynolds, Esq.
Mr. Robert J. Harrison Mr. Marvin I. Lewis Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.
Mr. Bruce L. Harshe Stephen H. Lewis, Esq.
Dr. Peter F. Riehm Samuel A. Haubold, Esq.
Mr. Gustave Linenberger, Jr.
Mr. Jesse L. Riley Mr. Wayne Hearn Terry J. Lodge, Esq.
Ken Robinson, Esq.
Steven P. Hershey, Esq.
Ms. Karen E. Long Mr. Frank R. Romano Donald L. Herzberger, MD Mr. Harold Lottman Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq.
Ms. Susan Hiatt Angus R. Love., Esq.
Ms. Mary Ellen Salava Renea Hicks, Esq.
Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Mr. Alfred Sargent Ms. Beverly Hollingworth Mr. Fred Luekey Mr. James 0. Schuyler Ms. Lee Hourihan Mr. Angie Machiros Cherif Sedkey, Esq.
Helen Hoyt, Esq.
Mr. John Marrs Ralph Shapiro, Esq.
Mr. Richard B. Hubbard Mr. Wendell H. Marshall Lewis Shollenberger, Esq.
Mr. Henry D. Hukill Mr. Robert D. Martin Mr. Steven C. Sholly Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey Michael W. Maupin, Esq.
Mr. Frederick J. Shon Mrs. Phillip B. Johnson Michael McBride, Esq.
Ms. Jo Ann Shotwell Dr. W. Reed Johnson M;. Brian McCaffrey Ms. Barbara Shull Dr. Walter H. Jordan Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom Jay Silberg, Esq.
William S. Jordan, III, Esq. J. Michael McGarry III, Esq.
Mr. Gordon Silver Mr. James R. Kates Mr. Patrick J. McKeon John M. Simpson, Esq.
Mr. Frank J. Kelley Mr. Edward F. Meany Ms. Mary Sinclair Mr. Jcmes L. Kelley Janine Migden, Esq.
Mr. Lanny Alan Sinkin Mr. Chauncey Kepford Mr. Marshall T. Miller Ivan W. Smith, Esq.
Janice E. Kerr, Esq.
Michael I. Miller Esq.
Mr. Jeff Smith Dr. Jerry R. Kline Prof. William ::. t4 filer Mr. C. W. Smyth Christine N. Kohl, Esq.
Mr. Gregory Minor Carol S. Sneider Esq.
Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
Thomas S. Moore, Esq.
Ms. Barbara Stamiris James A. Laurenson, Esq.
Dr. Peter A. Morris Mayor Howard Steffen Robert M. Lazo, Esq.
Ms. Pat Morrison Mr. Michael J. Strumwasser DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR BOARD NOTIFICATION Byron Units 182, Docket Nos. 50-454/455 Callaway Unit 1, Docket No. STN 50-483 Catawba Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-413/414 Comanche Peak Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-445/446 Diablo Canyon Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-275/323 Limerick Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-352/353 Midland Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-329/330 Palo Verde Units 2&3, Docket Nos. 50-529/530 Perry Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-440/441 Seabrook Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-443/444 Shoreham Unit 1. Docket No. 50-322 TMI Unit 1, Docket No. 50-289 Wolf Creek Unit 1, Docket No. 50 482 Robert J. Sugarman, Esq.
ACRS Members David C. Thomas, Esq.
Dr. Robert C. Axtmann George F. Trowbridge, Esq.
Mr. Myer Bender Dr. Mauray Tye Dr. Max W. Carbon Paul C. Valentine, c.sq.
Mr. Jesse C. Ebersole Ms. Ann Verge Mr. Harold Etherington Dr. Bruce Von Zellen Dr. William Kerr Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.
Dr. Harold W. Lewis Mr. David Wersan Dr. J. Carson Mark Mr. Joseph H. White, III Mr. William M. Mathis Mr. James Wiggins Dr. Dade W. Moeller Howard A. Wilber, Esq.
Dr. David Okrent Mr. Donald R. Willard Dr. Milton 5. Plesset Mr. Frederick C. Williams Mr. Jeremiah J. Ray Mr. Harry M. Willis Dr. Paul C. Shewmon Richard P. Wilson, Esq.
Dr. Chester P. Siess Maxine Woelfling, Esq.
Mr. David A. Ward John F. Wolf, Esq.
Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq.
Mr. Robert G. Wright Ms. Phyllis Zitzer BN 84-33 Names BYRON Mr. Dennis L. Farrar Mr. William Kortier Mr. Michcel Miller, Esq.
Mr. Edward R. Crass Mr. Julian Hinds CALLAWAY Mr. D. F. Schnell Mr. Nicholas A. Petrick Mr. J. E. Birk Resident Inspector Mr. Donald W. Capone Regional Administrator, Region III CATAWBA Mr. H. B. Tucker North Carolina MPA-1 Mr. F. J. Twogood Mr. J. C. Plunkett, Jr.
Mr. Pierce K. Skinner North Carolina Electric Membership Corp.
Saluda River Electric Cooperative Inc.
Mr. Peter K. VanDoorn Regional Administrator, Region II Spence Perry, Esq.
Mark S. Calvert, Esc.
COMANCHE PEAK Spencer C. Relyea, Esq.
Mr. Homer C. Schmidt Mr. H. R. Rock Mr. A. T. Parker DIABLO CANYON Mr. Malcolm H. Furbush Mr. Lee M. Gustafson Resident Inspector /Diablo Canyon NPS Dr. Jose Roesset Dr. William E. Cooper Mr. W. C. Gangloff Regional Administrator, Region V
EN 84-33 Names - Page 2 LIMER!CK Honorable Lawrence Coughlin Roger B. Reynolds, Jr., Esquire Frederic M. Wentz Eugene J. Bradley Mr. Vincent Boyer Mr. Karl Abraham Mr. Suresh Chaudhary Steven P. Hershey, Esq.
Jacqueline I. Ruttenberg, Esq.
Mr. J. T. Robb, N2-1 Governor's Office of State Planning and Development, PA Department of Environmental Resources, PA Chairman, Board of Supervisors of Limerick Township U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, PA MIDLAND Mr. J. W. Cook Stewart H. Freeman Ms. Julie Morrison Mr. R. B. Borsum Mr. Don van Farrowe Resident Inspector Mr. Paul A. Perry Mr. Walt Apley Regional Administrator, Region III Mr. Ron Callen Geotechnical Engineers Billie Pirner Garde Commander, Naval Survcce Weapons Ctr.
Mr. L. J. Auge Mr. Neil Gehring Mr. I. Charak Clyde Herrick Mr. Patrick Bassett PALO VERDE Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Mr. Charles R. Kocher, Esq.
Ms. Margaret Walker Resident Inspector Regional Administrator, Region V
BN 84-33 Names - Page 3 PERRY Mr. Murray R. Edelman Donald H. Hauser, Esq.
