NUREG-0464, Denies 781023 Petition to Reconsider Issuance of Security, Personnel Qualification,Training & Equipment Requirements. NUREG-0219 & NUREG-0464 Do Not Overlap Guidance.Burden of Requirements Is Considered Acceptable
| ML19225A969 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/10/1979 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Knuth D KMC, INC. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19225A970 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907230187 | |
| Download: ML19225A969 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES f,,%
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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July 10, 1979 g
g CHAIRMAN Dr. Donald F. Knuth, Presidcnt KMC, Inc.
1747 Pennsylvania Ave., NW.
Washington, D.C.
20006 Dear Dr. Knuth-The Commission has considered your retition of October 23, 1978, to recon-sider issuance of the Security Per onnel Qualification, Training and Equip-s ment Requirements.
Your request was based on a series of comments under the headings of (1) " Nuclear Power Plant Requirements to Protect Against Fabotage," (2) "Use of Deadly Force," (3) " Perceived Threat Level of Sabo-tage," and (4) " Cost of Guard Training."
In reply to your first comment, the Commission believes that a more thorough analysis of response procedures than is required by 10 CFR 73.55 is necessary and is obtained by adherence to the requirements of the contingency plan rule.
However, if a licensee has addressed all the elements of the contin-gency plan rule in response to the other requirements of 2D CFR 73.55, then no additional informatio need be provided as a result of the contingency plan rule and duplication can be avoided.
With regard to your comment that there is an apparent overlap of guidance provided by NRC (NUREG-0219 and NUREG-0464) to support this rule, you should note that the scope and intent of these documents are considerably differ-ent.
NUREG-0219 primarily presents a method for determining the jobs to be assigned to security personnel and the associated performance objectives, whereas NUREG-0464 is one of many documents which can be used to train per-sonnel to meet these performance objectives.
You were also concerned that NUREG documents have the force and ef fect of regul ations.
The Commission has modified the draft documents that were out fer comment, and on which your petition was apparently based, to indi-cate that these documents are not mandatory.
NUREG-0219 and NUREG-0464, which were significantly revised in answer to public comments, contain statements which now make this clear.
In reply to your question concerning the need for " extensive paramilitary training in the use of deadly force," you should note that the physical secu-rity rules applicable to power reactors and the fuel cycle in fact incorpo-rate the requirement that licensees instruct guards to use deadly force when necessary in self-cefense and defense of others (see 10 CFR 73.55(h)(4)(v) ana 73.50(q)(4)).
Training in weapons use is a reasonable requirement when tne potential use c.f deadly force under certain circumstance may be needed
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Dr. Donald F. Knuth 2
and is recognized in the physical protection ru'les.
Additionally, weapons training can reduce the incidence of unnecessary or careless use of weapons.
In addition, you quote certain parts of a Commission briefing held on September 6,1978 (referred to in the petition as occurring on May 17, 1978),
to support the position that where state law imposes a duty to retreat before using deadly force, then use of high powered semiautomatic weapons, or the use of any other sophisticated offensive weapons, or the use o' offensive military tactics to attack potential saboteurs may be contrary to such state and local laws, and thus guard training and qualification in these areas are questionable without " clear Federal (NRC) direction enabling such employment."
The Commission believes that you misconstrue the applicable rules.
The response rule requires the licensee to instruct quards to use deadly force when the guard has a reasonable belief it is necessary in self-defense or defense of others.
State law sets the context for the use of such 'orce which may in a few states include restraints imposed by the duty to retreat concept.
To the extent a licensee's physical security plan incorperates the carrying or availability of specific weaponry dependfzw on the specific needs of the site, it is again reasonable to require training and qualifi-cation in the use of those weapons with the clear understanding that cir-cumstances of justifiable use are set by state law.
You also argue that providing the same level of protection for significant amounts of special nuclear materials and nuclear power plants is " arbitrary and capricious." The Comm'ssion notes that the number of security personnel, the level of training, and the qualification of these personnel are not r.ecessarily the same at nuclear power plants as they are for the protection cf forcula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM).
In fact, the Commission has proposed regulations which consicer the protection against a greater threat level for such SSNM than for nuclear power plants (43 FR 352 7, August 9, 1978).
Apart from this, the guard training rule srecifies that security personnel should be qualified to their assigned cuties, and their training should be equivalent if their duties are equiva-
'.ent whether they are protecting SSNM or nuclear power plants.
The new regulation, moreover, permits additional flexibility in that security per-sonnel need only be qualified and trained in accordance with their duties specified in the physical security plan.
The last issue you raise involves costs associated with meeting our regu-
.ations.
The costs to implement the requirements have been developed in tne value/ impact assessment (VIA) (in Public Document Room) that accompa-ried the rule.
While the cost estimates accompanying the VIA differ from jour estimates, in the long term, the VIA actually estimates a higher cost
- nan yours.
The Commission considers these small incremental costs to be worth the benefits in improved physical security they provide.
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Dr. Donald F. Knuth 3
With regard to the draining of resources, it is realized that safeguards does require additional resources.
However, as in safety where training and procedures are used to assure that health and safety will be maintained, proper training and qualification procedures for security personnel are needed to assure that safeguards incidents do not lead to events which could affect health and safety or be inimical to the common defense and security.
Also, it is expected that, af ter the initial development of the qualifica-tion and training plans, plant management can delegate the maintenance of these plans to the security org1nization.
For these reasons, the Commission has denied your petition as reflected in the enclosed FEDERAL REGI,1 n Notice.
iSincerely,
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Joseph M. Herdrie
Enclosure:
FEDERAL REGISTER Notice 1u15 301
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