ML19290C928
| ML19290C928 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/04/1979 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290C925 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002150081 | |
| Download: ML19290C928 (42) | |
Text
av, scw -
K h & Pli S # - W W *'ry y w d M O * ?I" % ' Q
- T " @ t
- M 6? M N i u um m DR AFT SPEECH UKAEA SEMINAR IN LONDON p
~
1 admit to a certain trepidation in appearing bef ore you today. Here I stand to C
offer my comments about the regulation of nuc! car power in a country where you e
w have carried out the functions of nuclear regulation rather better than we have eto C
in the U.S. I say that both in recognition of the very serious accident in CC Pennsylvania carlier this year, and also because it seems to me that you manage to carry on discussions of r lear matters in a more civil manner than we do at hom e.
~
What I would like to do this af ternoon is to outline the development of nuclear regulation in the U.S., note the present status of the matters we regulate, say a few things about the Three Mile Island accident, and leave amp!c time for questicns.
~
Tne reguistion of civilian uses of nuclear power represents an unusual underta!<ing of government in the United State,. From its inception, the regulatory authority for this technology was essentially different from the traditional forms set us by governnient to regulate industry. The htter are typically preaccupied with :,etting rates, allocating territerics, and similar
.,.,a c a.;,.. <
v Not so with nuclear regulation. As you know, the roots of nuclear technology go back to the early 1940's when nuclear power was developed under total
L
]
t l
government control for military applications. This fact, which to some extent still affects public perception of this energy source, strongly affected the legislative framework in wn?.h commercial applications of nuclear energy I
emerged.
l t
Under the original Atomic Energy Act of 1946, activities involving nuclear energy were transferred f rom the military to a new civilian agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The focus of that Act was on development of the potential uses of nuclear materials in the national defense.
A major revision of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 charged the AEC witn the f
mission of providing for "a program to encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the commen defense and security with the i
health and safety of the public." Of particular significance at this time, the j
legislation allowed for the release into the public domain of technological i
knowledge necessary for the design, construction and operation of nuclear f
reac tors.
1 In 1955 the AEC established a licensing division and a special reactor hazards I
t evaluation group which formed the core of an expanding regulatory staff. The j
l basic regulations for licensing special nuclear materials, reactors and reacter operators were issued in 1956, and basic standards for protection against i
raciation were adopted in 1957. The earliest regulatory activity of the AEC in the private sphere was associated with small research reactors, of which more
1 l,
4 than 50 were licensed for operation-mostly by co!!cges and universitics-during the first decade following passage of the 1954 legislation.
4 i
f f
I i
e t
- f
(
l
)
1 4
9 d
i i
l
)
}
i
)
~
i y
i
L i
e c
j The application of nuclear energy to the generation of electrical power gradually i o 1
increased during this decade, as the AEC pressed forward with the development o
and demonstration of various power reactor concepts in small-scale projects carried out in cocperation with private industry. In 1957, the law was amended i o i
to establish a system of private insurance and governrnent indemnity, the Price-Anderson Act, to pay public liability claims arising from commercial o
1
(
nuclear operations.
0 5
fo During the second decade following enactment of the 1954 legislation, regulation l
began to emerge as an important function of the AEC. The reason was largely a o that more and more utilities were turning to the nuclear option. This occurred in i
o particular af ter the milestone application in 1964 by the 3ctsey Central Power and Light Company, which had decided to build a 515 MWe nuclear power plant o
on the basis of economic preferability. The rate of application, and the o
electrical capacity of proposed stations, increased rapidly through the latter half of the 1960's. In just the three years 1966, "67, and '63, orders for 64 power o
plants were announced, with a total generation capacity of some 55,000 MWe.
o Along with the expansion in nuclear power ge.fration came a propcrdnnan I
increase in nuclear fuel cycle activities, and this, of course, meant a o
corresponding increase in regulatory activity both in volume and in types of i
o f acilities regulated.
j I
io i
At about the same time-roughly the late 1960's-a general awakening of public s
o and Congressional concern with environmental quality took place, and nuclea-j plant licensing proceedings occame arenas of controversy drawing ever larger o
i a
b
^
L A
s numbers of intervenors. The thermal effects of reactors on bodies of water and i o f
wetlands was a prime focus of early environmentalinterest. The AEC
';o maintained-and the ccurts confirmed--that it had no authority to take
(
regulatory cognizance of such effects. This was soon to change.
!O j
Legislation regarding water quality and other environmental values was enacted t>
I in 1970 which had a major impact on AEC regulatory jurisdiction over the non-radiologicalimplications of licensing actions. By 1970, the National o
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was in effect, as well as the Water Quality Improvement Act, requiring all agencies of government to take heed of the O
consequences of their decisions and actions on the environment.
O l
During the first year under NEPA, the AEC relied on assessment by other federal l O
{
agencies and State-!cvel authorities for meeting its new responsibilities. Then a O
federal court decision in 1971 held that the AEC was required to make its own j
independent evaluation of environmental impact. The implications of the 1 O decision were far-reaching. The AEC would thenceforth be required to perform O
an analysis to determine that the benefits of each proposed facility exceeded any environmental detriment resulting from its construction and operation.
O t
t l
3
L a
Similar concerns with the safekeeping-or " safeguarding"--of nuclear material O
began to be felt in the late 1960's. The United States government had i
~
i O relinquished its exclusive rights of ownership of special nuclear material by t
legislative action taken in 1964. By 1967, the AEC found it necessary to create 3 0 j
an office with safeguards responsibilities, that is, to concern itse!f specifically I
O with the possible thef t of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear facilities.
I C in 1971 the Atomic Er.ergy Commission made it clear to the nuclear industry and j O the public that the agency's primary dedication with respect to light water i
reactors would no longer be to development and promotion but rather to
! O regulation. A substantial increase in the level of detail in standards and
! O regulations ensued. A major reshaping of the regulatory program and the organization of the agency consistent with the new priority was undertaken in O
i l
1972, involving substantial additions of regulatory staff people.
1 h
The new combination of regulatory and development activities proved 0
fissionable, and in January of 1975 the AEC was abolished and the Nuclear 1
O Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Acministration (ERDA), were set up to carry on the separated regulatory and Q
development missions. The ERDA staff and mission have more recently been O
incorporated into the new Department of Energy.
I t D I
The Energy Reorganization Act, which created the NRC, was an G
acknowledgement that the nuclear industry had rnatured. V/ith that enactment, the Nucicar Regulatory Commission was charged by the Congress to carry out
'i i
L 4
t the regulatory provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, that is, to assure that w
civilian activities involving nuclear materials and f acilities are conducted in a manner consistent with public health and safety, national security,
. o l
environmental quality, and antitrust legislation.
) :a 1
4 I
a The Comrf.....
onsists of five Commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and one o! the Commissioners is designated as i o o
p Chairman by the Px:ident. The Commission has a staff of about 3,0 people, o
wi+h hmJguarters of fices in the Washington, D.C. area and five regional offices j
located near Philadelphia, Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco.
O t
o The NRC is an independent regulatory agency, which means that we are not part j
of any of the three major branches of the U.S. Government. Our most direct and o
a active connections are to the Congress, where a considerable number of the
{o subcommittees of the Congress have oversight jurisdiction over our activities.
1 I
O As ! noted earlier, the NRC does not involvc itself in rate-setting or
[o route-approval or the like. We regulate primarily for safety and national security, and our authcrity extends to a!! fuel cycle facilities, from uranium O
mil;s to fuel enrichment ar.d fabrication facilities, nuclear power plants, and
'O radioactive waste disposal facilities. We regulate the transportation of commercial nuclear materials. We also license rer ; tor operators and the use of C
radioactive isotopes. Finally, the NRC licenses the import and export of nuclear O
materials.
3
L i
A number of these functions are carried out in cooperation with ather agencies e
of government, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of O
Transportation, the Department of Energy, the State Department, and so on. I should add that there are uses of nuclear energy and materials by Federal 0
agencies which do not come under our regulation, including most of those of the O
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.
0 By far the largest part of our operation involves the licensing, regulating and o
inspecting of nuc! car power plants. At the present time there are 70 such plants with a license to operate in the United States. Another 91 have received construction permits. In addition, there are 25 plants for which construction C
permit applications have been filed, and six others are on order or announced.
The f acilities holding operating licenses represent 31,000 MWe total generating 0
capacity; those under construction would add 100,000 MWe I should note that cf O
the plants with operating licenses, two are small units of an early vintage that are shu: down and will probably not come back into operation, and the situation C
of the units at Three Mile Island is yet to be determined. Also, some of the o
p; ants under construction or at earlier stages have been deferred and may never be compicted. Even at that, nuclear energy contributes about 13 percent of all 6
elect-icity generated in the United States. As you might expect, certain regions o
are rather heavily dependent on nuclear power, such as the New England States, where about 35 percent of the total electricity is nuclear-generated, and in the 0
area arour.d Chicago, where about half the total is nuclear.
0 We also administer directly about 9,000 licenses for the possession of
~0
'l
!i I 1 - !;}
l il
- 4
, ' j I;
!l I l?
3 O
O C
0 O
C O
O G
O O
C 9
o L
w e
T a T
d d
p e
n S
i u r
I l
m e
x h
n h
e n
r e
r n
u o
c n
a a
t u
m e
a e
f t
l o
e c
n p
y i
h v
p r
o e
d d
o d
i e
s t
p h
e e
e e
g el u
n e
i s
i i
s n
o t
o r
s r
U e
yl y
a r
s s
a i
h r
r e
a d
r f
o p
n v
e o
o r
s e
p d
o r
e o
t a
v t
s t
i r
o r
i r
d e
h S
o e
s e
u e
s r
t r
n m
p
,t p
i i n r
g p
s a
n a
g c
u o
v t
a e
e c
i l
i c h
yl al e
l n
o a
c o
e c
u s
w s
o n
t f
r e
t x
e a
s vl l
e i
b a
a a
t a
t t
t i
e g
W h
n e
d t
i b
e t
e e
W o d
e t
r i m d.
e n.
