ML19290C613
| ML19290C613 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, McGuire, 07002623  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/1979 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290C607 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-44FR34466, RULE-PR-73 NUDOCS 8001220169 | |
| Download: ML19290C613 (4) | |
Text
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August 30, 1979 Mr. William J. Dircks, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Re:
McGuire Nuclear Station Amendment to SNML-1773 Docket Nos. 50-369, 70-2623
Dear Mr. Dircks:
My letters of July 13 and July 30, 1979, requested approval of routes to be used for shipments of spent fuel from Oconee Nuclear Station to McGuire Nuclear Station.
In a letter dated August 3,1979, Mr. G. W. McCorkle of your staff stated that our primary route, which utilizes Interstate Highway 85 and Interstate Highway 77 and passes through a portion of Charlotte, North Carolina, was disapproved because it did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.37(a) (3) in that Charlotte is considered to be a heavily populated area.
We think this decision was erroneous and request a management review of the staff's decision.
We believe the staff's determination was based upon NUREG-0561.
NUREG-0561 provides on page 8, Criteria I, that "Roates should avoid movement through or within three miles of:
. C.
the boundary of any city other than those included in A and B (excluding the rural part of an extended city) with a population in excess of one hundred thousand persons."
We maintain that the approximately eight miles of the route which are within the city limits of Charlotte cannot be classified as going through a heavily populated area.
Due to the location of the interstate highways, the population along the primary and alternate routes is similar.
There is no reason to disapprove the primary route.
1785 061~
800teco/(i
Mr. William J. Dircks August 30, 1979 Page 2 NUREG-0561 states that, "The purpose of this requirement is the minimization of potential radiological consequences of sabotage of a spent fuel shipment.
Routing shipments of spent fuel so as to avoid movements through or near large, heavily populated areas reduces the potential health consequences of sabotage incidents and thereby lowers the overall risk without regard to the probability of occurrence."
Although routing of spent fuel shipments so as to avoid movements through large urban populated areas may reduce the consequences of a sabotage incident, that in itself does not necessarily reduce the risk of sabotage or guarantee a lowering of the overall risk to the public.
Indeed, an unmoving commitment to such a restriction may accomplish just the opposite by increasing the probability of occurrence of sabotage by utilizing alternate routes.
It is felt that the application of routing criteria should be applied on a case-by-case basis and the reduction in consequences of sabotage incidents should be carefully weighed against the benefits derived from a reduction in the probability of sabotage and accidents.
This point takes on added significance in that NUREG-0561 is advisory only.
Accordingly, we submit that the following facts should be considered in the rcuting process:
1.
Controlled access is accomplished by grade separated inter-changes.
2.
Medians separate the flow of oncoming traffic from the vehicle carrying the fuel.
3.
Passing lanes for parallel moving traffic are always available.
4.
Highway right-of-way is protected by fencing, guardrails, or natural barriers.
5.
No rail crossings are required.
6.
Bridges are designed for maximum weight limitations.
7.
Paved highway shoulders are required.
I785 062
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Mr. William J. Dircks August 30, 1979 Page 3 8.
Interstates are patrolled frequently by state highway police who are available for assistance to stopped vehicles.
9.
No stops are required for short-haul distances.
10.
Road maintenance offers less frequent and shorter duration disruptions to traffic flow.
11.
controlled and limited access reduces the number of highway locations which could be utilized for an on-route staging area for highjackers.
Sabotage plans are more likely to be successful if the vehicle could be highjacked; therefore, reduction in the potential for highjacking also reduces the likelihood of success of sabotage.
12.
continuous movement of the vehicle, coupled with the distances afforded by limited access of fencing, guardrails, and natural barriers may reduce the accuracy of missile-like weapons used by saboteurs.
13.
Use of interstate highways improves significantly the response times of state and federal law enforcement agencies.
Those agencies are expected to be better equipped and trained to deal with sabotage attempts.
Improvements in response time significantly reduces the likelihood of successful sabotage attempts and considerably improves the likelihood of success of contingency plans to deal with a successful highjacking.
14.
Escort by an armed escort force in a separate vehicle when traversing the city limits of Charlotte would provide addi-tional protective measures.
We do not maintain that the alternate routes are unacceptable but, rather, reasons exist which warrant approval of the primary route.
On the basis of the above, we request that the primary route be approved.
Further, we request a meeting with you at your convenience to discuss the staff's earlier decision and 1785 063
Mr. William J. Dircks August 30, 1979 Page 4 to provide more detailed information.
We suggest that this meeting be held during the week of September 3, 1979 in order to resolve this issue prior to resumption of the hearing on the license amendment to store Oconee spent fuel at McGuire.
Very ruly yours
/
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LA.J.
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William O. Parker, WLP/fhb Docket No. 70-2623 cc:
Marshall E. Miller, Chairman, Atomic Safety and. Licensing Board Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr., Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.
J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
Mr. Jesse L. Riley Richard P. Wilson, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, State of South Carolina Docketing and Service Section, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Edward G. Ketchen, Esq., Counsel for NRC Staff, U. S. Nuclear D.egulatory Commission 1785 064