ML19284A492
| ML19284A492 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001113 |
| Issue date: | 12/20/1978 |
| From: | Potter J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19284A490 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1113-78-23, NUDOCS 7903060622 | |
| Download: ML19284A492 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES o
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11
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Report No..
70-1113/78-23 Docket No.
70-1113 License No..
SNM-1097 Licensee: General Electric Company Post Office Box 780 Wilmington, North Carolina 28401 Facility Name:
Wilmington Nuclear Fuel Facility Inspection at:
Wilmington, North Carolina Inspection conducted:
December 5-8, 1978 Inspector:
- 1. '.. Kahle Reviewed,by;M((df/
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g'l.P. Potter, Chief Date '
f Fuel Facilities and Materials Safety Section Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on December 5-8, 1978 (Report No. 70-1113/78-23)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of facility changes and modifications, internal review and audit and non-routine events.
Results:
Of the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations ware identified in two areas. One apparent item of noncom-pliance was identified in one area, (78-23-01), failure to operate the vaporization equipment in accordance with the established operating instructions, paragraph 4.h(1)(a).
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Report No.
70-1113/78-23 Docket No.-
70-1113 License No.:
SNM-1097 Licensee: General Electric Company Post Office Box 780 Wilmington, North Carolina 28401 Facility Name: Wilmington Nuclear Fuel Facility Inspection at: Wilmington, North Carolina Inspection conducted: December 5-8, 1978 Inspector:
J. B. Kahle Reviewed by:
J. P. Potter, Chief Date Fuel Facilities and Materials Safety Section Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on December 5-8, 1978 (Report No. 70-1113/78-23)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of facility changes and modifications, internal review and audit and non-routine events.
Results: Of the three areas inspected, ne apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in two areas.
One apparent item of noncom-pliance was identified in one area, (78-23-01), failure to operate the vaporization equipment in accordance with the established operating instructions, paragraph 4.h(1)(a).
RII Report No. 70-1113/78-23 DETAILS Prepared by:
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J.B.Kahle,FglFacilities Inspector att Fuel Facilitief and Materials Safety Branch Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch Dates of Inspection:
December 5-8, 1978 Reviewed by:
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' ' Fuel Facilities and Materials Safety Section Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch 1.
Persons Contactet!
- L. A. Sheely, Quality Assurance Acting Manager
- W. T. Ross, Fuel Manufacturing Operation Acting Manager
- L. N. Grossman, Fuel Process Technology Acting Manager
- D. A. Domey, Planning and Projects Acting Manager
- C. E. Cliche, Fuel Fabrication Operation Manager
- L. G. MacArthur, Manufacturing Accounting Manager
- G. W. McKenzie, Fuel Manufacturing Engineering Manager
- B. F. Bentley, Chemical Fuel Operation Manager
- C. A. Risley, Fuel Cycle Procurement Manager
- W. J. Hendry, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- A. L. Kaplan, Licensing and Compliance Audits Manager
- G. E. Powers, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer
- J. A. Mohrbacker, Nuclear Safety Engineering Manager
- W. C. Peters, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer
- J. T. Taylor, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer
- S. J. Menendez, Nuclear Safety Engineer
- G. M. Bowman, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer
- W. B. Haverty, Compliance Auditor
- G. L. Finders, Compliance Auditor J. A. Larson, Employee and Community Relations Manager G. E. Green, Finance Manager (Acting Plant Manager)
E. A. Lees, Regulatory Assurance Manager J. E. Bergman, Fuels Manufacturing Operation Manager J. A. Long, Equipment Manufacturing Opetation Manager G. R. Mallet, Nuclear Materials Management Supervisor R. J. Owens, Powder Production Acting Manager A. G. Dada, Chemical Technology Manager
RII Report No. 70-1113/78-23 2
S. W. Dale, Chemical Manufacturing Engineering Manager B. J. Beane, HVAC Engineer F. D. Reynolds, Foreman D. C. Whaley, Radiation Safety Technician J. W. Miller, Senior Facilities Engineer J. E. Padgett, Operator L. R. Ilutchison, Operator R. M. Carter, Operator J. N. Smith, Operator J. D. Young, Daniel Construction Company G. Merritt, Daniel Construction Company The inspector also interviewed eight other operators and maintenance personnel.
- Denotes those present at the Exit Interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected during this inspection.
3.
Unresolved items None.
4.
UF6 Release a.
Event and Immediate Response Action On Sunday, December 3, 1978, at approximately 12:55 p.m.,
there was a release of UF6 gas from the U16 to UO2 conversion process.
