ML19289E003
| ML19289E003 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000033 |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1979 |
| From: | Hopper C TEXAS INSTRUMENTS, INC. |
| To: | Crow W NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7903210281 | |
| Download: ML19289E003 (50) | |
Text
5 e
TEXAS INSTRUM ENTS I N C o lt i'Olt AT c o l,
i 0 1 J
obbCTS GROUP M ATERI ALS & ELECTF IC AL P
~3.
February 2, 1979 f
N jg-
((/
C' IC Mr.
W.
T.
Crow, Section Leader Uranium Fuel Fabrication Section Fuel Processing & Fabrication Br.
(I'C Div. of Fuel Cycle & Material Safety
\\-
,.3 Q[-
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission N' j/ g, __
Washington, D.C.
20555 sKl%._-
Gentlemen:
We have reviewed the enclosure of your December 22, 1978, letter.
Our response to the comments of your enclosure and our discussions with portions of your staff on January 26, 1979, are enclosed and provide clarifying information and/
or alterations (page changes) to the Emergency Plan as submitted October 25, 1978.
Sincerely, Cadwh 2n. 5 p 7
Calvin M.
Ilopper Mgr., Nuclear Safety IIFIR Project CMll/ck Enclosures S'-
a,.,. -u r 790321098\\
A T T LE DORO, M ASS ACHUS ET TS C2703 e Tt.EPHONE. 617 222 2800 e C A DLE: TExlNS
Response to U.S.
NRC Comments on Texas Instruments Incorporated Amendment Application, Docket No. 70-33 Dated October 25, 1978 The following responses are presented in the order used in the U.S.N.R.C.
reply letter " ENCLOSURE" dated December 22, 1978.
1.
Internal reviews of operations during the approval sequence of an operation for criticality safety purposes requires in excess of two independent, unlikely, and concurrent events before a criticality may be achieved.
The occurrence of each event throughout the processing of discrete items of SNM requires a violation of product handling techniques, process step flows, and/or equipment physical limitations.
Page 1-1, Rev. O has been changed to Page 1-1, Rev.
A, to specify a postulated criticality incident as per your comments.
2.
Paqo 2-1, Rev.
O, has been changed to Page 2-1, Rev.
A, to eliminate reference to a non-existent U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Radiological Emergency Assista..ce Team.
3.(a) Available firefighting protection on site ic described on Page 5-4, Rev.
A, under the heading of "Onsite Emergency Organization".
Table 1 is provided for a description of emergency response group status (on-shift, off-shift, and/or on-site, off-site).
For clarification of on-site and off-site, Page 1-2, Rev.
O, has been changed to Page 1-2, Rev.
A, to providc definitione of on-site and off-site.
3.(b) In light of your comment 2, reference to "NRC Emergency Response" in Table 1, Page 3-2, Rev.
O, has been changed to
" age 3-2, Rev.
A, to delete the reference.
- 4. (a) As a result of our January 26, 1979, meeting, Page 4-3, Rev.
O, has been changed to Page 4-3, Rev.
A, to provide a criticality incident for assessment purposes.
4.(b) Page 10-2, section 10.5.10.2.,
Rev.
O, has been changed to Rev. A to provide dose determinations to persons Is a result of a postulated criticality incident.
5.(a) Clarification is required regarding your comment 5.(a).
Offsite is intended to mean any thing, service, or people outside the property boundacies of the Attleboro Site of Texas Instruments Incorporated.
During off-shift periods (see definitions, Page 1-2, Rev. A), certain emergency team members are available (see Page 3-1, Rev.
A, Table 1).
HFIR Project production periods (on-shift) occur 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> per working day (8 days per week) whereas non-nuclear related production periods within Building 10 (separated from the HFIR Project proper) and numerous locations throughout the Attleboro Site o f Texas Instruments Incorporated (on-site)
occur 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day each day of the week.
As such, there are emergency response personnel available on-site during "off-shift" periods.
5.(b) During off-shift periods, IIFIR Project Security prevents activities involving SNM until llPIR Project Staff are notified and direction provided.
The IIFIR Project Emergency Procedures (as recommended in U.S. NRC Reg. Guide 3.42, Anaex B, Section 2.2) provide the necessary notification of persons and alternates.
These persons include the IIPSA, MllP, IIPPF, NSG, MOA, or PE as alternates (see page 5-3 and page 5-4).
N 6.
As a result of your enclosure and comments of the January 26, 1979, meeting, Page 5-3 and 5-4, Rev.
O, have been changed to Page 5-3, Rev.
A, Page 5-4, Rev.
A, and Page 5-4A, Rev.
O, to indicate the separation of Management and on-site personnel and how emergency actions and direction is afforded until the Evaluation Team arrives.
Postulated accidents within the liFIR Project with radio-biological consequences during off-shift periods necessarily require the uncontrolled release of U 08 powder to the IIF I R 3
3 8 powder or U Og bearing powder (U-A1) is Project.
No U 0 3
left in a potentially uncontrolled condition during off-shift U08 is returned to stainless steel containers periods (i.e.,
3 physically positioned by steel structures located withln low-risk fire areas of the IIFIR Project).
As such, the only periods there could be an uncontrolled release of U 038 is during on-shift periods while the Radiological Evaluation Team is present.
A disastrous fire during off-shift periods could potentially affect fabricated fuel plates which would pose inconsequential radiobiological impacts on professional firefigiters.
Any spread of contamination before the arrival of the Radiological Evaluation Team would be due to the localized tracking of professional firefighters on the scene, since TI employees are not assigned firefighting duties for destructive fires.
Training of emergency response personnel provides basic guidelines and precautions to be observed to minimize the spread of contamination.
7.
The IIFIR Project Emergency Coordinator is responsible for notifying governmental authorities of emergency conditions as specified in the IIFIR Project Emergency Plan, Section 10.5.6.1.4.3. on Page 6-3, Rev.
O.
The release of information to the news media is directed by the SEC via "TI Attleboro Guidelines Emergency Communications" as referenced in Section 10.5.2, Page 2-1, Rev.
O.
The assignment of communications is specified in Section 10.5.5.2.2.11 on Page 5-6, Rev.
A.
- 8. (a) Any TI owned 'nd supplied emergency equipment or supplies provided to emergency agreement organizations' facilities are maintained as specificci in section 10.5.8.3, Page 8-4, and come under the responsibility of the IIFIR Project Nuclear Safety.
The Attleboro Fire Department maintains their own equipment with minor assistance from TI on request.
The Attleboro Fire Department has an employee who has been trained and maintains proficiency in the use of the equipment.
8.(b) Texas Instruments Incorporated has neither the authority nor power to dictate the " basis for a decision by the agreement organization director whether equipment and supplies should be distributed to his emergency support personnel".
Initial training and retraining is of fered to directors of emergency agreement organizations as stated in sections 10.5.6.4.2.2.1, 10.5.8.1.1.3, and 10.5.8.1.2.
Guidelines referenced in section 10.5.6.4.2.1.1, page 6-6, are provided the directors.
A statement has been added to section 10.5.6.4.2.2.2 to indicate the availability of TI owned equipment to agreement organizations.
9.
Page 6-8, Rev.
O, has been changed to Page 6-8, Rev.
A, to include the reference for exposure criteria.
Radiation exposure values are incorporated within the HFIR Project Emergency Procedures Manual.
1G.
Page 6-8 and Page 6-9, Rev.
O, have been changed to Page 6-8 and Page 6-9, Rev.
A, to reflect alternate hospital facilities.
11.
The clarification of your comment 3.(a) provides the specifi-cation of fit e fighting personriel and section 10.5.8.1.1.2 provides for training and retraining.
12.
Scution 10.5.8.1.2 on Page 8-2, Rev.
O, provides the specifi-cation of drills and exercises and their frequencies involv-ing on-site emergency organizations which include the HFIR Safety Action Team and the Building.10 Emergency Team.
13.
Page 8-4, Rev.
O, has been changed to Page 8-4, Rev.
A, to reflect the frequency for testing the operational readiness of emergency equipment and supplier.
14.
It is inappropriate to state within an emergency plan the various maximum contamination levels to permit any personnel access to SNM areas.
This statement is supported by the guidance provided by U.S.
NRC Regulatory Guide 3.42, Annex A, Section 9, and Annex B, Section 2.2.11, and the purpose of an emergency plan to establish an emergency response capability and program which requires emergency procedures that delineate specific emergency action guidelines and action levels based upon specific criteria.
Page 9-1, Rev.