li d
r e
n c
o v
a e
e n
e n
r i
i u
s r
a y
a e
W o B
ei n
e h
t t
v p
a m
a cl p
l t
b y
b ei e
h e
o f
t v
e c
f t
s h
e e
a i
n e
o h
t a
e n
a p
d i N l
r a
gi I
o g
R m
h h
r s
t a
h e
u r
n l
t t
e e
s l
m n
u a
o l
s w
ol c
h he o
C t
s v
u a
t e
u h
o e
w v
r f
s' t
e r
e m
oi c
n e
e o
o e
e d
cid cl i
I e
c f
l s
l r
a t
e i
c t
t a
a c
g t
h e
l v
y a
i t
gi e
n t
n r
o a
g a
p h
2 u
e o
n r
e 5
e l
s t
n n
m f
r c
o r
t o
a a
s c
a e
r d
o a
l s
f n
t n
g N
t p
a s
h d
o e
i t
c ei c
r i
t e
r p
o s
o a
R a p
t s
t l
e a
w w
v t
i e
h C
c a
e h g m
m C e r
t f
c i
h h
b n
h s
t a
o o
a l
c a
i a pl
.s a
a t
t t
l s
e h
z v
y t
m t
e a
t e
e e
T o i
r l
r h
d x
h i o h
m a
n T
l e
s a
c e
t e
e i
b t
v e
t o
o r
s s
h ss s
e e
r b
h n
n e
u a
e C i e e
a g
e e
n s
r l
a e
n o
o i
b
,s r
a d
n t
n s
o o
m n
c t
f r
e t
e e
n l
i a
i i
s a
d n
ci i e f
h e
m s
c p
d i
t s
n d
e d
s r
e s
a b
r u
n i
t o
s si h
e t
r o
e i
w ci o
e n
e u
g t
e s
s t
i n h
e s
f s
o o
c c
v t
u r
o s
a g
oi oi n
h o
y n
r t
l i
e e
s t
1 s
s e
n u
n l
o a
a h
v s
c o
u
,2 l
t a
s n
r o
c ol e
e u
v y
a u
p n
r 0
I d
s s
e r
0 m
e e
f f
a g
d r
o i i 0
ko ~
s a
e r
t r
y n
n a
s t
i e
s o
t i
t h
p u
t o
n t
e m
d e
m v
o c
h o
s h
f d
s e
e n
e e
c w
n si d
r o
u i
i s
a a
o e
t g
m a
r l
a f
n y
s p
u r
s b
i u r
b t
r a
o
,s g
l b
t a
e h
e t
l r
e n
i a
e n
i i c.i s
r i
c t
l a
i s
r r
f e
i e h
h o
a n
e d
s e
a f
l s
.k s
v s
e e
s 1
L 4
l In effect, the Commission defines the necessary level of protection through the 7
regulations that set various requirements for nuc! car plants. We can and do f O consider costs and re!ated factors in our rulemaking-cither explicitly through I
?
value-impact analyses, or implicity in the individual judgments of the
'~1 i
Commissioners. But it is the improvement in safety that must be the dominant
's element in our considerations. In a similar way, the NRC staff will generally
}*
make a value-impact analysis in considering new generic requirements to 0
implement the regulations.
e i
But when we com to apply those general requirments to a specific matter on a p
l specific plant, costs and related f actors do not count for much. Each olant must O
meet tnose general requirements in order to be allowed to operate. Our purpose, I
af ter all, is to reduce the risk to the public, by appropriate regulation, to as low I
e a level as we can reasonably achieve at the time a facility is designed and i
3 constructed and to keep it there during operation. That requires adherence to i
the body of regulations with which all licensed plants must comply.
O 3
The regulations are not totally inflexible. Exemptions can be granted when it can be shown that the necessary level of safety can be maintair.ed by some other d
means than that prescribed by the regulations. But, in general, a plan ~ that does 1
0 not meet the regulations cannot operate, and costs and other factors do *t have much to do with it.
3
.J Let me turn at this point te the subject of the Three Mile Island accident, a 1
l matter cf r.;ost serious interest to us all. The matter is still under investigation,
- (g
1.
i
?
C k
as you know, be a special commission appointed by the President, by several v
I\\
i commi: tees of the Congress, by the nuclear incustry, and, of course, by the j O NRC. The Presidential Commission is scheduled to report its findings and t
recommendations toward the end of October, and the NRC specialinquiry should Q
be completed sometime near the end of the year.
s i c I
It is not my intention to predict the results of any of those investigations. But I O
don't think we need to wait for their results to be able to identify some of the O
]
key elements and lessons of Three Mile Island.
O The Three Mi!e Island Nuclear Station consists of two pressurized water reactor t
units and the associated generating equipment. Unit I began commercial operation in 1974 and its net capacity is S19 MWe. Unit 1 is currently shut down i
G awaiting the outcome of Commission proceedings on whether, and under what
~
D conditions, it should be allowed to resume operation.
m Unit 2 began commercial operation at the start of this year with a capacity of C
906 MWe. At about 4 a.m. on March 28th, while operating about 97 percent of full power, Unit 2 underwent a loss of feedwater that led to a turbine trip and then a reactor trip on high pressure.
t
~
l 11 %
i
li4 ii j I
Ii I
- j
{
{
I i
t L
i w
n w
b d
e v
t r
t e
a B
f a
p p
W m
n n
s s
o l
c t
v i
T s
a u
e h
e r
n i
h l
a f
t i
hi t
l gi al e
t h
a a
d d
gi gi i
e h
f f
a t
t a
t i
h v
h s
a o
t zi t
e e
h e
t e
p c
s s
o al g
e c
r t
u c
b d
h h
e r
e a
e e
e a
t t
t n
p h
e o
i t
t s
e re e
p n
n a
d l
ti g d
e e
d n
v u
e o
h f
i c
t c
o a
r t
e a
o l
d c
t e
m r
e o
r b
d u
o s
n r
t h
o n
n t
a r
t i
h i m o
l w
e d
d s
l p
n a
e o
e n
o t
e i
l h
n e
h t
s f
e n
ei a
u e
n e
e l
d r
tr e
a e
g s
c p
o s.
p y
e t
p y
o i j gi g
f t
d t
t r'
i h
e o
h a
o n
r a
n r
s r
n a
n i
h t
t n
e t
l si e
h o
al a
ti s
d t
c w
p v
u o
o i e v
d T
f e
r p
h s
s e
o i
v e
a h p c
e x
l n,
r e
a h
e r
d n
a s
r e
f n
c s
a e
w m
m p
n u
g t
u y
w a
pu t
r t
e r
f u
o l
a s
r o
e c
u e
a l
c a
e l
s i a g
e r
o s
l b
s s
r o
x c
s f
t e
e f
o b
a l
o a
o o
h T
p i o t
r e
e o
i r
n
,n gi s
d u
o s
r w
e a
b d
i l
i n
s a
r u
r oi a
l n
e a
b t
u w
e o
,n y
t o
t a
d h
r f
o r
s o
l i
b i a i m r
f e
h e
n u
p z
t n
i e e
i m t
t c
y x
l e
d a
p o
u ue e
r r
e n
a e
g e
k t
j e
e h
r e
o e
s t
t r
f f
t l
s c
u c
d h
a d
e t
c 3
d a
s i
w e
c a
d t
e e
t r
t o
0 t
s ti t
t a
m k
y b
b h
d e
f r
u c
n t
e o
l r
e w
.d t
s o
t o
r e
o o
o y
o r
v s
t i
f e
o n
n u
p a
u e
e w
a p
e n
a f
e c
f t
c r
l t
s r
r u
c t
l t
a e
o i
t e
t t
a 2
o a
e b
T f
l f
n a
h y
d n
i v
e o
n h
t r
s a
e 0
s n
r n
h l
j p
e s
e s
s e
e w
d o
e p
r e
u l
s r
y e
t w
w c
s s
d s'
a s
a e
y v
a t
f r
a m
e f
o e
e e
t p
t f
t r
h t
u e
c c
v t
s r
o e
o el r
i i
a o
e c
r s
t e
o a
w e
p w
r ll t
i s
f e
t o
.n n
t bi el e
t d
l t
r h
n n
o t
o w
ta n
e w
d d
v m
e t
o e
a r
r t
l w
r h
s.
y r
e s
s t
s n
a l
a a
s e
r u
s T
t i
t r
a e
t d
o n
n e
l r
e r
e e
y s
a a
p si g
h e
t a
e A
d r
b p
e d
i p
cl ni c
t r
I r
e e
r y
f o
si r
n m
h i
t r
t e
t t
a p
s e
e e
e a
n h
d o
n l
d f
s h
e u
i a
a g
d t
t t
l e
o t
a w
c d
e e
e i e d
o e
r t
r t
s e
h y
b 6Wp u
r p
y o
i n u
d n
t
,d r
r a
t d
e f
a e
p a
u m
r i
f c
t r
i
.f a
e
.J al f
p o
a e
m n
i r
p t
z e
r s
T m r
c s
d w
y i
p c
a a
t h
b r
n t
n o
i i i l
LAt w
h s
r i
t
,n o
d r
m n
s t
h t
i n r
s d
e s
u e
r t
a a
c m
a o
e t
p u
h e
e t
s t
s s
r e
t e
n y!
r e
p n
c e
s h
h r
v e
,m i
i s
r u
u e
t o
p y
i e
e e
r r
n n
e r
l p
s gi pi t
a r
o u
l r
u n
t o
a t
a e
i e
h a
o d
e r
d d
u e
y n
i r
i c ai d
e t
e n
,n o
o s
t g \\,t f
e a
c d
l d
,s h
f i
t o
o 4
e e
m h
a e
pl e
ci t
s t
a t
h p
n a
5 c
h a
h l
f o
v m
e e
d n
s s
e r
e v
e a
a s
o a
e t
n r
v
,2 y
o h
d m
a i
y e
t a
a e
b r
n e
t o
1 i
o e
t q
c i
o t
u
,1 5
t s
l h
u l
0 o
o o
e v
u l
a e
n a
i 6
r n
n e
k
,d 0
s d
,d
,e a
t e
n n
e f
d c
0 s
,t e
,s;
,tI
, ':,i f>
'i l O
O O
O O
O G
O O
o o
o o
C O
o O
i c
o a
t w
A s
a r
a T
v t
d r
t r
lo u
u e
u h
a a
i e o
e o
v c
e i
o t
n e
c m
m x
s t
t n
s g
e l
k c
m t
r i p h p a
i p
o d
b p
l m
c e
h oi t
v ai h
e e
f h
a n
e n
r o
a o
p ai o
r a
n e
n o
i a
r n
u u
r s
a t
u r
n s.
h e
n o
p g
m a
,t y
e t
t c
d t
m t
n n
s p
b t
ci a
f e
o d
t t
e i i r
d u
e a
7 i
l u
A t
t 0
u o
b s
c l
h o
m w
e r
t l
hi n
o r
f t
g e
i s
s e
b e
i a m
a i
t o
g a
g d
d l
T l
b r
b t
i e al e
i i
h ei e
c o
n a
n n
n i m b
.h u
i s
g u
u u
r t
s o
a e
v l
t b
g i i t
t k
t d
u A
o h
t an e
o s
o b
b t
t i
a t
n e
t o
0 h
g o
l h
c!