The release of gas occurred as a result of a flow of UF6 from the vaporization-hydrolysis piping through an open valve into an empty vaporization chamber.
Initially, the UF6 gas was discharged from the chamber through the chemical exhaust system; however, when the high efficiency particulate air (REPA) filters plugged, UF6 gas escaped into the vaporiza-tion work area.
Upon observation of v' 'te smoke (UO2F2) in the vaporization work area, the cheu _al conversion area was evacuated and the C02 " freeze out" system was activated.
Two operators donned Scott Air Packs, entered the vaporization work area and operated valves to stop the UF6 gas releast.
Rll Report No. 70-1113/78-23 3
b.
Release Effects and Response Actions (1) Contamination Control The UF6 gas escaped from the vaporization area (controlled area) into the UF6 cylinder dock area (uncontrolled area).
The outer roll up doors to the building were closed and wet towels, etc., were placed around the bottom of the doors to contain the release within the building.
The maintenance area roll up doors were opened to allow air from the cylinder dock area (uncontrolled area) to flow into the controlled area.
Control barriers were established for the contaminated area and clean up of the contamination spread into the uncontrolled area was accomplished within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
(2)
Personnel Treatment One individual who was working in the uncontrolled area near the UF6 cylinder dock area complained of nausea and a sore throat. He and four companion workers were sent to the local hospital and subsequently released without treatment being required.
The two individuals who entered the vaporization area and stopped the release experienced a stinging sensation on their lower legs.
They were treated by the plant physician for minor burns.
(3) Ventilation The chemical exhaust ventilation system contains two parallel banks of HEPA filters.
The system was switched to the unplugged bank of filters to return the vaporization area exhaust to a normal condition. Actions were initiated to replace the plugged HEPA filters with new filters.
c.
Press Release A news release was made to the local television station, WECT-TV, Channel 6, regarding the gas release.
A licensee representative stated that the release statement had been prepared, but was made after a station representative made an inquiry regarding an incident at the licensee's facility.
Discussions with licensee management revealed that the licensee has not established a firm plant policy regarding news releases pertaining to non-routine events such as plant evacuations,
Rll Report No. 70-1113/78-23 4
individuals taken to hospitals, etc., which could arouse media interest. Ilowever, they stated that their present position was that:
(1) They notify the NRC of incidents irrespective of regulatory reporting requirements.
(2) They were somewhat sensitive to blanket release of news items which would be subject to misinterpretation and misunderstanding.
(3) They want to be consistent with the commercial community regarding business related releases which would be considered newsworthy.
(4) They prepare news statements ahead of time in the event they receive an inquiry from the press or other news media.
They stated that this matter would be discussed with higher corporate officials for review and concurrence before a plant policy would be established.
d.
Personnel Exposures Urine samples were collected from individuals who were involved in the incident.
Preliminary review of the data indicated that personnel were not exposed to airborne concentrations of uranium in excess of the regulatory limits.
Complete review and examination of the urine data will be accomplished during routine inspections of internal exposure of personnel.
Airborne Activity e.
A review of preliminary air samp e data showed that the airborne concentrations of uranium in the areas adjacent to the vapori-zation area ranged from five to thirteen times the maximum permissible concentration (mpc) averaged over an eight hour period.
The data showed that the activity returned to normal levels during subsequent shifts.
High volume air samples collected outside the vaporization area soon af ter the release showed air concentrations to be less than the mpc.
A detailed examination of the air sampling data will be made during subsequent inspections.
4 RII Report No. 70-1113/78-23 5
f.
Environmental Release One of the plugged HEPA filters ruptured, resulting in a release of material from the chemical area sta.k.
Because of the quantity of material on the stack sample filter media, two weight determinations (by different methods) were made.
Also, two analytical determinaticas for the quantity of uranium on the filter media were made in the Cht_,et Laboratory.
Preliminary results indicated that the quantity of material discharged from the stack could have ranged from 1.5 to 4.5 kilograms of uranium, enriched to 1.7 percen't (25 to 75 grams U235).
Using the meteorological data and parameters for the weather conditions at the time of the release, the calculations indicated that the concentration of uranium at the site property boundary was below mpe values.
The licensee's calculation of the quantity released via the stack and concentrations of uranium discharged to the unrestricted areas will be examined during subsequent inspections.
g.
Immediate Corrective Actions (1) Accountability of Material Before vaporization operations were resumed, the chemical stack filters were changed. The scrubber solution was drained to the radweste tanks, the solids were removed and sent to REDCAP for recovery.