O, has been changed to Page 9-1, Rev.
A, to add the criteria for personnel re-entry for resumption of operations within SNM areas.
15.(a) Personnel communications at the January 8, 1979, meeting between Chief Livesey of the Attleboro Fire Department and Calvin Ilopper confirmed the meaning of his agreement letter.
Under terms of a Mutual Aid Pact with surrounding communities and private arbulance service contract, there are no conditions that needed ambulance services would not be provided to in-state hospital facilities.
As a matter of policy, Chief Livesey chose the wording "Under certain conditions, emergency ambulance service to Rhode Island IIospital will be provided", to mean conditions of personnel contamination.
There are no exceptions to these services.
15.(b) Page 6-9, Rev.
O, has been changed to Page 6-9, Rev.
A, to reflect the alternate means for transporcation of injured personnel to medical facilities.
15.(c) See additional pages to Appendix 10.5.10.1.
15.(d) See additional pages to Appendix 10.5.10.1.
15.(e) See additional pages to Appendix 10.5.10.1.
- 15. ( f) As a result of our January 26, 1979, meeting, section 10.5.10.2, Page 10-2, Rev.
A, has been made to demonstrate the radiological impact of a postulated criticality to personnel at 135 meters (nearest industry) and 400 meters (nearest resident).
15.(g)
Fires occurring on-site require '.he summoning of professional firefighters equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus, and normally supplied protective clothing which is used for fighting fires having the potential for causing an uncontrolled release of U Og.
No TI employee is assigned 3
emergency firefighting duties for fires having a magnitude to cause an uncontrolled release of U 03 8-15.(h) Page 10-5, Rev.
O, has been changed to Page 10-5, Rev.
A.
The following additional page changes are made to:
A.
Eliminate references to the MEP.
Page Rev.
to Page Rev.
0 1-1 y_7 3
0 5-2 5-2 A
O 5-4
'~'
^
0 6-1 6-1 A
0 6-2 6-2 A
O B.
Add the definition of the DPE, Designated Process Engineer, Page 1-1, Rev.
O, to Page 1-1, Rev. A; and succession of authority, Page 5-2, Rev.
O, to Page 5-2, Rev.
A.
C.
Substitute references of the maximum credible accident being a destructive fire of the HFIR Project Facility to a postulated criticality.
Page Rev.
to Page Rev.
4-3 0
4-3 A
4-4 0
4-4 A
10-2 O
10-2 A
E.N.
79-5 Pg. 1-1 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.
ilFIR Project Emergency Plan Introduction
'Iyy Of prime concern to the Management of Texas Instruments tdfk (TI) is the protection of employees' health, whether during normal conditions of operation or in potential emergency situations.
This plan defines the potential accidents with radiolcgical consequences.
The plan demonstrates the means for detecting emergencies as well as defining the general actions required to mitigate radiological consequences which could jeopardize personnel health and sefety or damage property.
The plan describes the mechanism for timely emergency notification and responses to minimize the escalation of an accident from one accident higher classification.
severity classification to a The plan is maintained as a separate document with ready access to the emergency coordinator of the liFIR Project and the site emergency coordinator.
Details, such as names, telephone numbers, specific items of equipment / supplies, inventory lists, and step-by-step procedures / check lists are incorporated within the IIFIR Project Emergency Procedures Manual (IIPEPM) which implements the plan.
For evaluating radiological consequences it has been deter-mined that a postulated nuclear criticality providet, the maximun impact to the public at large.
10.5.1.
Definitions Terms and expressions appearing throughout the plan are alpha-betically listed and defined below for ease of reference.
AllPEC - Assistant to the llFIR Project Emergency Coordinator
- DPE
- Designated Process Engineer llPEC
- IIFIR Pro ject Emergency Coordinator IIPEPM - IIFIR Project Emergency Procedures Manual IIPPF
- IIFIR Project Production Foreman llPSA
- liFIR Project Security Administrator LLEA
- Local Law Enforcement Agency (City of Attleboro P.D.)
LFFA
- Local Fire Fighting Agency (City of Attleboro F.D.)
MASF
- Manager Attleboro Site Facili. ties MilP
- Manager IIFIR Project x4W?
f;.o n
.s E.N.
79-5 Pg. 1-2 Jan. 12, 1979 Rev. A MIIS Manager tiuclear Safety MOA Manager Quality Assurance MSS Manager Site Security NIAT Massachusetts Department of Health Nuclear Incident Advisory Team
- NSG Nuclear Safety Group OFF-SIIIFT -
Times other than on-shift
- OFF-SITE Outside Texas Instruments Incorporated, Attleboro, property boundary.
ON CALL Personnel telephone call list located at SCC ON-Sill PT IIP I R Project production periods
- ON-SITE Insi.de Texas Instruments Incorporated, Attleboro, property boundary PE Process Engineers RAP United States Department of Energy Radiation Assistance Program - Brookhaven SCC Site Control Center SEC Site Emergency Coordinator SNM Special Nuclear Material SSSS Site Sacurity Shift Supervisor h'EAC Winchester Engineering and Analytic Center
E.M.
79-5 Pg. 2-1 Jan. 12, 1979 Rev. A
- 10. 5. 2.
Scope and Applicability The scope of the IIFIR Project Emergency Plan encompasses the spectrum of all postulated potential accidents with radiological consequences at the llFIR Project.
The plan defines the functional positions and responsibilities of emergency response personnel and/or organizations for each class of emergency conditions and defines the facility to which the plan is applicable.
The plan is applicable to the IIFIR Project Fuel Fabrication Facility as contained within Building 10 of the Texas Instruments Attleboro, Massachusetts plant site (Sect. 10.5.10.4). It references 1) the implementing procedures of the Emergency Plan, 2) the liF I R Project radiological control and TI IIFIR Project security procedures
- 3) the TI Building 10 emergency assistance ter.ms, 4) the TI corporate emergency response (TI security emergency response, public information, etc.) and 5) the radiological emergency response of offsite area agreement agencies (Attleboro " ire / Rescue and Police Departments, Massachusetts State Police and Radiological Emergency Organization, Rhode Island llospital, and Brookhaven ':a t i o n a l Laboratory Department 0t I:ne rgy Radioloaical Assistance Program).
Depending upon the potential for escalation of given emergency events, various emergency response personnel and/or organizations will be summoned and alerted for assistance and/or services.
Except for occurrences classified as personnel emergencies, the required emergency response may be as minor as summoning local ambulance service-or an alert notification of the LLEA and LPFA for a plant emergency or as major as the notification and summoning or alerting of all emergency response personnel and emergency assistance and/or service organizations for a site emergency.
The HFTR Project Emergency Procedures Manual provide specific organizational responsibilities, action levels, implement-ing actions, reference to procedures and means for controlling the update of procedures.
These procedures are the basis for directing the responses to an emergency during regular IIFIR Project operating periods.
The TI IIFIR Project Security Procedures serve to initiate the IIFIR Project Emergency Plan Procedures during offshift IIFIR Project periods.
The emergency plan interfaces with other corporate plans and services such as the "TI Attleboro Guidelines Emergency Conunu nica t i ons ", the TI Attleboro onsite medical facilities program, the TI Attleboro Emergency Teams, and TI Attleboro Security.
Upon the escalation of emergency severity these corporate plans and services provide assistance in early
E.I.
79-5 Pg. 3-2 Jan. 12, 1979 Rev. A TABLE 1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE GROUP STATUS (see footnote)
Emergency Classification Personnel Alert Plant Site Shift Shift Shift Shift
- Emergency Response Group On off On Off On Off On Off IIFIR Project (Sta f f) Emergency Organization 1
2 1
2 1
2 1
2
!!PIR Project Security 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 Building 10 Emargency Team 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 TI Attleboro Site Security 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 TI Attleboro Site Metli ca l IIe a l t h Center 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 City of Attleboro P.D.
Ambulance Service 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 City of Attleboro F.D.
2 2
2 2
2 2
City of Attleboro P.D.
2 2
2 2
2 2
Rhode Islc.nd liosp i tal 3
3 3
3 Bolton and Diffley 4"
4 4
4 Winchester Eng. and Analytic O
O Center 4
4 4
4 Massachusetts MIAT 3
3 3
3 U.S.
Department of Energy (RAP) 3 3
Massachusetts State Patrol As requ red by LI,EA and Mass. NIAT 1
- LEGEND 1.
Active - onsite 2.
Reserve - offsite to onsite (e.g. Attleboro F.D.)
3.
Delayed reserve - offsite, possibly to onsite (e.g.