Resident Inspector Regional Administrator, Region III SEABROOK Bruce Beckley D. Pierre G. Cameron, Jr., Esq.
Regional Acministrator, Region I E. Tupper Kinder, Esq.
Resident Inspector Mr. John DeVincentis Mr. A. M. Ebner Mr. Stephen D. Floyd Ms. Letty Hett Honorable Richard E. sullivan Seacoast Anti-Pollution League SHGREHAM Mr. M. S. Pollock Resident Inspector Energy Research Group, Inc.
Mr. James Rivello Ezra I. Bielik Dr. M. Stanley Livingstone TMI Board of Directors, P. A. N. E.
J. B. Lieberman, Esc.
Earl B. Hoffman Union of Concerned Scientists c/o Hermon & Weiss Mr. E. G. Wallace Ms. Virginia Southard Mr. David D. Maxwell EPA, Rgn III, Reg. Rad. Representative Senior Resident Inspector General Counsel, Federal Emergency Mngt Agency Karin W. Carter, Esq.
Dauphin County Office Emergency Preparedness Harrisburg, Pa Mr. Robert Borsum Ms. Lennie Prough Governor's Office of State Planning and Development, Harrisburg, PA Regional Administrator, Region I Bruce Molholt Dr. David L. Hetrick Dr. James C.1.amb, III
BN 84-33 Names - Page 4 WOLF CREEK Mr. Glenn L. Koester Mr. Nicholas A. Petrick Mr. Donald T. McPhee Resident Inspector Teri Sculley Regional Administrator, Region IV Mr. Joe Mulholland Regional Administrator, Region III
2_
The Atcmic Safety and Licensing Boards for:
Byron (Miller, Callihan, Cole)
Callaway (Gleason, Bright, Kline)
Catawba 1 & 2 (Kelley, Foster, Purdcm)
Comanche Paak 1 & 2 (Bloch, Jordan, McCollom)
Limerick 1 & 2 (Brenner, Cole, Morris)
Midland 1 & 2 (Bechhoefer, Cowan, Harbour)
Palo Verde 2 & 3 (La o, Callihen, Cole)
Perry 1 & 2 (Bloch, Bright, Kline)
Seabrook 14 2 (Hoyt. Harbour, luebke)
Shoreham (Brenner, Carpenter, Morris)
Wolf Creek (Wolfe, Anderson, Paxton)
The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards for:
Callaway 1 (Rosenthal, Edles, Gotchy' Diablo Canyon 1 & 2 (Moore, Johnson Buck)
TMI-1 (Edles, Buck, Gotchy, Kohl)
All parties for the above proceedings 9
em.
a** " %y UNITED STATES
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NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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. C WASMNGTON, D. C. 20555
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e January 9, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Harold R. Dentop irerdor Office of Nuclear
' o d egulation FROM:
Themis P. Speis, Director Division cf Safety Technology Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF TASK ACTION PLAN USI A-17,
" SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS" The enclosed revised Task Action Plan (TAP) for USI A-17 is hereby submitted for your approval.
This revision reflects a number of changes from the previous TAP dated June 16, 1983.
Ali NRR Division Directors have concurred in this revised TAP.
The TAP changes are the result of an overall reassessment of the program following the assignment of a dedicated Task Manager in the Generic Issues Branch and recent (July 14,1983) ACRS comments on the USI A-17 program.
The changes are intended to provide a more definitive scope for this unresolved safety issue in order to develop the technical resolution by the end of FY 85 The only major task deleted from the previous scope is the explicit review of SRP sections (Task 9).
In addition, the methodology demonstration and utility systems interaction stucies review tasks have been combined into two tasks, an Indian Point demonstration task and a task to compare and evaluate systems interaction methods.
There have been some minor changes in resource requiremerts.which are mainly due to the assignment of the lead responsibility from the Reliability and Risk Assessment Branch to the Generic Issues Branch within DST.
There has been a small addition of resources due to the identification of the need fcr some assistance from the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
For a resource summary, see Table 3 of the TAP.
The program described in this TAP is the same program presentec to you and the Deputy Executive Director for Regional Doeratiens and Generic Reputrements prior to presentation to the ACRS on November 18.
. January 9, 19E4 We recuest your approval of this TAP, including.tne schedule for ccerating plan milestones on page A-17/17.
In the meantime, we have solicited and obtained principal reviewers from each f?RR Divisicn and frcm other tecnnical organizations involved and are proceeding to implement the TAP.
/
) '/NW.\\
f< n Themis P. Speis, Director Division of Safety Technology Enr.l os u re :
Revised TAP on USI A-17 cc:
P. Shemanski T. Michaels D. Jones W. LeFare R. Kendall E. Eltawila S. Diab D. Rasmussen E. Imbro B. f'endel sci.n E. Chellia C. Morris D. Lasher F. Coffman J. Conran f;RR Division Directors
//
Approved:
/ss Harola R. Denton
TASK ACTICN PLAN (January 1984)
SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (TASK A-171 Lead Organization:
Division of Safety Technology (DST)
Generic Issues Branch (GIB)
Task Manager Dale Thatcher Generic Issues Branch, DST Leac Manager:
K. Kniel, Chief, GIB, DST NRR Principal Reviewers:
E. Chelliah Systems Interaction Secticn RRAB, DST D. Lasher Systems Interaction Section RRAB, DST C. Morris Systems Interaction Section RRAB, DST P. Shemanski Equipment Oualifications Branch, DE T. Michaels Systematic Evaluation Program Brancn DL D. Jones DHFS W. LeFave ASB, DSI Office of Research D. Rasmussen Division of Risk Assessment Office of Nuclear Material Safety B. Mencelsohn and Safeguarcs Division of Safeguards Office for Analysis and Evaluation E. Imbre of Coerational Data aEOD Applicability; Light Water Reactors '?WR arc EWR)
Projected Ccmpletion Date:
Ma rch I986 A-17/1
e 9
1.
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM Backcround The issue of systems interaction was originally raised because cesign, construction and operaticn of nuclear power plants involve many functional specialists (e.g., civil, electrical, mechanical, and nuclear engineers); and
~
experience at operating plants raised the question whether the work of these specialists is sufficiently integrated to avoid serious adverse interactions (dependencies) among systems that are intended to be independent.
Simil a rly,
it was postulated that the review and evaluation of these systems may not have been sufficiently integrated to allow identification of such interactions.
The ACRS identified a generic need to examine the matter of systems interactions in a letter to L. M. Muntzing dated November 8, 1974 The staff initiated a systems interaction program in May of 19'8 with the definition of USI A-17 " Systems Interaction in Nuclear Power Plants."
