ML19282B252
| ML19282B252 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/28/1979 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND PROGRAM ANALYSIS (MPA) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0524, NUREG-524, NUDOCS 7903120044 | |
| Download: ML19282B252 (51) | |
Text
NUREG4524 DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 1978 e nao
+[s A
q Office of Management Program and Analysis U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 % 3(z.cofy
Available from National Technical Information Service Springfield, Virginia 22161 Price: Printed Copy $5.25 ; Microfiche $3.00 The price of this document for requesters outside of the North American Continent can be obtained from the National Technical Infonnation Service.
NUREG4524 DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 1978 Manuscript Completed: January 1979 Date Published: January 1979 Office of Management Program and Analysis U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
j# "%c UNITED STATES y
ym S
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y [. +. (*
g WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
- . r 8
January 31, 1979
%..j y
SV OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN The Honorable Thomas Bevill, Chairman Subcommittee on Public Works Committee on Appropriations United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chaiman:
Public Law 95-601 directs the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to forward to the Congress a report on the Commission's domestic safegeirds program. We are pleased to forward the enclosed report entitled "NRC Annual Report on Domestic Safeguards (Fiscal Year 1978)".
The Congress specifically asked that the annual report include an assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of safeguards at facilities and activities licensed by the Commission.
To this end, the report details NRC's criteria for judging the adequacy of safeguards at fuel cycle facilities; the report also summarizes actions required by NRC at any fuel facility whose safeguards systems are judged to provide less than high assurance protection against our design threat.
In addition, the report contains a discussion of NRC's criteria for safeguards adequacy at nuclear reactors and for transportation activities.
The process of preparing this report has been useful in focusing our attention on issues associated with the adequacy of domestic safeguards.
As a result, we have identified areas where our evolving safeguards regulatory policy needs improvement, and we have begun a systematic evaluation of these areas. We intend to implement any needed changes as soon as possible.
January 31, 1979 The Commission will continue to inform the Congress on all matters of safeguards significance.
inc_erely, s
CUL 44~JEwt_
Joseph M. Hendrie
' Chairman
Attachment:
NRC Annual Report to Congress on Domestic Safeguards (Fiscal Year 1978) cc: Rep. John Myers NOTE.:
Identical letters sent to: Mondale, O'Neill, Johnston/cc-Hatfield
t j; # "
UNITED STATES l
f,,,
., g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
I,.'g WASHINGTON D.C. 20555
- 'sc %
g j
% %.,/
January 31, 1979 OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN The Honorable Gary Hart, Chairman Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation Committee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Public Law 95-601 directs the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to forward to the Congress a report on the Commission's domestic safeguards program. We are pleased to forward the enclosed report entitled "NRC Annual Report on Domestic Safeguards (Fiscal Year 1978)". We are sending you, under separate cover, a classified appendix to the report.
The Congress specifically asked that the annual report include an assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of safeguards at facilities and activities licensed by the Commission.
To this end, the report
~
details NRC's criteria for judging the adequacy of safeguards at fuel cycle facilities; the report also summarizes actions required by NRC at any fuel facility whose safeguards systems are judged to j
provide less than high assurance protection against our design threat.
In addition, the report contains a discussion of NRC's criteria for safeguards adequacy at nuclear reactors and for transportation activities.
In preparing this report, it became clear that the various NRC offices with safeguards responsibilities have different approaches to safe-i guards regulation.
In particular, the definitions of and ways of determining safeguards adequacy are different for fuel cycle facilities, transportation, power reactors, and non-power reactors.
A " Task Force on Safeguards Policy" has been established by the ED0 to develop a single integrated approach to NRC safeguards regulation.
The Task Force should develop recommendations for the Commission which e
L J
...... _ _. _ _.. _ _ _ January 31, 1979 i
would achieve consistent policy in the following areas:
I 1.
Definition of safeguards adergacy, I
2.
Methods used to determine safeguards adequacy, 3.
Meaning and use of terms such as " reasonable" versus "high" y
assurance, i
4.
Levels of design threats against which safeguards must protect, and j
k 5.
Need for additional or revised rules.
We intend to implement any needed changes as soon as possible.
The Commission will continue to inform the Congress on all matters of safeguards significance.
Sincerely,
\\
s v
Joseph M. Hendrie Chairrran
Attachment:
NRC Annual Report to Congress on Domestic Safeguards (Fiscal Year 1978) cc: Sen. Alan Simpson NOTE:
Identical letters sent to: Dingell/cc-Brown, Udall/cc-Symms i
5 t
I
TABLE OF CONTENTS i
Page Introduction.
1 Scope of NRC Safeguards Activitics.....
1 How NRC Determines Safeguards Adequacy..................
2 Threat Considerations.
2 Safeguards Requirements..................
3 Assessments of Safeguards Adequacy.......
3 Safeguards Adequacy in FY 1978...........................
7 Fuel Cycle Facilities and Transportation Activities....
7 Power and Non-Power Reactors...
11 Safeguards Research and Technical Assistance..
13 Future Safeguards Programs...............
15 Organization and Management of Safeguards.
16 Appendices A.
Scope of NRC Safeguards Activities B.
Factors Associated with NRC's Assessment of Safeguards Adequacy C.
Safeguards Research and Technical Assistance D.
Future Safeguards Programs E.
Organization and Management for Safeguards F.
Glossary G.
Classified Appendix (Site-Specific Comprehensive Evaluation Results) 5 i
l NRC ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS (Fiscal Year 1978)
INTRODUCTION The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been directed by Congress (PL 95-601 amending Sec. 209 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974) to submit an annual report on NRC's domestic safeguards program.
The law directs the Executive Director for Operations (ED0) of NRC to:
".. prepare and forward to the Commission an annual report (for the fiscal year 1978 and each succeeding fiscal year) on the status of the Commission's programs concerning domestic safeguards matters, including an assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of safe-guards at facilities and activities licensed by the Commission.
The Commission shall forward to the Congress a report under this section prior to February 1, 1979 as a separate document, and prior to February 1 of each succeeding year as a separate chapter of the Commission's annual report (required under section 307 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974) following the fiscal year to which such report applies."
This report covers fiscal year 1978.
It focuses on the adequacy of domestic safeguards at facilities and activities licensed by NRC.
Discussions in the report cover:
the scope of NRC safeguards activities; how NRC determines safeguards adequacy; NRC safeguards adequacy in fiscal year 1978; NRC safeguards research and technical assistance; NRC future safeguards programs; and NRC organization and management for safeguards.
Separate appendices provide a detailed discussion for selected topics.
Scope of NRC Safeguards Activities NRC's safeguards responsibilities are set out in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.
Among other things, these Acts require NRC to regulate the safeguards of certain nuclear facilities and activities.
NRC safeguards regulatory programs share the common goal of assuring that licensed activities do not pose undue risk to the public health and safety and are not inimical to the common defense and security.
The NRC safeguards measures are designed to deter, prevent, and respond to (1) the unauthorized possession, theft, diversion or use of special nuclear material, and (2) sabotage of nuclear facilities.
In particular, safeguards far fuel cycle facilities emphasize protection against theft or diversion of strategic special nuclear material, while ;
safeguards for power reactors emphasize protection against industrial sabotage.
The NRC currently has safeguards regulatory control over 19 fuel cycle facilities which are authorized to possess formula quantities of highly enriched uranium or plutonium,1 transportation activities 2
involving formula quantities of highly enriched uranium or plutonium (about one shipment per month), 70 operating commercial power reactors, and 71 non power reactors.
A more detailed discussion of the scope of NRC safeguards activities is provided in Appendix A.
How NRC Determi'nes Safeguards Adequacy Safeguards at NRC-licensed facilities are in place to protect the public against significant risks associated with possible theft, diversion, or sabotage.
NRC considers safeguards " adequate" if they provide such protection.
Operational use of the term " adequacy" as applied to safe-guards at NRC-licensed facilities requires a more detailed description of:
1.
NRC's application of the hypothetical design threats and NRC's response to actual threats, should they occur.
2.
Safeguards requirements that NRC imposes on licensees.
3.
Methods NRC uses to assess the adequacy of licensee safeguards.
Threat Considerations.
Information available to NRC does not indicate the existence of a significant near-term threat of theft or diversion involving strategic special nuclear material, or sabotage.
NRC's continuing efforts to identify such threats are documented in Appendix B.
Nevertheless, NRC has developed the following hypothetical design threat:
3 1.
A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several persons assisted by an insider, and 2.
An internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in any position).
1Four additional fuel cycle facilities are authorized to possess more than one effective kilogram of low-enriched uranium and are therefore subject to safeguards material control and accounting requirements.
Those fuel cycle facilities involved in processing highly enriched uranium for the manufacture of fuel for the naval propulsion program possess nearly all of the highly enriched uranium at fuel cycle facilities.
2 Formula Quantity.
See Glossary (Appendix F). i
i 3
i This hypothetical design threat provides the basis for regulatory requirements that NRC imposes on licensees and provides criteria against i
which the adequacy of licensee safeguards are judged.3 The current threat characterization used tc NRC is essentially the same for power reactors,4 fuel cycle facilities and transportation activities involving strategic special nuclear material (SSNM).
Safeguards Requirements.
NRC imposes safeguards requirements on its licensees in two ways.
First, specific requirements, spelled out in NRC rules and license conditions, detail chose protection measures that NRC considers necessary for licensee safeguards.
Among other actions, i
NRC rules require each licensee to tubmit safeguards plans and a contingency plan that describe the licensee's site-specific implementa-tion of protection measures.
Second, weaknesses that become evident in NRC's routine inspections performed by regional inspectors or NRC's special comprehensive evaluations are corrected by enforcement actions or modification of site specific license conditions.
Assessments of Safeguards Adequacy.
NRC assesses safeguards adequacy at fuel cycle facilities through inspections and comprehensive evaluations.
Safeguards inspections are conducted by NRC safeguards inspectors based in four of the five NRC Regional Offices.
These inspections focus on the licensee's compliance with NRC requirements and the licensee's implementation of safeguards plans.
In addition to performing compliance-type inspections, inspectors also evaluate the effectiveness of licensee-implemented safeguard systems for potential weaknesses not covered by
.egulations.
Comprehensive evaluations of fuel cycle facilities are conducted by special teams of headquarters staff and regional inspectors.
i These evaluations are specifically intended to determine the capability i
of licensee safeguards to protect against the hypothetical design threat.
For each licensee, four separate evaluation teams look for external or internal weaknesses that would render a facility vulnerable to the hypothetical design threat (see Appendix B, pages B-7 to B-ll).
After an initial assessment of a fuel cycle facility, follow-on comprehensive evaluations may be conducted if a previous assessment is x
invalidated by a rule change, redefinition of the hypothetical design threat, detection of licensee weakness through an NRC inspection, or
=
other similar circumstances.