e u
t u
n t
r i
f 1
r t
i 0
,s T n ui e
d g
1 i
a a
t r
5 f
d w
e t
b a
s o
n t
4 e
o i
a m
o o
p t
w i
c m
h 0
s i
t e
e a
h g o
o c
n n
u p
s b
n t
i e
i e c
h m
i t
e n
u t
n t
a g
r n
o i
t e
p t
o u
p
,t r
r o
u p
5 r
n t
n a
r c
a t
o e
e s
h a
u t
r e
e u
n o
e a
r e
i 1
i d
o s
g e
r k
e n
s l
n l
e n
e w
ei
,s
/
s f
s e
h a
t t
m ol l
e s
2 v
t s
o t
t h
o o
e a
u t
a t
s r
t n
r a
e r
i v
l ni e
n i
f h
n m
r a
h a
r e
d i
a d
t pi r
s e
s n
e i
t n
v n
i t
t r
n m
n t
g a
r s
s u
o o
d o
f e
h e
w e
t t
t u
t l
a e
a a
f i c yl a
o o
t o
h l
n e
v t
r t
c p
h w
e n
m h
e e
,e c
a t
s t
p p
e p
t s
i h
t m
a v
e T o u
e e
s r
m d
a d
u T o w
r o
i e
r n
r y
e c
p t
c b
m h
a b
t i
t s
h s
m c
e a
c e
o is e
t pl a
e p
r i
c o
g e
p e
v o
s h
i t
t r
h o
e e
d f
c o
e l
an h
b r
o e
n e
o a
o d
d a
e n
n n
a t
m o
e i
s t
r i
v n
w n
t t
e d
t b
s i
o o
b p o
e e
u ni o
c t
t o
a o
e d
,t o
e t
t h
o a
c n
a n
m a
p r
h p u
h s
d f
c i
t a
i r
o l
i t
m m
r a
r d
r a
t 2
g m
o e
a o
m e
i r
h m
u
,d c
p p
e n
g t
a r
o e
e n
p e
i e
e n
a t
t t
s d
t i
t
,t i
l t
t r
d i
f n
a n
2 l
r a
s g
2 o
h t
o c
t u
r g
n t
h e
o t
l o
o
,k h
h e
t h
v h
o r
p o
o m
n p
s a
p o
m e
e o
r t
e e
u e
o r
t e
w h
p u
l r
a l
t a
s n
p e
h s
i s
h i
r r
s c
s c
S g
e s
n t
k u
i o i
t o
t o
s n
e u
c h
s 1
n r
n o
o p
m o
r h
s 5
e t
r o
e t
u i
t n
p o
p n
p u
p r
e r
h f
h u
t e
s g
m e
r t
o h
m d
t h
e a
e m
e h
s n
n c
o h
t i
t e
t d
e p
h m
e e
p n
t i e a
l r
s a
o r
u e
e h
r e
t v
r d
t i
e t
c k
e g
a n
e a
ei h
e a
l f
e d
t f
s.
t o
d u
f u
a l
e n
s t
r
,r e
n e
h e
el i
e n
~
i iI-
!!it l i :lI}I,hi 1;?
',l
.j. '
.'Il l,
Iji; n
O O
O O
O O
c O
O O
O C
O O
o o
L f
w M:
n
~
p s
B n
v t
R b
h T
s b g a
c w
r o
a h
y e
i i
2 t
y o
o a
o A
r v
t r
r l
p a
h e
0 n
u o
h a
v g
n s
v w
7 m
c o
al e
a t
c t
u e
r t
e t
e n
a e.
a t
d m
r r
t e
d e
n e
i d
0 a
e c
a i e r
s b
e l
r l
t o
e h
r c
m e
e o
n t
b a
e t
o p
m a
m l
gi 0
r r
n c
o W w p
l m
l s
a e
s r
u u
e o
c s
h e
a p
i l
a h
i t
h d
a d
i h
k o
o e
r
.m e
h i
r t
t d
o d
d e
e n
e n
e r
r i
f u
e 7
s s
n el v
n e
m o
n t
a a
t h
s c
s n
a p
e t
d c'
d p
a d
t h
u h
i l
t a
e a
i t
i y
l r
1 g
n e
t w
a u
r h
e
/
r s
yl g
c v
h n
o h
n i
r t
d b
t g
d B a a
g o
m e
e s
2 o
e o
e e
o h
e y
c t
T o
a t
n e
u o
n a
t p
p e
c u
h t
n n
i r
h g r
o h
t e
t c
u 7
i r
e o
r a
t r
i e
e r
i v
,s e
n t
u e
o r
i h
n o
t f
7 t
e
,s a
l l
h t
i y
x 3
i s
r e
v n
e z
r a
t t
i e
e 4
e d
i 0
t l
3 s
i m
d e
g e
n c
h y
u o
u l
s s
e a
a h
r i
r 5
n a
o i
t c
e y
y r
l s
e h
c r
le o
e.
e p
e ti s
v n
h i i h
g r
a e
ol gi i
l a.
a a
y m
v u
l f
e d
a e
d s
n f
c i
m d
r b
e r
r l
e s
il a
t o
s n
b n
h m
a u
n t
o l
a f
c o
t f
s m
y l
t e
t k
o u
r i
a o
i i in e
o a
o t
d p
l u
l f
s r
d i
i t
t c
n n
m o
d r
e e
d n
i r
n t
,n s
e s,
t t
o c
h e
n n
h s
o s
m i
i m.
m v
n s
t a
g e
e t
s r
e w
t w
e n
s r
v h
o e
a r
i t
v pi g
u h
c r
p a
n d
e e
c a
s a
e l
l t
r s
c a.
h e
B e
h e.
o a
o e
d o
d gi r
l t
e f
e n
3 a
a o
e c
y t
p i
f r
p T
d t
h l
c s
o s
o p
c e
d u
i t
ti t
n o
a i
n e
e hi o hi e
t i
r d
,d i
f n
r t
t n
e h
n r
T a
e e
h s
n s
a h
,t r
e e
a h
c v
d a
n h
n i
i t
e l
y f
i c e
i p
d l
h o
t h
w o
e a
a i
s d
m e
hi d.
e n
a N o i a
,t e
o r
r i
r t
r e
i t
o p
a s
4 l
c s
e i
s t
d o
i f
r p
e r
t e
0 i
h T u r
o s
n t
R n u
o a
r n
r o
e 0
e d
l n
m e
li w
e e
m l
C o h
i e
y t
g a
f h
r l
s r
h e
p o
f e
e a
s e
2 r
e s
i l
q t
l r
a g
e v
p i
u i
w e
gi n
c a
t i g c
i e l
o e
/
o u
r 1
i s
t c
e n
e o
n a
a l
a n
f p
i i
r n
d t
w o )al m
2 t
r n
i t
w e
t n
l o
h a
h a
a a
p t
v n
e
,t m
n e
a s
e a
c a
h t
s e
c i
r l
h n
e m
n d
r l
o y
l t
o s
h h
a o
o e
m s
o e
o a
t i a n
e v
u e
e t
n e
r i
a s
s p
p d
e u
v r
f n
d t
s t
i r
e ci
,e m
g o
c a
u e
e f
s b
e g
o i
o s
a r
e y
a n
a n
r b
r n
r s
d f
a n
s a
e b
z n
e n
t c
i s
c t
t t
t i
n a
o a
i d
o p
e h
c d
t t
i h
t l
e g
a t
e e
y w
o t
e a
o o
r n
u r
r n
n in s
a f
r h
d a
i i
t t
n s
le n
e m
u i
p d
4 s
s e
s e
e b
b n
u f
m a
u v
e d
f r
e h
m r
e o
g e
l re t
h e
x o
e a
e g
u bi r
n a
+
s h
o e
l t
r a
a d
r u
n r
a t
t s
e u
c v
s t
l g
n b
e c
d o
u r
l r
s a
e w
h e
e u
y a.
l r
v e
d n
t o
.s e
a e
a r
d c
o c
i i
f f
n e
s t
r y
k n
u o
d
,d a
g e
o r
~
43
f
>iIf' It;
! !lIi! ;
o 0
O 0
O O
O O
O O
O O
O o
a 4
s a
n c
f c
A m
p c
ci s
p lb A
o c
a t
u T
a m
i o
o s
t c
n a
i o u
r o
n h
b r
r t
m c
t t
i g n
c e
o b
h r
i e
i u c
s e
o x
e v
c s
c o
t a
e a
l a
c d
r u
h n,
e l
e s
k u
h u
u t
u e
i c
w r
s r
a e
u t
e c
d a
u n
l a
m t
u r
v c
e t
t n
o i
g i e
.e l
3 y
s r
8 t
d r
t a
1 h
e p
2 t
x c
i o t
e p
n e
e e
i w i o n
d o
d h
d o
d v
d s
e m
l r
n t
i n
p n
ai a
c
,h i
e t
r s
u t
n h
a i A e h
n r
f s
t o
c u
s s
p y
f i
a t
n t
c u
g l
u gi t
t T
s e
h n
u t
h d
d l
a t
n h
e a
r s
a o
s e
b r
r i
e t
e e
h r
r r
i t
t e
e b
o t
s o
a b
s n
e z
o c
q o
h l
e a
s c
u g
i t
f i
r a
a o
u i
r o
e c
a m
o d
n g
a t
1r
,n e
t u
,d e
o A a c
t h
t a
u i
e n
t t
p r
n o
s s
o t
m m
a p
c ci h
o 2
t 1
a t
r t
e r
8 h
6 n
v e
n 1
a r
e g
t e
e a
il e
c h
0 e
o d
o d
h o
o a
0 i
s n
o r
c r
n n
h e
l s
t v
e f
t h
m u
t 2
n o
e d
e o
t u
t p
e d
o 7
e l
t r
t t
e o
o a
F a u
h a
r e
c m
e r
r u
r h
.t i
m r
t c
m n
z c
,h m
w r
c
,s s
i e e
i r
o e
o a
a n
b a
i p
s e
b n
e el t
o w
i s
g e
n a
a y
d a
l d
i d
g c
t t
i s
e n
a n
a c
n e
m n
e t
h t
n d
r e
s l
h e
s a
g s
d o
a e
g w
m r
y a
s t
u t
t e
a o
e s
n e
d s
o y
r t
.s m
s t
t n
e d
t s
c m
t h
s t
v e
i r
t o
c p
t n
n
.e a
e r
o
,s i
s e
h e
s i
c h
d d
r t
t e
o m
u h
a i
n m
e o
e r
e o
e e
a e
a p
a e
a n
f m
s l
s a
l a
n t
p f
a b
r t
s t
m i
c e
e u
e o
a yl e
p c
c h
r p
c t
r T n o
e t
u l
n r
t s
e h
u s
e l
v u
i d
a 3
m s
o r
a u'
u l
lb o
e t
s m
i o e
d s
e p
t s
h i e v
d u
8 r
p d
e b
s u
s n
l t
n e
u h
g u
n y
n r
t e
g c
r t
r o
m i
t f
t p
0 z
p m
h e
r d
o a
a o
t p
0 e
w o
e a
o m
n r
n e
r d
a e
c c
s o
w a
a p
a n
w o
f s
i s
o k
.n d
gi f
u a
n n
c d
t u
n o
n e
a g
s d
d m
o a
m t
oi t
e u
r h
e c
r t
t m
t s
r a
b a
e 6a h
e i o m
T w a
a o
s o
e o
b n
t h
a t
s n
a d
s u
d ci e
n t
l e
n o
h
,s f
o m
p e
s r
a e
oi t
e a
m c
n h
b.