Subsequent events and folicw up actions ied to initiation o" various programs to investigate the issue.
Discussion Many significant events at operating nuclear power plants tave been tracec to, or postulated to be the result of, a single ccmmon cause, as ccposed to multiple independent causes, and as a result the required independence among the plant safety systems and the indepencence of the safety systems from the non-safety systems has been cuestioned.
Because scme of these events are cue to unexcetted interce:encencies ameng the various plant systems, generic is. cue A-17 was ceveloced to arc ess tnese
" systems interactions."
It has also been recognizec that scme of :nese single cause events resulted frca common characteristics of the e:Licment wnich make up the piant systems.
~hese ccmcen characteristi:s include inherent features such as single manufacturers, ccamen maintenance cractices, a-17/2
and common testing practi:es.
For purposes of discussion this latter class of ccmmon cause events / failures will be referred to as common ecde failures (CMF).
(For additional discussion of common mode failures, see reference 1.)
Another recognized scurce of common cause failures is external events such as earthquakes and floods.
This type of event will be censidered as a cubgroup of common mode failures.
A definition is given here for both (adverse) systems interactions and common mode failures.
For a diagram showing the interrelations 5ir of these terms, see Figure 1.
Definitions (a)
Common Mode Failure (CMF)
Multiple failures resulting from a single ccmmon cause and typically characterized by the failure of identical components in redundant safety systems.
Such multiple failures are traceable to causes such as external events, temmon design, manufacturing and installation errors; or operacion, testing and maintenance errors.
The usual design practice for safety systems is to satisfy the single failure criterion by providing identical, redundant safety systems wnicn are subjected to ccmmon external events and made, installed, crerated, tested and maintained by common individuals.
Therefore, common mcce failures are a recogni:ed scurce of compromise in independence anc are addressed in a number of ways, and in some cases withcut specific identification.
The folicwing is a discussicn of scmc of the ways in wnich this class of failures / errors are accressed.
A-17/3
To obtain protection frcm possible failures, including failures resulting from external events, the components of the safety systems are designed, qualifiea and installed to be immune to such anticipated challenges.
(For specific examples of external events c5vered in the review process, see Table 1.)
To obtain immunity to failures, including common mode failures, resulting from design, manufacturing and installation errors, the safety-related systems, structures and components are subjected to varicus irdependent design reviews and quality control and quality assurance programs which include comprehensive testing recuirements at all phases of construction and preoperation. The concept of indepencent design reviews has been used by industry to varying degrees and specific reviews have been requested by MoC.
The area of Quality Assurance has been undergoing major improvements both at utilities and within NRC.
Protection from failures, including common mode failures, attributed to errors by cperators, technicians and maintenance personnel can be obtaincd through adequate training and good procedures for all ascects of operation, testing and.r.aintenance.
The Division of Human Factors Safety-has major programs underway to acdress all of these areas.
Other provisions may be utilized for protection against common moce failures or ciscovered unreliability of specific types of comoonents.
One design technique which is utili:ec is civersity.
An example of such an application by the staff is a portion of the requirements which resulted from the Salem ATWS event.
As part of the resolution, it was concluced that consiceration should be given to providing a diverse breaker trip scheme.
These cases have been addressed on an individual basis, however the concept of diversity is cited in the Regulations (SDC 22}.
A-17/4
The other class of ccmmon cause events which is defined here is adverse systens interactions events.
Although it can be ar7ued that these cefinitions may overlap, it is necessary to differentiate between the two so that a clear overal.1 objective can be defined for USI 5-17.
(b)
Systems Interaction (SI)
Actiens or inactions (not necessarily failures) of various systems (subsystems, divisiotis, trains), components or structures resulting from a single credible failure within one system, ccmpor,ent-or structure and cropagation to other systems, components, or structures by inconspicuous or unanticipated interdepencencies.
Note:
The majcr difference between this typ2 of event and a classic single failure event is in the non-obs f ous aspects of the initiating failure and/or its propagation.
Systems interactions aisc can involve both safety and non-safety systems.
(c)
Adverse Systems Interaction ( ASI)
A systems interaction which produces an undesirable result.
(d)
Uncesirable Result (cue to systems interactioni This is de'ined by a list of the types of events which will be censiderec in A-17.
(1) Degradation of redundant portions of a safety system, inciucing consideration of all auxiliary support functions.
Reduncant portions are those considered to be ince;encent in the design enc analysis (Chapter 15) of the plant.
(2)
Degracation of a safety system by a non-safety system.
~
A-17/5
(3)
Initiation of an "accicent" (e.g., LOCA, MFLS) arc (1) the degradaticn of at least are redundant cortion of any cc.e of the safety systems required to mitigate that event (Chapter 2:
analyses); or (2.) degradation of critical ccerator information sufficient to cause him to perform unanaly:ed, unassumed or incorrect action.
(4)
Initiation of a " transient" (including reactor trip), and (1) the degracation of at least ene redundant portien of any one of the safety systems required to miticate the event (Chapter 15 analyses); jy; (2) degradation of critical operator information sufficient to cause him to perform unanalyzed, unassumed, or incorrect action.
(5)
Initiation of an event which requires actions of the plant operators in areas outside the control room area (it may be due to Control Room evacuation or initiation of a plant shutdown) and disruption of the access to these creas.
(For example by disruption of the security system or isolation of an area by closure of fire doors or actuation of a suppression system.)
The intersystem'cependencies (or systems interactions) have teen divicec into --
three classes:
(a)
Functionally'coucled:
Those sis that result from snaring of common systems / components; or pnysical connections between systems inciuoing electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic or mechanical.
(b)
Scatially coucled:
Those Els inat result 'ren sharing of ccmnen structures /lecations, or spatial interties such as HVAC ano train systems.
A-17l5
(c)
Induced-human-intervention-coucled:
Those 5Is where a plant malfunction (such as failed indication) inaccrc;riately incuces an operator action or a malfunction inhibits an operators ability to respond.
(Induced-hu_ man-intervention ccupied systens interactions exclude random human errors and acts of sabotage.)
Staff Actions Related to System Interactions The staff has addressed the issue of " systems interactions" in a number o#
ways:
(1)
The Standard Review Plan has a number of sections which specifically deal with the potential for adverse systems interactions.
For a list of these sections, see Table 2.
(2)
Similar to the SRP sectier.s, the Systematic Evaluation Program has utilized a number of review topics which address the potential for adverse systems interactions.
For a list of tcpics, see Table 2.
(3)
In response to events at operating reactors, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement has issued Bulletins anc Information Notices wnich address the potential for adverse systems interactions.
Two significant --
bulletins which are related to the issue of systcms interaction are:
(a)
IEB-79-27, " Loss of Non-Class IE Instrumentation anc Control Power System Bus During Operation."