Rhode Island Ilospital Staff) 4.
Delayed Assistance - offsite (e.g.,
fixed location services as Bolton and Diffley)
No involvement Indicated alert notification The TI Attleboro Site Security '"ift Supervisor coordinates medical t re a t :te n t response during Medical Center relief periods.
FOOTNOTE:
Table indicates the condition of readiness, involvement, and required alert notification of response groups.
E.N.
7 '. - 5 Pg. 4-3 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.4.1.3.2.1.
Small fire within the IIFIR Project Facilities.
10.5.4.1.3.2.2.
Radiation detection alarm.
1C 5.4.1.3.2.3.
Minor flamable gas explosion not affecting contain-ment of radioactive materials.
10.5.4.1.4.
Site Emergency--Release of radioactive material or a postulated criticality.
10.5.4.1.4.1.
The criteria for classifying a site emergency are:
10.5.4.1.4.1.1.
Positive observation of radioactive material releace from aluminum clnd fuel plates or containers to the IIFIR Project.
10.5.4.1.4.1.1.1.
Visual inspection of the HFIR Project Facility which reveals aamage to aluminum components within the facility.
10.5.4.1.4.1.1.2.
Alpha surface contamination surveys of accessable areas which have potential for contamination tracking by foot traffic of emergency response personnel.
10.5.4.1.4.1.1.3.
Alpha surface contamination rurveys of accessable areas which have potential for contamination spread by high winds, explosion, or use of eraergency response equipment.
- 10.5.4.1.4.2.
A postulated criticality within the III~' I R Facility forms the basis for the maximum uncontrolled release of radioactive material.
It is designated a site emergency.
- 10.5.4.1.4.3.
Protective action guides for surface contamina-tion, specified in Health Physier, Procedures Manual, are used for defining contamination control boundaries within the TI Attleboro site.
10.5.4.1.5.
Gcneral Emergency The postulated criticality does not cause a
significant release of radioactive material to the public at large.
This condition is imposed by the natcrial characteristics and environment (steel confinement, intimacy with alumi.num, surrounding steel equipment barriers, and material densities).
s E.N.
70-5 Pg. 4-4 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev.
A 10.5.4.2.
Spectrum of Postulated Accidents As demonstrated in Section 10.5.4.1.,
postulated accident situations are classified according to severit.y of radio-logical impact on the health and <>afety of persons onsite.
These postulated accidents range from a possible contaminated skin cut to the dispersion of Fiasion product, from the postulated criticality.
10.5.4.2.1.
Assessrent for offsite impact are preplanned and are treated within Section 10.5.6. entitled Emeraency
'*easures.
10.5.4.2.2.
The required instrurentation capabi1ity for prompt detection and continued assessment of classified emorqencies is described in Section 10.7 3.
1 10.5.4.2.3.
The required manpower for t ':u anticiapted sequence s ' il ! i t :1 n<; < > f e 'c e n t s is de cribed in Sectio:
10.5.5.
E.N.
79-5 Pg. 5-2 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.5.2.1.1.
Personnel Emergencien 10.5.5.2.1.1.1.
The Manager of IIPIR Project is de s i t;na ted the llPEC with the responsibility and authority to take charge of emergency control measures in the event of personnel emergencies.
In the absence of the Manager of IIF I R Project, the authority succeeds to the 'da nage r o f Nuclear Safety (MNS),
and then to the Designated Proce:m Enginee: (DPE).
10.5.5.2.1.1.2.
The TI Attleboro Site Security Shift Supervisor (SSSS) is designated the IIFIR Project emergency coordinator during offshift periods in the event of personnel emergencies.
In the absence of the SSSS, the authority succeeds to the Manager TI Site Security (MSS) and then to the llFIR Project Security Administrator (IIPSA).
10.S.5.2.1.1.3.
The functional responsibilities of the IIPCC are the assessment of emergency circumstances to declare a personnel emergency, activating needed emergency response personnel, p ro v i d i n(; alerts to potentially required emergency response personnel, coordinating the efforts of needed emergenci response personnel, and notifying the MIIP or MNS.
10.5.5.2.1.2.
Emergency Alert, Plant Emergency, Site Emergency, and General Emergency.
10.5.5.2.1.2.1.
The Manager of TI Attleboro Si te Facilities (MASF) is designated the TI Attleboro Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) with the responsibility and authority to take charge of emergency control measures in the event of all classifications of energencies with the exception of a personnel emergency.
In the absence of the MASF, the authority succeeds to the MSS then to the llPSA and then to the SSSS.
10.5.5.2.1.2.2.
The SSSS is designated the SEC during offshift periods in the event of an emergency.
E. !;. 79-5 Pg. 5-3 Jan. 29, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.5.2.1.2.3.
The functional responsibilities of the SEC are the assessment of emergency circumstances to declare the emergency according to Sections 10.5.4.1.2-4, activatinq needed emergency response personnel, summoning the llPEC or alternates, and coordinating the efforts of needed emergency response personnel.
10.5.5.2.1.2.4.
The communications links used for onsite emergency organizations are:
10.5.5.2.1.2.4.1.
A hardwired, di. rect access telephone system is available for communications among the SEC, ll P E C, and other central locations of emergency organizations.
10.5.5.2.1.2.4.2.
One-way voice communications site radio network is available for communications from the SEC to designated onsite emergency teams, medical and security personnel.
10.5.5.2.1.2.4.3.
Two-way voice communications site radio network is available for communications among the SEC, and designated emergency teams, and security personne1.
10.5.5.2.2.
Plant Staff Emergency Assignments The additional functicaal areas of emergency act'ivity are assigned to various organizational groups as follows:
10.5.5.2.2.1.
Plant Systems Operations.
10.5.5.2.2.1.1.
Onnhift 10.5.5.2.2.1.1.1.
This functional area is a s s i cined to the IIFIR Project Production Foreman (IIPPP), Building 10 emergency team and the TI Attleboro site emergency teams (in the event of a severe emergency).
- 10.5.t 2.2.1.1.2.
Facility staff members are !IPPP (MIIP /M::S, 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> fla i n tena nce and/or Paci?ities Super"isors who supervis(
the Building 10 and site Emergency Teams and MSS).
10.5.5.2.2.1.2.
Offshift 10.5.5.2.2.1.2.1.
This functional area is assigned to the Building 10 emergency t2am and the TI Attleboro site emergency teams (activities involving S!JM require the direction by IIFIR Project staf f).
'E.N.
79-5 Pg. 5-4 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.5.2.2.1.2.2.
Facility staff members are 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Maintenance and/or Facilities Supervisors who supervise the Building 10 and Site Emergency Teams.
Activities involving SNM require direction by the II PS A, MilP,
MNS, IIPPF, NSG, MQA, or PE as alternates.
This direction is afforded by telephone or direct oversight as the need dictates.
10.5.5.2.2.2.
Radiological Survey Monitoring 10.5.5.2.2.2.1.
Onshift 10.5.5.2.2.2.1.1.
This functional area is assigned to the IIF I R Hadiological Evaluations Team.
10.5.5.2.2.2.1.2.
Facility staff members are the Manager of Nuclear Safety (NSG and Process Engineers alternates).
10.5.5.2.2.2.2.
Offshift 10.5.5.2.2.2.2.1.
This functional area is assigned to the IIFIR Radiological Evaluations Team (on call offsite).
Personnel evacuation ad emergency area isolation provide adequate personnel protection until the liFIR Radiological Evaluation Team provides protective guidance by telephone and arrives onsite.
10.5.5.2.2.2.2.2.
Facility staff members are the Manager of Nuclear Safety (NSG and IIFIR Process Fngineers alternates) all who are on call offsite.
10.5.5.2.2.3.
Firefighting The LPFA is notified in all instances of fire and when present assumes all responsibilities for firefighting at TI.
10.5.5.2.2.3.1.
Onshift 10.5.5.2.2.3.1.1.
This functional area is assigned to the IIFIR Safety Action Team (functional group of the HFIR Project Emergency Organization section 10.5.8.1.1.2.)
and augmented by the Building 19 Emergency Team and TI Attleboro Site Emergency Teams (in the event of a severe emergency).
Duties of the liF I R Safety Action Team are limited to initial firefighting offorts until the arrival of the LFFA.
Upon arrival of the LPFA, the duties of the IIFIR Safety Action Team (as augmented by the Building 10 timergency Team) revert to the '; u p po r t of the LFFA as required.
10.5.5.2.2.3.1.2.