]
3NRC would take an appropriate response to evidence of actual threats.
NRC would notify a licensee of low level threats.
Should it receive i
evidence of threats considered more serious, NRC could request assistance from the FBI, other federal agencies, ari local law enforcement.
Licensees would be expected to institute such measures i
as deploying additional guard forces, curtailing operations, or i.
locking all SSNM in secure vaults.
4The level of protection required for non power reactor safeguards is currently under study.
3 9
mi d/
l r
i The comprehensive evaluation is essertially a two step process.
During the on-site portion of the evaluation, each team determines whether the facility has any emergency safeguards deficiencies that i
would make the facility so vulnerable to the hypothetical threat that continued operation of the facility would be inimical to the common defense and security or pose undue risk'to the public health and safety.
Such emergency safeguards deficiencies would be promptly reported by the teams to NRC management who would take immediate action to correct the deficiencies, employing whatever measures might be necessary.
Upon completion of the on-site assessments, members of the four teams and NRC management conduct a synthesis evaluation that considers the licensee's demonstrated capability to protect nuclear material, the state of safeguards system maintenance, and other safeguards-related factors.
The overall capability of the fuel cycle facility is then judged to provide high, good, fair, or poor assurance of protecting against the hypothetical design threat.
NRC recognizes that its evaluation of fuel cycle facility safeguards capabilities is somewhat imprecise and that licensee safeguards capabilities can change over time.
NRC's assessment that a facility provides a given level of protection against the hypothetical threat does not guarantee:
(1) that the actual level of protection is not somewhat better or worse than the assessment indicates, or (2) that the currently assessed level of protection will continue indefinitely.
Licensee safeguards that are judged to provide high assurance protection against the hypothetical design threat are considered to possess the desired level of safeguards capability.
Licensee capabilit.ies judged good or fair can provide adequate safeguards for a limited period, but do not provide the measure of safeguards capability that NRC deems i
prudent.
Therefore, NRC may make license modifications and will conduct j
special follow-up inspections to assure that these licensees attain high i
assurance protection against the hypothetical threat.
NRC maintains confidence in its assessments by requiring facilities to achieve high assurance protection; by inspecting and evaluating safeguards with sufficient frequency, breadth, and depth; and by bringing a variety of individual and organization judgments to bear in the evaluation of
[
safeguards adequacy.
j i
If a licensee's safeguards are judged inadequate (or if NRC inspec-
[
tions identify particularly serious violations of safeguards requirements),
[
NRC will require immediate improvements to be made, if necessary, by major enforcement action against that licensee.
Major enforcement sanctions available to NRC include Civil Monetary Penalties and Orders.
Civil Monetary Penalties are currently limited to $5,000 per violation i
and $25,000 for all violations in a thirty-day period.5 NRC can impose SNRC has submitted to Congress a proposal to increase penalty limits i
to $100,000 per violation and $300,000 for all violations in a thirty-day period.
4 !
-.---..n I
Orders to modify, suspend, or revoke a license or to make a licensee
" cease and desist" from certain actions.
Licensee safeguards judged poor are not considered adequate for continued plant operation.
In such cases, NRC would require that operations be stopped unless the observed deficiencies can be immediately corrected.
Licensee safeguards judged fair are considered adequate to permit continued operation only if the observed deficiencies do not pose i
an undue risk to the public health and safety or common defense and security during the short term required for their correction.
NRC monitors safeguards adequacy of SSNM transportation activities through its licensing and inspection processes.
NRC regulatory responsi-bilities for transportation include all domestic shipments and the domestic segments of import and export shipments (including all storage and transfer points) for formula quantities of SSNM.
Shipments of government owned SSNM using DOE couriers are a DOE responsibility and are not regulated by NRC.
Shipments are required to be made with an armed escort on primary roads during daylight hours, if possible.
If a trip is scheduled to l
extend into the night, a second escort vehicle with two additional guards is required.
Transfers of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from vehicle to storage, from one vehicle to another, or from storage to vehicle, as well as storage of HEU, must be protected by at least four guards.
The guards are equipped with communications to local police and at least three of them must keep the shipment under continuous surveillance.
All HEU air shipments of more than 350 grams must be made in aircraft dedicated to cargo.
Significant quantities of highly enriched uranium being transferred to or from such aircraft (including periods while in storage) must be protected by at least four guards equipped with a l
capability for radio communications to either a local law enforcement agency or an air terminal guard force.
j Many other specific requirements, such as requirements for vehicle markings, scheduled check calls which report shipment status, 49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> of specialized security training with annual requalification for guards, and advance notification of shipments are contained in NRC regulations and license conditions.
NRC's contingency planning rule, which became effective in June 1978, requires that any licensee transporting highly enriched uraniun.
j develop and submit to NRC a contingency plan for responding to threats or attempted theft or sabotage which might occur while the shipment is in transit or at transfer points. All required transportation contingency plans have been received by the NRC.
i' during the entire period it is in transit.
Inspection activities cover NRC inspectors monitor each shipment of formula quantities of SSNM material control and accounting, physical protection, and health and i j'
J
y l
m p
m m
i safety.
The inspection activity seeks to assure that the licensee is making the shipment in full compliance with NRC regulations, license conditions, and the NRC approved security plan.
Transportation activities i
that are conducted in the manner described above are judged to provide adequate public protection.
NRC assesses the adequacy of safeguards at reactors through its licensing review and inspection programs.
As part of its licensing process, NRC examines the physical security measures proposed by the licensee in terms of each reactor's vulnerability, inherent protective features, and NRC's regulations.
The bases for this evaluation are:
a)
The facility's security plan b)
An on-site evaluation of site-specific factors influencing safeguards adequacy c)
An analysis of design and operation details from the Final Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).6 This evaluation is performed by a team of licensing staff and regional inspectors.
NRC provides the conclusions of the overall licensing evaluation for each reactor site in a Security Plan Evaluation Report (SPER), the safeguards plan approval document.
earlier)isscheduledtobeimplementedin1979gnthreat(discussed A new rule specifying the hypothetical desi At that time, safeguards for power reactors will be judged adequate if they protect against the hypothetical design threat with high assurance.
NRC will approve a reactor operating license when the licensee's security plan contains protective measures that NRC believes will provide this high assurance protection.
NRC inspections at reactors verify the implementation of the safe-guards provisions specified in the regulations, the facility security 6A discussion of facility design features influencing safeguards adequacy is given in Appendix B.
7As of the end of fiscal year 1978, NRC had scheduled a February 23, 1979 implementation of a new rule (10 CFR 73.55) that would require power reactor licensees to protect against the hypothetical design threat.
However, as of late January 1979, the Commission was considering a staff recommendation that would delay the implementation of certain parts of the rule (concerned with measures for protection against the " insider" threat) until May 23, 1979.
The specific measures recommended to be deferred are " pat down" searches, compartmentaliza-tion, and the "two-man" rule.
This delay would provide the Commission time to consider HearinD Board recommendations on the material access authorization program and its implications on these insider threat measures.
The staff believes that delay of these measures for this short period of time will not cause unwarranted safeguurds risk.
However, the matter has not been reviewed by the Commission.
-g-i m
n i
plan, and the SPER.
If an inspection identifies items of noncompliance, NRC imposes appropriate enforcement sanctions.
Inspections also assess the adequacy of the licensee safeguards.
NRC takes prompt action to correct inad2quacies identified in these assessments-either through the enforcement process or (if the inadequacies do not involve noncompliance with NRC requirements) through changes in the licensee's security plan.
The severity of reactor licensee noncompliance dictates the enforcement action taken.
Noncompliances that do not have a substantial potential for harming public health and safety and/or are readily correctable typically form the basis for lower enforcement sanctions, such as letter Notices of Violation.
For those that are more serious, more numerous, deliberate, persistent, or not compensated (by redundant safeguards or inherent pro-tective features of the reactor design), NRC will consider higher sanctions such as Civil Monetary Penalties and Orders (as described previously).
All nuclear power plants in the U.S., with one exception,8 are light water reactors that use low enriched fuel.
Safeguards at these power reactors are designed to protect against radiological sabotage, but do not address theft, because low enriched uranium fuel is not suitable for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices.
For non power reactors, present regulations require licensees to provide a security program and plan.
In lieu of establishing a hypothetical design threat for all non power reactor licensees, NRC establishes a required level of safeguards protection for each non power reactor commensurate with the safeguards risk posed by that reactor.
Facilities possessing more than formula quantities of SSNM represent a potential theft risk; those operating at relatively high power levels (above 100 Kw) for extended periods of time represent a potential sabotage risk.
However, few non power reactors fall into either of these two risk categories.
For most non power reactors, there is only a i
small risk of either theft or sabotage.
(NRC is currently re-evaluating the safeguards risk of non power reactors, as discussed on page 12 below).
A more detailed discussion of factors associated with NRC's assess-j ment of safeguards adequacy is provided in Appendix B.
i Safeguards Adequacy in FY 1978
~
Fuel Cycle Facilities and Transportation Activities.
In May 1977, NRC initiated a safeguards comprehensive evaluation program expressly designed to assess the adequacy of safeguards at fuel cycle facilities.
As part of this program NRC scheduled visits to 11 fuel cycle facilities.9 8NRC licentes a single high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR).
This reactor uses fuel consisting of a mixture of thorium and highly enriched uranium.
Additional safeguards measures are employed at this facility to protect against the theft of unirradiated fuel.
90nly 11 of the 19 fuel cycle facilities authorized to possess SSNM and currently operating possess formula quantities in an unirradiated form.
o
l i
During fiscal year 1977, NRC conducted on site evaluations at four fuel cycle facilities.
In fiscal year 1978, NRC conducted on-site assessments at five additional fuel cycle facilities.
The results of three of the evaluations conducted during fiscal 1977 have been forwarded to the Congress in detailed classified reports.
Reports on the other facility evaluations are in preparation and will be submitted to the Congress as they are completed.
A summary of completed evaluation results and a schedule of remaining evaluations are contained in classified Appendix G.
Of the four facilities evaluated during fiscal year 1977, none had emergency safeguards deficiencies.
One of these facilities provided high assurance protection against both the hypothetical threats of a single insider and a violent assault.
A second facility provided high assurance protection against the hypothetical insider threat and fair to good assurance protection against the hypothetical violent assault threat.
A third facility provided good assurance protection against the hypothetical insider threat and fair to good assurance protection against the hypothetical violent assault threat.
The fourth facility provided fair assurance protection against the hypothetical insider threat and good assurance protection against the hypothetical violent assault threat.
Subsequent improvements have been made at the second and third facilities to upgrade their capabilities against each threat to high assurance.
The fourth facility has ceased strategic special nuclear material production operations and is undergoing a cleanout and recovery operation.