(Ref. 13)
(b)
IES-80-11 " Masonry Wall Design."
(Ref. 14)
A significant Information Notice is:
(a)
IEIN-79-22 "Oualification of Control Systems.*
(Re'. '.5)
A-17/7
(4)
The significant o nts, and concerns raised after TMI, lec the staff to ident.
'e L'SI for the investigaticn of the potential for signif.
s and adverse interacticns in the area of control systems.
_T 17, " Safety Implications of Control Systems."
(5) Specific concerns including sc.n d to common cause were identified in the area of DC power systems i result a generic safety issue was instituted.
This is A-30 "Adc
' Safety Related CC Power Supplies.
(6) An initial task, identified as part or
'ution of A-17, involved a study of the Watts Bar-1 plant by Sand.
3ry with the use of fault trees (Ref. 2).
Other tasks imluded ew of presently available systems interaction methodologies (s.
ferences 3, 4, anc 5).
There are also a number of ongoing inquiries into interactions.
The ongoing inquiries %to systems interactions incluce:
(1) Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) is complcting their evaluaticn of the systems inte :cticns discovered during their reviews of the Diablo Canycn units.
(2) ~n stacy -
of Indian Point-3 by the licensee, the Pcwer Authority of the,cate of New York (PASNY), using an analysis procecure deveicped by PASNY and its contractor is near comoletion.
(Ref. 11).
(3) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) completed its documentation anc cemenstration of the Digraph-Matrix Analysis (see ref. 6), a method by wnich systems interactions may be identified.
They also evaluated, by a pilot study acplication of the technicue, two modes of Operation of the high pressure coolant injection systems at Watts Sar-1 (Ref.12).
(c) Censumers Ecwer Company has initiatec a systers ir.terac; ion progran on Midland-2.
- -17/S
The TMI Accident led to issuence of tne "NF.C Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident" (MUREG-0660) wnich identified Action Item II.C 3, "Systens Interaction,* "to coordinate and expand ongoing staff work on syttems interaction.[Dnresolveo Safety Issue ('USI) A-17] so as to incorporate it. into an integrated plan for addressing the broader question of systems reliability in conjunction with IREP and other efforts." The TMI-2 Action Plan also stated that "As these programs go forward, there will be a conscious effort to ccordinate these activities, including possible combinatico of resources, to eliminate unnecessary duplication." DST and RES/DRA have been develcoing and reviewing various techniques for addressing systems interactions.
Some of this work is being done in ccnjunction with work in the area of Probabilistic Risk Assessment and some techniques have been included in t"c Nat'. anal R91iability Evaluation Program Proteoures Guide (NUREG/CR-2815).
(Reference 18).
The work descrit*ed in this task acticn plan includes all systems interaction activities described ir. TNI Action Plan Item II.C.3.
Resolution of USI A-17 will therefore constitute ccmpletion of action iten II.C.3.
Acoroach Based on the preceding consideratTont, this TAP outlines a prcgram which is-intended to:
( *. ) Evaluate discovered scurces sr.d potential sources of common cause events, identify signif; cant actual and postulated comcgr moce failures and adverse systems interactions and determine their sa; ty significar.ce, (2)
Compare und evaluate acolicacie ecarch methocs (past end cngoing) and determine the efficacy of the tethods for current use A-17/9
(3)
Evaluate regulatory criteria both from an adecuacy viewpoint and an application viewpoint, and (4) Develop proposed requ_irements, if any, based on 1, 2, anc 3 above, perform a value/ impact assessment and reccmmend implementation.
2.
PLAN FOR RESOLUTION There is a large amount of work which has been and is being performed in the area of " systems interaction." To best utilize all of the work, a program is cutlined to integrate as much of this work as possible with the objective of resolving USI A-17 within approximately a two-year schedule.
The overall program will review and evaluate past studies and preliminary conclusions, ard also follow the ongoing studies.
From this review and evaluation, it is anticipated that.possible alternative resolutions can be defined in terms of the benefits and cost and from these nossible resolutions, a cost effective solution could be chosen.
In general, the program will involve two significant efforts which will proceed in parallel, each with a number of tasks.
One effort will fccus on operating experience, varicus activities by utilities, and NRC studies.
Its
--~
objective will be to search for ccmmon cause events and tnen evaluate them with emphasis en adverse systems interactions.
The parallel effort will focus on a review'of the methods that have been and are being, used to uncover adverse systems interactions.
Its cbjective will be to determir,e the suitability of the methods for application te all plants.
For an overall diagram of the interrelationship of tr.E tasks, see Figure 2.
A-I7/10
Task Descriptions (A) Task 1 Search for Common Cause Events This activity will concuct a review of various scurces of inf ormation on common cause events and compile a list of adverse systems interactions dnd other common Cause events based on the definitions in this Task Action Plan. The sources for information aill include:
(a) Systems Interaction Studies performed to date by the Staff, Laboratories, and Utilities.
This will include the Sandia PRA Study (Ref. 2), the Diablo Canyon Study (Ref. S), the San Onofre Study (Ref. 9) the Grand Gulf study (Ref. 10), the Indian Point Study by PASNY (Ref.11), the Watts Bar study by Digraph Matrix Pethod (Ref. 12), the Results on Z'r.n (Ref. 13) and any other meaningful studies (including plant PRAs) performed by utild ties.
It will also consider the review of methodology performed by LLNL, Brookhaver, and Battelle (Ref. 3, 4, and 5).
(b)
Evaluation done as a result of NRC requirements / requests in the area of common cause failures.
This will consicer responses to OIE Bulletins 79-27 (3ef. 14) and 80-11 (Ref. 15) and DIE Informaticn Notice 79-22 (Ref. 16).
As part of this effort the sections of the SRP and SEP topics, (see Table 2) wnicn ceal with some types of systems' interactions will be considered to determine what impact (such as plant modifications) may have resulted from their application.
In addition, the docket files for power plants undergoing licensing review will te evaluated to see what recent staff cuestions and/or positicns have been issued in the area of systems interactions and common cause events.
A-17/11
(c) Other Generic Safety Issues.
For example:
(1) Unresolved Safety Issue A 47, " Safety Implications of Control Systems." _It is recognized that the area of control systems is a potential contributor to adverse systems interactions.
Some programs have been underway as part of the resolution of A-47.
This subtask would evaluate the scope and content of that work to determine potential acverse systems interactions which have been discovered.
Althcagh this work will be investigated fcr exampf es of ASIS, it may be cecided that such ASIS will not be add'essed by A-17 but will be cd ressed by A-47.
(2)
A-30, " Adequacy of Safety-Related LC Pcwer Supplies."
It has been recognized that the plant electrical system is an area of significant concern.
This issue has been under investigation for a number of years, and resolution is expected within the next year.
