ML19276G825
| ML19276G825 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1979 |
| From: | Boyd D, Ridgway K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19276G823 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-79-10-01, 50-155-79-10-1, IEB-79-08, IEB-79-8, NUDOCS 7908280214 | |
| Download: ML19276G825 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000155/1979010
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
.
REGION III
Report No. 50-155/79-10
Docket No. 50-155
License No. DPR-6
Licensee:
Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, MI 49201
Facility Name:
Big Rock Point Nuclear Generating Plant
Inspection At:
Big Rock Point Site, Charlevoix, MI
Inspection Conducted: March 16 May 6-10 and June 11-13, 1979
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Inspector:
K. R. Ridgwa
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Approved By:
D. C. Boyd Acting Chief
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Reactor Projects Section 3
Inspection Summary
Management meeting on March 16, 1979 (Report No. 50-155/79-10)
Areas Discussed: Annual review meeting for discussion of licensee
regulatory performance, areas of NRC concern, and current topies of
interest to the licensee. The management meeting was attended by six NRC
personnel and required three hours.
Inspection on May 6-10 and June 11-13, 1979 (Report No. 50-155/79-10)
Areas Inspected: Special, unannounced inspection of licensee activities
in response to IE Bulletin 79-08 including their response to the bulletin
and the operability and availability of engineered safety features (ESF),
administrative control of ESF, verification of ESF status, operating
procedures, surveillance tests an operator training. The inspection
involved 58 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in any
of the areas inspected.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
a.
Management Meeting, March 16, 1979 (Paragraph 2)
J. D. Selby, President, Consumers Power Company
R. C. Youngdahl, Executive Vice President
C. R. Bilby, Vice President, Production and Transmission
R. B. DeWitt, Manager of Nuclear Plant Operations
J. G. Lewis, Plant Superintendent, Palisades Nuclear Plant
C. J. Hartman, Plant Superintendent, Big Rock Point
Nuclear Plant
D. P. Hoffman, Assistant Nuclear Licensing Administrator
b.
Plant Operations Inspection, May 6-10 and June 11-13, 1979
(Paragraphs 3 throuFh 6)
- C. J. Hartman, Plant Superintendent
- D. E. DeMoor, Technical Engineer
R. F. Schrader, Technical Superintendent
- J. A. Rang, Operations-Maintenance Superintendent
- A. C. Sevent., Operations Supervisor
J. J. Popa, Maintenance Engineer
C. F. Sonncnberg, Shif t Supervisor
T. K. Pence, Shift Supervisor
F. J. Valade, Shift Supervisor
W. F. Blisset, Shift Supervisor
R. G. May, Shift Supervisor
E. F. Peltier, Shif t Supervisor
D. P. Blanchard, Reactor Engineer
- J. R. Fisher, QA Engineer
- J. F. Weed, QA Engineer
- R. W. Doan, Training Coordinator
J. A. Johnson, I&C Supervisor
D. Herboldsheimer, Maintenance Scheduler
- K. M. Brun, Senior Secretary
T. M. Brun, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
L. Oostermeyer, Senior Secretary
J. C. Alger, Control Operator
P. M. Donnelly, Control Operator
D. G. Lacroix, Control Operator
C. A. Dougherty, Control Operator
The inspectors contacted several other licensee employees,
including members of the technical, operations, and adminis-
trative grour.s.
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- Denotes those attending the management interview on May 10,
1979.
.
- Denotes those attending the management exit interview on
May 10 and June 13, 1979.
- Denotes those attending the management exit interview on
June 13, 1979.
2.
Annual Corporate Management Meeting
A meeting between members of licensee management (as noted in
Paragraph 1.a) and members of management at the NRC Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement was conducted on March 16,
1979, at the licensee's corporate office. The following topics were
discussed.
Enforcement - The licensee representatives were informed of the
a.
enforcement findings associated with the Big Rock Point Plant
during 1978.
Comparative statistics were also provided for
1976 and 1977.
b.
Licensee Event Reports - The licensee representatives were
provided with statistics relating to reported events, both on
an historical basis for Big Rock Point and on a comparative
basis between Big Rock Point and other operating facilities in
NRC Region III.
Management Controls - The licensee representatives were informed
c.
of areas of NRC Region III concern based on 1978 performance.
Specifically discussed were: The lack of control on some
aspects of the core spray ring project and some management
decisions during the plant startup in September 1978.
d.
IE Program Activities - The current and expected future IE
inspection program as it may impact on licensees was discussed.
Licensee personnel ind.
ed their objectives for improved plant
operations, reduced ent
- ement, and reduction of personnel related
problems.
3.
General
This inspection was conducted to review the response by the licensee
to Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 79-08 " Event Relevant to
Boiling Water Power Reactors Identified During Three Mile Island
Incident" and to verify that the actions requested in the bulletin
with respect to operator training, NRC telecommunications, and
reviews of engineered safety features (ESP) had been completed.
In
addition, the inspection consisted of an independent examination of
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ESF systems to verify that the systems were operable according to
technical specifications by review of procedures, administrative
.
controls, valve / breaker / switch checkoff lists and piping and instrument
diagrams.
The following systems were considered to be Engineered Safety Systems
in this inspection:
Post Incident System (Core Spray and Redundant Core Spray)
Emergency Condenser System
Reactor Poison System
Containment and Containment Sprays
Reactor Depressurization System
The reactor protection actuation circuitry was also reviewed briefly
as were portions of the nuclear steam system.
4.
Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Availability and Operability
The inspection included a review of ESF alignment procedures against
current piping and instrument diagrams to verify that the procedural
alignments do not compromise the availability or operability of
safety related components. Normal startup procedures from both cold
and hot shutdown conditions require the completion of valve checklists
before the startup can progress. This inspection also included a
review of any surveillance, special, and maintenance procedures to
establish that valves, breakers and/or switches in the ESF systems
are returned to pretest conditions or that normal prestartup check
sheet verification would be completed before the system operability
is required.