Implementation of the new requirements at the second facility has been verified by a follow-up special inspection.10 A special inspection of the third facility is scheduled for early February 1979, when all of the licensee corrective actions are scheduled to be implemented.
NRC considers the safeguards adequate for the limited period required for these facilities to make corrections and achieve high assurance protection.
Since the synthesis evaluation process has not yet been completed for the five facilities whose on site assessmants were completed during fiscal year 1978, NRC cannot provide ratings for them at this time.
However, NRC did not observe emergency safeguards deficiencies at any of these facilities.
Therefore the evaluation reports are expected to judge safeguards at these five sites to be adequate.11 NRC will require 1 A more recent special safeguards review at the second facility raised questions as to whether the existing safeguards program still provided high assurance.
Although safeguards at this facility are still considered adequate, further upgrades of safeguards at this facility are under consideration.
11 Comprehensive evaluations for the remaining two (of the eleven) fuel cycle facilities will be completed in early fiscal year 1979.
Preliminary evaluation results have not revealed any emergency safe-guards deficiencies.
E
these licensees to make any improvements ?cessary to achieve high assurance capabilities against the hypothetical threat which provides the extra measure of safeguards capability that NRC deems prudent.
NRC will verify implementation of these requirements through follcw-up special inspections and NRC will forward both the safeguards comprehensive evaluation reports and the special inspection reports to the Congress.
NRC inspection and enforcement activities at fuel cycle facilities during fiscal year 1978 included more than 13,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of on-site safeguards inspections at the 14 fuel cycle facilities of primary interest.12 These inspections revealed 137 items of noncompliance with safeguards requirements.
(See Table 1 for more detail on inspection activities at fuel cycle facilities.) NRC did not impose major enforcement sanctions (i.e., Civil Penalties or Orders) on any of the 14 fuel cycle facilities in fiscal year 1978.
However, several plants were required to shut down for reinventory and NRC sent several Immediate Action Letters identifying additional measures to be taken by the licensees in both material control and ac. counting and physical protection.
Based on inspection results, NRC has judged that all licensees have responded satisfactorily to identified items of safeguards noncompliance.
However, one case involving possible falsification of guard training records at a fuel facility is currently under investigation.
During fiscal year 1978, inventory differences exceeding regulatory limits were experienced at three fuel cycle facilities.13 NRC examines inventory differences which exceed specific thresholds to try to determine the cause.
During fiscal year 1978, NRC examined inventory differences (which in some instances were associated with reinventory and plant shutdown) in conjunction with material control and physical security Based on these examinations, NRC did not identify any factual measures.
indication (other than the inventory differences, which are of themselves
}
inconclusive) that SSNM had been stolen or diverted in fiscal year 1978.
i In the area of transportation activities, eight shipments of formula quantities of licensed SSNM were made during fiscal year 1978.
All of them were inspected.
NRC detected no items of noncompliance, and all shipments were conducted without significant safeguards incident.
In September 1975, New York City passed a health ordinance virtually banning transportation of radioactive materials through the city.
Similarly, in Chicago there has been a de facto. suspension of air shipments of highly enriched uranium through O' Hare airport since December 1977 as a result of concerns expressed by the Major of Chicago on this matter.
12There are 14 fuel cycle facilities authorized to possess formula quantities of unirradiated SSNM in an unsealed configuration.
Starting in the fourth quarter of FY 1978 resident inspectors were deployed to fuel cycle facilities at Babcock & Wilcox Co., Apollo and Leechburg, PA and Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., Erwin, TN.
13NFS Erwin, B&W Apolla, and General Atomic. I
TABLE 1
SUMMARY
OF SAFEGUARDS INSPECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978* AT FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES Number of Number of Number of Percent of Strategic Fuel Facilities Safeguards Manhours of Items of Unannounced Inspections Inspection Onsite Noncompliance Inspections 1.
Babcock & Wilcox, Apollo, Pa.
25(2/23)**
1775(41/1734)**
17(0/17)**
52%
2.
Babcock & Wilcox, Leechburg, Pa.
21(5/16) 1204(158/1046) 10(1/9) 48%
3.
Babcock & Wilcox, LRC, Lynchburg, Va.***
4(2/2) 46(23/23) 1(0/1) 100%
4.
Babcock & Wilcox, NNFD, Lynchburg, Va.
14(5/9) 1177(673/504) 14(11/3) 93%
5.
Exxon Nuclear, Richland, Wa.***
5(2/3) 258(32/226) 0(0/0) 80%
6.
General Atomic, San Diego, Ca.
8(2/6) 825(112/713) 15(6/9) 80%
7.
General Electric, Vallecitos, Ca.
7(4/3) 457(175/282) 12(11/1) 100%
8.
Kerr McGee Nuclear, Crescent, Ok.***4(1/3) 62(42/20) 3(3/0) 100%
9.
Nuclea-Fuel Services, Erwin, Tn.
18(5/13) 3987(202/3785) 25(12/13) 33%
10.
Rockwell International, Canoga Park, Ca.
5(2/3) 377(105/272) 10(9/l) 100%
11.
Texas Instruments, North Attleboro, Ma.
10(4/6) 462(101/361) 6(5/1) 80%
12.
United Nuclear, Montville, Cn.
15(1/14) 1037(69/968) 15(6/9) 60%
13.
United Nuclear, Wood River Junction, RI.
17(4/13) 762(153/609) 6(0/6) 59%
14.
Westinghouse, PFDL, Cheswick, Pa.
14(2/12) 580(90/490) 3(3/0) 43%
TOTAL 167(41/126) 13,009(1,976/11,033) 137(67/70) 63%
The summary includes inspections conducted September 1.977 through October 1978.
- For numbers in parentheses, the first number refers to physical security irapection activities, and the second number refers to material control and accounting inspection activities.
- These facilities are either not operating or not holding formula quantities in unirradiated form.
_ -~
In April 1978, the Department of Transportation (DOT) ruled that the New York City effective ban on radioactive materials shipment was not preempted by Federal regulation under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act.
Since the ruling, several States and communities have ins'ituted requirements for permits or advance notice of shipments.
In its " Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes,' NUREG-0170, published in December l
1977, the NRC staff concluded that the risks were so low that all shipments by all modes could continue under this present regulatory system.
However, the NRC is now extending this work to look more closely at transportation of radioactive materials through urban environments.
In addition, NRC has referred to the Executive Branch for analysis the alternative of using military airfields for HEU shipments.
Power and Non power Reactors.
In 1977, NRC published new safeguards regulations for power reactors that include hypothetical design threat requirements.
As required by these regulations (10 CFR Part 73.55),
operating power reactor licensees submitted amended security plans detailing the physical security improvements that they proposed to meet the new requirements.
NRC formed eight teams to review and evaluate these security plans for 70 reactors at 55 sites.
Phase I of the review effort consisted of a review of the amended security plans, an onsite evaluation, and one or more meetings with the licensees to discuss any deficiencies of the plan.
This phase was completed in 1977.
The second phase of this review process involves the resolution of outstanding security plan issues and the development of Security Plan Evaluation Reports (SPERs) for each site; this phase was initiated in 1978.
The third phase, inspecting the implementation of Part 73.55, will follow in 1979.
These efforts are discussed further in Appendix B of this report.
As of the end of fiscal year 1978, NRC had completed the initial 3
review and onsite evaluations of all operating power reactors (Phase I).
By January 1, 1979, about half of the SPERs had been drafted and had j
been either completed or were under review; the remainder are scheduled l
to be completed early in 1979.
NRC expects that most (about 75%)
j licensees with operating power reactors will have implemented the l
physical security improvement portion of Part 73.55 by February 23, 1979.
For the remaining licensees, construction and installation schedules will extend beyond this deadline, and NRC will require that l
compensatory measures be in effect by February 23, 1979 to provide a level of physical security equivalent to the permanent measures planned by the licensee. With these interim mea 3ures, NRC expects that all operating power reactors will be capable of providing high assurance protection against the hypothetical external assault threat by February 23, 1979.
In fiscal year 1978, prior to implementation of Part 73.55, power reactor licensees were not required to protect against a specific hypothetical design threat, and NRC inspections did not assess licensee capabilities against such a threat.
Therefore, NRC did not evaluate the adequacy of power reactor safeguards in terms of providing :
protection against particular threats.
However, all power reactor licensees were in substantial compliance with existing require-ments during fiscal year 1978 and all licensees were responsive in correcting identified items of noncompliance.
By these standards, NRC judges the fiscal year 1978 power reactor safeguards adequate.
In addition, parts of the new rule (relating to physical security organization, access, communication, testing and maintenance, and respcnse) were fully implemented by all operating power reactor licensees during fiscal year 1978.
In fiscal year 1978, 71 non power reactors held operating licenses.
As discussed above, the adequacy of safeguards at non power reactors is evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Safeguards requirements for each non power reactor are commensurate with the safeguards risk arising from its operation.
Different requirements are e-tablished for reactors possessing Category I, Category II and Category III material; Table 2 shows the numbers of non power reactors using each of these materials.
TABLE 2 NON-POWER REACTORS CATEGORYt4 I
II III OTHER TOTALS Test Reactors 1
1 0
0 2
Critical Experiments 1
1 0
0 2
Research Reactors 1
32 24 10 67 TOTALS 3
34 24 10 71 In fiscal year 1978, NRC continued its evaluation of non power reactor safeguard risk arising from potential theft and sabotage.
Preliminary results of this evaluation indicate that:
1)
The potential for endangering the health and safety of the public by a release of radioactivity due to sabotage of a non power facility exists only at a small number of reactors which can be operated at relatively high power levels.
NRC is continuing to investigate the level of risk in actual operating conditions.
2)
Only three licensees actually possess an inventory of unirradiated strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) in excess of a formula quantity, and these facilities have implemented the protective measures against theft specified in their approved security plans.
14 Categories I, II, and III.
See Glossary (Appendix F).
"Other" refers to those reactors covered for physical protection by 10 CFR 73.40. --
.. u n 3)
Physical protection measures at licensed non power reactors
~
are needed to prevent theft of special nuclear material that is not self protecting and is present in quantities and enrichments less than those presently covered by Part 73.
The safeguards theft risk for these reactors is small because multiple thefts at several facilities would be needed to obtain a formula quantity of SSNM.
Nonetheless, NRC is considering additional regulations to improve the physical protection measures at these facilities.
NRC also recognizes a need for compatibility between US and international physical security guidelines.
The new non power reactor regulations and associated guidance to licensees, if approved, will provide a standard of adequacy compatible with international guidelines.
NRC inspection and enforcement activities at reactors also provided a means of judging the effectiveness of safeguards.
During fiscal year 1978, NRC expended nearly 6500 hours0.0752 days <br />1.806 hours <br />0.0107 weeks <br />0.00247 months <br /> in on site safeguards inspections at power reactors and 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> at non power reactors.15 These inspections revealed 468 items of noncompliance with safeguards require-ments.