Therefore, tne work on A-17 can possibly use the information from this program where applicatie.
(3)
New Generic Issues - e.g.,
Issue 77, " Flooding of Safety Equipment Ccmpartments by Back-Flow Through Floor Drains" and Issue 81, " Potential Safety Problems Associated with Lockea Doors and Barriers in Nuclear Power Plants."
(d)
Search of Operating Experience.
There have been a number of events labelled " systems interactions." This search would a: ply the definitions of the previous section to these events and create a list of experienced common cause events including severse systems interactions.
'e)
ACRS information and meetings.
ACRS nas oeen a cr'me ' actor in '.nc
~
pursuit of systems 1.1:eractions.
This subtask will ::mrile :he examples, and postulated events, given by the ACES, basec cn the A-17/12
proceding definitions.
In addition, meetings will be scheduled with the ACRS for the purpose of keeping them informed of systems interaction activities.
(f) AEOD studies.
The NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data has published a number of reports, some of which have discussed common cause events and systems interactions (e.g.,
Potentially Damaging Failure Mod.es of High and Medium Voltage Electrical Equipment).
This task will compile any results and conclusions from their work which could provide further informatien on potentially 3dverse systems interactions.
(g)
Efforts by industry groups - This task will investigate the efforts in this area which have been undertaken by industry groups such as INPO, EPRI, IEEE, AIF and NSSS Owners Group.
Any efforts wnich have uncovered common cause events and/or adverse systems interactions will be used to expand the 'ist.
(B)
Task 2 Trends / Patterns of Common Cause Events Based on the results of the above task, this task will ccmpile anc evaluate the list of " common cause events." Where sicnificant safety-
~
questions are raised due to the elimination of scme issue as not to be considered further by A-17 (e.g., common mode failures), this task will explain wnere such ouestions are, or will be, coverec; or propose potential new generic issues to be processed in accordance with NRR Office Letter #40.
For the ASIS, ccmplete (as possible) documentation will be :cmpiled to incluce:
A-17/13
(a) What system, component, or structure failure initiatec the e,ent or could initiate.the event?
Is it considered a sa'ety system, comconent, or structure?
(b) What system interdependency creates the coupling and is it functional or spatial or induced-human or some combination?
(c) What undesirable event or degraded function resulted? What was the plant mode of uperation?
(d) What plant recovery actions were taken at that time and how much time was available?
(e) What subsequent corrective actions '<ere taken?
(f)
Is the event within the plant design bases?
(g)
Could the review crecess (e.g., SRP) be expected to icentify this event?
(h)
How wt, the ASI uncovered-i.e., by LER, PRA, SI study?
~
From this information, this task will search for patterns and treras based on similarities.
(C)
Task 3 Indian Pcint Comcarison This task will involve the application to Incian Point 3, of (I)
Digraph Matrix Method by Lawrence Livermore Natioral Lateratory, and A-17/la
(2)
Interactive Fault Tree /Fcilure Mode Effects Analysis by Brookhaven National Laborctory.
These studies are to be done in parallel w sth task 1 and 2 above. The objective is to complete the candidate studies :n a time frame which will allow an assessment of the efficacy of each methodology as part of Task 5.
In addition, any commoa cause events that are discovered will be included in Task 2.
(D) Task 4 Screen Events for Safety Significance Tnis task will evaluate the discovered events (Task 1); review the established trends / patterns, if any, (Task 2); review the results of the other SI studies (Task 3); to determine if there is a significant risk associated with the catential for adverse systems interactions.
The major emphasis of this task will be the development of screening criteria.
To develop these criteria, the trends anc patterns will be reviewed and screening categories will be formulated considering such fectors as:
the importance of the safety function affected, and the significance of time in the sequence.
The resulting " fixes"_will also De reviewed.
Based on the " screening criteria," the ASIS will be screened and an estimate of the potential for the occurrence of other safety significant ASIS will be made.
It is possible that a pattern of adverse systems interactions may indicate a weakness in criteria in a particular area.
This task may conclude that certain types of ASIS appear to te resolved oy cert:in classes of fixes.
It is also possible that this task cculd conc'uce e
A-17/15
that certair. types of ASIS should be resolved by imolementing r.ew criteria or new review procedures.
As part of this task technical reports wil i bemaba available to all licensees and applicants.
(E) Task 5 Review-Define Search Methods Considering the ASIS discovered in Tesk 1 and the evaluations performed in Tasks 2, and 3, this task will compile the various methods (proposed or used) to search for and find ASIS.
The methods to be compiled and summarized will include:
(a) Operating Experience Searches (b)
Plant Walk Throughs (c)
Failure Mode and Effects Analyses (d) Use of SRP Guidance (e) Multi-discipline Review Team (f) Candidate Studies on IP-3 (g)
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (h) Combination of the Above (F) Task 6 Compare / Evaluate Methods This task will compare the various methocs to determine the most effective met' hod or methods for discovering potential ASIS.
It will consider bcth the effectivenss of the methods for fincing the events anc the costs involved.
This task will utilize applicable information developed previously by the National Laboratories.
Specifically. tne evaluaticns done in References 3, a, and 5.
A-I7/16
As part of this task, technical reports will be mace available to all licensees and applicants.
(G) Task 7 Technical ResoJution Based on the results of Task 4 and 6, a regulatory analysis will be performed as the basis to determine if:
(1)
Plants need to do an ASI " study" to find ASIS and, if yes, what the
" study" shculd involve; and/or (2) New requirements are necessary; and/or (3) New review criteria / procedures are necessary.
The objective of this task is to develop a proposed regulatory position frota the technical findings of the progren and to support that position with a regalatory analysis.
Part of this task will be to develcp any neceseary regulatory guidance, such as a regulatory guide, SRP change and/or a rule.
Procram Schedule Complete and prepare draft resolution 03/30/85 Completed Package to NRR Director 05/30/85 CRGR Review Complete 07/30/85 Issue for Public Comment 09/30/83 Resolve Ccmments and Re-issue Package to NRR Director 12/30/85 CRGR Review Complete 02/30/86 Issue Final Resolution 03/30/86 e
A-17/17
3.
BASES FOR LICENSING CR CONTINUED OPERATION PENDING COMPLETION OF FROGRAM Although the occurrence of scoe events at LWRs that adversely affect plant safety justifies the prese.nt program on systen.s interacticns, NRR is confident that current reculatory recuirements and procedures provide an adequete degree of public health and safety.
Most applicants have not committed to implement a ccmprehensive program that separately evalustes all structures, systems, and components important to safety for adverse systems interactions.
However, there is assurance that LWRs can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public.
Each application was evaluated against licensing requirements that were founded on the principle of defense-in-depth.
Adherence to this principle and conformance to the regulations (e.g., the General Design Criteria) results in design provisions such as physical separation and independence of redundant safety systems.