The licensee used alignment checklists following extended outages or
extensive maintenance work to assure proper lineup of valves and
valve switches. All breaker alignments can be verified by indicator
lights in the control room or by proper functioning of instruments
or equipment that are also carried on startup checklists.
In addition,
any open breakers or out of normal position valves and switches are
controlled by switching ,ad logging orders and workman's protective
tags or caution tag procedures which are under the control of the
Shift Supervisor. The checklists along with operating procedures,
surveillance test procedures, special procedures and maintenance
procedures were compared with piping and instrument line drawings to
verify correct positioning of valves and switches following tests
and during normal operations.
The review of system lineups ane:. test procedures did not identify
any instances of improper lineup control, such that the operability
or availability of ESF systems would be compromised.
A number of
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it: consistencies between procedures and piping and instrument digrams
and alignment checkoffs were noted.
A list of the inconsistencies
were provided to the licensee for his followup.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Administrative Control of Engineered Safety Features
Licensee administrative controls to assure proper return to service
of ESF systems and components following maintenance or test activities
and at the conclusion of extended outages are and have been subject
to continuing review by the NFC inspector. These areas were cursorily
reviewed during this inspection to determine if any changes had been
made th.,t might reduce the effectiveness of the Administrative
Procedure, A.4, General Operations Administrative Control, which
includes:
.. 4. 3
Key Control
A.4.6
Switching and Tagging Orders
A.4.6.1
Workmens Protective Tags
A.4.6.2
Caution Tags
A.4.7
Jumper, Link and Bypass Control
and Maintenance Department Administrative Procedures:
1.5.1
Maintenance Orders
1.5.11
Maintenance Suprevisors Review
1.5.12
Equipment Outage Request (EOR)
1.5.12.7
Returning Equipnent to Operable Status via
Use of the ECR
1.5.14
Notification ot Repair Completed
Based on this review, administrative controls are considered adequate
to assure proper return to service.
Discussions with licensee personnel concerning independent verification
of system lineups indicates that the lineup checks are made by
qualified operators (licensed or unlicensed); the lineups and test
data sheets are not reverified, but the sheets are approved by the
Shift Supervisor and reviewed by the Operations Supervisor to verify
completeness and accuracy of data.
Licensee tagging practice and procedures to provide control of
equipment, was reviewed during this insepetion.
The purpose of the
review was to determine the potential for tags to obscure position
indicators, meters or alarm lights.
It was noted that tags were
either bent or held in place by rubber bands so that significant
indicators would not be obscured.
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The inspector also reviewed the recent surveillance tests of ESF
systems to verify completeness and conformance to Technical
Specifications.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Current Status of Engineered Safety Features
Since the reactor will be shutdown until about September 1979, and
the fuel has been unloaded, it was decided that the independent
review of valve, breaker and switch alignments by the NRC inspector
would better be made just before startup follcwing this outage.
This will be cerried as an open inspection item.
7.
Staff Training
The inspector reviewed the training actions taken by the licensee in
response to IE Bulletin 79-08 and attended the first formal training
session concerning TMI conducted on May 9, 1979.
The licensee is
conducting this training in conjunction with operator retraining
sessions and will be concluded before the reactor is restarted. The
training covered the only procedural char.ge made as a result of the
licensee's review of the bulletin which concerned the manual isolation
of containment following an automatic isolation.
Manual isolation
is required to prevent the automatice reopening of containment if
and when the automatic trip clears.
Completion of the training is considered an open inspection item and
will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Operations Review
The inspector observed plant outage conditions which included the
removal of the new and old diffusers, control room manning, lock and
tag status of equipment and shift turn overs. Additionally, the
following records for the month of April 1979 were reviewed to
determine compliance with Technical Specifications and regulations
and to determine if Daily Orders and Operational Memos conflicted in
any way with operational requirements:
a.
Shift Supervisors Log, No. 101
b.
Reactor Log, No. 114
c.
Control Room Log, No. 210
d.
Daily Orders, No. 15
e.
Control Room Log Sheets
f.
Operations Memos
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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9.
Plant Status
t
In late April, as the plant was being restarted following refueling,
a small primary water leak at the F-2 Control Rod Thimble - Pressure
Vessel wall was discovered.
In addition, a vibration was noted in
the internal bottom vessel when the No. 1 Recirculation Pump was
operation. The fuel and other vessel internals had been removed
down to the lower core support plate.
By pressurizing the F-2
thiable vessel wall shrink fit junction with nitrogen, bubbles of
gas could be observed, via TV, coming out of the F-2 stub tube to
vessel wall weld inside the vessel.
Possible corrective measures
are still being evaluated. The skirt diffuser was removed and the
No. 1 Recirculation Inlet Diffuser was found to have come loore from
the vessel wall causing the vibrational noises.
Corrective measures
are being evaluated by the licensee and their contractor.
10.
Management Interviews
Management interviews (as shown in Paragraph 1) were conducted on
May 10, 1979, and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 13,
1979. The inspector discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
The following items were discussed:
The inspector adivsed the licensee that the independent review
a.
of the ESF systems procedures and administrative controls had
not identified any condition that would jeopardize ESF availa-
bility or operability.
b.
Notes made by tne inspector relating to inconsistencies and
apparent inaccuracies in procedures, piping and instrument
diagrams and lineup checksheets were provided to the licensee.
The inspector stated that the resolution of the list would be
reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
The inspector stated that verification of certain valve, breaker and
switches of ESF systems would be made prior to plant startup.
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