ML19275C956
| ML19275C956 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/13/1980 |
| From: | Brown G, Dawson J, Mustain M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19275C947 | List: |
| References | |
| 30-09664-79-01, 30-9664-79-1, NUDOCS 8005071128 | |
| Download: ML19275C956 (9) | |
Text
8 0 05 071 /% h REPORT OF INVESTIGATION IE Investigation Report No. 79-01 License No. 35-15727-01 Licensee: Star Jet Services P. O. Box 12336 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Subject:
Investigation of Allegations Period of Investigation:
November 7, 20, 21, and December 3 and 4, 1979 N"
d /3 80 Investigators:
Jean M. Dawson, Radiation Specialist Date u,
S W
Mithhel J. Mus
'in, 'Radihtion Specialist IDat*e Reviewed by:
3(//
//[///8 b
flgn"D. Brown, Chief,FublFacility
[Dath and Material Safety Branch
2 REASON FOR INVESTIGATION On November 6,1979, a former employee (individual A - see exhibit A) of Star Jet Services, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, contacted Region IV by telephone to report apparent items of noncompliance with NRC regulations and license conditions at Star Jet Services.
SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION To investigate the the validity of allegations made against the licensee.
These allegations included sloppy working habits, unauthorized use and disposal of radioactive material, improper handling and storage of radioactive sources, dosimeter and survey meter abuses, records fabrication and improper transportation, lack of training, failure to follow radioactive spill procedures, lack of security, intentional contamination of an individual, lack of surveys, and lack of vehicle placarding. The investigation involved ten hours by one inspector and 33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br /> by another inspector.
SUMMARY
OF FACTS 1.
On November 7, 1979, one inspector interviewed individual A and employees stationed in the Star Jet Services Blackwell, Oklahoma, office and observed buried contaminated rags at a well site.
Individual A was again inter-viewed on November 20, 1979, by two inspectors. On November 21, 1979, Oklahoma City personnel were interviewed and records were reviewed by two inspectors.
A records review was continued on December 3 and 4, 1979, by one inspector.
2.
The following items were substantiated as apparent items of noncompliance through acknowledgement by Star Jet Services representatives and the records review.
A.
License Condition 19; (1) Unauthorized burial.
See " Details," 3.R and 4.B.
(2) Survey and history protions of the Emergency Procedures not followed after a spill.
See " Details," 4.D.
(3) Handling tongs not used to handle source.
See " Details," 4.F.
(4) Utilization log, receipt and disposal records not maintained.
See " Details" 5.H, I, J.
3 (5) Film badges not provided; film badges not required to be worn; and assigned film badges worn by different individuals.
See " Details," 4.K and 5.D.
(6) Surveys not performed.
See " Details," 4.L & 5.F, G.
B.
License Condition 12; unauthorized users.
See ' Details,"
4.C & 5.B.
C.
10 CFR 19.12; training.
See " Details," 4.F and 5.C.
4 DETAILS 1.
Introduction An employee, recently dismissed from Star Jet Services, telephoned the NRC Region IV office on November 6, 1979, to report apparent items of noncompliance with NRC regulations and conditions of Star Jet Services, NRC issued license for byproduct material. An investigation was conducted during the period November 7, 1979, to December 4, 1979.
The investigation involved interviewing the individual who reported the apparent items of noncompliance, observing radioactive, contaminated rags buried at a well site, interviewing personnel at Star Jet Services Blackwell, Oklahoma, field office and a records review and interview of personnel in the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, office.
2.
Persons Contacted H. W. Patton, President and Radiation Safety Officer.
L. D. (Chuck) Robertson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Station Manager and Head of the of Profile Logging Department (responsible for radiation safety)
Michael Deal, Blackwell, Oklahoma Station Manager Jerry Stettnisch, Blackwell, Oklahoma Operator Laurence Beliel, Blackwell, Oklahoma rigger Individual A, dismissed Star Jet Services employee 3.
