ML19290B855
| ML19290B855 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1979 |
| From: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Andognini G BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912140250 | |
| Download: ML19290B855 (4) | |
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UN!TED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5
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NOVEMBER 2 3 1379 Docket I;o. 50-293 Mr. G. Carl Andognini Boston Edison Company M/C lluCLEAR 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199
Dear Mr. Andognini:
You responded by letters dated January 9,1979 and August 21, 1979 to our letter of November 29, 1978 concerning Containment Purging.
In your response you have attempted to justify unlimited operation of only those valves involved in the containment differential pressure operation.
During the course of our review of your submittals, we identified several areas where additional information is necessary to enable us to complete our review in the mechanical area.
The enclosed request for additional information was previously transmitted to you by facsimile service on llovember 11, 1979.
Please provide your response within 60 days of your receipt of this letter.
Further, we are in the process of completing our review of your design in the electrical area.
To this extent, we have provided our electrical review criteria as an enclosure to this letter.
We will be contacting your staff in the near future to discuss the details of this review and arrange for a meeting, if necessary.
Sincerely, n
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homas A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosure:
1, Reques; for Additional Inft r ation 2.
Electrical Review Criteria 7gQ cc w/enclcsure: 3 1 see nex : age 791214 o 2 I C7
Mr..G. Carl Andogr.ini Ecston Edison Co::any 2-d cc: Mr. Paul J. McGuire Pilgrim Station Acting Manager Boston Edison Company RFD #1, Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360 Anthony Z. Roisman Natural Resources Defense Council 917 15th Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20005 Henry Herrmann, Esquire Massachusetts Wildlife Federation 151 Tremont Street Boston, Massachusetts 02111 Plymouth Public Library North Street Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360 1574 231
E:,205URE 1 REOUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM AND CONTAINMENT VENTING SYSTEM FOR PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-293 1. With regard to the containment purge system (18" and 20" lines), provide tne following information: Discuss the provisions made to ensure that isolation valve a. closure will not be prevented by debris which could poten-tially become entrained in the escaping air and steam. b. Provide an analysis to demonstrate the acceptability of the provisions made to protect structures and safety-related equipment; e.g., fans, filters, and ductwork, located beyond the purge system isolation valves against loss of function from the environment created by the escaping air and steam. c. For the containment purge isolation valves, specify the differential pressure across the valve for which the t ximum leak rate occurs. Provide test results (e.g., from vendor tests of leakage rate versus valve differential pressure) which support your conclusion. 1574 232
ENCLOSURE 2 ELECTRICAL REVIEW CRITERI-The primary intent of this evaluation is to deternine if the following NRC staff criteria are met for the safety sign il-tc all ourge ar:: ventilation isolation valves: (1) Criterion no.1 - The overriding
- of one type of safety actuation signal (e.g., radiation)nust not cause the blocking of any other type of safety actuation signal (e.g., pressure) to the isolation valves.
(2) Criterion no. 2 - Sufficient physical features (e.g., key lock switches) are provided to f'acilitate adeauate administrative con trol s. (3) Criterion no. 3 - The systen-level annunciation of the overridden status is provided for every safety systen inoacted wher, any override is active. Incidental to this review, the following additional NRC staff design criteria were used in the evaluation: (1) Criterion no. 4 - Diverse signals should be provided tc initiate isolation of the containment ventilation system. Specifically, containment high radiation, safety injection actuation, and containment high pressure should automatically initiate CVI. This is in conformance with Branch Technical Position 6.4 of Section 6.2.4 of the Standard Review Plan. (2) Criterion no. 5 - The instrumentation and control systens provided to initiate CVI should be asigned and qualified as safety-grade equipment. (3) Criterion no. 6 - The overriding or resetting
- of the isolation actuation signal should not cause the automatic recoeninc of any isolation / purge valve.
rThe following definition is given for clarity of use in this evaluation: Override: The signal is still present, and it is blocked in order to perforn a function contrary to the sicnal. Reset: The signal has come anc gone, and the c'rcuit i: reing c. 'ared te return it to the no" mal cond# tior. 1574 233 D *
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