l t
t o
b u
e e
t e
a h
n a
r s
i n
h e
t s
g b
e c
t n
f t
a a
a e
h l
e n
e h
d a
l s
t r
o a
,d a
o p
m t
i a
u c
n e
a e
s t
t 2
r o
ni g
t a
m d
h 8
m v
r b
l r
h e
r t
u e
m s
e e
h c
m a
h oi s
i t
t e
d e
t g
a n
,h l
e r
y s
t p
a t
g s
o s
o e
e i
s w
u b
t e
r t
o r
o t
l n
i d
s o
n a
r f
t a
c w
e b
a o
e e
l f
e a
r h p e
e s
e m
a e
y s
n o
a a
u u
c o
a r
o t
r i
h s
t r
t e
a n
r l
ni pi ri i
l t
s t
t r
e p
t m
d f
e s
B u
i o
e d
e i
l s
k h
s i
u o
r t
r
,1 r
o t
n a
i t
0 r
a n
y a
e y
o e
s d
l t
d f
o 0
a t
t d
t n
o r
h s
t 0
p o
e i
t o
i r
m e
h d
s g
i l
o e
e y
n n
~
\\
e rc
,, -.,w
~ ;,
I By 8 p.m. on the 28th, there were 11 people and a mobile radiation monitoring
!f, laboratory frc;n the NRC, and several radiological emergency teams from the I
Department of Energy at the site. The NRC staff had begun arriving at the site a
l by 10 a.m. that morning and the Department of Energy teams and monitoring i o aircraf t had been in operation from mid-af ternoon on. Radiological health i
experts and civil defense staff f rom the, commonwealth of Pennsylvania had been o
at the site from the morning hours. On Thursday, NRC strength on site o
increased to about 30; on Friday it went to 80-odd; and it was soon over 100.
Similar efforts by other government agencies and by utility and nuclear industry o
support groups to say nothing of the news media and assorted spectators, created o
a large and active temporary population around the site.
o T*
Although the reactor was stabilized by Wednesday evening, it was anothq day and
=
o A
mest of a night before the extent of the damage to the reactor core was fully 0
c! car. Wednesday night and Thursday, it appeared that the damage amounted to -
cracking of the cladding tubes of a number of fuel rods. The relatively small o
radiation releases on Wednesday and the types of radioactive ma.erial identified o
in the first samples tended to support that view.
O By Friday morning, it was clear that the damage was much more severe and that J
a substantial fraction of the fuel rod cladding bad reacted with steam at high temperatures to produce a large volume of hydrogen. Some of this hydrogen had o
burned in the containment on Wednesday, a circumstance that was not understood i
J cr reported at the time. The rest of the hydrogen remained in the reactor system and there was concern about how to get it out safely.
v
I.
4,i:
ii i
!e
,l j
!l.
)
O o
O O
Q O
O O
G O
C O
G o
o C
L F
T f'
f E
g m
o g
i gi e
sl T"
t g
e a
G s
n t
a a
c A
A p
n t
A j
o h
n n
o l
o h
e l
r t
r e
h o
o l
e e
t o
d d
m b.
e n
t e
t e
m a
v p
u h
o l
o re e
i e p
r I
f h
w r
m r
e e
r c
l t
t o
c b
m n
g t
i b
a o
a f
h s
a n
n d
a o
o u
u e
o s
n t
e s
h r
a h
a a
i h
h n
r t
a h
e F
c e
o v
o e
t e
d d
p a
i
,r y
g i
r r
a o
r a
n c
c d
l d
l v
e ti f
a d
f y
o e
y i o t
s d
a t
c v
p s
o h
o r
d e
pl o
o u
a h
t s
i y
r a
s s
e a
o s
n e
u e
t o
a d
n t
e m
f f
y m
d i
p l
d m
t ti o
d f
e i
p t
a m
7 s
f r
t o
t o
c a
h n
o r
n o
t i
a v
G h
l oi o
e t
e r
r r
t n
w u
a t
i g e
o p
e h
t b
r n
a t
h e
,d e
e i c o
m i
e n
n l
o 3
i gn a
s o
d s
m e
n e
i o c
e m
a n
t n
h a
t v
a n
g t
e o
a i
t r
e b
l i c h
e r
s m
t t
t r
e v
.m n
t e
r e
h h
o f
yl d
m i c o
e p
n n
a h
e e
e e
i r
i r
e o
r t
o d
a a
e h
r r
n e
n o
r r
a n
u a
e d
n b
n o
e e
t t
d xi e
t e
a i
g t
i w
o r
l w
h o
e t
e f
i u
r s
n n
i a t
t e
e d
d e
e
,o d g d
i P
s e
a a
n e
s s
ai r
n e
e l
s e
r d
el e
n m
h s
tl y
a p
i m n
e e
e t
r u
e w
p s
a o
t o
r L
n m
r e
o e
a e
n s
e o
w e
e b
s r
r g
t yl d
n a
i v d
ui e
ai o
e e
n e
l
,s t
w v
e s
v a
l r
r n
d a
d a
r i
i b
e c
n d
e a
a a
f e
e n
u n
n e
s o
n s
i s
y yl u
i s
d r
r y
c t
a a
a n
d w
e e
,n f
a t
s t
g o
w t
g a
f e
r f
i
,d u
t u
t e
a o
a n
n o
m o
t s
i t
r h
r h
a t
e m
a c
T m
e n
h h
t T e s
h r
x n
u y
oi h
w n
e e
h l
he e
e o
n t
l u
t e
a b
t o
e e
e a
a a
f s
a r
n r
it c
r s
r e
s o
p s
e f
o a
y I
e m
e o
u w
o h
v i e re n
a a
e co s
r g
a s
o e
g c
n m
a h
c h
s u
u n
v h
t e
n s
t v
r i c o
w a
e t
a a
d s
t r
l o
t t
e t
e e
d f
o a
u e
e g
o l
m y
a h
e o
r r
r a
f e
m h
l r
t a
u r
r a
e
,l w
a u
t e
n e
e d
a p
s a
e a
c r
n d
p d
i l
o v
n r
t t
d s
e a
el e
s i
t i
c o
o t
s r
h e
d e
h s
t a
i o
t r
a y
b el e
n m
u h
t c
o e
a i
s t
t e
s t
t t
r i n d
e n
a e
i a e
h e
l t
l l
w d
e l
a h
i i
t p
s.
l s
s o
s e
v n
e i e e
i e
s o
i e e
n g
n e
u r
a d
t s
N'e C t y
s.
n m
a t
t s
h h
s a
v, h
d t.
a a
m e
a e
b t
o i
a c
o i
s t
f e
d s
l c
N
,e a
n e
i o
o v
d b
h u
s l
n e
a a
l t
e ai e
s h
f d
t r
t e
i e
t s
o e
n i
f o
m
}
':hi, I;
j, j
i
'I ii l!
a}l.
O D
C 0
D G
D C
O D
O 0
a a
v m
b t
e D
d o
e T
b s
r a
B c
a a
h c
m c
d B
r t
a n
y o
n y
o o
i y
e n
e o
c x
h u
a r
r q
d d
n t
d u
k m
e n
a il t
e b
e e
S l
u r
d t
s c
t s
ri n
e u
e b
n c
go.nT il w
e m
o t
u d
e t
o v
i r
n r
o e
l e
e t
a l
t h
n l
s h
g o
t e
t e
e c
t f
ai w
n h
a a
i e e
i s
u n
e a
a t
t a
,r h
c n
d e
o u
n d
a d
o t
a p
n a
d e
t y
d n
e s
e i
h o
r n
n r
o e
0 s
ci C
o c
a n
o o
a d
i s
h s
g a
r t
f t
i f
p h
e e
t a
i a w
d a
o g
e y
v o
s d
s i a i g t
F a
n pl n
e l
p h
e e
s e
d a
n r
e i m n
o i
r y
n o
a r
h t
n a
id u
t o
r r
d h
e a
t f
t a
r t
a e
n o
o d
i f
l o
o t
e.
w 1
s d
s e
g x
n p
a i
o o
e p
id g
r n
l w
h m
u o
r t
t y
T n
w o
c e
o g
a t
f a
h e
t o
h a
t f
a t
s n
g m
hi a
e r
t d
b e
o e
a t
N t
i h
o f
o u
v e
e g
c p
a m
i t
r e
w n
i m
s r
s t
t h
h r
e R
l l
s u
n e
C i e i
o bw e i
r l
n h
e n
a b
m 3
a p
y t
i s
g w
t c
a o
e s
t
,s
,e h
r a
a m
e e
o n
t s
s l
r l
e c
r t
e a
o a
h r
n s
u e
h e
e g
h a
e w
c n
c o
a di d
f a
c e
mi e n
l a
a a
p o
n a
l mi y
a t
v n
e o
c e
n r
a r
t t
8 c
e f
d e
o l
r s
ti i a t
o b
a x
f r
u a
c f
l 0
s e
e a
c n
o p
e i
t r
e s
y e
i h
e o
d o
0 l
h i
d r
t r
s r
c t
I s
r t
s t
e r
u e
y s
r r
n t
a 1
t t
0 c
e e
n s
a f
d e
a s
h e
t s
n o
e a
b o
a o
a p
g d
l c
o a
o e
t t
c n
t h
s d
w m
i e
e h
e e
o e
o e
e l
t x
m m
e r
r r
r e
s b
p o
t t
v n
y e
o ul e
u s
t g
c w
e h
r r
i t
w e
w n
m n
h e
f o
s s
T o n
r h
e o
o s
e x
d m
T d
u o
g e
e n
u h
u n
e a
b i
t e
p r
r v
i i
e s
w l
t e
l a
e g
s e
N i
h h
e n
r t
d a
a e
z e
n d
h b
m e
t s
b e
e i
u a
n h
y v
e d
h a
a n
b l
l l
o 0
t b g n
n a
a t
s t
e e
t v
a o
e g
.r b
h e
x e
a r
y e
d e
b t
t t
u n
e a
s s
i r
n
.t t
e t
t o
t n
3 t
a i
ti A
d x
b m
ei u
h a
o d
o e
r s
e p
k c
w n
x c
e e
e h
1 e
m e
n e
r 3
.v o
a a
c n
g d
r o
e o
e h
d a
e b
u w
g e
t n
r t
e b
a n
h 0
n o
a 0
e u
m e
y t
p a
t e
o i
t d
o n
f o
a b
r s
r c
c e
n t
x f p
T d
t e
o i
r o
o n
t s
t e
h r
n m
c c
b e
ei e
\\fa h
r r
i t
x q
c o
d e
o t
h t
f h
p u
t g
u c
r n
e w
a t
o x
2 t
e s
e e
o i
w n
h g
n 0
a o
e h
t o
y c
e c
a M
d u
e o
h l
g e
s s
t e
a i e l
a i e l
l r
a e
d s
o g
e pl d
a n
e a
l s
a u
e i
c y
c p
h r
o n
n b
r l
t t
l a
s c
r i
d a
,m i
h
,w e
g p
y y
h a
c p
o u
t d
o a
t e
d t
n d
b r
e n
e a
t h
w r
r r
s c
e t
a o
a e
e t
d I
g o
r c
e n
s w
l o
n a
c t
t t
bl d
T m
e m
r t
h r
t a
n a
t c
o h
h e
h o
e I
a w
h n
e l
c n
e e
r e
ioe e'
o a
a d
m l
r p
v c
n c
sh m
i ci d
r o
si h
l a
y e
r e
t l
t a
u t
a.