(See Table 3 for more detail on inspection activities at reactors.) NRC has issued a number of Immediate Action Letters that identified measures to be taken by the licensees to improve their safeguards systems, but no safeguards events warranted major enforcement actions (Orders or Civil Penalties) against reactor licensees during the year.
Recent physical protection inspections and investigations of allegations have disclosed evidence of improper guard training records and possible falsification of training records.
Licensee management audits of guard training have also been found, in some cases, to be either nonexistent or severely deficient.
" Inadequate Guard Training / Qualification and Falsified Training Racords,"
NRC informed all licenses of these situations and advised that NRC would j
be evaluating each licensee's program for guard qualification and training.
l NRC will take necessary corrective actions.
Safeguards Research and Technical Assistance The NRC safeguards program includes both research (long term, comprehensive efforts) and technical assistance (short term efforts in support of operational assignments).
In fiscal year 1978, about
$10 million was spent on safeguards research and technical assistance, divided about equally between these two categories.
During this period, the major efforts of the safeguards research program were directed to development of methods for evaluation of safeguards effectiveness.
Technical assistance was provided to major program offices to support their current safeguards 15By the end of fiscal year 1978, about 20 resident inspectors were deployed at power reactor sites.
A portion of each resident inspector's time is spent inspecting safeguards. _...
TABLE 3
SUMMARY
OF SAFEGUARDS INSPECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978* AT REACTORS Facility Number of Safeguards Number of Manhours Number of Items Percent of Inspections of Inspection Onsite of Noncompliance Unannounced Inspections Power Reactors 219(167/52)**
6470(5400/1070)**
428(405/23)**
90%
Non power Reactors 96(56/40) 1201(701/500) 40(33/7) 95%
i The summary includes inspections conducted September 1977 through October 1978.
i For numbers in parentheses, the first number refers to physical security inspection activities, and the seccnd number refers to material control and accounting inspection activities.
l activities; projects ranged from aiding in the development of NRC's physical security upgrade rule to making improvements in nuclear measurement standards.
A more detailed description of NRC's Research and Technical Assistance programs is provided in Appendix C.
Further dis:ussion of NRC safeguards research activities may be found in NRC's 1978 Annual Report, Chapter 11.
Future Safeguards Programs To improve the safeguards protection at facilities and activities under the regulatory authority of NRC, the staff is currently undertaking additional safeguards projects.
These projects are summarized below:
A new guard training upgrade rule (for fuel cycle facilities, transportation activities, and power reacters) became effective in early fiscal year 1979, and implementation, which will take two years, is underway.
This rule provides for an upgrade of qualification, training, and equipment requirements for security personnel at fuel cycle and power rr -tor facilities and for escort z
I guards who accompany domestic shipmencs of strategic quantities of SSNM.
The NRC staff has proposed a physical security upgrade rule for fuel cycle facilities that would increase the required level of protection against theft of SSNM by increasing the postulated threat (including emphasis on internal conspiracies).16 This proposed rule would also require increased protection for SSNM shipments and certain non power reactors.
This rule is currently scheduled to become effective in fiscal year 1979..
The results of hearings an a proposed Material Access Authorization Program requirement will be studied during FY 1979 to help NRC decide whether such an effort would enhance safeguards protection j
in a cost-effective manner.
I i
As stated earlier, NRC is currently considering the development of a new rule for non power reactor safeguards.
This rule would cover non power reactors not included in the fuel cycle facility upgrade rule mentioned above.
The NRC has also developed a proposed rule, to be implemented in fiscal year 1979, that would specify physical protection measures for facilities possessing less than formula quantities of highly enriched uranium and plutonium or certain specific quantities of low enriched w anium.
These materials are of moderate or low 16 Threat studies conducted by NRC have generally supported the judgment that it would be prudent to adopt a higher threat level for fuel cycle facilities.
A major classified study of the characteristics and capabilities of terrorists and other criminals was submitted to the Commission in September 1978.
An unclassified version of this report should be available in fiscal year 1979. -
safeguards significance, and the increased ;iutection conforms with international guidelines.
The staff is also evaluating recommendations of an internal Task Force studying the role of material control and accounting in NRC's safeguards program.
A material control and accounting development plan has been 7,repared to analyze recommendationr, and alternatives and to irrplement improvements judged to be cost effvtive.
Those improvements involving state-of-the-art technology will be included in a proposed rule scheduled for public comment in fiscal year 1980.
Those recommendations requiring further research and development are to be considered for later implementation.
A more detailed discussion of NRC's future safeguards programs and their status is provided in Appendix D.
Organiz: tion and Management of Safeguards Each of she major program offices has a role in the planning and implementing of NRC's domestic safeguards program.
Inter-office coordina-I tion of the NRC contracted safeguards activities is provided by the Safeguards Technical Assistance and Research Coordinating Group (STAR),
with participation by the major program offices.
An Integrated Safeguards Program Plan is currently under development to aid in the coo-dination of the various NRC safeguards activities.
The entire NRC safuguards program is reviewed and approved annually bv the Budjet Review Group, the Executive Director for 0pecations, and the Commission during the NRC budget review process.
More detailed descriptions of the safeguards responsibilities of individual NRC program offices and of the Safeguards Integrated Program Plan are provided in Appendix E.
i I
=
.,i r3 I
w fl l'~'hm
=
l
?
APPEN0lX A i
SCOPE OF NRC SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES i
A.
NRC Responsibilities in Safeguards f
1.
Legislative Assignments of Responsibility l
The origins of NRC safeguards responsibilities can be traced to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
These responsibilities were augmented in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which assigned safeguards responsibility for licensed activities to the NRC.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, in Section 2(d), mandates the regulation of processing and utilization of source, byproduct and special nuclear material (SNM) in the national interest in order to (1) " provide j
for the common defense and security" and (2) " protect the public health and safety." To implement these policies, Section 3(c) of the Act j
provides for "a program for Government control of the possession, use and production of atomic energy and special nuclear material sa directed as tc make the maximum contribution to the common defense and security and to the national welfare..."
Finally, the Act recognizes the poten-tially serious consequences of SNM loss or diversicn, for it require:
the Commission (Section 161i) to " prescribe such regulations... it may j
deem necessary... to guard against the loss or diversion of any special nuclear material..." and "to govern any activity authorized pursuant to this Act... to protect health and to minimize danger to life and property."
Substantially increased attention to the area of domestic nuclear safeguards was mandated by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 q
(ERA), which created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The ERA created the Offaa or Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) and charged it with licensing and regulating all l
facilities and materials associated with processing, transport and handling of n; !aar material, including (Sec. 204(b)(1)) "the provision and maintenance of safeguards against threats, thefts, and sabntage of such licensed facilities and materials." The ERA also mandated
=
j (Sec. 204(b)(2)) reviews of safeguards by NRC to include:
"(A) monitoring, testing and recommending upgrading of internal accounting systems for special nuclear material and other j
nuclear material licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; 1
i (B) developing... contingency plans for dealing with threats, j
thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear material, i
high-level radioactive wastes, and nuclear facilities resulting from all activities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of i
1954, as amended; 4
i A-1
i (C) assessing the need for, and the feasibility of, establishing a security agency within the office for the performance of the safeguards functions,..
a report with recommendations on this r
matter shall be prepared within one year of the effective date of this Act and promptly transmitted to the Congress by the Commission."
The ERA also established an Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), assigning it responsibility for licensing and regulation of i
nuclear reactors and requiring the Director of NRR (Sec. 203(b)(2)) to
.i
" review the safety and safeguards of all such facilities...", and the g
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) to develop recommendations j
for research and to engage in or contract for research.
2.
The NRC Safeguards Mission In 1976, the NRC formally adopted the following statement:
" Safeguards measures are designed to deter, prevent, or respond to (1) the unauthorized possession or use of significant t
quantities of nuclear material through theft or diversion; and (2) sabotage of nuclear facilities.
The safeguards program I
has as its mission achieving a level of protection against i
such acts to insure against significant increase in the overall risk of death, injury, or property damage to the public from other causes beyond the control of the individual."
3 The following guidelines were established in 1976 to define the adequacy, effectiveness, and acceptability of safeguards.
First, to be effective, safeguards must be capable of:
"... preventing, with high confidence, a civil disaster; i
providing substantial protection against serious civil i
damage; and providing timely and accurate inforn.acion
}
on the states of nuclear material and facilities."
E e
Second, to be acceptable, safeguards must
...teke realistic account of the risks involved, and of a
burdens on the public, in terms of civil liberties, institutional, economic, and environmental impacts."
[
B.
Affected Facilities and Activities The Nuclear Regulatory Commission domestic safeguards prcgram is applied to all licensed nuclear facilities and activities authorized to receive title _to, own, acquire, deliver, receive, possess, use, transfer, g
import and export special nuclear material.
Import and export activities i
are generally considered within the realm of international safeguards and will be discussed here only to the extent necessary to fully describe the facilities and activities subject to domestic safeguards.
I I
A-2 m
a, 4
x s
Lu
.__.a_._.
w. z
~
r The NRC currently has safeguards regulatory control over 19 fuel cycle facilities which are authorized to possess significant quantities I%
of highly enriched uranium or plutonium,1 transportation activities v
o involving highly enriched uranium or plutonium (about one shipment per month), 70 operating commercial power reactors, and 71 non power reactors.
The safeguards requirements for licensed facilities and activities
=
are tailored to the quantities of special nuclear materials (SNM) authorized for possession or actually possessed.
Those facilities 2 of SNM
'e authorized to possess and use more than one effective kilogram are subject to detailed requirements for the material control and l
accounting of all material received, shipped, discarded, or in l^
+
inventory.
These facilities include fuel conversion and fabrication k'
plants, those engaged in special service (e.g., production of isotopes
[
for medical purposes), power reactors, test reactors and research l
reactors.
Physical protection is required if the licensee possesses D
formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM)--that j
is, uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in
-L the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium alone or in any combina-tion in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams =
(grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium).
Physical p.
protection of the facility and material is also required in the operation of a nuclear power reactor, and attendant activities.
These physical s
protection measures are intended to prevent the theft of highly-enriched 1 -
[
uranium, uranium-233 or plutonium which could be used to make a nuclear
' * ~
bomb, and the sabotage of the licensed facilities which would significantly p-t increase the risk to the public of radioactive release.
N a
l Formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material must
- "^
j also be safeguarded while in transit.
Transportation of SSNM takes
., )
place between different licensees, between licensees and Department of Energy (DOE) facilities and between licensed or government facilities 3.
y and a terminus for export or import shipments under NRC license.
Such 1
d) l 2Four additional fuel cycle facilities possess more than one effective kilogram of iow-enriched uranium.