The ventilation ducting was inspected to assure there was no accumulation in the ducts before startup of the vaporization process.
The affected area was decontaminated.
(2)
Operation The vaporization operating procedures (PRODS) were reviewed for appropriateness and completeness.
Operators were instructed and cautioned about the proper position of valves for installation of cylinders, leak testing, vaporization-hydrolysis operation, nitrogen purging and removal of cylinders.
An extra operator was placed on duty to be present in the vaporization area during the vaporization process to monitor the correct position of valves and to take immediate corrective action in the event of a UF6 gas leak.
(3)
Investy t ' t ijg nn ir u
.gation team of managers and engineers was
.. p o c.
. < to conduct an investigation to de'. ermine the
RII Report No. 70-1113/78-23 6
cause, events and weaknesses which led to the release and to recommend corrective action to prevent a recurrence.
h.
Inspector Findings (1) Procedures (a) The operating procedure for the vaporization opera-tion, PROD No. 10.05, was examined.
Paragraph 3.2.9 of the Equipment Operating Instruc. tion requires that the main line block valve be closed upon completion of purging the piping with nitrogen when the pressure is insufficient to continue the vaporization-hydrolysis process.
Licensee representatives stated that the main line block valve was open for chamber B when the vaporization-hydrolysis process was started for a UF6 cylinder in chamber A.
This permitted the flcw of UF6 gas into chamber B, thus resulting in the release of UF6 to the chemical exhaust system and eventually into the vaporization room when the exhaust filters plugged.
Licensee representatives were informed that failure to follow the established operating procedures was identified as an item of noncompliance (78-23-01).
(b) The inspector noted that the valve nomenclature used in the operating procedures was not consistent.
The valve in question was referred to as the main line block valve, the main block valve, the UF6 panel block valve and "A" or "B" valve.
Some individuals referred to the valve as the Jamesbury valve.
- Also, it was noted that the UF6 cylinder valve was referred to as the "x" valve.
Licensee representatives stated that they had realized this discrepancy in their very recent review of the procedure (since the release) and that consistent nomenclature for valves would be used in the revision.
(c) The inspector stated that the method sheet portion of the PROD lacked detail or complete instructions and precautions regarding cylinder installation, pigtail connection, proper valve positioning for leak testing, vaporization-hydrolysis, proper valve positioning for nitrogen purging, disconnecting pigtail and removing cylinder.
Licensee representa-tives stated that the procedure was incomplete in some areas and the current revision was including more detail.
RII Report No. 70-1113/78-23 7
(d) The inspector inquired about the use of additional sequential check off steps for operators and the need for foreman's approval before carrying out the remaining steps of the procedures.
Licensee represen-tatives stated that this idea had been discussed, but a decision along these lines would not be made until after the results of the investigation were finalized.
(2) Controls (a) Licensee representatives stated that several consider-ations have been proposed regarding valving, valving controls, limit switches, manual controls, remote controls, etc., pertaining to the vaporization-hydrolysis process and how they would interface with the heating mechanism and the ventilation system.
They stated that an engineering evaluation would have to be completed before a decision would be made in this area.
(b) Licensee representatives stated that differential pressure sensor transmitting devices for the chemical stack HEPA filters were being installed with read out capabilities and alarms in the control room.
This will give the control room operator actification of any sudden pressure change across the chemical stack HEPA filters.
The inspector stated that the control gauge readings should be recorded periodical-ly or graph charts retained.
Also, the operators' response to alarms should be covered by written instructions.
5.
Internal Audits The inspector examined the audit report of the Wilmington Manufacturing Department by the Nuclear Safety and Safeguards Product and Quality Assurance Operation in San Jose, California.
Fifteen Corrective Action Requests (CAR's) were identified.
Documentation was available which gave the monthly status of the corrective action pertaining to each CAR.
The inspector examined six audit reports by the Licensing and Compliance Audits personnel.
Recommendations regard-ing items needing corrective actions were made.
Licensee represen-tatives stated that since this is a new audit function, a formalized syste.a for documentation pertaining to corrective action has not been established.
They stated that management was aware of the recommendations and corrective actions which were taken.
4 s
RII Report No. 70-1113/78-23 8
6.
Facility Changes and Modifications The inspector examined several nuclear criticality safety reviews of changes to equipment and facilities.
One change was of major significance to requi e review by the Wilmington Technological Safety Council.
It was verified from the records that nuclear safety request releases were made for completed changes.
7.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection on Friday, December 8, 1978, the inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1).
The scope and purpose of the inspection were discussed.
The findings pertaining to the UF6 release were discussed in detail.