ML19290E535

Technical Evaluation of Electrical Instrumentation & Cantrol Design Aspects of Low Temp Overpressure Protection Sys for Facility

ML19290E535
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	02/21/1980
From:	Laudenbach D EG&G, INC.
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ML19290E523	List: ML19290E530 ML19290E535 ML19290E538
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NUDOCS 8003140170
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APPENDIX A SELECTED ISSUES PROGRA.M H-R.

TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF-TE ELEC RICAL, INSTALMENTAT!]N, AND CONTROL OE :GN A3PE~TS OF Tni LOW TF.PERATURE CVERPRESSURE PRCTE:T:CN SYSTEM

~CR THE SALEM NLCLEAR ?CTa'ER ?LANT, ~.'N:7 1 by D. H. Laucenbach'

'EG4G, Ene ;y 'ais; e en s 3r:c:, San Ra.m:n

era-':.s

[d 8003140

This report docunents the technical evaluation of the electrical, instet::entation, and c:ntrol design aspects of the ics-te.:erature over-pressure protection syste.m fer :ne Salem nuclear :: <er pl ant, Unit 1.

Design basis criteria used to evaluate the ac:ep:attit:y of the syst em include operator action, system testability, single f ailure criterien, and seisaic Category I and IEEE Stc-279-1971 criteria.

Tnis report is supplied as pa. of the Sele::ed El ectrical, Instrtmentatic.., and Control Systems

'ssues Supper: Progre. being ::rdu::ed for the U. 5. Nuclear Regulatery -

C =ission by L:wente Liver:ncre La:cratory.

a

TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTRICAL, IRSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL DESIGS AS?ECTS 0F THE LC".i TEiFERATURE OVERPRES5URE PROTECTION SYSTEM FO?. T.~.:. SALEM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 1.

IhTRODUCTICH Sy le::ar :: the Public Service Electric a.d.3as C:rneany (?SEG) dated August 27, l.C75, ne U. 5. Nuclear Regula: cry C:=issi:n (NRC) re-cuested an evaluttie-of system cesigns :

cetemine sus:e::ibility :=

cver:ressuri:atic evsn s and an a.alysis of nese ; ssi:le events, and Ort:: sed interi= anc :e-nanent modifications to the systens and :recedures to reduce the likai'h: d and ::nsecuences of su:., events.

By le::er :ated Oct:ber 25, 1975 an: su:sequen letters (refer :: :ne A::endi:), the Public se rvice El ectri: a.: 3as C:mpany submit:ec the adci-icnal infor:natien recuested by the NT-s t a'#, including -he acninistrative ::erating prc:e-dures and the ;r::c se: icw temperature over ressure ;r: ec-icn mitigating system.

The syster a-dware in:1udes sens

-s, actuating ecnani sus,

alams, and valves :: prevent a rea: or coolant sys em transien from ex-

ee:ing the press. a inc tencerature limits of :ne Te:nni:31 5:ecifica icns

1. r Salem Uni

as seuired by tne Code of Federai

.eculations, Title 10,

?ar. 50 (10 CFR 5:), :::endix G.

The :u ::se of this re:cr is to evaluait the Licensee's equi: ment and ;r::e:. es based on the infor ati:n scovice: (refer to the A:cendix), and :: cef ne how well they mee: :ne :riteria established by NRC as necessary :: ;-eve-. unacceptable overpressuri:ation events.

L

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6

2.

EVALUATICN OF sal.Di UNIT 1

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Review of the Salem Unit I low temperature over ressurt :r:te:-

tien system design by PSEG was begun in 1975 at NRC's re:uest.

~he :verall a;;rcaen to eliminating overpressure events incorperates ad=inistrative, pr::edural, and hardware con:rols, with reliance u;:n the plant :pera::r as the ;rincisal line of defense.

Preventive acninistrative/grt:edurst :nen-sures incl ude:

(1)

Prc:edural precautions.

(2 )

~ 3eenergi:ation (; wer removed) :f n: essential c:

es senti al ::raponen s whien are no; reavired to te cerable during the cold snu:dewn m:de :f 0; era-ion.

(3)

Maintenance of a non-water-solif rene :r ::el ant system ::ndition wnenever possi31e.

