ML19275A746
| ML19275A746 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1979 |
| From: | Cole R, Glaser M, Shon F Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910190069 | |
| Download: ML19275A746 (26) | |
Text
N l 's m D
h i k
g3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
/
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 9.,
p
'ra In the Matter of SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT Docket No. 50-312 (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station)
ORDER RULING ON SCOPE AND CONTENTIONS In our Prehearing Conference Order of August 3, 1979, we directed, inter alia, that all parties confer regarding a possible stipulation of contentions and that all parties submit briefs on the scope of this Board's jurisdiction in this pro-ceeding (Prehearing Conference Order at p.
2).
On August 17, Intervenors Friends of the Earth, Environ-mental Council of
- Sacramento, Original SMUD Ratepayers Associa-tion (ME) noted that they had been enable to reach an agreement with other parties on their contentions (Statement of Petitioner Friends of the Earth).
On August 20, the NRC Staff submitted its Response of NRC Staff to Contentions of Intervenors and to Issues of Interested State (Staff's Response) in which the Staff noted it had been orally advised that FOE would stand on its Revised Contentions for Prehearing Conference (M E Revised) as submitted August 1.
On August 20, the California Energy Commission (CEC) sub-mitted its Revised Statement of Issues of Concern to the CEC (CEC Revised).
1179 130 069 "l910190
?
G
. On August 17, Intervenors Gary Hursh and Richard Castro (Hursh-Castro) submitted Contentions of Petitioners Gary Hursh and Richard Castro (Hursh-Castro Revised ).
NRC Staff submitted responses to Hursh-Castro Revised on August 28.
On August 27, CEC submitted a Motion of CEC for Leave to Reply to the " Response of SMUD to Revised Statement of Issues of Concern to CEC."
The Motion also included the reply.
Leave is hereby granted to CEC and the matters discussed in the reply have been considered by us in issuing this Order.
Licensee (SMUD) submitted separate responses to the revised contentions and issues:
Statement of SMUD on Revised Contentions Presented by FOE, dated August 16; Response of SMUD to Revised Statement of Issues of Concern to CEC, dated August 17 ;. Response of SMUD to Contentions of Petitioners Gary Hursh and Richard Castro, dated August 20.
All p'.rties except Hursh-Castro. submitted briefs on the scope of the hearing, CEC on August 27, FOE on August 27, SMUD on August 24, and Staff on August 27.
In order to formulate a sound basis for deciding the admissibility of contentions, we have first carefully considered the arguments presented in the briefs regarding scope of the proceeding.
At the outset of this Order, we wish to make clear that the phrase "related to the action taken by the Commission i179 131
. in its May 7 order," as used in footnote three at page three of our July Order, includes all matters and issues which hinge upon response to feedwater transients.
We reject the narrow position on the scope of this proceeding asserted by SMUD that no responses beyond the immediate effect on the secondary coolant system should be included.
In this proceeding, it will be appropriate to investigate questions concerning the propagation of a response throughout the Rancho Seco system, where " system" includes the physical facilities as well as the organization and personnel which operate them.
We recognize, of course, that such an interpretation can arguably be construed to include emergency responses, especially since, at Three Mile Island, some emergency response action ultimately resulted from a feed-water transient.,We believe, however, that to include the subject of emergency response as an issue here would be contrary to established Commission policy as enunciated by the Appeal Board in Douglas Point that:
"...[T]he Vermont Yankee line of cases stands for the proposition that licensing botrds should not accept in individual license pro-ceedings contentions which are (or are about to becomd the subject of general rulemaking..."
(8 AEC 79 at 85)
In this regard the Commission has recently published notice of its intent to engage in rulemaking on the subject of emergency 1179 i32
. response plans.
(44 F.R.
41483, July 17, 1979).
This published notice thus removes the_ issue of emergency response from those that we may consider as relevant to this proceeding.
As to "various transient events" as the phrase is used at page four of the Commission's May 7 Order, we believe that, taken in the context of page five of that same Order, the scope of this proceeding can be expanded no further than "... feedwater and/or trip of the turbine..."
We will, therefore, not allow matters such as loss of off-site power to be raised and con-sidered among the contentions here.
