ML19289E251
| ML19289E251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/12/1979 |
| From: | James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19289E252 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-78-642A, NUDOCS 7904110002 | |
| Download: ML19289E251 (6) | |
Text
s' SECY-78-642A
- 1 arch 12,1979 COMMISSIONER ACTION Fjr:
The Commissioners From:
James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs l
Thru:
Executive Director for Operations /
M
Subject:
APPROVAL 0F A PROPOSED LICEilSE T0' EXPORT HIGH-ENRICHED URANIUM TO SWEDEN (LICEllSE APPLICATION fl0. XSNM01247 SECY-78-642)
Purpose:
Commission review of proposed issuance of subject j
license to Transnuclear Incorporated.
Review Dates:
60-day period expired on February 6, 1979 120-day period expires on April 7, 1979 Discussion:
In December 1977, Transnuclear Incorporated submitted an application for a license to export 24.2 kilograms of uranium, enriched to 93.3% U-235, to Sweden.
In August 1978, the applicant amended the request to read 22.055 kilograms of uranium, enriched to a maximum 93.3%, containing 20.577 kilograms of U-235.
The material, in the form of uranium oxide, will be shipped to NUKEM (FRG) and to CERCA (France) for the manufacture of fuel elements for the Studsvik R-2 research reactor at Nykoping, Sweden.
The R-2 reactor was specifically designed to produce the high neutron flux necessary in the testing and development of power reactor fuel. This high neutron flux is also required for neutron physical research and for the production of certain radioisotopes. The US has furnished HEU for this facility since it became operational in 1950.
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Contact:
J. Gunn Lee
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i 2-In response to our January 6 and August 30, 1978, requests for views, the Executive Branch has (1) concluded that issuance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the interests of the United States, including the common dsdense and security; (2) confirmed that the material will be subject to all the terms and conditions of the US-Sweden Agreement for Cooperation, and during the time it is in the FRG and Francejthe US-EURATOM Additional Agreement for Cooperation; and (3) noted that Sweden and the members of EURATOM have adhered to the provisions of their Agreements for Cooperation with the United States (State memoran-dum at Appendix B).
Among other things, the Executive Branch memorandum notes that:
o The President has approved this proposed export application.
Since it involves a project or facility with which the US has previously supplied HEU, no new US commitment to supply HEU would be created by approval of this case.
o In conformance witn policy direction to minimize unirradiated HEU inventory, the quantity under this export request, in conjunction with material requested under application XSNM01248 (which is being forwarded separately for Commission considera-tion), is limited to that expected to be sufficient for not more than two and one-half years of reactor operation from the time of the export.
This is considered a reasonable period to allow for export, transportation, and fabrication of fuel and maintenance of a fresh fuel reserve sufficient to assure the continuous and economic operation of the reactor.
With respect to the physical security program in Sweden, the staff notes that Sweden has provided the written physical security assurance as required by 10 CFR 110.43.
. The written assurances (as required by 10 CFR 110.43 (a)) that physical security measures providing as a minimum protection comparable to those set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev. l., will be maintained have not been obtained from the Governments of France and the FRG.
Instead, France and the FRG have provided written assurances based on the Suppliers Group physical security guidelines which the Commission determined to be acceptable on February 16.
The staff wishes to emphasize the fact that this export is being shipped to the FRG and France for conversion and fabrication purposes only and will be retransferred to Sweden immediately after fabrication for ultimate end-use in the Studsvik R-2 reactor.
Since the proposed export is not for end-use within EURATOM, the staff does not believe that written EURATOM-wide physical security assurances in accordance with 10 CFR 110.43 are necessary, and therefore no exemption from this requirement is necessary.
Sweden and the FRG, as carties to the UPT, have accented IAEA safeguards for all their nuclear installatiers.
The staf notes that facility attachments for the R-2 Studsvik and NUKEM facilities have been completed.
With respect to the CERCA facility in France, the staff notes that France, as a nuclear wea;.x state, is not subject to IAEA safeguards. Although France will voluntarily submit facilitiesi u Agency safe-t guards, the staff is not aware that the CERCA facility is under a facility attachment. EURATOM safeguards, nevertheless, will contiae to apply to the CERCA facility.
In addition to the general comments on facility attachments in EURATOM discussed in the State Department memorandum of December 8, 1978, the Executive Branch notes that the EURATOM /IAEA agree-ment provides the right to the IAEA to apply to all non-nuclear weapon states party to the agreement, the procedures. laid down in the agreement, including inspections, even if the subsidiary artangements are not in force. The agreements do not impose on the IAEA any limitation of access, or frequency, of these inspections prior to completion of facility attachments.
s.
With respect to export licensing requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, application XSNM01247 does not differ in its merits from previous exports to Sweden approved by the Commission. Upon review of the Executive Branch analysis and the supportive documen-tation, and based upon its analysis in SECY-78-216A, for similar material, the staff concurs.in the Executive Branch's determination that the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and the NNPA of 1978 have been met and that the proposed export would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the US.
The staff has also examined the question of whether it would be possible to operate the R-2 Studsvik Reactor on uranium of lower enrichment. Argonne National Laboratory has completed an independent assessment of the need for HEU in fueling this reactor.
The assessment concluded, on the basis of currently available information, that conversion to an intermediate (45% U-235) enrichment may be possible using currently available fuel fabrication technology.
However, there currently is no commercial fabricator of plate-type research reactor fuel containing less than 93% U-235.
Furthermore, such fuels of. lower enrichment fabricated with current technology have not been demonstrated in an operating reactor.
The Commission will note that processing of this case, and several other HEU exports involving EURATOM, has been delayed due to the complexities and workload involved in the analysis and staff coordination of a large number of major export applications during the past three months. For example, Executive Branch views were received on more than 20 such applications during December.
These and other difficult cases processed during this time period have been complicated by the need to resolve a number of questions concerning whether NNPA criteria and NRC regulations are satisfied and by the need to address other matters requested by the Commission. The resolution of the physical security questions noted in this paper will enable the staff to expedite processing of future EURATOM exports.
, The following documents are forwarded for Commission review of the subject application: (1) application of December 29, 1977 (Appendix A); (2) Executive Branch views of December 8, 1978 (Appendix B); and (3) copy of proposed license (Appendix C).
flMSS Technical Review:
No information has been received concerning the state systoms of accounting and control in Sweden, France,.and the FRG.
With respect to France,t! MSS has received no informa-tion covering the status of implementation of EURATOM and IAEA safeguards.
tio information has been received by flMSS concerning IAEA implementation activities and problems in Sweden and the FRG other than from the source which was the basis for flMSS conclusions reflected in Tables IV and XII of the November 29, 1978 memorandum to Commissioner Gilinsky. The principal conclusion of the NMSS examination is that the available information on IAEA implementation is not sufficient to permit f1 MSS to evaluate the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in Sweden and the FRG.
flMSS has reviewed the physical security programs in Sweden, France, and the FRG and found them adequate for the purpose of this export.
Recommendation _:
That the Commission approve the issuance of the proposed license to Transnuclear Incorporated.
Coordination:
0 ELD has no legal objection. NMSS views on the adequacy of the accounting and control system, the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards implementation, and the adequacy of the physical security program in Sweden, France, and the FRG are as stated above.
wk Jam s
. Shea, Director Of i e of International Programs
Enclosures:
As stated
, Commissioners' comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Tuesday, March 20, 1979.
Commission Staff Cffice comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT March 16, 1979, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations Secretariat
.