Facility staff members are the IIP PF, MNS, and MHP.
E.N.
79-5 Pg. 5-4A Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. O 10.5.5.2.2.3.2.
Offshift 10.5.5.2.2.3.2.1.
This functional area is assigned to the Building 10 Emergency Team and TI Attleboro Site Emergency Teams (in the event of a severe emergency).
10.5.5.2.2.4.
Rescue Operations 10.5.5.2.2.4.1.
Onshift 10.5.5.2.2.4.1.1.
This functional area is assigned to the IIP I R Search and Rescue Team.
C.N.
79-5 Pg. 5-5 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.5.2.2.4.1.2.
Facility staff members are the llPP F, the MNS, and the M:iP.
10.5.5.2.2.4.2.
Offshift 10.5.5.2.2.4.2.1.
This functional area is assigned to liFIR Project F.ecurity with the !!PIR Pearch and Rescue Tear (on call offsite).
10.5.5.2.2.4.2.2.
Facility staff members are the SSSS, the IIPS A,
the IIPPF, the MSS, the M!IP, and the TI Safety Director.
10.5.5.2.2.5.
First Aid 10.5.5.2.2.5.1.
Onshift or offshift 10.5.5.2.2.5.1.1.
This functional area is ansianed to the TI Attleboro Medical liealth Center.
10.5.5.2.2.5.1.2.
The facility staff member is the Director of the TI Attleboro Medical llealth Center or a1 ternate.
10.5.5.2.2.6.
Decontamination 10.5.5.2.2.6.1.
Onshift or on call offshift.
10.5.5.2.2.6.1.1.
This functional area is assigned to the IIFIR radiological evaluations team.
- 10.5.5.2.2.6.1.2.
Facility staff members are the MNS (the MIIP,
NS(;, and IIF I R Procaw F.n g i n e e r s as a l t e r na h's ).
10.5.5.2.2.7.
Security of Plant and Access Control 10.5.5.2.2.7.1.
Onshift or offshift 10.5.5.2.2.7.1.1.
This functional area is assigned to liFIR Project Securiti (assisted by TI Attleboro G ite Security during severe emergencies).
10.5.5.2.2.7.1.2.
The facility staff member is the IIPSA (assisted by the MSS in severe emergencies) or their alternates.
10.5.5.2.2.8.
Repair and Damage Control 10.5.5.2.2.8.1.
Onshift or Offshift
4 E.N.
79-5 Pg. 5 -- 6 Jan. 29, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.5.2.2.8.1.1.
This functional arca is assigned to the Building 10 Emergency Team (assisted by TI Attleboro Emergency Teams in severe emergencies).
10.5.5.2.2.8.1.?.
The facility staff members are the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> rotating '4aintenance and Plant Engineering Supervisors.
10.5.5.2.2.9.
Personnel Accountability 10.5.5.2.2.9.1.
Onshift 10.5.5.2.z.9.1.1.
This functional area is assigned to IIPIR Personnel Accountabi1i.ty.
10.5.5.2.2.9.1.2.
The facility staff member is the IIPPF with the MilP and Process Engineers as alternates.
10.5.5.2.2.10. Recordkeeping 10.5.5.2.2.10.1. Onshift 10.5.5.2.2.10.1.1. This functional area is assigned to the Assistant to the llP IR Project Emergency Coordinator ( AllPEC).
- 10.5.5.2.2.10.1.2. The facility staff member is the MIIP (with the T;S, NSG, anri Proces<> I:nq i nee r., as alternates).
10.5.5.2.2.10.2. Offshift 10.5.5.2.2.10.2.1. This functional area is assigned to llPIR Project Security with the AllPEC or al ternates on call offsite.
10.5.5.2.2.10.2.2. The facility staff members are the IIPS A and the AIIP EC.
10.5.5.2.2.11. Communications 10.5.5.2.2.11.1. Onshift 10.5.5.2.2.11.1.1. This functional area is assigned to the IIPEC and the SI:C in severe emergencies.
- 10.5.5.2.2.11.1.2. The facility staff members are the MIIP with the MNS, AND NSG as alternates, and the personnel 1isted in TI Attleboro Emergency Guidelines.
10.5.5.2.2.11.1.3. Comunications with the newsmedia is directed by the TI Attlebcro Emergency Guidelines and
I'. N. 79-5 Pg. 5-6A Jan. 29, 1979 1Re v. O coordinated by the TI Attleboro Site Management as;igned individual for news releases (Typical--
TI Attleboro Communications Specialist).
The assigned individual is a member of the HFIIR Project T:mergency Organization under the heading of TI Attleboro I:me rgency Comnun ica t ions.
10.5.5.2.2.11.2. Offs;hift
C.M.
79-5 Pg. 5-7 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.5.2.2.11.2.1. This functional area is assioned to IIPIR Pro ject Security with the liPI:C on call offsite and the SCC in seJere emergencies.
10.5.5.2.2.11.2.2. Th.
facility staff members are the MSS and the Ml!P or alternaten.
10.5.5.3.
Augmentation of Onsite Emergency Organization This section describes two categories of Onsite Emergency Organization augmentation, TI Corporate siippo r t, and local services support au committed b) agreement letters.
10.5.5.3.1.
TI Corporate ll e a dt; u a r t e r n Support Under cer tai n circunsitaneen it may be necenaary to enlist additional support services from TI Corporate Ileadquarters to cope with emergencies.
This support is provided through the TI Attleboro Site Emergency Coordinator to the appropriate emergency organization.
The enlistment of such support is acconplished by TI Attleboro Site Management under the advisement of the TL Attleboro <;i te emergency coordinator.
10.5.5.3.1.1.
Status of Support Services The resources and support of TI Corporate are available on call by TI Attleboro Site 'lanagement.
10.5.5.3.1.2.
The nature of Corporate support services are financial and administrative.
10.5.5.3.1.3.
The scope of support services is to supplement any needs of the TI Attleboro Site Emergency Organization through manpower, equipment, and/or financial aid.
10.5.5.3.2.
Local Services Support 10.5.5.3.2.1.
Arrangements and agreements are maintained with the local Attleboro City Fire Department to provide necessary ambulance, and firefighting services.
These agreements are included in Section 30.5.10.
These services are utilized as described in Section 10.5.6.
10.5.5.3.2.2.
The extension of TI Attleboro medical services is provided through agreement arrangements with Rhode Island Ilospital.
This agreement is included in Section 10.5.10.
These services are utilized as described in Section 10.5.6.
E.N.
79-5 Pg. 6-1 Feb.
],
1979 Rev. A 10.5.6.
Emergency Measures This section describes the emergency measures required for each applicable class of emergency as determined by the criteria established in Section 10.5.4.1.1-4, It describes
- 1) the activation of emergency organization, 2) assessment actions, 3) corrective actions, 4) protective actions and
- 5) aid to affected personnel.
10.5.6.1.
Activation of Emergency Organizations This section describes the applicable communication steps taken to alert or activate emergency personnel agencies, and/or organizations for 1) personnel emergency,
- 2) emergency alert, 3) plant emergency and 4) site emergency.
The action levels for notifying offsite emergency response aoreoment or<tani: ations is necessarily dependent upon the classification of the emergency as defined in Sections 10.5.4.1.1-4 and the criteria for the classifi-cation (i.e.,
there is/is not a potential for widespread site fire).
The coordination for the activation of emergency response personnel and organizations is provided by the SEC with the advisement of the IIPEC and other active emergency response organizations (e.g. Attleboro Fire and Police Departments).
10.5.6.1.1.
Personne] Emergency With the classification of a personnel emergency., the severity of the emergency and its radiological consequences necessarily dictate the degree of emergency organization activation.
For this reason, an assessment of the emergency and commensurate communications are required in order to activate or alert appropriate emergency organizations.
As the radiological consequences of a personnel emergency are assessed to escalate, the communications steps are:
10.5.6.1.1.1.
Observer notifies IIPPF.
10.5.6.1.1.2.
IIPPF notifies IIFIR Project security, TI Attleboro llealth Center, and MllP.
10.5.6.1.1.3.
Mllp acts as IIPEC coordinator.
10.5.6.1.1.4.
IIPEC activates the liFIR Project energency organization and directs the authenticated alerting of radiological assistance agreement organizations of possible needed assistance.
E.N.
79-5 Pg. 6-2 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.6.1.1.5.
IIPEC di rects the authenticated summoning of radio-logical assistance from agreement organizations.
10.5.6.1.2.