(4 )

Inc:rporation of a low pressure relief se:::i.t fer ne existing : wer-ccerated relief valve (PCRV) c:r.-

rel logic.

Tne design basis cri eria that were a;:li ed' in evalua fn; the a::e::a:ility f :ne electrical, ins:rt:nentation, anc ::n.r:1 as;e::s f

ne icw tem:erature overpressure ; rete::icn system (0?S) are as foli:ws:

(1) 0: era:ce Acti:n.

No assun; icn of c: erat:r a : ion is ma e un 11 ten minutes after the 0; erat:r is aware, through an action alam, that a pressu-e transier.: is in progress.

(2 )

S f-cle ailure Cri erien.

Tne CP! snali :s desig ed

:r: et-ne reac :r vessel ;ive a single failure iri:n is in aediti:n :: :ne fatiure tna; in;;ia;e: tne

ressure ransient.

svs e-Tes a:ili:y.

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e-f: m i s fune:i:n.

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(4)

Seismic Catecory I and IEEE Std-279-1971 Criteria.

ine GPS snoulo satisfy co:n :ne seismic C4:e;: y a and IEE'E 5:d-279-1971 criteria.

Tne basic c:je::ive is tha: the CPS should not be vulnera:le := a failure code that would both initiate a pressure transien; and disable the low temperature everpressure nitigating system-Events su:h as loss of instreen air and loss of effsite pcwer must be considered.

2.2 PSEG PRESSIRIZER OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYST F. OESIGN The PSEG Pressurizer Overpressure Protecti:n System (PO?5) design information detailed in this secti:n was derived fr:n Reft-=.nce 5 in the Aopendtx.

Tne FSEG design for the Salem Unit 1 PC?S is a o-train over-pressuri atien sitigating system which uses separate and ir.demen:ent pres-sure transmitters Oc open the two pressuri:er PCRV's (l?R'an: l?R2) in the event that reactor coolan: system (RCS) pressure ex:eeds r.e :rese: value f 375 psig.

Tais autmati: action takes place pr:vi:es :ne syste has seen manually er.atl ed by placing two keylocked ::snbu : ns in ce ":n*

ositi:n.

Tne sys:s. Will be enacled wnenever the R;5 is bei:w 3'.2'F.

Each ?:RV is a:tuated by its own logi: rel ay,r.i:A is ene gi:et by a bistacle device.

The bistable device is energi:ed wnen the RCS pres-sure ex:eecs the se::: int.

Existing installed press;re sens: s are used ::

develec the signal f:r valve actuation.

These are :ne sc e senscrs wni:n

r

vice automati: closure of the residual nea rem val (RHE) su: tion pa-hs at C D psig.

Caera:fer. :f :ne POPS is governed by tw: a:-inistratively c:n.

trolled, keylocke- ;usr.:::: ens which perfom three func t:ns, as foilews:

(1) inen the RCS tem:erature is less tha.

3'.2 F, the system is amed by depressing ne "On"

usn

:::: for each 20P5 train.

(2)

If ;he te.perature should subsecuently increase above 312"F, an actuation signal to open the ::::r-operated valves (MOV's) upstream of the PCRV's is initiated as well as an alam to indicate tha: the FCPS is a: sed..

n nis mode of ::eration, the FCRV will te

ened autmatically if the RCS cressure ex

eecs 275 sig.

(3 )

i er ne RCS temperature increases abore 312*F, the

• f"

usnou: on for en:n POPS crtir (s depres s ed.

's ac-i:n emoves.he :cenin; :e :issive signal ::

ne :0RV, rem:ves ne ::ening signal f r:r the asse:i-ne: w Y, and ;r: vices an ala -

i. dica:e inat :ne

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y b J fa) fhL 1[

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I Wu sys:c is disamed if.the temperature is subsequently decreased belew 312 F Upon actuation, the valves

. Mll open and will reset when system pressure de-creasas below 375 psig.

RCS pressura and temperature instrunentation are provided which permit the operat:r to menitor the above parameters.

An alarm is provided on the main controi console to infem the operator of a POPS initiation.

Valve positien fedicator lights infom the operator when the valves have opened. ~ In addition, a computer-generated alam infoms the operator of an impending press,urs ex:ursion beyond the Technical Specification limits.