Those fuel cycle facilities s !
involved in processing highly enriched uranium for the manufacture of fuel for the Naval Propulsion Program possess nearly all of the L
j ]
highly-enriched uranium at fuel cycle facilities.
2 Effective k'lograms of SNM means:
(1) for plutonium and uranium-233 J
. +l their weight in kilograms; (2) for uranium with an enrichment in the isotope U-235 of 0.01 and above, its element weight in kilograms
- J
'j multiplied by the square of its enrichment expressed as a decimal weight fraction; and (3) for uranium with an enrichment in the
' +
isotope U-235 below 0.01 by its element weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.000).
3See Glossary, Appendix F.
3 I'
A-3
-ss...
-+-;--n---r..va.
,+s j
.l o
4 s
i material is measured and packaged, transfer documents are prepared, and after the required physical protection arrangements are made, the material j
is shipped to the recipient.
00E provides for physical protection of all DOE-owned shipments of formula quantities of SSNM.
Licensed ship-ments are protected under NRC safeguards requirements.
f f
L t
e i
b k
A-4
5 1
APPENDIX B FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH NRC'S ASSESSMENT OF SAFEGUARDS ADEQUACY A.
Threat Considerations Information available to the NRC does not indicate the existence of a significant near-term threat of theft or diversion involving strategic special nuclear material, or sabotage.
The NRC itself does not engage in intelligence gathering or collection.
To ensure the timely flow of data necessary to assess an actual or potential threat to the domestic nuclear industry, the NRC relies upon the existing efforts within the Intelligence Community to collect and report back information.
Over the past three years, the NRC has actively pursued the development of interfaces with 82 organizational elements of over 28 agencies that could provide response support and threat information.
Formal and informal interface 4
agreements have been established and frequent contact is maintained with j
the Intelligence Community to obtain threat information.
These agencies j
provide NRC:
(1) reports dealing with threats to nuclear facilities and (2) collateral information of an analogous nature such as adversary characteristics, previous acts of violence, bombing incidents and other data useful to threat assessment.
Means of communication include secure telephone, teletype, routine distribution channels, and regular informal meetings.
i q
The NRC plans to develop and negotiate a series of formal safe-J guards interagency agreements with thirteen key agencies.
A draft agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigation is currently in negotiation.
These formal agreements would be in addition to functional working arrangements already in existence, such as with the National i
Foreign Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Assessment j
Center that provide guidance to the Community for use in assuring appropriate i
and timely dissemination of information relevant to NRC's mission.
The l
NRC is also a member of the NSC/ SCC interagency working group on terrorism.
9 The current threat characterization for industrial sabotage against i
nuclear power reactors, contained in 10 CFR Part 73.55, is as follows; l
(1) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or i
deceptive actions, of several persons with the following attributes, assistance and equipment:
(a) well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, (b) inside assistance which may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in both a i
passive role (e.g., provide information) and in an active role (e.g.,
facilitate entrance and exit, disabie alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), (c) suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long range accuracy, and (d) hand-carried equipment, including incapacituting B-1
^
. e 1 /
Im
. if'%
_.-.____..-._n
.--.._._..__....i.___-..___.3 O
3
{
d
,c
'I agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or otherwise destroying the reactor integrity, and u
l (2) An internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in any position).
e
- t j
The threat characterization presently used in the determination of adequacy of nuclear fuel cycle facilities and transportation activities is the same as the one for power reactors specified above except that the equipment the adversary may empicy would be used to destroy " features of the safeguards system," rather than "the reactor integrity."1 NRC has not established a hypothetical design threat for non power reactors.
The level of protection required for these facilities is currently under study.
B.
Current Regulatory Requirements
===1.
Background===
Many current safeguards regulatory requirements were imposed some time before the current hypothetical design threat level was postu-lated.
In the years 1969-1974, the Atomic Energy Commission developed r
physical security and material control regulations that were set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR Parts 70 and 73.
In 1975,.
NRC assumed responsibility for application and administration of these regulations.
Part 70 specifies the regulations for the domestic licensing, accounting, and controlling of special nuclear material (SNM).
In 1977, Part 73.55 was issued; this regulation added a substantial number of new safeguards requirements for the operation of nuclear reactors and charac-terized for the first time in NRC regulations the hypothetical design
~
threat.
These requirements are to be fully implemented in 1979.
Additional r
L proposed changes to Part 73 would upgrade safeguards requirements and would increase the hypothetical design threat for SSNM.
=
Physical Protection, 10 CFR 50, 70, and 73 2.
The physical security requirements for fixed sites and materials in transit are addressed in Parts 50, 70, and 73 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Under these regulations, all licensed production facilities, power and non power reactors, and carriers that transport formula quantities of SSNM are required to submit, for NRC review and approval, a plan describing the physical security measures proposed to protect the facility, material, or shipment.
Specific requirements for y
fixed sites licensed to possess or use formula quantities of SSNM include M
the following:
(a) A physical security organization including armed guards.
2 Comprehensive Evaluation Plan (for fuel cycle facilities with SSNM)
NRC, NMSS, May 1, 1977.
B-2 f;
e
.=vv-tr.. ' -A=-
=r--.
_em=.,
C_----_s.
j..
y p-l g
b s',
i i
(b) Physical barriers such that vital e wipment and SSNM are protected by two security barriers.
(c) Access restrictions to control the movement of personnel, vehicles, and materials.
(d) Detection aids, including alarms which must annunciate in central and secondary alarm station manned and operated by the facility security force.
(e) A requirement for testing and maintenance of all security j
related equipment.
(f) A response requirement by facility guards and, as provided by
]
prior liaisua, by the Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEAs)
Section 73.55 describes similar requirements for power reactors.
l A performance requirement is also included that specifies the hypothetical design threat (as described in Section A above). to be used in the i
evaluation of the effectiveness of safeguart sor power reactors.
l 3.
Material Control and Accounting lu CFR Part 70 The current material control and accounting system for nuclear materials, as required by 10 CFR Part 70, was designed to:
(a) provide knowledge of the identity, quantity, and location, based upon actual l
measurements, of material present at a fixed site and in transit; (b) detect the loss of material from discrete items, containers, or process-J ing operations; and (c) provide checks and balances for physical security measures.
Each applicant for a license (to possess or use SNM in a quantity exceeding one effective kilogram in unsealed form) is required to submit for NRC approval a description (plan) of his material control and accounting system in sufficient detail to show that the system i
j fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70.
i For licensees authorized to possess more than one effective kilogram i
of special nuclear material, the rule provides specific requirements j
for:
(a) A management system to implement the licensee's material control and accounting plan.
(b) Written policies, instructions, procedures, and other documenta-tion necessary for the implementation of the material control and an accounting plan.
(c) Audits to assure compliance with procedures.
i B-3
=_
i h
a (d) An SNM measurement and record system.
r (e) Periodic physical inventories.
=
(f) Evaluations of inventory and shipper / receiver differences.
(g) A measurement quality control program.
(h) Audits to ensure that the program is functioning effectively.
h C.
Licensing Review
{
NRC performs licensing reviews (on-site in many cases) to evaluate f
licensee safeguards plans covering physical security and material control i
and accounting.
The approval of appropriate accountability and protection plans is a prerequisite for the issuance of a license for the manufacture, i
possession, and use of special nuclear material.
[r 1.
Fuel Cycle Facilities and Transportation During 1978, the staff reviewed requirements for measurement control program plans.
The required plans will specify measurement systems for mass and volume determination, sampling errors, and analytical errors.
Licensee plans for the material control and accounting and physical protection of SNM at fixed facilities and of SSNM in transit are submitted
.j for review and approval in support of license applications.
NRC reviews these plans to determine whether they conform with regulations.
- Also,
[
NRC has published additional guidance to licensees in the form of NUREG reports.
Certain additional conditions have been imposed in 1978 as a result of the findings of the comprehensive evaluation review teams (discussed in Section D, below).
2.
Reactors 5
Parts 50, 70 and 73 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regula-tions require the submittal of a security plan for each power reactor.
l As discussed above, the requirements for power reactors (10 CFR Part 73) have recently been upgraded, and a performance criterion for protection against the hypothetical design threat has been incorporated in 10 CFR 73.55.
r In addition to regulations, NRC has published additional guidance to j
licensees in the form of NUREG reports providing details of the " Standard Format and Content" of power reactor security plans, and the " Acceptance Criteria" to be used by the staff as an aid in determining the adequacy I
of these plans.
l l
I B-4
As required by the revised 10 CFR Part 73, all operating power reactor licensees had submitted amended security plans in May of 1977.
NRR formed eight review teams to review and evaluate these security plans for 70 reactors at 55 sites.
Phase I of the review effort (consist-ing of a review of the plan, an on-site evaluation, and one or more j
meetings with the licensees to discuss any deficiencies of the plan) was completed in 1977.
The second phase of the review process (involving l
the resolution of outstanding security plan issues) was initiated in j
1978, and is currently nearing completion.
The third phase (inspecting i
the implementation of Part 73.55) will follow.
D.
Comprehensive Evaluation Program for Fuel Cycle Facilities 1
=
In April of 1977, the Commission directed the Office of Nuclear i
Material Safety and Safeguards and the Office of Inspection and Enforce-B ment to conduct a comprehensive program of safeguards evaluations at fuel cycle facilities.
The actual safeguards evaluations began during May 1977 and have continueu throughout 1977 and 1978.
The primary purpose of the safeguards comprehensive evaluation i
program has been to assess the fuel cycle facility licensees' capability to protect against the hypothetical design threat identified earlier.
A secondary purpose of the evaluation program was to provide to the Commission a preliminary estimate of the licensees' capability to meet more demanding safeguards requirements under consideration by the Commission.
f The comprehensive evaluation process employs four separate NRC teams.
Each team visits the facility to examine a different facet of
=
y its overall safeguards system.
Team findings are then synthesized and f
documented in a single report evaluating the adequacy of the facility's j
safeguards program.
The four teams are:
1j 1.
Diversion Path Survey The purpose of the Diversion Path Survey portion of the compre-hensive evaluation program is to determine where in the production process there are points that might be vulnerable to internal diversion of SSNM.
To make this evaluation, the team examines the processing operations of the facility to identify locations where special nuclear materials are accessible, to determine their form at these points, and to determine whether any diversion paths exist that would allow removal of SSNM from the facility.
The evaluation considers all process locations where nuclear material is accessible, but emphasizes those paths vulnerable l
to a single facility employee in any position or a single authorized j
visitor.
i i
2.
External Assault Survey i
The purpose of the external assault survey is to obtain an external adversary-oriented view of the facility.
The individuals involved in conducting this portion of the evaluations have extensive B-5
i i
experience in covert military operations.
The survey places pa.'ticular emphasis upon finding possible safeguards vulnerabilities that a potential adversary might exploit for theft or sabotage.