Interview of Individual A An inspector interviewed Individual A on November 7,1979, and two inspectors again interviewed Individual A on November 20, 1979.
Individual A alleged:
A.
Generally sloppy working habits.
B.
Burial of contaminated rags.
C.
Unauthorized individuals using licensed materials.
D.
A spill not being cleaned up.
E.
Lack of training.
F.
Handling a sealed source with rubber gloved hands rather than a handling tool.
G.
Not returning the source to the shielded container between job sites.
5 H.
Leaving the unattended source overnight in a container which was neither secured from removal from the vehicle nor locked to prevent removal of the source.
I.
Lack of security of radioactive materials in the Blackwell Oklahoma office; (1) Keys to the securing chain and lead pig attached to the Pig.
(2)
I-131 liquid left on the garage floor.
J.
Storing radioactive materials and explosives in the same location.
K.
Being tricked into transporting radioactive material without his knowledge nor NRC authorization.
L.
Intentional contamination by one employee of another.
M.
Film badge abuses; (1) Wearing of each others film badges.
(2) Film badges not being provided new employees in a timely manner.
(3) Film badges not always worn when working with licensed material.
N.
Survey meter abuses; (1)
Survey meters were sometimes not taken to job sites.
(2) Survey meters without good batteries were sometimes taken to job sites.
O.
Required surveys of job sites, vehicles and personnel were not always performed.
P.
Records were fabricated for surveys not actually performed.
Q.
Vehicle placards did not always indicate " radioactive material" when radioactive material was being transported.
6 R.
The interview on Fovember 7, 1979, of individual A included a visit to the Stockton - Thiele number 1 well site in Kay County, Oklahoma, where individual A had observed burial of I-131 contaminated rags.
The rags were buried under approximately 18 inches of dirt at the well site
'When the rags were surveyed with a Xetex beta gamma survey instrument, a reading of 0.6 mR/hr was obtained (see the attached statement made by Individual A-Exhibit B).
4.
Star Jet Services Personnel Interviews A.
Personnel of the Star Jet Services Blackwell, Oklahoma, office were interviewed on November 7,1979.
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, office personnel were interviewed on November 21, December 3, and December 4, 1979.
B.
The licensee stated that general working habits were not unnecessarily sloppy.
They did indicate, however, that contaminated rags were buried on job sites when they had been used to wipe off the injector tool after loading it with I-131.
The " Star Jet Services, Inc.
operators Radioactivity Manual," (hereafter referred to as the manual), Appendix C, IX, 3(b), states that no licensee shall dispose of radioactive materials by burial without a permit from Federal or State authorities.
C.
Blackwell personnel indicated that infrequently individuals different from and not always in the physical presence of those individuals listed on License Condition 12 would use licensed material.
D.
The Blackwell personnel acknowledged that an injector tool, lying on the shop floor, leaked fluid.
A survey meter, range setting not noted, taken near the spilled fluid indicated the spill contained radioactive materials.
A formal survey was not performed.
One Blackwell employee iudicated he did wipe up the spill, but did not prepare a history, of the accident such as that required by the manual, Appendix C, VIII, 2.
The manual also requires a survey to determine if safe levels were obtained by decontamination efforts.
This survey was not performed and the area released by the Radiological Safety officer.
E.
Blackwell personnel stated they had received on the job training.
F.
Handling the sealed source with the hands was represented as being prohibited by the Blackwell management staff.
The Manual, Appendix A, III, B states tongs shall be used when handling the source.
Enforcement of this po. icy, however, has been difficult and abuses were acknowledged.
Training to minimize exposure when handling the source was inadequate to prevent abuses.
7 G.
It was acknowledged that, during transport between well heads within a short distance of one another, the sealed source was left attached to the logging tool.
An attempt to shield the sealed source was made during the transport, but the effectiveness of the shielding was not evaluated.
H.