The PG?S is designed as a " protection grade" system in accordance with the applica:1e partions of IEEE Std.279-1971.

The use of preven devices provides assuran:e that the system is ccmca:ible with other pro-tection system e;ui:r.ent.

The use of acninistrative controls to arm the POPS is : nsidered a::eptable due to the infrequency of low-;ressure, low-temperature ocera-i:n.

Tne effects of various failures have been ::nsidered in the PO?S de si gn.

hese fai.ures include 1:ss of ::n:roi air and less of station power.

Due :: :f a v:-train design, failures within the POPS cannot cause a less of pr: tecti.'e functien.

Failures :a:able cf causing an overpres-surization even : ann:: cause failures within the POPS cr preven: operation of the system.

An air ac:u ulat:r is pr: viced for each PORV in :ase of a loss of control air failu e.

Tne ac:utula :rs are si:e: to :revide en..gn :entrol air for un :: 100 cy:les of ?CRV valve cening and closing.

Tne ac:unul a-Ors are designec ':: sei snic Catege y I requirenents, and are provided wi-h

.an ala m wnich Wl-aler the coerat:r to a icw air pressure :endition.

e ac:unula:Or :esi;n :nus precludes a :::al icss of on roi air to -he PORV's.

A loss of s ation power failure will not affect -he POPS since

retecti

n legi: : -er is provided by inverters, and ::ntrol p:wer for the FORY's Originates a: the batteries.

~

In the even. that one PORY cpens en a false signal or upon trans-mitter failure a a -ime when protection is not required, a decressuri:a-tion of the RCS wmuld oc:ur.

Any such depressuri:ation would be less severe than these analyzed in the ~5AR, Section 14.1.2.

The discharge through the PORY :a se teminated by :: era:Or action, thus minimi:ing :ne effects Of :ne !rinsien!.

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2. 3.1 0:erater Action In each design basis transient analyzed, no credit for operater action was assuned until 10 minutes after the initiation of the RCS over-pressurization transient' and after the operator is made aware of the over-pressure transient.

Operat:r awareness of the overpressure transient will be derived by the low temperature overpressure transient alarm.

PSEG states in Reference 5 that the POPS requires no operator action other than to enable the system prior to operation when the RCS tem:erature is less than 312*F.

All other protective a: tion is then per-forced automatically.

2. 3.2 Sincie Failure criterion PSEG states in Reference 5 tha: One PCPS is designed to pre e::

the rea::cr vessel given a single failure in a:dition to :ne 'failurs that ini-ia:ed ne ever;ressure transient.

Redundan cr diverse pressure pro-te:-icn channels a e used to satisfy the single failure criterien.

The POP 5 incorp:ra es redundancy and separation of pressure t ransmitt ers,

icsic, and valves in a channeli:ed system. Single f ailures wi nin the PC?S will not defeat -he safety functi:n.

In aedition, single failures wnich are cacaole of initia-ing a pressure transien, canno: cause f ailures within

-he POPS wnich v:uld rencer it unable to pr:vice protection.

We c:n:1 ude that -he PSEG Salem 'Jni: 1 POPS satisfies the NRC staff single f ailure criterion.

I. 2.2 Syster Testability Tne NRC staff position requires that the POPS centrol circui ry fr:r. pressure sensor o valve solenoid shali de tested prior to each hea up an: cecicown.

The PORY's should be tested during each refueling.

Deviations from these criteria should be justified.

?SEG states in Reference 5 that testing provisions in the POPS cir:uitry allow 'or test opening of the PORV's prior to ar : ling of -he d

system below 212 F.

Tne " test" :ushb utten, wnen decressed, will operate ne ?CRV roviced ha: the associated u: stream 9.0V is clcsed.

Other ::r.

i:ns :f ne 7075 can be ested in a manner simiiar to other p1an: or: ec-syst es.

Tne :C:S desi;n pr:vides fer testing of ne anale; circui ry a y -i e ne R:~;. su:-ion valves fr:m -he 03 are c!:sec.