a u
d y
o o
l h
d o
d l
e t
t a
s e
o w
s r
g r
o t
n c
u i a r
ul g
a r
l i
d e
d d
a t
s e
i s
h e
t i
o a
u e
r o
a r
d i e i
h o
g a
a s
s v
t t
u n
n l
n f
n h
s a
g w
o
,l d
a z
r u
k g
o v
g i
t r
e e
n o
r o
e e
n e
t n
d s
e i
e o
l t
t n
e e
2 h
h o
d e
e b
b o
e f
a a
T h
o i
r p
t a
si p
o o
W o
t l
c gL f
n e
r h
y p
x c
c t
h h
t h
o e
b m
e e
t c
s t
t t
s a
h a
r e
m i
T e
s h
a p
e e
f l
gi pl a
o r
h h
c e
t r
t o
e p
a n
d h
s m
c t
o t
s e
r y
r a
o y
t f
e o
i t
a e
s v
i a e
n n
o ih c
f r
oi t
e t
e c
b v
t r
c a
n e
s o
g l
d s
o u
h i
t e
t c
s' e
s s
o
.M m
u l
g v
s t
p d
l s
c o
a o
o a
k r
a e
e fr S
e f
l o
e s
a 3
m r
f s
r a
n s
e o
m i
el d
e n
r o
t e
u c
s n
p d
h i
t n
g s
n e
t e
e b
m c
i 2
d h
t n
a t
g e
w i p I
s r
t l
g e
l gi j
e r
e e
a e
m l
s r
e a
pl a
n c
t e
s s
i c t
l c
ci l
e a
p e
o s
a n
p i
n m
a n
e o
s t
c f
o c
,d d
i e i n n
i n n
di t
l t
e s
g c
a i
r w
v e
o n
a h
e h
i a u
o y
h n
o d
n oi oi t
t o
e d
t t
t o
b n
b t
s f
d e
v t
e n
e r
e d
n s
t t
c t
t l
i t
n p
e
,s d
d y
t e
o o
o s
i d
b o
o v
e d
c t
e s
h s
e c
t o
b a
n n
o v
t h
a t
e y
e f
p gi c
e h
l e
r g
t' c
s r
u e
l a
s a
e m
,e l
e e
r rn o
w
.m m
e p
a v
n e
r a
,e t
n p
i e p
v t
e u
o t
o i
e t
o a
l a
s e
r p
.m a
t e
o u
h u
d e
h r
r h
t r
s l
e n
o b
r e
s i a a
t g
y r
e t
s zi t
s o
f n
p t
e T
o c
e h
u t
d f
t h
e a
e o
o n
h al u
t o
o e
b l
t f
r o
c e
r g
e t
r i
3 o
r f
f i
e d
m i
b o
o
.f s
s y
g h
d t
w w
l sl 2
s pl y
u e
d d
d e
h c
e e
a e
a
,0 i o a
i d
a s
s T
d f
o s
i v
g t
e n
i a
t' c
e gi o
e a
d e
s o
0 n
h w
h n
r f
,t o
w 0
n el r
i e !
a r
d e
l r
o o
c p
t s
i cri p
a n
s y
h v
0 y
n s
t t
o c
s t
g e
l t
w r
n n
u o
e e
l o
a r
h n
c
.n v
d m
g o
t d
a a
i n
n e
s i
t n
sl e
ni t
o e
l l
l s
h b
b e
e h
l n
l i
i m
g e
a i A w s
z e
e u
g f
n f
.m i
g l
a t
v d
b c
b e
a s
t n
c s
o t
r s
h e
e f
u o
s t
s o
a n
r e
h i
y r
e o
c ci a
b s
s d
m T o f
i b
f s
a o
s t
t t
e q
a d
t u
l u
t e
e u
b h
r u
u U
a u
l w
e t
y t
o c
t i
,e t
n m
o h
e e
r t
f k
n l
a n
n e
,s m
a e
y o
i l
h t
h y
s s
t f
c o
t c
a l
y i
w i u a
s a
n h
i e
d s
a e
a n
u y
a d
r s
a oop 2
d i
t o
m e
e e
g e n
d n
,d e
t d
c h
h c
s o
a i i al o
r l
d pl _ m n
a l
v o
d n
ci b
ll o
i t
a d
n e
a a
f d
h e
e a
s n
t i
t e
v t
f n
l a
d a
c i
y
,d h
s c
c el e
p gi t
l c
p h
o h
r e
h a
i s
a n
e e
e r
i e
s n
n
,s h
c t
n d
t e
o h
m n
r
,t k
u i e u
d t
l di e
a l
c r
n r
e i c d
d r
t c
e a
d o
e a
n l
e s
h e
e r
r s
t t
a r
a a
t.
i n h
e l
i s
n m
m b
o t
t f
t r
a n
b r
i T
f e
h e
e b
d g
o i
ni
,s h
o t
i r
o e
n a
e s
e e
n a
m n
k o
k g
e n
t e
~
6 aok O
6A
/
ks e" h
~
N M
% Nr
.G u3m b
/
/i
5 g,
t.
There were other things that happened, not as cru. sl, but disturbing and i
~
,1 revealing. It was some time af ter the onset of the accident before the operators 1
I realized that water in the containment sump was being pumped to the auxiliary i
building and overflowing the tankage there, and it was some hours before the i
w containment was fully isolated. And the aixiliary feedwater block valves were closed at the onset of the accident. Yh act that apparently did not have f
much to do with the severity of subsequent events, but it was a flat violation of the license conditions for that plant to be in operation with those block valves closed.
4, An important lesson is that operator training has not been sufficiently rigorous with respect to transient or off-ncrmal situations. Operators, of course, are licensed by the NRC and a good bit of training and testing takes place before a license is granted, but I think we have simply failed to recog.aze that the e
operators' readiness to deal with the unusual, and a frequent reinforcement of that readiness by training with the reactor simulators, are essential elements in a
the process.
e A second lesson in this same area is the need to reassess the makeup of operator o
teams or shif ts and the back-up engineering capability of licensee companies.
One of the disturbing problems emergin in the decisive early stages of the accident is that the small operating staff on that dawn shilt became prisoners of the control panel. They were instantly riveted to the switches and the gauges and no one stood back, to take in the overall situation and comprehend what was taking place. It is clear that some enlargement of control room staffing should
)
O O
O O
O O
o O
U O
O O
o s
n l
h m
i t
t o
T a
i w c
t t
i f
ci a
e h
h f
h n
T A
g e
v a
r a
e n
d h
o h
o n
a r
e h
o t
t e
r i
s s
n e
t t
T h
u i
ol e
pl e
m m
al ol t
t e
r t
c n
r e
a s
l e
h d
h e
n m
a e
t u
e e
r e
e s
e c
r b
t a
d n
e r
gi e
p r
o r
n g
m o
t n
b T
e e
x i a t
y' s
e o
g t
r c
z n
k n
e yl t
r e
v s
e g
fa a
n i
t d
ti c
u e
iM al e
o
,a o
t c
t t
n h
a w
c e
a e
f o
o e
g i
t n
y f
i f
el o
n a
n d
gi r
t l
e s
o l
t i
r d
a i
s e
h e
s t
ei i e M
p ti h
s s
t l
e l
u o
r cil l
b i
d l
u yl a
h e
c n
re i :
e I
i m
e u
o i
a a
s a
p
,m s
n t
s h
m s
d e
d a
d r
on id i
y t
k t
n w
n c
n t
i m h
v a
oi i
s I
i r
s s
l t
o s
t n
e o
al a
d h
i e
g a
si pl a
n l
o v
s n
l t
a m
m d
i s
d r
m i n y
e i e e
t a
a r
l n
e e
v c
o h
s d
d o
o m
x e
ci e
t f
r a
p t
n a
e t
d a
t i
t t
h r
u e
c r
d t
n c
w e
o a
m h
o h
n w
n n
a e
e e
t e
d i
t n
n f
r v
t p
t s
s v
a i
t f
e e
o o
d q
i t
i s
r h
i i
d r
i c
m a
m n
r a
ui i
e v
e e
t a
c n
i c n
e c
t t
n n
h e
.s a
v s
t i u v
n r
a k
s n
o o
l r
t t
e i
.t t
a i
t l
t e
n p
v s
e t
W h
y r
t t
p d
e t
i e
s r
u t
T s
o u
p e
s a
a m
c o
r l
r y
h y
n o
n a
e n
p l
t i
t t
a h
O o s
t i
i r
p g
d e
ni w
s n
ul T
i a n
e a
d e
r o
n o
w e
h e
e t
i r
r g
i i s
d r
i v
e t
c o
h s
o a
o t
m m
r t
t o
h a
f h
e t
n r
s o
a t
i e o
a e
a r
a
,s f
n t
r s
h l
a r
a e
h v
e n
v i
I s
s y
d r
n e
v t
e e
e d
d l
i e
n u
i a r
i w
u n
a n
e h
s i
r o
s r
o p
a a
v v
g i p r
y u
e e
e n
g e
n g
r n
e e
n d
s l
g c
c t
r s
o g
e s
i e e
d r
l e
o [$t' e
e e
s r
i e t
a r
a v
t i
a s
u e
n w
s r
k m
n d
v e
c s
a h
t r \\
t e
e N
e t
r a
o o
l t
y t
R s
u e
e r
d t
r n
u s
o a
y n
t o
f e
a m
a o
d m
t s
r h
t s
f C
r w
a t
n p
a b
o u
t l
a o
w s
a o
i e e
c t
s p
o n
n u
r l
F gi m
n cc a
r t
r p
u a
d s
m t
p a
e i
u a
a h
e e
a g
t a
n o
k i
t e
c r
e d
u e
n l
r d
e o
i m u
a n
i r
o r
i
,s s
t a
r n
n s
o r
t t
o s
u n
n g
e t
c ni g
e s
i i
d t
n o
n
,n i w d
b r
r u
o r
r s
e g
a s
s n
f w
p ti r
g o
o m
r i e e
l id g
i e e
s a
l r
r i
a r
i l
s s
e t
f o
e e
t v
x e'p i e n
r t
r v
t t
e e
t i n m
l c
t a
t n
e c
c t
a l
i i s
r h
n t
n e
a t
h p o
s i
,n y
t r
d w
a t
l a
i W
f r
o e
s o
i e
u f
t n
a n
i a o
l n
l n
o c
n d g y
.n t
h s
e e
d o
f j
~
ch, j
L gm 1
4, Our staff makes a selection of the more significant items and reports them in a e
publicaticn that goes to the licensees. It happens that a couple nf the precursor events I speak of made their way into this publication, but we did not understand them well enough and we did not sit down with the operators of these plants to O
make sure they understood them as well. We are establishing a group of cxperienced staf f members whose sole job will be to evaluate the operating experiences, to understaad the lessons in those experiences, and to make sure that the plant eperators underr,tand them and take all necessary steps.