Emergency Alert The communications steps taken for an emergency alert traverse from TI Attleboro Site Management to the llPEC who then alerts the liFIR Project emergency organization.
The llPEC directs authenticated alerting of emergency response agreement organizations with the capabilities to treat emergencies having radiological consequences (e.g. City of Attleboro P i. r e and Police Departments).
10.5.6.1.3.
Plant Emergency 10.5.6.1.3.1.
Any IIPIR employee may notify IIFIR Project Security and/or the IIPPP of emergency situation.
10.5.6.1.3.2.
IIPIR Project Security notifies TI Attleboro Site Security and the MIIP.
10.5.6.1.3.3.
Simultaneously 10.5.6.1.3.3.1.
TI Attleboro Site Securit'f notifies the SEC.
10.5.6.1.3.3.1.1.
The SEC activates portions of the site emergency by:
10.5.6.1.3.3.1.1.1.
Summoning appropriate emergency agreement organizations (e.g. Attleboro Fire and Police Departments).
10.5.6.1.3.3.1.1.2.
Coordinating emergency control measures with the IIPIR Project Emergency Coordinator.
10.5.6.1.3.3.2.
The "Ilp acts as the II P EC.
10.5.6.1.3.3.2.1.
IIPEC activates the !!PIR Project emergency organization and:
10.5.6.1.3.3.2.1.1.
Directs the authenticated alerting of emergency assistance agreement organizations having capabilities for treating emergencies with radiological consequences (e.g. Rhode Island llospital, U.S.
D.O.E.
- RAP).
10.5.6.1.3.3.2.1.2.
Coordinating emergency control measures with the SEC.
E.M.
79-5 Pg. 6-4 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. A
- 10.5.6.2.2.
Techniques Alpha N beta / gamma surface contamination survey equipment and techniques and emergency res;>onse personnel observa-tions are reported to the llFIR Project Emergency Coordinator for assessment.
The techniques of the assessment are the:
10.5.6.2.2.1.
Comparisons of survey and observation results with pre-established action levels specified within the llPEPM.
10.5.6.2.3.
Determinations The determinations of the magnitudes of 1) radioactive rca to r ia l release, 2) spread of contamination, and
- 3) estimation of personnel exposures are integral to the assessment actions.
These determinations are acconplished by.
10.5.6.2.3.1.
Defining the specific IIFIR Project areas affected by emergency (e.g.
Inspection Area, Element Fabrication Area, Plate Storage Area, etc.) and equating the potential maximum radioactive material within the snecific area to that material assumed to be released.
10.5.6.2.3.2.
The IIFIR Radiological Evaluations Team possibly assisted bi radiological response agreement organizations, perform-ing area alpha & beta / gam a contamination surveys of accessable areas and personnel and defining boundaries of required control areas based upon pre-established contamination limits as specified within the I!PEPM.
10.5.6.2.3.3.
The llFIR Radiological Evaluations Team, possibly assisted by radiological response agreement organi-zations, project estimated exposures to persons in accordance with practices established within the liPEPM.
10.5.6.3.
Corrective Actions The primary corrective actions for emergencies are the rapid and 'ircely emergency organization responce to cope with the emergency with appropriate manpower and equipment as deemed necessary by prudent assessment.
Under certain emergency situations, actions,re taken to control or mitigate the consequences of the emergency to prevent or reduce the magnitude of a radioactive material release at or near the source of the problem.
Examples of such actions are:
10.5.6.3.1.
Establishment of contamination control boundaries and limited personnel access.
E.M.
79-5 Pg. 6-6 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.6.4.1.1.5.
for the disposition of evacuees is established in (cont)
Section 10.5.6 of the II PI:P'4.
10.5.6.4.1.2.
Offsite Areas The actions planned to protect persons or population at risk are assumed by the local and state Civil Defense Agency as supported by local and state government agencies (See Section 10.5.10.).
10.5.6.4.2.
Use of Protective Equipment and Supplies Protective equipment and supplies are utilized by persons responding to emergencies within exclusion areas having potential radiological consequences.
10.5.6.4.2.1.
TI Emergency Respons< Personnel 10.5.6.4.2.1.1.
The criteria for issuance of protective equipment is that at any time there is a suspec..ed or potential uncontrolled presence of radio-active material, particulate filter respirators, and protective clothing will be issued to personnel.
10.5.6.4.2.1.2.
Protective equipment and supplies (e.g. respirators, shoe covers, protective clothing) are maintained within the IIFIR Project Facility and within the llFIR Project emergency cabinet located separately from the IIFIR Project Facility.
10.5.6.4.2.1.3.
Distribution of equipment and supplies is provided by Radiological Evaluations Team members with the coordination of the TI Attleboro Site I;mergency Coordinator.
10.5.6.4.2.1.4.
Criteria for issuance of protective equipment is based upon potential airborne particulate contamin-ation and therefore require as a minimum che issuance of high efficiency particulate filter respirators to personnel responding to the emergency.
10.5.6.4.2.2.
Non - TI Emergency Response Personnel 10.5.6.4.2.2.1.
Emergency assistance agreement organizations establish criteria for issuance of protective equip-ment and supplies.
The director of the organization is appraised of conditions and criteria established by the TI IIFIR Project emergency organization.
E.N.
79-5 Pg. 6-7 Jan. 29, 1979 Rev. A
- 10.5.6.4.2.2.2.
Pr otective equipment a,i supplies are maintained by respective emercency agreement organizations for the protection oi their personnel. Equipment described in 10.5.6.4.2.1 may be offered by TI for use to respond-inq agreement orc'anizations.
- 10.5.6.4.2.2.3.
The distribution of equipment and supplies is at the discretton of the aorcement organization director who in cognizant of recommendations from the llFIR Project Radioloqical Evaluations Team.
10.5.6.4.3.
Contamination Control Measures The control of contamination within the TI Attleboro site and offsite areas is described in this section.
Specific procedures and established contamination limits are maintained within the llPIR Project Health Physics Manual.
10.5.6.4.3.1.
TI Attleboro Site Protective actions taken onsite for controlling contamination are:
- 10.5.6.4.3.1.1.
The establishment of access control areas by the IIPEC in based upon alpha & beta / gamma contamination sur-vey information received from the llI'I R Project Radiological Evaluations Team (assisted by onsite agreement organizations).
Under the direction of the SEC, TI Attleboro Site Security (assisted by onsite agreement organizations) maintains personnel access to the established access control areas.
At the direction of the HPEC, contaminated waste receptacles are emplaced at strategic points within the access contro] area for the contr311ed d'isposal of suspected or proven contaminated waste.
10.5.6.4.3.1.2.
There are no commercial agricultural products produced on site.
10.5.6.4.3.1.3.
There are no public water supplies on site.
10.5.6.4.3.1.4.
Contamination levels established within the TI Attleboro IIealth Physics Manual define the contamin-ation limits for permitting the normal use of equipment, facilities, and supplies both within restricted access control areas and unrestricted access control areas.
These limits are the criteria for permitting return to normal use.
10.5.6.4.3.2.
Offsite Areas Protective actions taken offsite for controlling contamination are:
E.M.
79-5 P(;. 6-8 RCY' A
Jan. 12, 1979 10.5.6.4.3.2.1.
Access control areas are established by the Attleboro Civil Defense Agency and the Massachusetts Department of Ileal th Nuclear Incident Advisory Team with the advisement of the SEC.
- Acces, co n t rc> l is maintained by agreenent organization traffic and security personnel.
10.5.6.4.3.2.2.
Control of the distribution of affected commercial agricultural products is maintained by local and state authorities.
10.5.6.4.3.2.3.
Control of public water supplies is maintained by local and state authorities.
10.5.6.4.3.2.4.
Criteria for permitting return to normal use of equipment, facilities, supplies, and public thoroughfares is established by local and state authorities.
- 10.5.6.5.
Aid to Affected Personnel This section describes the measures that are used to provide emergency assistance to exposed and/or injured personnel.
The postulated accidents (as defined in Section 10.5.4.2.) provide the busis for exposure criteria of emergency personnel and assistance afforded to injured and/or exposed perscnnel.
10.5.6.5.1.
Emergency Personnel Exposure Criteria The source of radiation exposure to emergency personnel is limited to alpha & beta / gamma surface contamination and possible airborne uranium particulate.
Therefore, the criteria for exposure on entry or re-entry is that if there is the potential of an uncontrolled release of radioactive material, emergency personnel are required to wear protective clothing and hiqh efficiency particulate filtered respirators.