Within the frame of these ground rules, we turn now to the specific issues and contentions of CEC and the Intervenors.
CEC Issues We are here confronted with a series of matters styled
" issues" by CEC in its Revised Statement, on which CEC, as a representative of an interested State pursuant to 10 CFR 9 2.715 (c ), wishes to participate without assuming any burden of going forward.
(Brief of CEC on the Scope of the Licensing Board's Jurisdiction and Comments on the Burden of Going Forward on Contentions,
- p. 8).
This de:. ire parallels, in considerable part, the role which an interested State sought to assume in the River Bend case (Gulf State Utilities, Co.,
Docket Nos.
50-458, 50-459, River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2).
In that case the Appeal Board noted:
1-179 133
. "The Board is entitled to insist, however, that any new issue raised be framed with sufficient detail and preciseness.
Cf.
A hearing participant
'must be specific as to the focus of the desired hearing.'
BPI v. Atomic Energy Commission, 502 F.2d 424, 429 (D.C.Cir. 1974).
And contentions (or their equivalent in the case of an ' interested state') serve the pur-pose of defining the ' concrete issues which are appropriate for adjudication in tb-pro-ceeding.'
Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-107, 6 AEC 188, 191, affirmed, C LI 12, 6 AEC 241 (1973), affirmed sub. nom. BPI v.
Atomic Energy Commis sion, supra."
(6 NRC 760 at 768-69).
"Early in the ensuing hearing, after extensive oral argument, the Licensing Board ruled that the mere notation of TSAR and SER items and of regulatory guides was insufficient (Tr.
1657-59).
Such notations, standing alone, were thought by the Board not to provide
'a fair opportunity to other parties to know precissly what the limited issues (are),
exactly what proof, evidence or testimony is required to meet that issue and exactly what support the State intends to adduce for its allegations' (Tr. 1658; 4 NRC at 298).
What was required in addition were allegations es-tablishing, with respect to each item or guide, a relationship to the River Bend application (4 NRC at 312-13)...."
(6 NRC at 771).
..."[I}t was not erroneous for the Licensing Board to have imposed its nexus requirement.."
(6 NRC 773).
Much of what CEC has submitted (vide infra) is in the nature of quotations from NRC Staff reports, taken out of context and with no specific nexus shown to the subject of this i179 i34
. proc eeding.
Although we recognize that the posture of this case is vastly different from that of River Bend where the State introduced its lists of quoted Staff report items at (or near) the end of a case whose hearings and pretrial prepara-tion had started (and been largely completed) months before, nonetheless, we are bound by its holding.
However, this case is in its early stages, and we believe CEC should be given the opportunity to clarify those issues which it suggests will have a significant effect on the outcome of this proceeding.
Accordingly, we review below each of CEC's " issues" and, where we have decided the subject matter to be within the scope of this proceeding, we either (1) refer it to CEC for submission of a succinct contention or (2) frame a Board Question based upon it.
The basis for treating an issue as f alling within category (1) or (2) below is the Board's understanding of the subject matter raised from our review of CEC's August 17, 1979 Revised Statement, and the gravity of any safety question it may raise.
The CEC will have 15 days from the issuance of this Order to submit succinct contentions where indicated, or to request reconsideration of the Board Questions.
If reconsidera-tion is not requested, these Questions will stand as we reworded them, and will be in issue in the hearing stages of this pro-ceeding.
CEC's issues set forth in its Revised Statement are ten in number, but several (e.g. number one) have unnumbered sub-parts 1179 135
. ranging to as many as twenty-five.
For convenience of reference, we have numbered these sub-parts as we have treated them, below (e.g.
1-1, 1-2, 3-1, 3-2, etc.).
For further identification we have added the references cited by CEC in excerpts quoted under Issue 1.
Issue 1:
This issus merely restates the wording from page two of the Commission's June 27 Order, identifies certain Staff documents, and lists twenty-five quotes out of context
.from those documents.
Accordingly, we considered each quote as suggesting a proposed issue:
1-1 (NUREG-0578, p.6):
This quote states a " lesson learned" but we see no connection to the question of adequacy of the short term modifications and actions described in sub-para gra phs (a) through (e) of Part IV of the Commission's Order.