O i
I will also note the need for substantia! work to be done in the area of emergency 1
o planning, particularly with respect to off-site preparations for the af termath of 0
an accident. Federal, state, and local government agencies are involved in this l
effort. Soon af ter the accident I wrote to the governors of states having nuclear 0
plant sites and urged speedy and determined action to bring their planning up to 3
date. There is now a considerably enha.;ced spirit of urgency and cooperation in i
f this area.
0
- } D incre are a number of other actions that are being taken as a result of the Three I
Mile Island accident and I would not want you to regard my list as exhaustive.
i Some of these actions relate to plant design features and others to the extent t
O and emphasis of our safety analyses and the way in which we review applications and inspect the plants. And, as !~noted, the results of the major independent investigations, with their recommendations, are still to come.
i D 4
Thank you very much.
3v l
1
s ar m n
,impastameneau
%^
i k
C AEA SEMINAR O
O Q. The Chairman: It seemed to me that whatever the operators did or didn't do
}
in the first two hours of the accident, it didn't rea!!y have much dffect on j
j the ultimate resu.t until they realised that the valve was open letting all the f
O water out. I wonder if there was any partcular happening at about two hours and twenty minute which before that time they hadn't recognized that the valave was open and at that particular time wher' there was activity they
~
O suddenly realized that this.vas a possible f ault.
?
I' O
' m rtait
.,,mm a j
A.
rw....~_
...... wo.. v..,...e e,~ ~ fn authoritative sort of answerie ~.s will have to wait for some of 0
the detailed results from the invest'gations, but I will tell you that my
{
understanding is that the thing that happened at two and a half hours was O
that the operating supervisor from Unit $be had been in the control room at UnitTwo cbout ten minutes et that point and had looked at the instruments
! O and said "the relief valgve is open, close the block valve" so they did and O
that was that!
- O 3
in O
Q.
Geoffrey Johnson-Smit Whay was it 11;.::.t at three and a half hours that the NRC came into the situation and what was the cause of the delay of this O
three and a half hou.s'.
O e
A.
Well it certainly wasn't a matter of interagency or interorganization O
g, ga -. - wr a
- n. ;r.
1 rivalries or whatever.
The operators you will remember did not see high radiation levels on their instruments until something like six-fif teen;the transient started almost exactly at 4 a.m.g}t was about two hours and a quarter before the first high radiation alarm came through on any of the monitors. The declaration of a site emergency, which means something that is expected to be confined to the plant site, or a general emergency which is expected to have @ffects outside the plant, the triggering e!cments for those have to do with radiation !cvels or prospective radiation levels,$at i if you think something bad is going to happen or you are pretty sure its going to happen you don't have to wait until it has been proven to you in order to take sensible action. But those actions are keyed to radiation levels. So it was about six fif teen before they got their first high alarm and began then to be entit!cd to think that the core had had some damage to it.
As a matter of a fact the operating staff continued to feel,I think, that to there hadn't been much damage and,.R f act, even by Wednesday night af ter the full array of the events of the day and high radiation Icvels on monitors all over the place, the operator still felt there was very limited damage (a few rods cracked) to the core.
e W
4D
LW
- ~,.
.p.;
g 0
So up to six-fif teen there was not much reason for them to call us under the situation they were operating in. Radiation alarms began to arrive then 0
af ter six fif teen with an increasing intensity and number. By seven o' clock or so they had declared at first a site emergency and soon af ter that it was t
clear to them that i was a general emergency and they began to notify first O
the local people, who might have to take action in the immediate area, then g
the state authorities and the federal authorities, and they started that notification as I recall about 7 a.m.
O g
Now they didn't get through to our regional office til! about 7:45 a.m.,
because at that time the regional office was set up cn a system where there O
was not a full time duty officer. when a call came through a beeper sounded O
n the watch officer's belt, one of these things that you carry around that goes beep at inconvenient moments and then you go to the telephonc and O
find out what's happended. He was trapped in traffic at about 7:10 or so when it beeped and then again a few minutes later, and that call wasn't actually received then and understood until about 7:45. We got people on the hoe 6 O
site in two and a quarter [and of course the whole federal effort began to roll g
immediately then. The aircraf t started down immediately and so on.
O 9'
M#' M **h "I8 CEGB: How were the responsibilities divided between the O
s NRC staf f and the operating staff?
O A.
Under the sart of operating instructicas that were in place at the time of O
k r1
^7, T
4 L
o Ihree f: ile, and I put it that w because obviously these things are the subject of scry sea ching scrutiny in reconsideration; "[he plant operator, the operating utility and n supervisory staff in the plant have responsibility for the safe operation of the machine and they continue to have it in the event of an accident of this kind.
a The NRC staff who arrived on site were then several reactor inspectors and Aur&%
a number of Pgphysic: cocple, concerned with radiation levels, monitoring and so on. They were th- ?. : t y to help communications with headquarters, to observe what was going on or for coi.iment and advice as seemed appropriate, but[e plant operator)+emainad operatos in the sense of the operating organization, remained with full responsibility and in command of the situation.
g Under our regulatory system, that has been the casejand it is my belief that lM WC9-- Ah-The plant operatop/ge-L
.i it will have to continue 20-6 7' o
people who run it every day,6 peopienviestuqQehp-=:c-s, phTvisery staff, are the people who know the plant best. It's, I think, probably impossible fer the government to maintain a separate emergency 3
team in a barracks somewhere who are prepared to go to plar[X and take O
over and just operate it. I think ycu M could not mahtain that kind of capability on a standby basis. This means that the most expert meople in g
terms of knowing where the switches are and the valves are and what the
'N a'
- dio ncracies of the plant are, are the operators and they will have to stay in charge.
3
L,ro
- M e yh J
y o
When I sent Harold Denton down to the site on Friday, it was because the communication probic ms were very severe because the reactcr condition O
GLA E
had just be diagnosed as much worse that we'd thought at first, because the
/\\
situation was developing into a full scele national flap, and because it g
seemed clear to me that we couldn't eperate it from Washington and there O
didn't seem to be the capability to operate it down there at the site.end[o I sent Denton down to take personal charge and to run_ the operation down g
there. It the communications links had been better we might have O
maintained operational control in Washington.
C Now Denton,in f act, at that time went into essentially fully charge of the O
situation. The utility, the operators, continued to carry out such detailed functions in keeping the essential equipment going as were necessary and fly 4 nvnuJ their reporting chain went up{u> theirpommand structure but Denton j
O oversaw that and they had to have explicit permission from him and his staff to take any significant actions that could effect the condition of the plant.
O O
Q.
Mr Cartwright, AEA: What is the relationship between the station manager who may or may not be licensed and the licensed operator?
O O
A.
If the station manager is not licensed he'd better keep his hands ofythe reactor controls. The only people who are a!! owed to touch those are people O
who are licensed by the NRC at either the senior reactor operator level, which weu!d typically be the sh.'~ wjerviser er the reactor operators
- -ln L. Fy-
.m s
e A
themselv./There would bc.a. ugh -c'"r e, at least two on every shif t.
i h cut b.%'8<. of cop!c who are not licensed touch the reactor controls,the e44e4 tne N#pkV license being pulled and(having to sit there es a monument to their mistake.
He can, of course, give instructions to his shif t supervisor who is licensed, to
- j the reactor operators wh
- ure licensed and the licensed people in turn will
.f#
have to recognize whether those instructions can be carried out within the rather extensive book of license conditions which attach to each plant, and c
p2 if not they will carry them out at risk of having their licenses 4 ti doca.n...e,p *Tii;p-*v. _ _ &h-a
- m :.ed-hw~en,W f j. -
.c
! should notthat ene of the things which, "E, occurs in most plants is O
that the operating chiefs do in fact hold licenses on the plant, and I think g
there is a fair possibility that we may encourage that in a more official and O '
formal way in the future. I think its a good ides for the managers to understc.nd the details of the operation.
O O
Q.
- arol:nc Marvin: Hew did the media handle the situation?
O C
O O
O
u
~; " ; ' "R uMb 1
A.
In my opinion there were some good elements and some bad elements about it. There were a number of reports which, I must say, I found rather more in the print press than in the electronic media, which seemed to me to be good i
honest pieces of reporting >.certainly so in the circumstance.a.ed I was glad to u,fuuk see that there were some other pieces > sed::h the other way round seemed to
- 3
- e. e.
4 occur in the electronic media han the print media. which bordered on your-intesponsibility. -h-lN.Lma. c- 'f <! gw.44.
ts It is fair to say that v.e at the NRC were unprepared for a major media event of this kind,I guess it hadn't occurred to us how it would turn out and cf how much interest there would be in the event of an incident et an accident.
ano we were not very well prepared, I think, in a public information sense in terms of overall strategy of how to hand!c a thing this sizee, Our policy generally is to try and be as open as we ca.
try to say what we think.e cA-he ~ '
~ : "'
. Over the years there have been a' number of criticisms of the way the AEC used to manage information and one of the kvA h
things we tried very hard at the NRC to do we+to put all of that behind us Is A
and to be completely operpod.1 think the agency probably is as open as any in Washington. We put practically everything in the public document room.
~
If you would like to read my correspondence, come to Washington, w
S:,uk.C b4rce Nile occurred our public information people and members of the i
L, pe staff. simply tended to respond directly and as fully as they had information.
e'
'h it resulted for a while thein an information sourceq as far as NRC was concerned that just had many sub. sources, and that led to a
~
i
u
-m 1
o certain amount of confusi<sn and awkward reports because a reporter would read one staff merrLer as having said one thing and another reporter would a
understand a different staff member talking about much the same thing to have said something different. So there were these reports that conflicted.
O v.
The utilities didn't help the job very much down in the Harrisb rg areay although not wilfully I think,I think they just totally, as we did, underestimated the severity of the accident over the first day arxf a half and o
kept saying cheerful things like "well it's all over now" on Wednesday nightj O
and then Thursday.aMTnen when we began to uneerstand the coneition the O
machine was in and when the releases occurred en Friday morning and started a fresh rash of media reports, their credh slity dis / appeared comp!ctely.