Although it is uncommon, a well logging vehicle, assigned to the Blackwell office, had been left unattended at a field site. A Blackwell office representative indicated the sealed source was placed in the locked, shooting cab. All personnel acknowledged that a general practice is made of leaving the keys, which open the source container and the padlock to the chain used in securing the container to the vehicle or a garage stud, attached to the source container.
The Blackwell personnel felt, however, that the source was secured from removal by the office building being locked when all personnel of the companies sharing the building have gone for the day. The presence of an intruder during work hours would be detected and so the radioactive material is secure from removal.
The Blackwell personnel indicated they kept I-131 and explosives together in the explosives magazine for short periods of time, rather than have the I-131 left on the garage floor where others would have access.
I.
All personnel acknowledged individual A was mistakenly asked to transport radioactive materials between the Oklahoma City office and the Blackwell office on a Sunday before a trap shoot in Tonkawa, Oklahoma.
All personnel indicated that Mr. H. W. Patton recognized that individual A was not authorized to transport the material and precluded him from transporting the radioactive material.
J.
The individual, purportedly intentionally contaminated, and the individual, purported to have wiped liquid I-131 on the other, in-dicated the incident had not occurred.
Other personnel indicated they had no knowledge of such an incident.
K.
Film badge abuses were acknowledged by company representatives.
The abuses include not providing employees with a film badge in a timely manner, film badges being worn by individuals other than the individuals to whom they were assigned, and film badges not being worn during all operations involving radioactive material.
The manual, Appendix A, III requires all personnel related to activity involving radioactive materials wear a film badge.
L.
Company officials indicated they had been experiencing maintenance problems with their survey meters and acknowledged operable survey meters were not available for all jobs involving radioactive materials.
As a result surveys of job sites, vehicles, buildings, storage areas and personnel were not always performed as required by
8 the manual, Appendix B, III and Appendix C, VIII.
Company personnel denied survey records were fabricated for any period of time when a survey meter was not available to perform surveys.
M.
Vehicle signs were represented as indicating " Radioactive Material" on all occasions except one.
No one was able to remember a date when this incident occurred.
N.
The Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, offices had been moved during the month of August, 1979, from 91 No. Council to 9208 W. Reno Rt 3.
5.
Records Review A.
A review of records was performed on November 21, December 3 and 4,
-1979, in the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, office.
B.
This review indicated that licensed material was not u. sed in the physical presence of any of the individuals listed by License Condition 12 on September 18, 1979, at the Christensen E#5 job site in Nowata County, Oklahoma.
C.
A Gulf Nuclear training course was attended by individuals listed on License Condition 12 with records maintained.
On the job training for other employees working with radioactive materials was inadequate to instruct them in health protection problems associated with exposure to radioactive materials, procedures to minimize their exposure, the purposes and functions of protective devices employed, NRC regulations, and the procedures contained in the "ctar-Jet Services, Inc. Operators Radioactivity Manual."
D.
Film badge records compared with individual A's approximate date of employment showed a film badge was not provided during the period April, 1979, to August, 1979.
E.
A Ludlum instrument (serial number 3971) calibrated on February 16, 1979, was used on September 18, 1979, at the Christensen E#5 job site in Nowata County, Oklahoma.
In general, however, the instrument calibration program appeared adequate.
F.
No quarterly building or storage area surveys, nor monthly vehicle surveys were made during the period August 23, 1977, to December 4, 1979.
G.
No surveys of personnel, wellhead, tools, or vehicle were made for the Corley Ginther Oil Corporation job (job ticket number 800-2) on August 23, 1979.
9 11.
Receipt records were not maintained for I-131 received during the period August 23, 1977, to December 4, 1979.
I.
Disposal records were not maintained for a nominal 30 millicuries I-131 which was shipped on April 11, 1979.
J.
Utilization records were inadequate to demonstrate the use of I-131 during the period August 23, 1977, to December 4, 1979.
K.
An internal audit system has not been used during the period August 23, 1977, to October, 1979.
A new position was created during October, 1979, to allow for an individual to be responsible for an internal audit system, records keeping system, training, and regulation compliance.