Tne FORV's (*.?R1 an: * :0 2 ) :an :e es ed Orior to entry in:: a water-sclid ::ndi icn :y use

' : e : :5 " fun:-i:.a; tes:" usn:ut::n.

he POPS is designed o fun:-icn

.; ' ; 1 3 r:e-a ure 1:w-:resse e c:erati.; : n:i-icns and, theref:re,

e '::i:

es-i.;

f ne sys.e curing : wer :: era-icn is ne: ;ianned.

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The safe:y evaluation reper: (SER), dated Deceber 1977, by the NRC React:r Safety Sranch/ Division of Operating Reacters (?.55/00R) for the Salem Unit 1 CM.S states that:

(1)

Testability will be ;r:vided.

(2)

PSEG has stated tha verification of c;erability is pessible prior to RCS low temperature operation by use of the remotely o;trated isolation v al ve, enabl e/

disable switen, and normal electronics surveillance me-hod 1cgy.

(3 )

Testir.g requiremen s will be incorperated in the Te:hni:al Specifications as discussed "n Se:.icn 4.2 of this evaluation.

We cen:'ude. hat the PSSG Salem Unit 1 POPS. satisfies the NRC s aff system testa:ili y :riteria.

It is recomended tna; the h'iC staff ensure tha: thorn;h surveillance cf the ?0?S from sensor : valve s:lencid an: crocer 70iV estir.; are adecua ely cescribed in :ne PSE3 Sale Unit 1

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2. 3. 4 Seismi: :es':- and IEEE 5:t-279-1971 Criteria FSEG sta:es in Reference 5 -ha: the PCPS design tests sei s.i:

a egory I criteria 1:r all equi; men recuired to c:en na FCW's, an: Ona:

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We con:*.ude tha: the ?SEG Salem Uni: 1 POPS satisfies the NRC sei s-i: design an:.= :.d-279-1971 Oriteria.

2. 4 AL*RM 5579'.5 OESIGNS AC ?IRATION 5:ecific ce ails concerning alar-n systems designs and operation for the POPS are ces:ribed below.

2.4.1 M f ;h.3 -=_s s u-e A l a -a 7ne N:.0 sca'# ::sitten recuires that a high.:ressure audic/ visual a a-m shall be use: c,: ring low RCS a.: era ure :: era-icas as an effec-ive i...... e pe r.,m...

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wnen :ne R 3 :e :erature is less tr.an 312 :

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o (2)

The annunciater provides both visible and audible signals.

(3 )

0;erator action is required to acknowledge the alarm.

(4 )

In addition, a c:cputer-generated alam infoms the c: era:ce of an impending pressure excursion beyond the Technical Specification limits.

We conclude that this desigt satisfies the NRC staff p sition.

2.4.2 Isolati:n valve Alarm, Tne NRC staff position requires that (1)

The u: stream isolation valve shall be wired into the Over essure prote::icn alam sc tha

ne alan vill n:: : lear unless the system is enabled and the isola-tien valve is open.

(2 )

The alam shall be of the audie/ visual ty:e anc pro-vice unam:iguous infomatien to the :perat:r.

PSEG s ates in Reference 5 tha-the isclation valve riarm system design is as foll:ws:

(1)

The :: stream PORY is:ia-ion valves (1?R6 and I?R7) are wired in o the RCS ? Ops in such a way -hat hand-swi.:h a:-ivation of the 7075 will resul-in ne Opening of

e isola-ion valves.

(2)

k. ::en-close indi:a or for ea:n iscia-icn valve is proviced on the main control board.

We con:1uce that this desig-n does fully satisfy IEEE

' ~

St d-279-1971 (4.,20 and the NRC staff position.

2. 4. 3 E nacl e ' i a--

Tne NRC sta#f ; sition recuires ina-( *. )

A-a'a-m shall be activa ed as : art f -he :l an

::w. ;r: cess

ensure ha

ne FORY "l o w" se -

i-- is activa cd :sfere the RCS te : era.ure is e ual

Or Iess than 312'.

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(2)

The alam shall be of the audio / visual type and pro-vide unambiguous infomation to the operater.

PSEG st'ates in Reference 5 that the enable alam syste: design is as follows:

(1)

A PORY " low" reset alam is activated den the RCS temp.erature is equal to or less than 312*F, and en-sures that the PORY " low" setpoint.is activa:ed.