3 So thats a long and rambling answer which I expect would be hard to summarize but it's a mixed bag, and I don't want to leave the impression of O
sitting here saying " Boy, the media really did a lousy job and they said a lot of things that weren't true" and so on. We were in some confusion at the NRC over an extended period as to precisely what had happen $cd and our inability then to lay it all out in detail was reflected to a considerable O
extent in some of the press reports.
l:
t I!O i
t 0
i
g g, 3 3;; m ~ a 3
f 4
i Q.
Chairman: An accident situation is one that we have given quite a lot of I
thought to and we have had numerous exercises of simulated accidents or the like happening on different establishments. But I think the thing that has given us the rnost concern has been how we deal with hundreds of media l
people asking questions, all the regulatory people from all parts of 1
government, ministers, local members of parliament, local associations, all demanding instant informaticn, and it is very difficult indeed to provide a i
service which can give this volume of information and answer this volume of df questions. We have of course been af<fying it again in the light of your experience, the blockage of the entire telephone network and the American telephone network is remarkably good by our standards, have you any advice t
you could give us on which lines we ought to look at particularly carefully.
l C
A.
We!!, since we are studying the matter to(! can only tell you what I think I
,\\ ~
would do next timgif there is ever a next timepad that is to concentrate i
1 t
the news sources in a single person or just a couple of people who can be together to provide a source which knows what it said and has as reasonably 1+ _
a full layout of information availabbf to it as we can provide,Iat probably
!1 -
rneans a single spokesman. I think I would also, if we ever got into a s.tuation that had the dimensions ofThreelpi!e Island in terms of press i
~
9 coverage and response by people in the area, that I would be very ca.tious f,
about s hat we said to avoid the Nssibility of creating panic and then actior6 which c;uld be injurious amcng peopic in the area. I hadn't really
- c. ROD.
appre;ciated unt:i'Three lililelsland that there was that e ilet in the am/ \\
poLcy of just simply saying everything you know when you know it and 1
krA7 1;
- ~ m j
I think it is an important public policy aspect. So you get your information source and localize it.
I l
i Q.
Chairman: Yo*2 presumably have to do this immediately adjacent to the[or where the accident has taken place.
A.
I think so.
I e-Q.
Chairman: So you are really saying if they ring you up in Washington, you would say no comment from Washington, you must ring upThree Miie brand or press information center.
,1 A.
Yes.
Q.
3cnathan Sumner - Public Information Services. Question about the China Syndrome.? r,s, kv) b$ hd (,u. Gdhh k p r 4 d p b C--
A.
Well, I really don't know how to answer.' I am not sure it has made a great z.
deal of difference. I think the producers of the film probably ow Metropolitan Edison Con.pany at least a vote of thanks if not a share of the U
profits, but 1 don't know what effect it has had,p
~
%S
w.c a m -..
,-.A no m
t l
t.c41 don't think there are elements in the film which people weren't aware of before, and I'm not sure I would regard the film as presenting an C
authoritative and thus educational picture of how plants are run and p
regulators behave and the general attitudes overall.
C Q. Mr. Ian Smart - Related to licensing. Not just a matter of rules but judgement in nuclear matters. How do we apply judgement as well as rules s
to other energy matters?
s A.
The exercise of the NRC's authorities has certain peculiarities built into it s
by virtue of the several pieces of legislation under which those authorities m4 exercised.1 am sure that all functions of government have precisely the g
same type of boundary conditions of their own.
s Ours are that the licensing under the fitomichnergy ctg [f the primary g
stc t ue, i very much a judgemental matter. The act doesn't say how safe is s
!+ =g
- safcQud decide that and whatever a majcrity of five commissioners end up A
/
voting for on any particular issuc establishes that, g
j u
on the environmental side, in respcnse to the National havironmental holicy I
Act, we are required to inform ourselves about environmental effects and about the balance between costs and benefits of our licensing action. In O
principle the licensing is donc completely under thektomic hergy het and Or s
g we make this jud;emen)t is it safe enough and meet,%
the other requirements
~
L ab c
w d
y a
d f
g u
p e
a b
w o
I d
f f
e o
r e
i e t
r l
n e
e e
e r
o e
a n
l' t
c o
i f
u g
v l
t c
u u
i e n
c t
s d
e n
i p
c l
e h
i o t
l in m
m l
t y
d t
c r
o r
d e
f s
d e
i e s
a e
s i
s i o a
i v
a i
b d
r
,e i
t o
e c
g r
t e
c s
s t
t e
s g
n s
a i
d d
e h
n t
c m
i t
t t
n p
t w
a h y u
t y
t h
i g
t l
t y
u w
m s
r b
P e
o h
a o
e e
i n
w w
,n c
e n
g l
e s
h e
e e
d e
a o
t o
x b
e o
a a
.k a
s e
n n
t s
p p
h r
t d
e l
e ci i a p
d e
n o
n n
e n
n a
e re p
e k
d a
r e
c t
a t
g t
i m a
l a
a f
yl N
h
,d c
r h
o n
h t
t e
v d
e o
a oi y
n o
c i
t si h a
ka a
r v
i h
g e
o i
l t
a s
i t
e r
v n
f d
n e
n s
d s
d a
o n
a u
r o
e a
d g
u t
d v
e y
n i w a
b
?
c s
a r
c r
t i e a
l o
r d
a p
e e
o e
h p
l c
h o
n e
mp v
a m
d q
e A
p c_i u
t i a b
t u
n v
t e
h r
a i w y
e h
e t
i p
a u
c u
g e
w s
r h
d o
r r
t a
e e
c n
t r
h a
e o
t a
o t
a r
r r
a n
s l
h t
t s
t i g a
t s
me w
b l
t y
h i e e.
h y
s y
o u
a t
t t
h a
h o
t o
e a
o p
a s
y y
a l
e a
i t
a
,n h
i t
f s
v e
b d
n s
o i i n
g n
r a
d d
p o
d n
e a
e a
e e,
wti B
s c
t f
b u
p i
m h
y g
r t
1 h
r al e
oi t
r d
r o
a o
h a
e s
- .y n
u t
o a
e i
,u t
a n
c s
s e
n g
n o
n f
t r
r d
f e
o
[
o t
s t
r h
h a
d g u
c u
g i
n a
o l
a i a e
f r
n f
p n
e t
Qm i c c
d n
p w
d c
d j
r l
t t
o a
r f
u n
u r
e d
a r
e a
s n
o w
h s
u a
h h
a l
s s
l t
t d
a e
s o
e l
i e a
h e
a al o
a h
r r
l t
n t
c a
s s
t t
t a
s h
t r
t e
o l
s l
o r
e u
t i
t e
s y
o e
h t
h s
e p
el o
a i o r
w a
e n
a e
h s
n
,n g
t e
i e t
f o
f e
n l
a s
s r
a i
n c
n a
w a
r t
a h
u e
s r
h g
o d
m n
g r
u e
e c
s t
e a
a s
s c
h v
f n
N el o
ti a
a t
t b
a t
a n
e k
i t
m n
n t
e a
s s
a o
e i e b
t s
a o
R
.r e
g e
h e
a c
O t
n t
h e
i r
k t
a s
d h
y e
o C
s i
v e
d e
v o
t b
f e
a u
s' N
r f
f l
pl o
r a
n m
e s
r e
li e
s e
t a
o t
r o
e a
r i n d
r c
t i w y
n w
o o
r
?
n n
d m
s s
m e
t a
f e
r o
h w
l t
t w
a A
a e
i o n
i b
t e
y h
s l
y a
e r
s r
h h
s m
e n
h l
si e
ol c
t t
c e
e a
a a"
i e
e l
a t
l n
a t
s i e d
g a
i t
g r
h e
r r
o r
h
- N t r
r c
e C'be i
Eh i
e l
g t
a e
f t
h l
d.
o a
t r
a s
n z
w s
x
.r
~
2
g g;y
- x s..; 3, y
n I
DCOT That Nepranalysis,. he-envke-ta! 2 'pis is the only place where we l
g dealin any way with other energy sources, with whether a conservation O
measure for instance will remove the need for a plant, or could remove the need for a plant at lower environmental cost and so on, and is sort of the g
4 j
place we intersect the national energy policy. Now I don't know whether I I O j
got an answer inserted somewhere in that discussion to your question, I hope _
t l g so.
!C 1
I Q. Mr. Michael Flood - Friends of the Earth. Concerning the fact that reactor go i
safety studies are not made available in this country but you have proposed that they should be made availabic.
k o A.
Well I guess I would answer as f ollows. We have decided for assorted reasons
,iO in the U.S. to place all of this material on the public record 6t-were, and
)
have been doing it for some time. One can argue, I guess, over whether that o
h is the best way to do tnings or whether it would be better to have some
'o
$WAt c.
{.
informed summary of that[ volume of detailed technical reportgut there, but i
we have decided for us it is best to put it out on the table and we are going O
to continue to do that ac.d I think it would be kind of presumptuous for me to of fer an opinion how the United Kingdom ought to run its affairs in this 0
~
j o -
-way, As a guest here I feel that I ought to sort of stick to my own last.
1 0-Od dChMi g
Q.
John Ashworth,.[If the NRC gets into conflict with another regulatory body, k)
y
,u. - ; ~ ~;~ -
n j
how c0 )ou resche the conf bct?
Well it depends very much on where it is, but ultimately a formal resolution
(
A.
probably would only be accomplished in the federal courts or by new a
legislation by the Congressp u o.c, s: pass a :: :,Mg, cci g u-fMwning to settley vce-c-+ +w ww -s m :,,,s.e.u, %'
6
,wP euA% CI etweenregulatory bodies aregha$ we can
-64.
cf'!iiiDXW In general, saiat' x
ti all prevent things f rom being done, but since we don't do things ourselves i
none of us can build a plant or a pipe line or what have you, so that there t a r'
tend to be a large number of bodies whose*No is loud and uniquely authoritative and whose'Yeiis weak.Sh;jih order to get anything done you l
have to have out of all the regulatory bodies all these littleYes answers, but I'
ene No and you have had itMhe result of this is that arguments between i
bodies tend generally to result in projects being delayed r.rwiThen whether
<3 1
there is to be a resol, tion depends on the good will and sense of responsibility w
j O of the heads of the agancies involved and also whether the project managers
\\>Y_u
~
3 for the stopgroject feel spunky enough about the whole thing to go to court f.
and see if they can get a judgement against us. Beyond that there isn't any 9
1 sort of formal resolution machire
', c) 3 tih t,he large amount of information that is Q. Mr. Peter Ward ham, O.
being available in the United States, whether it is a good thing er whether
(
! Oc you regret it?
1
\\.