There are no circumstances requir-ing emergency personnel to volunteer to receive radiation exposures in the course of carrying out lifesaving activi-ties beyond those specified in NCRP Report No.
39, Jan. 15, 1971.
Emergency personnel providini first aid, decontam-s ina' i on, ambulance, or medical treatment are appraised of putential contamination hazards and equipment (clothing, sheets, respirators, etc.) are provided to minimize the hazard.
10.5.6.5.2.
Decontamination and First Aid
- 10. 5. 6. 5. 2.1.
Onsite facilities (shower rooms) and offsite facilities (Rhode Island Ilospital or other hospital agreement g
organization) have the capabilitics of providing personnel decontamanation.
E.N.
79-5 Pa. 6-9 Jan. 12, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.6.5.2.2.
?1 embers of the HI'IR Proj ect Security and/or IlFIR Project Safety Action Team are trained in first aid emergency treatment.
In addition, the TI Attleboro
?iedical IIcalth Center maintains a staff of qualified medical personnel.
10.5.6.5.3.
Medical Transportation 10.5.6.5.3.1.
Arrangements are maintained (City of Attleboro Fire Department Ambulance agreement organization) to provide transportation of injured personnel who may be contaminated.
10.5.6.5.3.2.
In the event the City of Attleboro Fire Department is unable to provide ambulance service, a TI owned vehicle provides emergency transportation.
10.5.6.5.3.3.
Injured persons with no contamination, localized, or controlled contamination (as defined in the HFIR Project Emergency Procedures) nay be transported by personal vehicle or commercial taxi.
10.5.6.5.4.
Medical Treatment Arrangements are maintained to assure that medical treatment and radiological evaluation facilities are available, prepared, and qualified to handle radio-logical emergencies.
These a r ra nc,emen t s exist with agreement hospitals and the United States Department of Energy-Brookhaven Radiological Assistance Program (see Section 10.5.10.1).
E.M.
79-5 Pg. 7-1 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. Is 10.5.7.
Emergency Pacilities and Equipment This section identifies and briefly describes the locations of facilities and equipment maintained in readiness or use for an emergency response.
- 10.5.7.1.
Pmergency Control Centers The location of the TI Attleboro Site Emergency Control center is adequately removed from the source of an uncontrolled radioactive release at the llPIR Project Pacility (1000 feet) such that no provisions are made for an alternate control center location oncite or offsite.
The prevailing wind direction is of no consequence to emergency control center evacuation routes 10.5.7.2.
Communications Systems Onsite and offsite radio communications systems utilized among emergency teams and organizatic.., are either battery powered or have auxilary geierator systems.
Onsite and offsite communications systems are used routinely and maintained in a constant state of readiness.
In addition to radio communications among onsite and loca l of f site emergency response groups, dedicated emergency telephone links are maintained between the TI Attleboro Site Emergency Control Center and local offsi.te emergency response organizations.
These systems are briefly described in Section 10.5.5.
10.5.7.3.
Assessment Facilities Instrumentation or monitoring systems and laboratory facilities used to initiate emergency measures and to provide continuing assessments are included in this section for onsite and offsite locations as cpplicable.
10.5.7.3.1.
Onsite S.
' ems and Equipment 10.5.7.3.1.1.
Ilyd ro lor;i c and seismic geophysical phenomena are inconsequential to the IIFIR Project Puel Fabrication Pacility and no such monitors are utilized.
Meteoro-logical phenomena are considered inconsequential la the uncontrolled release of radioactive material by the postulated accident.
The monitoring systems utilized are the U.S.
Department of Commerce h'eather Bureau notification system and primary observance of conditions by TI Attleboro emergency response organizations.
Information received from these sources is used to initiate an emergency alert and provide continuing assessment of emergencies in progress.
E. II.
79-5 Pg. 7-3 Feb.
],
1979 Rev. A
- 10.5.7.3.2.2.
t;o radiological monitors are located offsite for the purpose of initiating an emergency alert or condition.
Portable alpha and beta / gamma survey instrumentatien is used during site emergen-cies for the purpose of radiological monitoring to maintain continuing assessment information used to ini time emergency measures.
10.5.7.3.2.3.
Offsite assessment facilities are available through agreement organizations and are specified accordingly as follows:
- 10.5.7.3.2.3.1.
Rhede Island Hospital provides emergency medical and decontamination treatments of contaminated ambulatory patients, and provides continuing assessment of medical patients, and provides continuing assessment of medical condition of decontaminated patients.
10.5.7.3.2.3.2.
Bolton
& Diffley or other agreement organizations provide emergency bioassay analyses for radio-bi, logical assessments.
10.5.7.3.2.3.3.
RAI -E rookhaven provides all necessary assistance and assessments of radiological hazards (environmental anc biological) and advisement of corrective emtrgency and recovery actions.
10.5.7.3.2.3.4.
Massachusetts I;IAT provi2es all necessary assistance and assessment of radio 2.ogical hazards (environ-mental and biological) and advisement of emergency and recovery actions.
10.5.7.3.2.3.5.
h'EAC provides emergency whole body counting of decontaminated personnel for the purpose of radio-biological assessments.
10.5.7.4.
Protective Facilities and Equipment Two primary assembly stations are designated for evacuating personnel.
These assembly stations are utilized for all emergencies requiring evacuation from Building 10 as points of muster for personnel accounta-bility, information screening, monitori.ng, and subsequent instructions (relocation, assistance, etc.).
The features of the assembly stations and the supplies available are:
E.N.
79-5 Pg. 7-4 Feb.
1, 19~19 Rev. A
- 10.5.7.4.1.
Assembly station #1 is located approximately 500 feet fron. the IIF I R Project within the Building 10 Annex which is referred to as the s i l o ".
The " silo" is a
closed metal structure affording shelter from potential fallout.
The site Securit; provides mobile two-way communications with the TI Attleboro Site Emergency Control Center.
Protective clothing, respirators, and radiation survey instruments are available in the emergency equipment cabinet out-side the IIFIR Project area.
Emergency lighting is available within the "stlo" and portable lighting is provided by TI Attleboro Site Security.
10.5.7.4.2.
Assembly station h2 is remotely located in Building 5 approximately 750 feet from the IIF I R Project.
Building 5 is a closed r.e t a l structure affording shelte: from potential fallout.
- 0 emergenci supplies are available at this location other than those dispatched by emergency response personnel.
The building structure and distance from the source of a llPIR Project emergency afford ample protection from the postulated emergencies.
10.5.7.5.
First Aid and Medical Pacilities The TI Attleboro Medical IIealth Center is located in Building 1 and is staffed by a licensed medical doctor and medical ;upport personnel.
The medical center is an industrial medical facility with emergency response capabilities.
10.5.7.6.
Damage Control Equipment and Supplies The TI Attleboro Facilities organization maintains typical industrial onsite damage control b3 utilizing onsite -'aintenance personnel, equipment, and supplies (maintained within TI Attleboro equipment stores facilities).
E.N.
79-5 Pg. 8-2 l'eb.
1, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.8.1.1.2.
h)
TI Attleboro Emergency Communications (cont) i)
Search and Rescue Team ji Building 10 Emergency Team Annual (pla or minus sl:
weeks) retraining is conducted to review liFIR Project implementing procedures and to maintain emergency response proficiency of personnel assigned functional responsibilities.
10.5.8.1.1.3.
Local agreement organizations (e.g. City of Isttleboro Fire cad Police Departments, Attleboro Civil Defense, and Rhode Irland liospital) initial training consists of familiarization with the Tl Attleboro emergency organizations, special emphasis of hazards, concerns, and the coordina-tion of efforts to minimize the consequences of an emergency (c.si. cooperation in controlling contamin ation boundaries with personnel and equipment, etc.).
Pre-established communications links and notification procedures are reviewed in detail.
Annual (plus or minus si:
weeks) refresher information is provided by TI to review contamination control measures, communications links, notification procedures, and special hazards concerns.
10.5.8.1.2.
Drills and Exercises Annual (plus or minus six weeks) drills and exercises will be conducted to involve the onsite emergency organizations in simulated accident situations developed in accordance with S ite or Emergency scenarios.
Offsite (local and state) agreement oraanizations are notified of intended drills and are invited to participate.
These organizations are encouraged to participate in the communications and notifications procedures of the emergency response drills.
Monitoring of drills or exercises is accomplished by persons designated by the IIFIR Project emergency coordinator to observe the effectiveness of the emergency response.
Post drill critiques from individual emergency response teams and organizations are provided to the IIFIR Project emergency coordinator designee for assimilation into a final critique which is distributed to emergency response teams and organizations.