(2)

Once the PCRV's are reset to the " low" relief post-tion, an annunciator window will emain lit to indicate the " low" PCRV mode of operati:n.

Tne annun-cia: r will remain in this mode until :ne FORV's are reset to the "high" position.

(3 )

After the PCRV's are set to the "ld' pesition, the over:ressure transient alam,be:r.es operational only at R S temperature below 312*F.

When -he 70RV's are rese: :: pr: vide low temperature relief at 375 psig,

l an

c:olcown can be resumed.

We con:lude tha: this design satisfies the NRC staff ;:sition.

2.1. '.

Disable Alarm Tne NR: staf' position recuires tha (1)

An al ar: snall be activa:ec as :ar: of -he plant heatuo :rocess to ensure tha: :ne FORV's are rese: o

-he "high" se point when the RCS te::erature is grea:er than 312*F.

(2 )

The alam saali be of the audie/ visual y;t 'and pr:.

vide una= iguous infomation to One coeratact.

PSEG states in Reference 5 that the disable alar: system design is as follows:

(1)

During the pl ant heatup, nomal operat'ng precedures will maintain the RCS pressure :eicw d5 :sig un-il ne RCS tan erature er:ee:s 312 F.

• hen the RCS frn:erature ex:eeds 212 F, nomal :: era-i.g :r::e:ures re0cire *.na: *he 'r!RY's are rese

:.e "hign" se*-

0 0 i "..

(2 )

ne same -ime, -he over:ressure :ransi ent al am si'.1 :e :eenergi:ed when :ne R:5 e :eratu e ex:ee:s 2*.2*:.

• n Or:er e s ;re :na-ne :0RY 's are e*,e-

:ne "M;n" se:::i-, an ala - 4 11 be a:-iva:30

&, aJull ld. ~,!rdfx

~

wi.en the RCS pressure exceeds 375' psig.

After the PGiV's are rese to the "high" setpoirt, nor=al hettup will continue accordingly.

We concluda that this design satisfies the NRC staff position.

2.4.5 PORY Oeen Alarm The NRC staff position rewires tha: an audie/ visual alarm shall be activated to previce unambigueus information and alert the operator that a PORY i s' in the "epen" position.

PSEG states in Reference 5 tha: the PORY~open d ar-. system design is as follows:

Tne :ressurizer PORV's have open/shu-indica::rs on :ne main control board.

We :enclude that this design does fully satisfy IEEE St d-279-1971 (4.20 ) a.xt the NRC staff positien.

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i The NRC staf* position is that a pressure transient wni:h :Auses

he FOPS :: fun::i:r., thereby indi:a-ing *he occurrer.ce f a seri:us pres-sure trans i ent, is a 30-day reportable event.

In additi:n, cressure-recording and tem:erature-recording ins rtrnentation are required previce a_ per anent recer: ' Of the pressure transien..

The res::nse time of :ne

ressure/ emoeratu e recordeps snail be ::cpatible with ;ressure transients that increase at a ate of approximately 100 psig per sec:nd.

PSEG states in Reference 2 that four O'F-to-700 F temperature 0

recorde-s are installed in the cor.: ol room to verify es.pliance with -he 10 Cr7 50, Accendi: G :ressure-temperature limits during sta-tup, shutdown, or periods of cold snutdowi.

Tne recorders moni:Or the hot-leg and cold-leg temperatures :

ea:h cf the four loops.

A pressure re::rder and tw:

s

ressure indicators are also installed in the c:ntrol resn :: monit:r the hot-le; ;ressure.

Tnese instrunents are.ke:: in service during all =edes Of :: era icn.

We ::n:1.te :ha this im:icen:ation, if :r:;erly in::r;: rated in

ne :SE3 Sale Un -. Te:nni:al 5:e:f #ica.icns, sa-isfies :he 52C s aff

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2. 6 DIS ABLING C.: ESSENTIAL CCMPONENTS NOT REQUI?.ED Dt?.ING COLD SHUTDOWN The NRC staff position requires the deenergi:ing Of safety inje -

tien system (SIS) p:r;s and the elesure of safety injecti:n (5~) header /

discharge valves d:rin; cold shutdown operations.