The design provisions are also subject to review against the SRP which providet for multidisciplinary reviews of safety-related equipment and addresses some types of common cause events and potential adverse systems interactions.
(See Tables 1 and 2).
Furthe rmore,
the quality assurance program that is folicwed during cesign and construction contributes to the adherence to these provisiens.
Therefore it is ccncluded that the design and construction as well as the licensing process can provide for a significant degree of plant safety with respect to th'e potential for adverse system interactions.
The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in 1977 to evaluate c;erating facilities to reconfirm and document their safety 'n ldgnt of the current regulatory requirements.
The Systematic Evaluaticn Program cerivec a list of significant safety topics from existing issues.
Althougn the 137 to ics do not explicitly address systems interactions reviews, the ac:ectance cri*eria for some topics incluce reviews for hazards created cy intersystem dependencies.
The Systematic Evaluation Program also incluces a systematic A-17/IE
review of the operating experience of the plant under evaluation.
The Systematic Evaluation Program is nearing completion of Phase II wherein eleven of the oldest plants are being evaluated, i.e.,
those plants licensec most remotel," from current, reouirements.
The results of Phase II have been p-esented to the Commission.
Concurrently, consideration is beirg given to a program which would folicw SEP Phase II. Although the Systematic Evaluation Program objective was not intended to resolve USI A 17 on older plants, the acceptance criteria ior the topics within SEP are cerived from the acceptance criteria within the 5RP.
Some of the acceptance criteria inherently address potentially adverse systems interactions.
The corrective actions resulting from the SEP reviews will help preclude adverse systems interactions for the operating plants reviewed, in the same way the SRP review provides protection against systems interactions.
The follow-on program to SEP Phase II would similarly upgrade such protection for subsequently evalucted plants.
Operating reactor experience is continually monitored to detect precursors to serious event sequencec.
As such events occur, corrective actions are taken for all affected facilities.
Thus, the performance of a systematic review of older plants against current requirements and the continuing generic reaction to isolated events contribute to the preventien of edverse systems interactions in operating plants.
An additior.al measure of safety has been taken on all plants (both those operating and those under licensing review) in the area of operator inf o rma tion.
Specifically, Generic Letter 82-33 (Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737), dated Decemoer 17, 1982 provided " Requirements for Emergency Response Capability." As part of these requirements, utilities will be adding a Safety Parameter Display System as well as demonstrating the adequacy of their post-accident monitoring capabilities as outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.97.
Ecth these requirements, and the other requirements of that letter, will ennacce the ability of the operator to perform A-17/19
mitigating actions in response to events including those due to adverse systems interactions.
Based on the activities iden"ifiec above and the cngcing activities in the area of adverse systems interactions, we conclude that licensing and operation of PWRs and SWRs is acceptable pending ccmpletion of this program.
4.
NRC TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED A.
Division of Licensing (DL)
Support from the DL is needed to continue the coordination with the participating utilities.
The utilities' cooperation is needed to provice the detailed information used in a systems interactions analysis.
The needed information includes engineering P& ids, systems ficw diagrams and manuals, electrics) drawings, instrumentation and control drawings, plant procecures, and selected reports.
DL will provide assistance to the Contract Technical Monitor Tor setting up and coordinating with the utility persennel, informational meetings, documentation requests, and site visits that may be necessary.
DL will also provide assistance to the Task Manager for integrating any relevant experience and any new requirements resultinc from the activities identified in Task A-17.
DL will contribute to the review and approval of any licensing requirements and guidelines ceveloped as c result of this USI, and will provide review and comment on tne te:5nical evalua-tions provided by the Task Manager.,
Manocwer Peauirements Total FYE4 FYE5 Operating Reactors Brancn No. 1 0.1 sy*
.05 0.05 Licensing Branch No. 1 0.1 :sy
.05 0.C5
- -17/20
Licensing Branch No. 4 0.1 psy
.05 0.05 Licensing Branch No. 3 0.05 psy
.05 Operating Reactors Assessment Branch 0.05 osy
.05 0.4 psy
- Assumed 1 professional staff year = 40 man weeks.
B.
Division of Systems Integration (DSI)
DSI will provice review and comment on technical evaluations provided by the Task Manager in the areas of instrumentation and centrol, electrical power, the reactor systems and auxiliary systems desiens, and accident analysis.
The Instrumentatibn and Control Systems Branch and the Pcwer Systems Branch will provide assistance for the purpose of integrating relevant experience and any new requirements and guidelines stemming from the completion of the tasks described in Task A-17.
The Reactor Systems Branch and the Auxiliary Systems Branch wil.1 assist in the development of the screening criteria to be used for establishing safety significance of discovered systems interactions.
A large cortion of the Auxiliary Systems Branch support will be determining the safety significance of systems interactions discovered at Indian Point-3 on the auxiliary feedwater systems.
The Auxiliary Systems Branch will provide _.
coordination with DST for completeness to assure that all sources of missiles and safety-related ecudgment that could be impacted by missiles were analyzed.
The Auxiliary Systems Branch will also share the coordination responsibility with the Mechanical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering for the consequences of High Energy Line Breaks (HELBs) since the Auxiliary Systems Branch has the primary responsibility for HELBs outside containment.
The Centainment Systems Branch will provide coordination with DST to assure that the effects of systems interactions en containment isolation and containment oressure/
temperature analyses h6ve been considerec.
In additien CSI will A-17/21
contribute to the formulation, review and appreval of the recommendations, and guidelines developed at the completier cf the tasks (described in Task A-17).
DSI will also review and comment on the draft and final NUREG Repor,t.
Manoower Recuirements Total FY84 FY85 Instrumentation and Control Systems
.2 psy
.1
.1 Brinch Power Systems Branch
.1 psy
.05
.05 Reactor Systems Branch
.6 psy
.3
.3 Auxiliary Systems Branch 4 psy
.3
.1 Containment Systems Branch
.10 osy
.05
.05 l.4 psy C.
Division of Engineering (DE)
DE will provide review and comment on technical evaluations provided by the Task Manager in the areas of (a) the qualificatien of equipment against spatially coupled adverse systems interactions, (b) the compatibility of fire detection and mitigation equipment with safety-related equipment including the adverse effects of inadvertent actuatien, (c) HELBs and their consequential effects on control system 3 and safety-related ecuipment, and (d) generated missiles.
The Equipment ~~
Qualificatiors Branch will provide support to establish the hostile-environment functionability of equipment identified to be within a harsn environment jenerated as part of a postulated systems interaction scenario.
The Chemical Engineering Branch will provice coordinaticn with DST for completeness to assure that fire protecticn equiprent intended actuation, inaevertent actuation, or failure does not generate adverse systems interactions that are safety significant.