The final critique will include any recommendation for changes in the overall emergency response process.
After the emergency response teams and organizations have reviewed the final critique and resolved any recommend-ations, recommended procedural or action plans,
F.. !!. 79-5 Pg 8-4 Jan. 12, 1979 Rev. A
- 10.5.8.3.
Emergency Equipment and Supplies The operational readiness of all items of emeroency equipnent and supplies is r.-ovided Ir/ frequent opera-tional testing, calibration, and exanination by IIPIR Project NS.
Emergency equipment (clectrical instrumentation) is operationally tested and calibrated quarterly.
Emerger:cy suppl ies are verified quarterly to be availallo for use.
E.N.
79-5 pg, 9_1 Jan. 12, 1979 Rev. j\\
10.5.9.
Recovery The general plans for restoring the IIP I R Project and surrounding areas to a safe status are-10.5.9.1.
Maintain contamination controlled restricted access l>ounlaries which are consistent with criteria established within the llF I R P ro j e c t.
1:me rsp'ncy Procedur es Manual.
10.5.9.2.
Establish means for minimizing spread of contamination (e.g. possible area coverage, coating, solidifying, etc.).
10.5.9.3.
Decontaminate areas (e.g. washing, contaminated soil and debris removal into sealed containers) under controlled supervision and radiological monitoring.
10.5.9.1.
Total recovery of the llFIR Project ar.d the re-entry of personnel for re ;um :t ion o f o,n rat ions is based upon the IIF T R l' ro j ec t lica]th Phy;ien Prouram.
The basen of these l im i t: s are 10 C1' R Part 20 and license conditions of the
!!ealth Physics Program.
E. !J.
79-5 Jan. 29, 1979 Rev. /s 10.5.10.l.1.-2 S um:: a ry o f E::i s tinct Plans or Rervices Rendered The City of Attleboro Pire Department functions under a broad mandate requiring a general plan c
actions and notification sequences.
As such, they provide professional firefighting and ambulance service with augmentation from sur-rounding municipalities participating in a Mutual Aid Pact.
There are no conditions or exceptions that needed ambulance services would not be provided to in-state hospital facilities used by TI for emergency atsintance 4
e 10.5.10.1.7.-l Letter of Agreement From:
- A DEPAR U.*E NT OF HE ALTH. f ~l)UCATION. AND '/'E LF AR E
', TQ nMn tC Ut Al iH CE HVICE FOOD AND DHUC ADM WST H ATION j
.b' 7,,, ~ /
E.N.
79-5
.did*
Jan. 29, 1979 Rev. A VrtNCH[ S T E H [ N.ilNL E RING AND AN A LN TIC A L CE N T L H I(*6 u d t. f t' N S T H f t' T v i N C u t t.T t H. M ASS A C H US L TT S 01890 January 22, 1979 Ti 't"HoNc: si7720 >700 Toxas Instruments, Inc.
HFIR Project Mail S top 10-17 34 Forest Street Attlaboro, Massachusetts 02703 Attention:
Manager, Nuclear Safety Direct arrangenents with a private organization for use of the in vivo whole-body counter at '..'EAC cannot be undertaken acept for so~e research studies.
It would t'e available upon reques t. to the Massachusetts Departa.ent of Public liealth for radiation emergency situations thcugh our participation in their Nu. lear Incident Advisory Team.
If we can be of cny further assistance, please centact me.
Sincerely yours,
/[th',i', O ). L,.
i
- ?,j:
. s :m u t nc
- v "eil A. Gaeta Heal th Physicist
E.N.
79-5 Jan. 29, 1979 Rev. A 10.5.10.l.7.-2 Summary of Existino Plans or Services Rendered Services rendered are provided by letter of agreement with the Massachusetts I]epartment of Public llealth nuclear Incident Advisory Team and include necessary in vivo whole-body counting.
- 10.5.10.1.8.-l I,etter of Agreement From:
F V-
^
MURRAY M.
f3 O LT O N, JR.
E.N. 79-5
' o?n u t ti,:q A,.<,li :l:vi:i s t
-,Gde ll u s.ouvi -i s t 39y9 Re s<denc e 40oM 2011 23a 76 Copty RoaJ 71 MASSACHUSETTS A V f. ft U E f pse.O*. Mass. 019)G C\\MGHIDGE.
M A S S.
02139 3 % 3825 Tti
?bl-21U0 January 5, 1979 Tc::a s Instruments, Inc.
ll.r. l.it.
Project, !!/ S 17 3 !. Torrest ';t ree t Attleboro, !!a m.. 02703 Attention: !!anar,er ::nclear Sa f e ty Thin in to confirn a te' phone convernation on October 9, 1973 between fir. K. l'opper of Texan Instronents acd nvnelf.
1 inf orned !!r. liooper that I an a ';taff renber of the !!.I.T. "adiation Protection office and an nuch I have consultinr, privilen,es. I have availabic to ne laf.oratorv facilitien and a whole body counter and could be able to per f orn b io-:t nna yn eind /or in-v ivo non i t o r i nc..
An you are aware, I an presently performinp. uranium analynir, on urine specimenn that are routinely nubnitted by Texas Instrunent pernonnel.
Please call ne if I can be of further service.
/ wu,sfo 1 /lrLY i
Itu r ra yj'l. Ho l,t on,Jr.
Con m;l t a n t i
E.N.
79-5 Jan. 12, 1979 Rev. O 10.5.10.1.8.-2 S u n'na ry of Existinr; Plans or Servicen Rendered As per letter of T Ir. Murray M.
I3ol ton,
Jr.,
Mr. Ilo l ton o f 130 l to n T.
Difflev I.aboratory Services will provide the necessary bio-amiay and in-vivo monitoring of personnel on an emergency basis.
E.N.
79-5 Jan. 12, 1979 Rev. O 10.5.10.1.9.-l Letter of Aqreement from Rouer h'illians General lio n p i ta l As per phone conversation (January 8, 1979) between the Director of Radiological Physics and "r.
Calvin M.
Iloppe r (TT IIP I R Projeet), Roger Wi11iams Genera 1 flospita1 could provide a letter of aareement to TI !! PIE Pro ject upon pro:' r req u e '; t.
The following letter of January 9,
- 1979,
- i. s the letter of r e q u e <; t.
A follow-up telephone conversation between Mr. Milliam Hoventine and ?r. Calvin ?.
!!o ppe r (January 22, 1979) indicated that a letter of agreement is to be forthcoming by the end of February 1979.
The agreement letter will be provided to ::RC Licenainq for incorporation into the Emergency Plan following receipt by T.I.
_i. i. s,s
~l 10.5.10.1.9.-2
(
E.N.
79-5 3"".
12, 1979 TEXAS IN STRU M ENTS Rev. O i N C O 11 l'O lt A T I'.1)
M ATERI ALS & ELECTHiC AL PRODUCTS GHoUP January 9, 1979 Mr. W i l li a:n Rotantine Director of Radiologteal Physics Roger Hil1ia:sn General !!onn i ta l 375 Chalkstone Avenne Providence, RI 02908
Dear S i :
"'h i s letter cetver to conf 1:
eur ohone coacersation today related to our request for energency t reat ment of personnel c':!'osed to
- idents Taving r ad ic. l og i ca l consequences.
In addition, i it formally requested that Ro g e r ',,' 1 1 1 i a m i General IIospital en ter into s u cil an agreement with the liF I R Project o f Te:.
Instruments incorporated in Attlebaro,
a t ;achusetts.
Such an a c r e e.n e n t ux ld proitue alte at' oc perhaps overflow services to those provided by Rhode Islana !!asal tal.
Enclosed is a copy of our agreement with Rhode I n l an<i llospital which you may find useful regarding the content of such n
a y 1 e el' e n t.
J As mentioned in our phone conversation, 'te are under pressure to obtain alternate services ':ior to February 1,
1979.
Any help you ray provide in meetine this deadline will be greatly appreciated.
Any such agreenent should be addresseu to:
T4:xas Instrunents Incorporated I!!'I R Project,
S 10-17 31 Foreut Street Attleboro, i t's 02703 Attn s'.g r. Nuclear Safety Any further information, meetings, or tours which you deem useful in completing an agreenont will be provided you upon request.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely, f
n L t%,,:n p {.
,~
,,,!, /f 6)tjl'r
/j Calvin M.