The survey identifies F
facility safeguards vulnerabilities through the use of remote observa-tion and close surveillance of the site and monitoring facility guard force and local law enforcement radio communications.
Later in the evaluation, survey team members are escorted through the facility to i
obtain a first hand view of the safeguards system from an insider's perspective.
Actual plans for theft of SSNM or radiological sabotage may be developed by the team to illustrate identified vulnerabilities and to evaluate their usefulness to a potential adversary.
E 3.
Physical Security Assessment This portion of the assessment process is designed to determine those capabilities which provide protection against:
(1) Theft by a Lone Insider Are present material control procedures sufficient to deter or
(
detect the theft of SSNM by an employee in any position in any w
single theft or in any continuing series of thefts over a period of up to one year?
i (2) Theft by External Assault
?
Are present physical protection procedures sufficient to prevent the theft of SSNM by means of a well planned and
,i coordinated assault by several outsiders assisted by an insider?
b In contrast to the adversary-oriented external assault team, which operates mostly outside the facility, the physical security assessment team performs a detailed review of safeguard capabilities from within the facility.
In assessing capabilities against the lone insider, this portion of the evaluation considers access controls, including: measures to prevent the introduction of contraband, measures to allow only authorized personnel access, and detection of unauthorized access.
Containment control (which includes measures against unauthorized removal of SSNM),
assurance of integrity of containment, and detection of unauthorized 3
conditions are also evaluated.
In assessing the facility's capability for protecting against external assault with insider assistance, this portion of the evaluation considers detection and delay of adversaries; deployment and communication of response forces; and motivation, training, i
and reliability of response forces.
I 4.
Material Control and Accounting Assessment l
The purpose of the material control and accounting assessment is to determine:
(a) whether the licensee's material control system is j
capable of detecting a loss of five formula kilograms of SSNM during the inventory period in which such a loss might occur, (b) whether the B-6
..--,--i-.---.
f i
i licensee's material accounting system was capable of detecting, after the fact, a loss of five formula kilograms of SSNM occurring during a a
prior two month inventory period or during a prior period of up to j
twelve months, and (c) whether the material control and accounting systems could determine quickly, in response to an external stimulus (such as an alleged theft), whether or not a five formula kilogram loss of SSNM had, in fact, occurred.
The material control and accounting assessment involves an in-depth j
examination of the record system, the item control system, process i
controls, measu:.ements and measurement controls, the material balance, shipper-receiver controls, and the statistical program.
)
The final part of the comprehensive evaluation is the synthesis of the results of the Diversion Path Survey, External Assault Survey, Physical Security Assessment, and Material Control and Accounting Assess-
=
ment into a conclusion concerning the adequacy of facility safeguards.
This is accomplished by careful consideration of the specific observa-tions developed during each portion of the assessment to determine whether the safeguards strengths observed counterbalance any vulnera-bilities that might also have been observed.
These results are summarized, along with the specific observations l
made during each portion of the evaluation, in a safeguards comprehensive evaluation report.
After appropriate coordination, these reports are transmitted to the Commissioners and Congress.
l In reaching their judgment, both the assessment teams and the synthesis group use the following rating scheme:
I 1.
Poor No evidence of capability Obsolete 4
i Not yet implemented j
Not yet operable Poor maintenance i
Easily compromised 2.
Fair Stated capability but not verified Fair maintenance Implemented but not completely operational
^
Fair records and history Could be compromised i
3.
Good Limited demonstration of capability Good maintenance Good records / history Not easily compromised f
i B-7
I.
I L
4.
High Several operational demonstrations i
High state of maintenance Records and history provide high support y
of performance
[
Very difficult to compromise When the safeguards comprehensive evaluation of a licensed facility j
uncovers a weakness in its safeguards program, NRC requires that the licensee take appropriate remedial action.
The schedule for remedial action depends upon the severity of the vulnerability discoveted.
If on emergency safeguards program deficiency is discovered, immediate action is required.
For deficiencies of less severity, the licensee is required to take prompt action.
Remedial action on minor safeguards program deficiencies is usually scheduled to be completed within a reasonable f
length of time.
A summary of the comprehensive evaluations is provided in classified Appendix G.
E.
Inspection and Enforcement The inspection and enforcement program is designed:
(1) to verify that licensees perform in accordance with applicable sections of the p
Federal statutes, Commission regulations, and Commission-issued licenses and permits; and (2) to inspect the licensee safeguards program for overall adequacy.
When licensees are not adhering to these requirements j
or are conducting operations that might endanger the public health and safety, or might adversely affect the common defense and security, NRC takes appropriate enforcement action or takes steps to change the
[
requirements.
NRC also investigates incidents, accidents, allegations and other unusual circumstances involving matters that may be subject to NRC jurisdiction.
The two types of safeguards inspections--material control and accounting and physical protection--are conducted at nuclear reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and at the other facilities that are licensed to possess or ship special nuclear materials.
The activities inspected include those measures that:
(1) assure physical protection of nuclear reactors and fuel cycle facilities against theft of nuclear material or the creation of a radiological hazard through sabotage; (2) control and i
account for special nuclear material; and (3) protect both domestic transport and import and export of special nuclear material.
Material accaunting inspections are conducted to determine whether i
the licensee's program assures adequate control and accounting of special i
nuclear material.
In addition, the NRC inspects certain licensed export and import shipments of special nuclear material to review material control and independently verify the quantity and type of material i
shipped.
i i
B-8
n s-l Both destructive and nondestructive assay techniques are used to monitor special nuclear material inventories.
Three NRC regional offices i
have nondestructive assay vans that provide a capability for conducting i
onsite measurement of licensee material.
Physical protection inspections review the level of protection i
provided by the licensee against theft, diversion and sabotage at fixed j
licensee sites and for special nuclear material in transit.
NRC inspectors examine each licensee's security program to assure both effectiveness and conformance to license specifications.
Materials in transit are l
also subject to NRC monitoring.
This includes inspections at the points of origin, destination, or transfer, and observation or surveillance by 3
NRC inspectors along the shipment route.
i F.
Assessment of Reactors There are currently 70 power reactors and 71 non power reactors licensed to operate in the U.S.
In addition, 88 construction permits f
for nuclear power reactors have been issued.
The safeguards concern for reactors includes consideration of possible theft and sabotage.
For power reactors, the primary concern is the potential for sabotage, while theft is a concern primarily for those non power reactors possessing formula quantities of highly enriched fuel.
j 1.
Power Reactors The primary concern of power reactor safeguards is to prevent l
a release of radioactivity which could harm the health and safety of the
]
public as a result of industrial sabotage.
Power reactors, by nature of their design, have a relatively high level of intrinsic sabotage resistance compared to fuel cycle facilities.
Nevertheless, independent backup systems are installed to assure safe shutdown of the facility in the event of a failure of the primary system.
The design principle of separation of redundant emergency systems, with the capability to tolerate an additional single failure, provides a further measure of~ protection by increasing the number of steps a saboteur would have to follow to i
achieve successful sabotage.
Another design principle which increases j
the difficulty of achieving a significant release of radioactivity is j
the arrangement of multiple barriers against the release of fission products.
(These barriers include the reactor containment, which in most cases is a massive reinforced concrete structure.)
In addition, i
protection of other vital systems is provided as a result of the design J
of structures against violent natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornados, etc.
In addition, NRC requires physical protection measures for adequate safeguarding of power reactors.
NRC is currently reviewing the adequacy of safeguards at all operating power reactors, based on 10 CFR i
73.55.
Phase I of this effort has been ompleted and is discussed in i
Section C.2 of this Appendix.
In 1978, NR: continued to place primary emphasis on completion of the review and evaluation in Phase II of the B-9
=
,' -._ _?,_?'.-
[_ _, _ - _ _..- lL
.f 3
u_.
1 s.
y.
3 review.
This includes a review of the licensee's response to questions fe and comments from NRC, further meetings with the licensees to attempt a E
resolution of any differences or outstanding issues, and the preparation of a Security Plan Evaluation Report for each site.
The third and last phase of the implementation of 10 CFR 73.55 at all operating power reactors will consist of an inspection by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement to verify the completion and operability of all physcial security systems and procedures described in the security plans.
Completion of the review and implementation of all provisions of all three phases of this regulation was originally scheduled for
~
August 24, 1978.
However, many licensees indicated that they could not achieve this implementation time because of construction delays caused
- ~
by severe winter weather conditions, delays in delivery schedules for some highly specialized security systems of limited availability, and other factors.
=Q On August 7, 1978: the Commission published in the Federal Register an extension of the deadline for final implementation of Part 73.55 from August 24, 1978 to February 23, 1979.
This extension permits completion of construction and equipment installation at most sites.
In a few cases, however, the completion schedules extend beyond this deadline.
In those situations, NRC will require compensatory measures (which, in a
most cases, are heavily manpower intensive) to be in effect by February 23, i
1979, which provides an equivalent level of security against the external assault threat.
These compensatory measures will be documented in the j
security plan, and will have received prior review and approval by the
,o
~~
NRC staff.
1 In January 1979 the NRC staff recommended to the Commission that I
the implementation of certain parts of Part 73.55 be deferred until i
May 23, 1979.
The Commission is curreatly considering the staff recommenda-tion for deferral.
The specific measures recommended for deferral are " pat down" searches, compartmentalization, and the "two-man" rule; these measures l
would provide additional protection against the " insider" threat.
A February 1979 implementation of pat-down searches, two man-rule procedures, and compartmentalization could preempt Commission consideration of
!g Hearing Board recommendations concerning the proposed material access ig authorization program.
The material access authorization program (or an
- Y equivalent clearance program) would provide substantial protection against the insider threat.
The staff believes that delay of these measures will not cause an unwarranted safeguards risk against sabotage by an insider for the additional three month period because licensees presently use interim search procedures and they will have implemented other requirements of
- 2 Section 73.55 by February 1979.
B-10
,.m,m-.----z.-
- ~ -. -. - ~. - -
3 -, 3
. ~
g 4
4
( }.,
4
i
=
Thus far, the NRC staff has reviewed physical security plans for all of the 70 operating reactors.
When the plans are fully implemented, these power reactors should provide an adequate level of safeguards protection.
Continuing assessment of safeguards adequacy will be made i
j through an inspection and enforcement program.
i
)
2.
Non-Power Reactors i
In contrast to power reactors, where sabotage is the primary concern, the safeguards concern for some non power reactors also includes the potential for theft of SNM, particularly for those facilities which I
are authorized to possess more than formula quantities of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.
(At this time, no ncn power reactor licensee is in possession of formula quantities of plutonium, although one facilty i
is authorized to do so.)
The NRC is currently evaluating non power reactor safeguards adequacy.
This evaluation includes an assessment of the target attractive-j ness for theft or diversion of several types of fuel elements, the potential of various protection measures, and the physical security effectiveness at the various non power reactor installations.