PSEG states in References 3 and 5 that the disablir.; cf essential cer:penents not regired during cold shutdown is as follows:

(1)

During plant cooldown, the power to both SI punps is reeved by ra king out the power gupply breakers een the.C5 taperature is belcw 350 F.

A13:, 5: header isolati:n valves are shut and their power is run:ved.

(2)

The SI p.r::s are deenergi:ed whenever the 2.05 tencera-0 tu e is below 312 F except wnen a special su veillance test is ceing c nducted.

During nese :re:edures,

only ene II pump is energi:ed.

This ailws :C?S to maintain the RCS pressure below the 10 09. 50, A;:en-dix G ;i=it in case an inadvertent mass addi icn fr=

the si gle 5: ptt:0 oc:ur during this ;rceedure.

'de con:lude -hat this implementati:n, if pr:per'y it.: r; crated in the :5EG Salem Uni:. Te:hnicai 5:eci fications, satisfies the !aC staff

si ti On.

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e 3.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The Technical Specifications infer.ation detailed in this section was derived from the RS3/ DOR SER entitled, " Safety Evaluation Reper of the Overpressure Mitigating System for Salem Nuclear Plan: Uni: 1", dated Ctee.v.ber 1977.

To ensure operation of the POPS, the Licensee is := submit for NEC staff review its Technical Specifications for ine:rporation into the license for Salem Unit 1.

The Licensee should ensure that the :reccsed Technical Specifications are canoatible wi-h c:her Li:enses requirements an: are consistent with the intent f the statements listec :eiow:

(1) 5cth PCRV's must be operable whenever One ROS te er-ature is less# than the minimum pressuri:1-ice te -

perature (512 F); however, one PCC.V may be in::erabie for seven days and still meet

..e single failure criterien.

If these c:ndinens canne: be met, the primary system must be de:ressuri:e: anc ven ed o the atmospnere or to the pressuri:er relief tank within eight hours.

(2)

Caerability of the POPS requires -ht: :ne l o.-:ressure setooint will be s el ected, the u:strea. isciation vaives opened, and tne ba:ku; air su:;1y :narged.

(3 )

No mere than one high-heat,SI pun; may be energi:ed at RCS temperatures below S12*F.

(4 )

A reac cr coo.lant pur.p may be started er j gged only if there is a steam bubble is the ;ressuri:er, or if the SG/RCS aT is less than 50 F.

(5 )

The ? OPS must be tested en a ;eriodi: basis :ensiste.:

.<ith -he need for i s use.

(5 )

Failure of :ne FOPS :: :: era e v er e ui ed is a re:Orta:1e event.

f bde,$$IN_bAb

4.

CCNCLUSIONS Tne electrical, instrtmentation, and centr:1 (E:aC) design as-Pects of the icw temperature pressuri:er overpressure pratacticn system (POPS) for Salem Uni I were evaluated using these desiga c:-itaria origi-nally prescribed by the NRC sta#f and l ater expanded d: ring subse:: vent discussiens with the Licensee.

'de ce::r=nend that the NRC staff find the f:11: wing Il&C aspe:ts cf the ?!EG Salen Unit 1 POPS design ac:eptable:

(1 )

0?erator action (2)

Single fail ure criterion (3)

Seismic Category I and IEEE-279-1971

~

(4 )

High pressure alarm (5)

Enasie alarm (5 )

Disable alar =.

e 9

6 6

REFERENCES 1.

NRC (Kniel) letter to PSEG (Libri::1) dated Au;us: 27, 1975.

2.

PSE3 (Librini) letter to NRC (Kniel) dated 0:::ter 25, !!75.

3.

PSE3 (Librini) letter to NRC (Lear) dated March 25, '.977.

~

PSE3 (Libri::1) letter to NRC (Lear) dated May 3, *.977.

5.

PSE3 (Libri::i) letter to NRC (Lear) dated 0:::bar Zi,1977.

5.

" Staff Dis: ssion of Fifteen Technical Issues Listed in A::achsen: G, Nov emb er 3,

1975 Memo rand um fr= Director NRR

.o NRR Staff,"

NUREG-0135, Nover.ber 1975.

7.

"2 essure Mitigating Sys em Transient kalysis Results' crepared by

e sti ng h:us e for the We sting house User's Gr u: Or Rei:t:r C :lan System Cverpressurization, July 1977.

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