Iloppet Manager of Nuclear Safety
/ck Enclosure a T T L F t1090. M A $$ 4C H US E T T S C2 703 e T.: L E P H O N r. -. 617 222-2020 e C A ULC. T ExlNS
1 A
10.5.10.1.10.-1 tetter or agreement rrom:
the
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HOSPITAL.
SAN DWI C H STREET, P LY M O U T H, M AS SAC H U S E T T S 02360 i TELEPHONE '6171 746-2000 i RELM AN BOY N TON, Preudent W At T L R A. S TR AUCH, Adminatrator January 25, 1979 E.N.
79-5 Feb.
2, 1979 Rev. O Mr. Calvin M. Hopper Manager, Nuclear Safety Texas Instruments Incorporated hFIR Project, M/S 10-17 34 Forest Street Attleboro, MA 0?703 Dear Mr. Hopper The Jordan Hospital hereby agrees to enter into a formal agreement with Texas Instruments to accept and provide medical services to any victims con-taminated by radiation at your plant.
For our mutual protection, and to provide the best possible service to radiated victims transferred to us, we ask that you carry out the following procedure:
1.
Nutify The Jordan Hospital Emergency De,1artment supervisor as soon as a possibility exists that victims are to be transferred to The Jordan Hospital (617 - 746-2000, extension 311 or 312).
2.
Decontaminate any victims as thoroughly as possible.
Clothing should be removed, if possible, and retained at the Texas Instru, ents plant for later exanination.
3.
Victims should be brought to the ER entrance of f San iwich Street (see enclosed diagram).
The Jordan Hospital reserves the right to cancel this agreement should any conditions at eithe, institution change significantly (i.e., changes in location, changes in safety practices and procedures, changes in the type (s) of radioactive material handled, etc.).
The altering party is obligated to notify the other party as to the changes.
Otherwise, this agreenent is void.
If this agreement is acceptable to Texas Instrurrents, please sign and return one copy of this letter to Mr. Peter A. Chapman, Assistant Administrator, The Jordan Hospital, Sandwich Street, Plymouth, MA 02360.
b e
10.5.10.1.10.-2 Letter of Agreement Calvin M. liopper Page 2 If we can be of further assistance or provide additional information, please feel free to call on us.
Sincerely,
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/"o..,u' Peter A7diapman
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Assis tant Adminis trator Q / ) W / (- l -
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Dalter A. Strauch Administrator L
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-0 Robert Olson, M.D.
President, Medical Staff
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ArthuF Gornan, M.D.
Chief, Emergency Room Services PAC /seg Enclosure z
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E.N.
79-5 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. C 10.5.10.1.10-4 Summary of Existing Plans or Services Rendered The emergency plan of the Jordan IIospital provides for the interfacing with the TI Attleboro IIFIR Project Emergency Organization for the medical treatment and decontamination of personnel.
The plan describes the staff, communications, facilities, equipment, and procedures used for these purposes.
E.N.
79-5 Pg. 10-2 Feb.
1, 1979 Rev. A
- 10.5.10.2.
Dose Determinations for the Postulated Criticality The postulated incident with ma:<imum of f site radio-logical consequences is a criticality.
A time-distance-done plot is not necessary for the postulated incident since the nature of the incident presents minimal radiation hazard to the public or emergency personnel.
The following is the assessment of a postulated criticality incident and the offsite dose determina-tions incurred from such an incident.
e 10.5.10.2.1.
Criticality Each phase of operations within the Attleboro fuel fabrication facility has been evaluated with respect to nuclear criticality safety.
Results of this study indicate that it is not possible to incur a criticality due to accidental failure of no less than three independent and concurrent controls imposed by operational procedures and storage conditions.
However, to assess the adequacy of the facility, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Guide 3.34 2 requires that a criticality be assumed to occur and the resulting environmental impact be evaluated.
Therefore, for the purpose of fulfilling this requirement, a criticality is assumed to occur.
The fabrication of material testing reactor fuel elements into nearly optimum dispersed fuel physical configurations for criticality within water defines the basis for a postulated nuclear criticality excursion.
As such, it is assumed that fuel elements are optimum 1y grouped in water with an assembly rate to cause the maximum prompt radiation and maximum subsequent fission product release.
3 has demonstrated that there is a Experimental evidence destructive threshold effect for MTR fuel elements similar to 4
those available in the IIFIR Proj ect.
The destructive threshold establishes the maximum fission product and prompt radiation release.
The maximum energy release reported by experiments was determined to be approximately 31 megawatt-seconds with an associated four percent fission product release.
The postulated criticality assumed for the assessment of environmental impact is, therefore, a 1x 1018 total fission yield with a four percent fission product release.
10.5.10.2.2.
Maximum Dose to the Nearest Resident The surrounding population which would be exposed is as described in section 4.1.1. with the addition of a nearest industrial facility located 135 meters from the fuel fabrication building.
Gamma and neutron doses resulting from the prompt burst were calculated using equations presented in Regulatory Guide 3.34, section c.3.a.
Conservatively, neglecting any shielding from surrounding structures (approximately 8 inches of brick with concrete) the prompt gamma and neutron doses at the nearest industry are estimated to be 0.73 rem and 1.9 rem, respectively, and at the nearest resident are 0.060 rem and 0.127 : m.
Exposures resulting from the airborne release of fission products were calculated using the assumptions provided in Regulatory Guide 3.34.
It is assumed that 45 of the fission products listed in Table 1 of the Guide resulting from the 0.5 second initial burst were immediateli released at ground level.
&(
- 'e a
No credit was assumed for in plant holdup (afforded by 4.7 air changes per hour within the 7584 cubic meter HFIR Project Facility), filtration systems, building wake, or decay or deposition in transit.
Accident meteorology employed, 0-8 hours, was taken from figures 3A and 3B of the guide.
Doses to individuals are presented in Table 1.
External whole body gamma and beta skin doses were calculatea ucing the infinito cloud methodology presented in R.G.
3.3,.
Gamma and beta energies were taken from reference 4.
The thyroid dose from radioactive iodine is the critical inhalation pathway.
Dose conversion factors for radioiodine were taken from Regulatory Guide 1.109(5) 1 Assumptions Used for Evaluatino the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors.
U.S.
Regulatory Guido 1.4, Rev.
2, June 1974.
" Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of Accidental Nuclear Criticality in a Uranium Fuel Fabrication Plant, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Guide 3.34 (for comment), April 1977.
3W.E.
- Nyer, G.O.
- Bright, R.J.
McWhorter " Reactor Excursion Behavior",
Proceedings of the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Users of Atomic Energy, paper 283, Geneva 1964.
4 C.M.
- Lederer, J.M.
Hollander, I.
Perlman, Table of Isotopes, 6th edition, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of CaliTornia, Berkley, CA.
5 Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Eftluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CPR 50, Appendix I,
U.S.
Regulatory Guide 1.109, Rev.
1, October 1977.
4
D' s.h TABLE 10.5.10.2.
Estimated Exposures to Individuals Following the Postulated Criticality Thriod Total Body Skin Beta Inhalation Location Gamma (Rem)
(Rem)
(Rem)
Nearest Industry 2.77 4.3 2.4 Nearest Resident 0.32 0.49 0.28
-3 Attleboro 5.1 x 10 8 x 10
~
4.4 x 10
./
,,.1 E.N.
79-5 Pg. 10-5 Jan. 12, 1979 Rev. A
- 10.5.10.S.
Listino by General Cateoorv of Articles Maintained for l'morgency Purposes 10.5.10.5.1.
Emergency Kits 10.5.10.5.1.1.
First Aid Medical Kit 10.5.10.5.1.2.
Acid Burn Medical Kit 10.5.10.5.2.
Protective Equipment 10.5.10.5.2.1.
Personnel High Efficiency Particulate Air Filter Respirators.
10.5.10.5.2.2.
Environmental Monitoring Equipment (i.e.,
Air Sampling and Alpha Surface Contamination Monitoring Eq u i pme n t )
10.5.10.5.3.
Supolies 10.5.10.5.3.1.
Protective Clothing 10.5.10.5.3.2.
Contamination Control Supplies (e.g.,
Cloth and/or Plastic Sheetino, Tape, Labels, etc.)
10.5.10.5.3.3.
HFIR Project Emergency Procedures.
10.5.10.5.3.4.
Powered Megaphone 10.5.10 5.3.5.
Emergency Documentation Supplies (e.g.,
Radiological Survey Sheets, Paper, Pencil, etc.)
10.5.10.5.3.6.
Emergency Article Check List 10.5.10.5.3.7.
Instructions for Use of Emergency Kits, Protective Equipment, and Supplies
,