In addition, the staff is also currently performing an in depth evaluation of the sabotage potential of non power reactors, particularly those reactors operating at the higher end of the range of power levels (i.e., above 100 kW).
i J
G.
Safeguards Contingency Planning k
The development of safeguards contingency plans was mandated by Congress in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.
These plans set forth operational schemes and response activities for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to SSNM and nuclear facilities resulting from activities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, j
as amended.
The safeguards contingency plans under development include i
planning at the licensee level and at the national level.
l i
A licensee safeguards contingency plan relates to a specific licensed nuclear facility or transportation activity.
The plan assigns responsi-bilities and identifies procedures for the licensee's security organization j
to effect timely coordinated response actions in the event an adversary i
threat or attempt occurs against the facility or activity.
A rule
]
requiring licensees to prepare safeguards contingency plans became effective on July 6, 1978.
l NRC safeguards contingency planning at the national level is intended j
to accomplish necessary rapid information exchange about threats and j
criminal acts against licensed nuclear facilities, activities, and i
material, and to cooperate with the FBI and other agencies.
An NRC l
Incident Response Organization has been established to assure that proper actions are taken to protect the public health and safety in the j
event of an incident subject to NRC jurisdiction.
It includes an Executive i
B-11
i 0
Management Team (EMT), the Information Assessment Team (IAT), an Incident Response Action Coordination Team (IRACT), and necessary supporting L
staff to implement IRACT directed actions.
An NRC Incident Response Center, including facilities, communica-tions, operational readiness data, and operating procedures is operational and is currently being further developed.
Alerting and recall procedures to initiate operations from the Incident Response Center by the Incident 3
Response Organization are being exercised to evaluate the NRC response procedures and to train appropriate staff.
i-i i
-m E
E e
i l
L i
[
B-12
_1 2
APPENDIX C SAFEGUARDS RESEARCH AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE i
j A.
Nature and Scope The NRC safeguards contractual program includes both research and f
technical assistance projects.
Research projects are planned and managed j
by the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES).
They are usually j
long-term, comprehensive efforts, conducted for the most part in response to specific user requirements generated by the other program offices.
Technical assistance projects, on the other hand, are normally short-term efforts managed directly by the program offices and oriented toward 9
providing the specific technical and analytical support necessary to d
fulfil.1 operational assignments and responsibilities.
For FY 78, the d
total safeguards contractural program was about 10.5 million dollars, divided about equally between research and technical assistance projects.
B.
FY 1978 Projects During FY 78, the major efforts of the safeguards research program j
were directed to tha development of methods for performance evaluation of safeguards effectiveness.
The methods being developed include various i
computerized models applicable to a broad spectrum of safeguards scenarios.
Five evaluation models were provided to user offices for suitability testing.
These tests began in March 1978.
Earlier suitability testing d
has confirmed the applicability of two of these models to power reactor evaluation even though they were initially developed for fuel cycle evaluation.
The nature of technical assistance projects varies in accordance with the assigned functions and responsibilities of the sponsoring offices.
In FY 78, the major emphases in technical assistance projects, by office, were as follows:
for NMSS, the physical security upgrade l
rule, field adequacy evaluations, and identification of safeguards requirements for the nuclear industry; for NRR, the implementation of i
new physical protection requirements in reactor facilities; for IE, j
analytical and technical nuclear measurement services for regional inspectors; and for SD, the improvement of nuclear measurement standards j
and the development, in both physical protection and material control and accounting, of NUREG documents and guides for dissemination and use throughout the government and the nuclear industry.
d i
C-1
i I
I C.
Utilization of Contractual Program Results During FY 78, contractual projects were conducted in all major safeguards areas, which include material control and accounting, physical protection of facilities and SNM in transit, threat analysis, contingency planning, and information systems.
Primary emphasis was placed on efforts in material control and accounting and physical protection, which together accounted for approximately 80 percent of the safeguards i
contractural funds.
Results from contractual projects have been used to acsess and improve the effectiveness of nuclear safeguards for both l
current and proposed facilities, and to provide specialized technical l
and analytical support to the program offices in the performance of i
their assigned responsibilities.
Examples of application include the following:
j.
Use of event tree modeling to identify reactor vital areas.
Use of Bayesian statistical logic to assist in the comprehen-sive field evaluations program.
Application of route selection logic to determine the least
[
vulnerable route for a 1300-mile SNM shipmcnt.
Publication of numerous documents to provide licensee guidance.
[
I.
r I
i C-2
APPENDIX D FUTURE SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM 5
To improve the safeguards protection at facilities and activities under the regulatory authority of NRC, the staff is currently undertaking l
additional safeguards projects.
These projects are summarized below:
A.
Guard Training 1
In response to public comments on the proposed rule published in the i
Federal Register in July 1977, to upgrade qualification, training, and i
equipment requirements for security personnel at fuel cycle and power reactor facilities and for escort guards who accompany domestic shipments of SSNM, the rule was extensively revised to specify performance-oriented i
requirements instead of the detailed training requirements originally l
proposed.
The rule was approved for publication as a final rule by the 4
NRC on May 17,1"J8.
At that time, the NRC decided that all of the required guidance to licensees necessary to implement the rule should be available in final form before the rule is published.
This guidance:
NUREG-0464, " Site Security Personnel Training Manual"; NUREG-0465,
" Transportation Security Personnel Training Manual"; and revised chapters to Regulatory Guide 5.52, " Standard Format and Content for the Physical i
Protection Section of a Licensee Application (For Facilities other than i
Nuclear Power Plants)" was made available for comment on August 9, 1978.
The final rule was published on August 23, 1978, and became effective October 23, 1978, concurrent with final publication of all guidance l
documents.
Implementation, which will take two years, is underway.
B.
Physical Protection Upgrade Rule - Fuel Facilities B
Based, among other things, on the findings of a joint ERDA-NRC1 task force on fuel cycle site assessments, and on a need to give licensees more flexibility in fulfilling protection requirements, the NRC in 1976 initiated 4
a physical security upgrade program for fuel cycle facilities that possess formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM).
As a part of this program, a proposed physical security upgrade rule was published in the Federal Register on July 5, 1977.
The rule is designed to provide i
safeguards protection against a threat level higher than the one currently used.2 Following receipt and evaluation of public comments, the proposed
=
IERDA is now in the Department of Energy (00E).
i 2 Threat studies conducted by NRC have generally supported the judgment that it would be prudent to adopt a higher threat level for fuel cycle facilities.
A major classified study of the characteristics and capabilities of terrorists and other criminals was submitted to the Commission in September 1978.
An l
unclassified version of this report should be available in fiscal year 1979.
D-1 l
-i
i r
=
=
rule was modified and republished for public comment on August 9, 1978.
One of the main features of the proposed rale is its emphasis on performance requirements that allow licensees greater flexibility in i
carrying out their physical security responsibilities.
The proposed rule also sets forth requirements for certain protection systems and subsystems.
7 At the time the upgrade rule becomes effcetive, the NRC will provide l
additional guidance in the form of descriptions for alternative protection systems and design methods for these systems.
L The proposed physical security upgrade rule would also provide for j
strengthening of protection for nuclear shipments.
Again, performance
=
requirements supplemented by requirements for certain protection systems and subsystems would be used.
When compared to current measures, additional guards and escort vehicles and additional hardening of transport vehicles would be required.
This rule is currently scheduled to become effective b
in FY 1979.
In a separate program, the NRC is conducting tests of a radio F
communication system designed to more reliably transmit essentially continuous location ano status infcrmation from nuclear transport vehicles
)
to a control point, g
C.
Material Access Authorization Program In March 1977, the NRC published for comment proposed regulations (10 CFR Part 11) that would require certain individuals involved in licensed nuclear activities to receive NRC authorization before being granted access to or control over special nuclear material (SNM) or vital and protected areas at reactors, fuel cycle facilities and in transporta-tion activities.
j i
NRC authority to require such authorization was acquired in 1974 by
)
enactment of Public Law 93-377, which amended the Atomic Energy Act I
(section 161i).
A staff proposal for a personnel access program in which j
background investigations would be conducted by the Civil Service Commission
,ds forwarded to the Commission in late 1976.
This proposed program would i
be administered by the NRC, utilizing procedures similar to those presently i
applied in the security clearance program for NRC employees, contractors, i
and others having access to NRC classified information.
The results of i
hearings on the staff proposal, which were held in the summer of 1978, i
will be studied during fiscal year 1979 to help NRC assess this program.
l i
D.
Non-Power Reactors i
NRC is currently considering the development of a new rule for i
non power reactor safeguards.
This rule would cover non power reactors not included in the fuel cycle facility upgrade rule mentioned above.
c-I.
E D-2 i
=
E.
Physical Protection of Category II and Category III Haterials
)
During 1978 NRC published proposed rules that would require protection of Category II material (special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance) and Category III materials (special nuclear material of low strategic significance).
The proposed measures are designed to provide a level of protection equivalent to that suggested in Information Circular /225 published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
They require physical protection at fixed sites, including non power reactors, and for nuclear materials in transit.
The proposed rule was published for public comment on May 24, 1978, and will be published for implementation during g
fiscal year 1979.
5 F.
Material Control and Accounting In September 1977, a Task Force was established to study the role of material control and accounting in the NRC's safeguards program.
The study considered domestic nuclear faciliti?s possessing one effective j
kilogram or more of SSNM.
Low-enriched uranium and international safeguards i
were not included in the study except that some consideration was given to j
the role of the NRC safeguards program in supporting international safeguards.
In its report, issued in April 1978, the Task Force concluded that the current regulatory base is fundamentally sound and rigorous implementation l
of its requirements should provide a substantial level of safeguards protection, but that there are some areas in which strengthening is appro-
]
priate.
The report sets forth several findings and recommends that the NRC develop and issue a material control and accounting upgrade rule t'o j
implement the findings.
The rule would be issued in two phases:
the j
first would be implemented in 18 to 24 months following a Commission decision to proceed with the rulemaking effort; the second would be implemented within five years as technology under development is proven.
The Task Force recommended that NRC require licensees to use existing or i
I available process monitoring data in their safeguards programs, maintain shift inventory controls over items and containers, provide for certifi-cation or overcheck of waste discards and intraplant transfers, improve j
traceability of records, develop response plans for performing special physical inventories on demand, upgrade custodian and scrap controls, j
reconcile shipper / receiver differences in a more timely manner, perform i
random audits three times per year, and select and train key material control and accounting personnel in accordance with specified criteria.
i The Task Force also recommended improvement in NRC operations, revitali-zation of the regulatory guide program, specific studies to support a goal-oriented safeguards programs, and priorities for NRC's research and technical assistance programs.
The Task Force recommendations were sub-sequently reviewed by NRC staff.
A material control and accounting develop-ment plan has been prepared to implement those recommendations that are determined to be cost-effective.