The Mechanical Engineering Branch will orovice coordination with OST for A-17/22
completeness to assure that the consequences of HELBs inside containment have been bounded in the safety analysis.
Mancowe-Recuirements Total FY84 FY85 Equipment Qualification Branch
.1 psy
.05
.05 Chemical Engineering Branch
.1 psy
.05
.05 Mechanical Engineering Branch
.1 psy
.05
.05
.3 psy D.
Division of Human Factors Safety (DHFS)
CHFS will provide review and comments on those technical evaluations involving man / machine interfaces.
The scope of A-17 does not incluce random operator errors.
DHFS will contribute to the formulation, review and approval of the draft and final recommendations / requirements, and/or guidelines involving man / machine interfaces developed, as appropriate, during the program.
Manocwer Recuirements Total FY84 FYE5 Hu;<,an Factors Engineering Branch
.2 psy
.1
.1 Procedures ar.d Systems Review Branch
.2 osy
.1
.1 4 psy E.
Division of Safety Technology (DST)
DST will provide overall management of USI A-17 and provice i e decn between other Offices and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulaticn (NRR) and provice coordir,etion of activities. performed within NRR.
A-17/23
DST will provide assistance to the Task Manager for the purpose of integrating relevant experience ano any new requirements temming from the completion of USIs A 44, A-47, and A-49.
The coordination between A-17 and A-47 is important and there will continue to be close coordination bbtween these two programs.
RRAB will provide review of risk assessments associated with the regulatory analyses required to support A-17 proposed positions.
The Safety Program Evaluation Branch will provide technical support on the cost / benefit evaluations associated with the recommendations and positions developed.
Manpower Reouirements Total FY84 FY85 FY86 Generic Issues Branch 2.7 psy 1.1 1.1
.5 Reliability and Risk Assessment 4.0 psy 2.4 1.5
.7 Branch Safety Program Evaluation Branch
.6 psy
.2
.2
.1 Research and Standards Coordination
.15 osy
.05
.05
.05 Branch 7.45 psy 5.
ASSISTANCE FROM OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS (NMSS), OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) AND OFFICE OF REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
AEOD will provide review and comments on the technical evaluatiens provided by the Task Manager.
AEOD will also prcvide assistance to the Task Manager for the purpose of integrating relevant experience for which AEOD has responsibility.
A-17/24
Manpower Recuirements Total FY84 FYE5 AE00 Pl;nt Systems Unjt
.1 psy
.05
'.05 NMSS wiil provide assistance to the Ta5K Manager in the area of nuclear power plant security systems including relevant expertance at operating facilities.
NMSS will provide review and comment on the technical evaluations provided by the Task Manager for those potential adverse systems interactions which involve the security systems.
NMSS will also provide assistance to the formulation, review and comment of any recommendations and guidelines developed in the area of security systems.
Manpower Recuirements Total FY84 FY85 NMSS Division of Safeguards
.2 psy 0.1 0.1 The Office of Regulatory Research will provice review and comments on those parts of the program which involve risk cnalysis and work for which they have related ongoing programs.
Manpower Recuirements Total FY84 FY85 Division of Risk Analysis 0.2 psy 0.1 0.1 6.
TECHNICAL ASS! STANCE Technical assistance to the program will be required for the activities identified in Tasks 1, 2, 3'and 4 Contracts have been initiated with the national laboratories in these areas.
Funcing is to be pr0 viced oy the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The estimated costs (in thousands) are as follows:
A-17/25
Cont ract FY84 FY85 A-0445 - Application to IP3 700 50 A-3725 - Application _to IP3 700 50 Proposed Survey and Evaluation of Systems Interaction Events and Sources 200 Additional technical assistance is anticipated for estimation of the risk significance of discovered adverse systems interactions and the potential for risk reduction due to the implementation of possible solutions.
Also, the cost of the solutions will be estimated.
The estimated cost (in thousands) is as follows:
Contracts FY84 FY85 Value/ Impact Assessment 200-7.
INTERACTIONS WITH OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS The past program had benefited from a broad base of involvement with outside organizations due to the use of four national laboratories in the program:'
~~
Brookhaven National Laboratories, Livermore National Laboratories, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, ar.d Sandia National Laboratory.
Three of the laboratories performed separate evaluations of methods that could be applied for near-term analysis of systems interactions.
Many methocs were evaluated including Fault Trees, Event Trees, Cause-Consequence Diagrams, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Phased Mission Analysis, Markov Modeling, GO, COMCAN-III, Visual Inspections, Operational Survey, Divers;on Path Analysis, and Generic Cause Analysis (Refs. 3, 4, and 5).
The laboratories concluded that no single method presently exists in a form adecuate to perform analyses
~
for aaverse systems interactions (Ref. 17).
A-17/26
The staff will ccntinue to maintain active interfaces with outside organizations. The staff has met annually since 1981 with the Atomic Industrial Forum Subcommittee on Systems Interaction.
There have been oiscussions rith Nuclear Sfeam Supply System vencors, applicants, licensees, and consultants on many occasions during the course of regular safety review activities, particularly those outside organizations involved in the systems interaction program tasks described in Section 2.
Additionally, informal exchanges have occurred with British and French individuals concerning their efforts on systems interactions.
The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) has continually pursued operating problems which it named systems interaction and has followed the progression of the systems interaction program.
The ACRS interests led to meetings and memoranda and active interfaces between the staff and the ACRS.
The activities of Task A-17 are scheduled to allow for keeping the ACRS informed of the program.
The cooperation of selected utilities is necessary for the resolution of of USI A-17.
Utility cooperation is needed to provide the detailed information used in a systems interaction analysis on a plant.
The needed information includes engineering P& ids, systems flow diagrams and manuals, electrical -
line drawings, instrumentation and control drawings, plant procedures, and selected reports.
In addition, utility cooperation is needed for informatior,al meetings and site visits.
8.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS A.
A systems interaction analysis is basically a search for hidden safety problems at a nuclear power plant.
!! is not a process to engineer the solution to a well cetined safety orablem.
As a A-17/27
result it may not be possible to assure that all such hidden problems have been uncovered.
The A-17 program plan will try to answer whether we have gone far enough in the area of adverse systems interactions by reviewing operating experience for trends and patterns and considering the studies and the " fixes" wnich have been implemented.
Based on the conclusion, it will then determine if additional requirements are necessary.
B.
The cost of performing a systems interaction analysis is a potential problem.
The analysis should be performed on the entire plant so as not to preclude the discovery of any intersystems dependencies.
The analysis should be performed to the level of detail that would assure no hidden dependencies frcm supporting equipment.
Both of the constraints on the analysis (broad scope and sufficient detail) contribute to the large costs of performing a systems interaction analysis.
The decision to incur a large cost for the purpose of searching for adverse systems interactions is a potential problem in itself.
