05000366/LER-1980-002-01, /01T-0:on 800128,during Cold Shutdown,Ae Notified Util That Single Mode Failure Existed for Torus Gravity Fill Isolation Valve 2G51-F013.Caused by Design Deficiency. Standing Order Issued

/01T-0:on 800128,during Cold Shutdown,Ae Notified Util That Single Mode Failure Existed for Torus Gravity Fill Isolation Valve 2G51-F013.Caused by Design Deficiency. Standing Order Issued

ML19290D004
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	02/04/1980
From:	GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19290D000	List: 05000366/LER-1980-002, Forwards LER 80-002/01T-0 05000366/LER-1980-002-01, /01T-0:on 800128,during Cold Shutdown,Ae Notified Util That Single Mode Failure Existed for Torus Gravity Fill Isolation Valve 2G51-F013.Caused by Design Deficiency. Standing Order Issued
References
LER-80-002-01T, LER-80-2-1T, NUDOCS 8002150323
Download: ML19290D004 (3)

LER-1980-002, /01T-0:on 800128,during Cold Shutdown,Ae Notified Util That Single Mode Failure Existed for Torus Gravity Fill Isolation Valve 2G51-F013.Caused by Design Deficiency. Standing Order Issued

Event date:
Report date:
3661980002R01 - NRC Website

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EVEN'T DESCH APTION AND PROOABLC CCNSECUENCES h 10n 1-28-80, at,1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br /> CST Unit 2 was in cold shutdown in order to perform modific-I 3

2 gtions per TMI requirements (f;UREG-0578).

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Georgia Power Company Plant E. I. Hatch Baxley, Georgia 31513 Event Description and Probable Consequences.

would be greater than water head pressure from CST.

Actual event date cannot be determined as this condition has existed since plant was constructed.

Un-it I was not affected by occurrence as Torus Water Cleanup system has not been installed to date.

There were no effects upon public health and safety due'to this event.

All redundant systems were available and capable of performing their intended functions.

This is a non-repetitive event for this system.

Cause Description and Corrective Actions.

Architect-engineer has issued a proposed design change which will install a second valve in the affected piping system.

Bechtel PDCR #B2M-041 was rec-

. cived on site on 1-23-80, and is being reviewed.

Upon comoletion of review of preliminary engineering package, engineering services personnel will issue necessary design change request for modification.

Terus Water Cleanup system is not currently installed on Unit 1 so event had no affect upon that particul-ar unit.

Torus water cleanup system will remain isolated until such time as a second isolation valve can be installed.

Resolution of this potential problem is expected by 5-1-80.

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s' LER #:

50-366/1980-002 Licensee:

Georgia Pcwer Company Facility flame: Edwin I. Hatch f

Docket #:

50-366 g

t'arrative Report for LER 50-356/1980-002 On January 28,1980, at 1300 CST, Hatch Unit 2 was in a cold shutdoun condition to perform modifications per TM1 requirements (l1UREG-0578). The plant l

was contacted by the architect-engineer, Bechtel Power Corporation, and was

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notified that a single mode of failure existed for valve 2G51-F013 (u us Gravity Fill Isolation valve). They contend that folicwing a postulatcc LOCA and a single failure of valve 2G51-F013, that a flow path is provided via the "B" core spray suction piping and the condensate storage tank (CST) to core spray suction isolation valve bypass (2G51-F013) from the torus to the CST. This water transfer to the CST could occur post LOCA because the tor-us pressure would be greater than the water head pressure from the CST.

The actual event cannot be readily determined as this condition has existed since the plant was constructed Hatch. Unit 1 was not affc:ted by this occurrence as a torus water cleanup system has not been installed to date.

This was a first tif,e occurrence for Unit 2 for the condition described.

There were no effects upon public health and safety as a result of this ev-ent. All redundant systems were available for use and capable of performing their intended functions.

The cause of this event can be attributed to design deficiency.

The archi t-ect-engineer possibly failed to consider post LCCA consequences on this par-ticular section of the system during the design stages of the plant.

Immed-iate corrective actions taken by plant personnel was the writing and implem-entation of a standing order (50 #80-5).

This particular standing order req-uires the closing of certain valves associated with the Torus ' dater Cleanup system and visually inspecting the valves daily to assure the valves are in a closed position.

Bechtel has issued a proposed design change which will install a second valve in the affected bypass line upstream of valve 2G51-F013. The proposed deqign change, Bechtel PDCR r!B2M-041, was received on site on 1-28-80, and is in the process of review.

Upon. completion of rev-iew of the preliminary engineering package, site engineering services person-nel will issue the necessary design change request for the modification.

This event did not affect Unit 1 as the torus water cleanup system is not pre-sently installed on that particular unit.

However, a design change is being The des-currently worked on to add the torus water cleanup system to Unit 1.

ign change for Unit I has been revised to add the second valve in the bypass Resolution of this potential problem as a result of the Unit 2 occurrence.

is expected by 5-1-80.

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