0-3
muull'NEW.imml5l Ele i
h; G.
Classification of Safeguards Information The classification of safeguards information within NRC was, in fiscal year 1978, based on Executive Order 11652, " Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," dated i
March 8,1972, as amended, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
e The application of the Executive Order to specific categories of safeguards information has been an evolutionary process which began with the reports L
generated by the Special Safeguards Study Group and continued with the reports generated in support of the Safeguards Supplement to the Draft j
Generic Environnental Statement on Use of Mixed 0xide Fuel in Light Water j
Reactors.
This evolutionary process was reinforced by studies and decisions on the part of the National Security Council concerning the safeguarding of those categories of information and materials that could be most directly i
useful in the construction of nuclear explosive devices.
l In fiscal year 1978, NRC classified safeguards information only if it i
fell within the below-listed five categories and if its disclosure would significantly assist a malevolent individual or group in acquiring or using special nuclear material.
The categories are:
g i
Certain information on material control and ;ccountability.
a.
s b.
Information on physical protection at fixed sites.
l Certain information on in-transit protection of special nuclear c.
material.
d.
Safeguards analyses that indicate vulnerabilities and plans for protecting certain types and quantities of special nuclear material.
e.
Certain safeguards communications-related information and procedures.
It should be clearly noted that most of the information within the above five categories was not classified and that classifi_ation was used only when essential to the national security.
r Effective December 1, 1978, Executive Order 11652 was replaced by Executive Order 12065, " National Security Information," dited June 28, 1978.
This new Executive Order specifically identifies information con-cerning United States Government Programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities as one criterion for classification of information.
It does not, however, substantially modify the safeguards categories of information classified by the NRC.
Through its requirement for the issuance of classifi-cation guidance, implementation of this new Executive Order should result in a more clearly codified set of classification standards for use by NRC personnel in the safeguards area.
D-4 i
APPENDIX E ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT FOR SAFEGUARDS A.
Functional Responsibilities - Lead and Support Offices Each of the major program offices has a role in planning and implementing the NRC domestic safeguards program.
The Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) has lead responsibilities for safeguards activities in the areas of fuel cycle facilities and material transportation.
This office formulates safeguards policy and develops new and revised regulatory approaches and requirements for fuel cycle facilities and material tranportation.
It reviews, evaluates and approves safeguards elements of licensee applications and amended physical security plans.
It also develops contingency plans, interagency agreements, and threat assessment capabilities.
It maintains safeguards information gathering and retrieval systems.
This office is also responsible for conducting assessments of advanced safeguards measures and, with the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, evaluates adequacy of safeguards as implemented by fuel cycle licensees.
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) has lead responsi-bilities with respect to safeguards for reactors.
This office formulates safeguards policy and develops new and revised regulatory requirements for safeguarding power and non power reactors.
It reviews, evaluates and approves safeguards elements of license applications and amended physical security plans for upgrading power reactor physical security.
It supports reactor licensee contingency planning.
This office, with the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, evaluates the adequacy of safeguards as imple-mented by reactor licensees.
Tha Office of Standards Deveicpment (50) develops and maintains standards and guides clarifying the objectives and performance criteria of the evolving safeguards.
It is also responsible for developing standards and guides for assessing licensee safeguards systems.
The Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) conducts inspections and investigations to (1) monitor licensees' compliance with all safeguards regulatory requirements, (2) assess the adequacy and effectiveness of licensee-implemented safeguards programs, and (3) determine the necessary enforcement actions to ensure that the proper corrective action is taken by licensees to protect the public health and safety.
It advises other program offices on inspectability, enforcement and adequacy of proposed safeguards regulatory changes, and it provides inputs regarding adequacy of licensee plans.
This office provides overall coordination of the NRC incident response program.
E-1
The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) provides research support to the lead offices.
It conducts programs to aid the establishme, of NRC safeguards regulatory policies.
This office is also responsible for the development of evaluation techniques for assessing the effective-ness of reactor, fuel cycle facility, and transportation safeguards, for the development of the Integrated Safeguards Information System (ISIS),
and for research to develop improved methods for assessing protection levels.
(
Inter office integration of the NRC safeguards research program is provided by the Safeguards Technical Assistance and Research Coordinating Group (STAR), under the lead of NMSS with participation by the other program offices.
All safeguarci contractual projects are reviewed by the Coordinating Group and the Group conducts followup reviews of each contrac-tual project.
In addition, the Coordinating Group maintains contact with i
NRC representatives on the DOE /NRC Safeguards Liaison Board to assure that NRC safeguards projects do not unnecessarily duplicate or overlap 00E
[
safeguards projects.
The NRC safeguards program is reviewed and approved annually by the Budget Review Group, the Executive Director of Operations, and the Commission during the budget process.
B.
Integrated Safeguards Plan The development of a formal Integrated Safeguards Plan was initiated in August 1977.
When completed it will provide a formal, long-term plan which, in its first phase, defined the current safeguards activities of all NRC offices that are engaged in the NRC safeguards program.
In its second phase, the plan will specify the goals and objectives of the total NRC safeguards program, delineate office responsibilities for achieving the safeguards goals and objectives of NRC, and assure overall coordination of NRC safeguards efforts.
Phase I was completed in March of 1978.
Phase II of the Integrated Safeguards Plan is scheduled to be completed in 1979.
C.
Coordination With Other Federal Agencies In its role as a regulatory agency, NRC has no response forces for responding to safeguards contingencies.
Therefore, NRC must rely on those Federal agencies that have authority, responsibility, knowledge, expertise, and capability for providing an active and timely response.
To date, the NRC has contacted 82 organizational elements of 28 Federal agencies and three national associations.
These contacts were made to determine what resources are available and of use to NRC, and what agreements would be needed for NRC to request any desired assistance.
NRC is preparing to negotiate " Memoranda of Understanding" with those agencies that can provide meaningful assistance to NRC.
E-2 i-m m,-
,,,isemmis a meanimm mui i mm u-i a
ui = m
= ' '
?,
k APPENDIX F l
GLOSSARY A
TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USE9 IN SAFEGUARDS ANNUAL REPORT Category I Equivalent to Formula Quantities of SSNM l
Material f
Category II Special nuclear material of moderate strategic
?
Material significance:
(1) Less than formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material, but in a quantity of more than 1,000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or more than 500 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium or in a combined quantity of more than 1,000 grams when computed by the equation, grams =(grams contained U-235)+2(grams U-233+ grams plutonium), or i
(2) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than i
20 percent in the U-235 isotope).
l Category III Special nuclear material of low strategic significance:
Material (1) Less than an amount of strategic special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance, but more than 15 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or 15 grams of uranium-233 or 15 grams of plutonium or the combination of 15 grams when computed by the j
equation, grams = grams contained U-235+ grams plutonium +
grams U-233, or (2) Less than 10,000 grams but more than 1,000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium j
enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent
[
in the U-235 isotope), or (3) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 contained in uranium enriched above natural but less than 10 percent in the U-235 isotope.
I y
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
}
DOE Department of Energy 7
00T Department of Transportation x
Effective (1) For plutonium and U-233 their weight in kilograms
-l Kilograms (2) For uranium with an enrichment in the isotope of SNM U-235 of 0.01 and above, its element weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment expressed as a decimal weight fraction.
F-1
-i i
I Effective (3) For uranium with an enrichment in the isotope Kilograms U-235 below.01 by its element weight in kilo-of SNM, cont'd.
grams multiplied by 0.0001
?
EIS Environmental Impact Statement EMT Executive Management Team ERA Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 ERDA Energy Research and Development Administration I
(now part of DOE) i Formula Strategic special nuclear material in any combination Quantity in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams =(grams contained U-235+2.5(grams U-223
+ grams plutonium))
FY Fiscal Year j
[
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency l
IAT Information Assessment Team ID Inventory Difference IE Office of Inspection and Enforcement IRACT Incident Response Action Coordination Team ISIS Integrated Safeguards Information System LLEA Local Law Enforcement Agencies i
i LWR Light Water Reactor NMSS Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards F
Non-Power Reactors used for research, training, testing, or
[
Reactors the production of radioisotopes
(
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commisssion i-NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i
E k
F-2
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration PWR Pressurized Water Reactor RES Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research SD Office of Standards Development SNM Special Nuclear Material SPER Security Plan Evaluation Report SSNM Strategic Special Nuclear Material STAR Safeguards Technical Assistance and Research Coordinating Group Strategic Uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 Special percent or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, Nuclear or plutonium Material F-3
d APPENDIX G SITE-SPECIFIC COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION RESULTS (FY 1978)
CLASSIFIED This Classified Appendix contains schedules and Summary Evaluations based on comprehensive evaluations at fuel cycle facilities.
l E
G-1 i
~
U.S. NUCLE AR HEGULATORY COMMIS$10N (7 77)
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG'0524
. TITLE AN D S'JBTl'TLE (Add Volume No., if appetrnate)
- 2. leave blank)
Annual Report to Congress or romestic Safeguards
- 3. RECIPIENT *S ACCESSION NO.
(Fiscal Year 1978)
- 7. AUTHOR CS)
- 5. D ATE REPORT COMPLETED l YEAR M ON TH January 1979
. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (Include Zip Codel DATE REPORT ISSUED
' MONTH Office of Manag uent and Program Analysis January DN U. S. Nuclear Regulatory: Commission g, ft,,,, y,,,,
Washington, D. C.
20555 8, (Leave blank)
Office.of %nagement and Program Analysis
'U. S. Nui: lear Regulatory Commission
- 11. CONTRACT NO.
Washington, D. C.
20555
- 13. TYPE OF HEPORT PE RIOD COVE RED (Inclusive dates) ctober 1, W - Weer M, M Report to Congress
- 15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
- 14. (Leave dank)
- 16. ABSTR ACT 000 words or less)
This report responds to a Congressional mandate (P.L.95-601) for NRC to prepare a report for fiscal year 1978 on the status of the Commission's Domestic Safe-guards Programs, with specific emphasis on an assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of safeguards at facilities and activities licensed by the Comission.
Safe. guards at NRC licensed facilities are intended.to protect the public _against significant risks associated with possible theft, diversion, or sabotage.
Dis-l cussions in the report cover: the scope of NRC safeguards activities, how NRC determines safeguards adequacy, NRC safeguards adequacy in fiscal year 1978, fiRC safeguards research and technical assistance, NRC future safeguards program, and NRC organization and management for safeguards.
%7. KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT AN ALYSIS 17a. DESCRIPTORS 17b. IDENTIFIE RSIOPEN-EN DE D TERMS
- 18. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
- 19. SE cue.lTY CLASS (This report)
- 21. NO. OF PAGES Unlimited
- 20. SECURITY CLASS (This pepe)
- 22. P RICE HCFORM 335 (7 77)