C.
The need for detailed information about the plant creates a potential for a third problem.
The utility is the organization possessing the needed detailed informatien.
Considering that 3 -
requirement to perform a systems interacticn analysis aces not exist, the progress of the program will be depend upon voluntary cooperation from the involved utilities.
A-17/28
Table I A.
Some Reviews for External Events
- Standard Review Systematic ! valuation Hazard Plan Section Program Taoic Earthquakes 3.2, 3.7 IIi-I, III-6 Floodings 3.4 II-3B, III-3A High Winds 3.3, 3.5.1.4 III-2, III-4A S.
Standard Review Plan Sections Section 3.2.1, Seismic Classification Section 3.2.2, System Quality Group Classification Section 3.3.1, Wind Loadings Section 3.3.2, Tornado Loadings Section 3.4.1, Flooding Protection Section 3.4.2, Analysis Procedures Section 3.5.1.4, Missles Generated by Natural Phenomena Section 3.7.2, Seismic System Analysis Section 3.7.3, Seismic Subsystem Analysis C.
Systematic Evaluation Program Topics Topic II-3B, Flooding Potential and Protection Requirements Topic III-1, Classification of Structures, Componer.ts, and Systems, (Seismic and Quality Topic III-2, Wind and Tornado Loadings Topic III-3A, Effects of Hign Water Level on Structures Topic III-4A, Tornado Missies Topic III-6, Seismic Cerign Consicerations
- This should not be ctnsicered an exhaustive listing because there are other reviews (SRP', SEP) which deal with various aspects of external events.
A-17/29
Table 2 Some Present Staff Reviews for Adverse Systems Inter.sction*
~
Type Tooic Section Other 1.
Spatial Fire IX-6 9.5.1 Flooding II-3B.1 3.4.1 III-5G HELB III-5A 3.6.2 IEIN-79-22 III-5B 3.6.1
~
Missiles III-4.C 3.5.1.1, 3.5.1.2 (Internal)
'11ssiles III.4.B 3.5.1.3 (Turbine)
Masonry Walls III-6 3.8.4 IEB-80-11 Overhead Heavy Handling Systems 9.1.5 Generic Letter Ventilation Systems IX-5 9.4 2.
Functional Reactor Protection IV-2 7.2 VII-1.A Safe Shutdown VI-10.3 7.4 VII-3 Station Service IX-3 9.2.1, 9.2.2 and Cooling Water Systems Circulating Water
!X-3 10.4.5
~
Control Systems VII 4 7.7 IEB-79-27 USI A 47
- This table should not be considered an exhaustive listing because there are other reviews (SRP, SEP) which deal with the potential for systert interactions.
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TAB;E 3.
RESOURCE RECUIREMENTS
SUMMARY
FY E4 FY 25 FY E6 Contract Dollars for Technical Assistance in Thousands -
15C0 300 NRR Manpcwer in Person Years DST GIB 1.1 1.1
.5 SPEB
.2
.3
.1 RRAS 2.4 1.5
.1 RSCB
.05
.05
.05 DSI RSB
.30
.30 ICSB
.10
.10 CSB
.05
.05 ASB
.30
.10 PSB
.05
.05
.05 SEB GSB HGEB MTEB CHES
.05
.05 E0B
.05
.05 DH*r5 HFEB
.10
.1C OLB LOB PTRB
.10
.10 DL (Total)
.25
.15 RES (Total)
.1
.1 AEOD (Total)
.05
.05 NMSS (Total
.1
.1 5.40 4.30
.75 A-17/31
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.I P r.
REFERENCES 1.
IEE2-379-1977, "IEEE Standard Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Nuclear _Pcwer Generiting Station Class IE Systems.
The Institute Of Electrical and Electrcnics Engineers, Inc.
2.
G. Boyd, et al., Sandia National Laboratories, "~inal Repc + - Phase I, Systems Interaction Methodology Applications Program," USNE Report NUREG/CR-1321 (SAND 80-0884), April 1980.
3.
P. Cybulskis, et al., Battelle Memorial Institute, " Review of Systems Interaction Methcdologies," USNRC Peport NUREG/CR-1896, January 1981.
4 A. Busiik, I. Papazoglou, R. Bari, Brockhaven National Laboratory, Review and Evaluation of Systems Interactions Methods," USNRC Report NUREG/CR-1901, Janua ry 1981.
5.
J. Lim, R. McCord, and
's. Rice, Lawrence Livermore Nationa l Laboratory,
" Systems Interactions:
State-of-the-Art Review and Metnods Evaluation,"
USNRC Report NUREG/CR-1859, January 1981.
6.
H. Alesso, et.al., Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, " Initial
~
~~
Guidance en Digraan Matrix Analysis for Systems Interaction Stucies,
USNRC Report NUREG/CR-2915 (UCID-19457), March 1983.
7.
J. hinarick, C. Kukielka, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, "Precurscrs to Potential Severe Core Damage Accidents:
1969-1979.
A Status Report, USNRC NUREG/CR-2497, tCT.NL/NSIC-182/Vi) June 1982.
S.
U.S. Nuclear Regula cry Ccmmission, "Sefety Evaluation Re:crt Related to ne Operatien of Diablo Canycn Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 anc 2,"
USNRC Report NUREG-0695, Supplement No.11, Cctcber 19EC.
A-17/34
9.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn, " Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation cf San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3,"
USNRC Report NUREG-0712, Supplement No. 2, l'ay 1981.
10.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Safety Evaivation Report Related to the Operation of Grand Gulf Nuclear Generating Station, USNRC Report NUREG.0831, 1981.
11.
Power Autnority of the State of New York " Systems Interaction Study" Indian Point 3, Docket 50-2E6.
12.
T. J. Secks, B.C. Ashmore, J. M. Champney, Analytic Information Processing, Inc. and H. P. AI' esso, Lawrence Livermore Nstional Laboratory " Preliminary Systems Interaction Results frc= the Digraph Matrix Analysis of the Watts Bar Nuclear Pcwer Plant Safety Injection Systems." UCID-19707, June 1983.
13.
Commonwealth Edison Company, "Zicn Station Interaction Study," Zion Station, Docket 50-304 14 Gulletin 79-27, " Loss of Non-Class-1-E Instrumentation ard Control Pcwer System Sus During Ope-a tion," Ncvember 30, 1979.
15.
IE Bulietin '30-11, "Mascnry Wall Design," May 8,1980.
16.
IE Information Notice No. 79-22, '0)alification of Control Systems,"
September 14, 1979.
17.
Memorancun f rom T. E. Murley, NRC, to distribution, "The Approach to Systems Interactions in LWRs,' June 25, Ic81.
10.
National Reliability Evaluation Program Proteuvres Guice NLREG/CR-ZS15.
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