-a e
i
.A Q
A Fr h
a w
v e
f t
h a
e al e
ni M
k g
d t
o s
t s
-n W
e W
a n
r n
r o
a t
v e
a e
o o
ih d
p h
s v
d e
b v
t e
w
.r e
c a-n
,n E'
e t
e a
4 e
m e
e r
a i
gl B
n s
d e
e h
s r
e p
a u
3 e
4 p
e n
y y
r w
n t
e i
e r
d c
i b
s t
o t
d m
t e
o t
o I
a j
cl i
s h
n s
1 h
b h
e w
o o
s h
o o
n d
m i
t i g f
e w
u e
s s
a n
i n m
l p
u n
n e
s a
e o
n p
y a
n a
H t
n e
d h
t r
k k
n g
t m
g a
h w
e t
i' e e
a s
r d
o p
d t
s a
al t
g l
n e
r a
l a
ti o
i t
n h
o y
wh a
o m.
h o
,d t
o t
t i
s t
r n
s h
e ci n
l e
i i t
r a
s d
y r
t y
n e
wd i m d
,m a
o k
h t
o a
g h
g e
a w
ul y
o h _y s
a e
z h
n g
i id n
e c
a n
e t
t c
r h
a e
t' r
t i
aU a s
.m o
y s
r n
d A
y t
r n
c r
o e
b s'
e d
y r
o a
e g
h c
m a
t a
bag w
u s
o d
n i
s d
t w
o b
t g
h e
e e
n e
e s
oi a
t p
g c
i n g
n I
t gi $
t e
l t
l e
o e
s t
cbehh l
i gQe r
s v
y n
a o
r h
o o
i o
me e
e e
o t
i u
f f
t n
d n
c r
n i
f r
m e
d r
t n
u i
r s
a n
o o
o t
y Wkt s
t f
v a
t u
d n
o E
m h
o o
I j
t u
o e
n e
t c
o d
n e
l f
n h
u e
d e
e r
{y C.
l g
n a
t d
t h
h o
d e
t a s
c b
d e
c p
r o,"
r t
e a
w z
e d
t a
o-e t
a e
e a
p y
r r
n o
e r
eM n
a t'
n s
y aAi s
p r
n s
i c
?
A e
d ni o
i n
W i t
i d
g f
n e
t As.
k t
e e
g o
t i e d
a y
t s
o n
x I
c a
p d
o i
s n
a f
d o
e n
o o
o a
t i
f o
u t
t a
h l
e o
n s
d u
p g
e y
l e
n n
e.
s u
i h
t l
h e
u l
n n
a r
n a
gi s
L" w
n p
u s
e t
i a
+
o c
e a
h g
d t
e n
n r
t r
t s
s o
h t'
u d
h s
n a
t o
I' a
y t
l d
.s l
v m
i s
t t
i e
t o
a I
s a
u H i s
t u
w w
a y
w M
k b
y t
m t
i k
b o
o c
s I
f t
e e
h a
k il I
,e e
o m
m i
h t
e n
a s
a t
r e
e y
s r
t u
a l
d h
i I
l t
f t
n s
i t
s h
c u
g m
ci c ct r
i ar y-n s
n b
a h p t
s y
e gl t
a i e m
p i
t h
t e
d d
r e
a p
dT e
h o
a p
a h
G o n
e t
t u
s r
e e
a t
n r n
y t
s E
r h
h i o c
r s
o d
n s
u m
a t
o l
e j i
s o
w e
e w
e d
e b
t a
je k
t
,e y
g a
e r
a a
s e
v s'
9 b
i t
r h
o a
si U
k c t
b n
e a
o f
f o
c
)d s
w m
a e
w n
t i
i t
m h
a i
t o
d yl d
n o
y e
o h
o k
y n
c e
t.
l t
o m
e r
a l
o s
o a
o w
i e i
s g
e d
,w t
u h
I u
t y
r t
e g
r a
e b
n n
o r
i
,e o
v n
e e
o d
p i
o u
r w
a e
d r
e r
c o
u v
l' n
S o
u t
a g r
E m l
s z
u e
p d
n y
f e
l a g f
t t
m n
e m
t e
ld b
t' c
u g
d u
n n. yb c
l o
a s
t t
t t
o e
t u
h pi s
e t
r h
o d
c r
o i y e
l t
t t
o a
s p
o r
a a
s e
g i
r e
r a
y y
n e
i e e
a o
a u
if I
a n
c o
s s
t r
e t
a p
g Y
r h
n l
sa g
n r
k o
g n
b z
t t
g c
w" d
e n
n c
f u
i v
e h
e o
t e
)
o o
.d a
y el t
e a
iv e
t i e r
b s
n l
t ta e
ul a
t l
i o
b w
d d
m m
l t
e a
s o
o u
s e
y t
u m
x, m
1 N
)
i, L
ve.
same thing from that or go out of the business.
e 0
We try to encourage, and in fact the AEC spent a number of years trying to encourage vendors to come in so that they could develop several sources of c.
supply, have competition between them and so on. We have very strong O
anti-trust laws in the United States which are ta the effect that the Lt.M government is against monopolics in nay way shape or formjind this would c:.
clearly be a monoply of the first order.
ti Now, if oncJecided if the Cor.gress in its infinite wisdom decided that we o
should indeed be doing one standard design instead of letting everybody c
come and present his best eff ort on a competitive basis, then they can pass M
a new law that says that. Mr,.Ud I)-has-been a tn:nt-fc 31 mig time-in o
(%
Congress end has had ample opportunity in the past to propose that 0
0 legislation, but so f ar has not,and I kind of doubt that it will d in that
}
\\
direc tion.
o O
Ej. M +
Q.
Mr. John King h=is on the relative hazards of nuc! car power and othc[ forms u
of electricity generation. Has the NRC,got any views of this question?
O O
V
b k,,
a v
A.
Well the NRC does indeed have a view in the sense that the regulatory staff comes to some conclusic. 'on this matter in each application that is N Us efrA presented to us,e goes 6rward in the record of Ughearing to offer its testimony to what the balance of those effects is between say nuclear and t
l coal and whatever other sources you might propose and gets cross examined, j
j r4 If the application is to result in a construction permit, that case will 4
have to be made and those things are all publicgso@cre you see once again I a
have the advantage of saying sure we'll make it public, we have been making 4
{
it public, you know its all there Adden.down somewhere in the environmental assessment}made by the US NRC regulatory staff on every construction permit and operating license. As a general proposition, all j
energy sources have their benefits and their risks and costs,in human and environmental terms. Doing without energy also has its benefits and its l
risks and costs too.
i I have always felt that nuclear power as an c!cctricity generating i
technology was a pretty good one, but it is on the basis of my own conclusion that it is no more risky overall than the other sources and that it i
has some benefits compared to the most likely of the other sources. V s a vis coal in particular, coal is a great materialua to make e!cctricity et::
I cer.:acaw sase f or only two minon problems. The first is that it is very r a%Q MQk.
di!ficult to rnine and the second is it is very difficult to burr @\\udn<c A
f o
i nucicar,it yic!ds a benefit when burned under boilers,ij yic!ds a benefit)in j
it has costs in terms of the mining accidents that are the electricity,O
<SIpE% m
__~
inevitable, the black lung conditions of mindrs andc the b ncIlts that all
a3 e ra -
e t,.
of us who-breatheirefrom the sulphuric acid that comes out of the
- 3 stacks. On balance,I think thai is a higher risk nit of electricity gs produced than is involved mth nuclear generation et en taking into account j
nuclear reactor accidents that can happen.
4%
O
{$f Kbb e
LIM Graham Duxburg Will~{hree Niles accidenti slow the U.S. nuclear program.
i O
Q.
E e9 n n
o Yes I think c!carly. There has been quite a slow down since the winter 5'in 73 A.
J
- V
)J
[4e
- 74 o{the Arab oil boycott you remember. Wnat happended up to that net 0
"es had cheerfully been prediciting 6 - 7% per year in was that u-O c!cctricity growth rate and just projecting it on out into the indefinite fu:ure. hkwtt+~[-~dw.cc around.lS92.why everphuman-being-was-O enga ge d-imtha. p r o duction.of-elec t rici t y-on,* hat, basis,.bu t.ac u er.4 ni nd-i t-wa s gcciencugh ior-plannin}itheext-ten-years-a-6the-next couple-of-units.
O s
r w
e.,
They had ordered unit' including a whale of a lot of nuc! car units in the j'
o t
l
, years f rom (66 to ch maybe 72 or 3. On-that ba(pthev-we e-all? otted irs l
[ [ \\)$4 %
1si-MG O
4 years, Then came the oil boycott and the c!ectricity demangwnictwha&
~
b
- bec rgoing-up-hke-this dipped a little and then flattened and it has been in a O
s;. ::: state of high nervous lateral movement since.
O C
o
j t,. E "" N f ' _'#13 be Alm'.
ALb t.u.d g M c.
h*
b '1k t.
- i. CA,
.So.thatJutilitio&Meer* Biter-the-boycott-looked-at-their-. books and.<ny.
y O d M.cip f vi M. A u.()! hgoo.dans11Ltoptc.is 2.nything utilities.hatesj (,,to investJLlo,t,Q1.Inone bOkt CS4A.P.A4.*V:.S.CN i
ib
\\v v3 h2.u 4.1'4..
plant-ehd then not fin:f-any place ta ship tirelectricityrThat'stonsidered
-bad. form _proicssionally aod.yomatility. commission-really kilis-you.Ior.that, n
.they wen't.lct//ou,put.itJrea-rate-base and you-have-tcrtakeitmut-of-your
- m elary-or soraething4ike-that. There wereg lot of postponements and delays in plants that were already ordered s!iding their schedukgcompletion dates j
out and hence also the scheduled dates at which really large amoungo!
5 money started to pout into the projec}. Well)those delayed projects in turn
.then Save really killed the ordering of new plants over the years from that winter to the present.
Three f4ile l stand then comes along during a period, it might have been toward the end of a peri of essentially zero orders,I think it is quite.
possible that without"{ITree Mile (sland, there would in the next year or two have been a number of new orders coming in as people began to look beyor.d that batch cf plants which they had previously ordered and had stretched out, and were now going to come into operation in the SO's and they were now looking out at the 90's. Three fdile clearly causes everybody to stop and Utility comniissions as well as utilities [verybody vould like to wait.
understand the lessons of that accident pretty thoroughly)to understand
~
what changes we want to make in the way we regulate to make that L.nd of ft>
M thing very unlikely to ever happen again, gee what changes we have in the plants and the way they are operated and then to be able to incorporate if j
"me e Sn-to be any rew crders, certainly to incorporate a!! those
'+
L
"'-E C s
lessons and it.aybe some more into any new plant. So I thinkst-isThree #itle O
o
.that has as minimum) moved onto the fuiure,by several years probably)any
) h o
substantial orc'ering of new plant. Esuch-orderingefmew plant would41 ave-
.cccurredjwhich-i-'havemovay-of knowing-O O
O E/ SCI:(wpc):ges:2719A O
O O
O O
O O
O O
.'