(Subparagraphs a-e).
CEC will be given 15 days to resubmit this issue as a succinct contention.
1-2 (NRR Status Report, April 25, p.
1-5):
We see this as reasonably defining an important issue.
Accordingly, we have reworded it as follows:
Board Question CEC-1-2:
Can poor understanding of natural convection in the Rancho Seco system result in a situation that will lead 1179 136
to 1.Idequate cooling despite the modifications and actions of Subparagraphs a through e of Section IV of the Commission's Order of May 7.
1-3 (NUREG-0578, p. 6):
CEC may resubmit this matter in the form of a succinct contention.
1-4 (NUREG-0578,
- p. 7):
We believe this statement defines an issue and have framed it based upon our understanding as follows:
Board Question CEC-1-4:
Will the failure of safety and/or relief valves in the Rancho Seco primary system result in an unsafe condition despite the modifications and actions of Sub-
~
paragraphs a-e of Section IV of the Commission's Order of May 77 1-5 (NUREG-0578,
- p. 7):
This statement is too vague to form the basis of an issue.
CEC may reword it as a succinct contention.
1-6 (NUREG-0578,
- p. 10):
We believe this defines an issue:
Board Question CEC-1-6:
Will the modifications of Subparagraphs a-e of Section IV of the Commission's Order of May 7 still leave the Rancho Seco emergency feedwater system in a condition of low reliability?
ll[t) l}7
-g-1-7 (NUREG-0578,
- p. 11):
We believe this defines an issue:
Board Question CEC-1-7:
Do the operator training actions responding to Subparagraph (d) of Subparagraphs a-e of Section IV of the Commission's Order of May. 7 for Rancho Seco fail to give sufficient attention to providing appropriate analytical bases for operator actions?
l-8 (NUREG-0578,
- p. 12):
We see no issue here.
The statement is overly broad and ultimately notes that improvements in many matters "will be recommended."
The overly broad nature of the statement puts it beyond the scope of the present hearing.
1-9 (NUREG-0560,'p. 2):
We see no issue here.
The statement lacks both specificity and nexus.
CEC may however resubmit it as a succinct contention.
.-10 (NUREG-0560, p.
8-2):
We believe an issue exists here:
Board Question CEC-1-10 :
Is the physical configuration of the Rancho Seco primary system such as to permit unsafe accumulation of steam or other gases despite the modifications and actions of Subparagraphs a-e of Section IV of the Commission's Order of May 7?
1179 138
. 1-11 (NUREG-0560,
- p. 8-3):
We believe this extract is substantially intended to suggest the matter raised in Castro-Hursh Contention 2.
We therefore have consolidated it with that contention.
1-12 (NUREG-0560, p.
8-3):
This seems a mere observation of fact.
We see no issue here under any circumstances and reject it as a matter in contention in this proceeding.
1-13 (NUREG-0560, p.
8-4):
This extract merely addresses alleged inadequacies in requirements and criteria for plant process controls.
To the extent it might be made more specific it appears to be a challenge to NRC Regulations which is barred from our consideration by 10 CFR 92.758.
1-14 (NUREG-0560,
- p. 8-5):
This extract, if it raises issues at all, is subsumed by either Board Question CEC-1-4 or Board Question CEC-1-7 above.
1-15 (NUREG-0560, p.
8-7):
This statement concerning TMI does not seem directly related to Rancho Seco.
It is beyond the scope of this hearing.
1-16 (NUREG-0560, p.
8-7 ) :
This statement regarding operators' abilities to respond to off-normal col litions neither specifies conditions to which they cannot respond nor suggests that required retraining under Subparagraphs a-e of the Commission'.s i179 139
. Order of May 7 is specifically deficient.
CEC may resubmit this issue as a specific contention.
1-17 (NUREG-0560,
- p. 8-9):
This has neither specificity nor a nexus to Rancho Seco.
CEC may reword it to show some connection between the single failure criterion and deficiencies in the training actions of Subparagraphs a-e.
1-18 (NUREG-0560,
- p. 8-11):
We see neither specificity nor a nexus to Rancho Seco as written.
CEC may reword this issue to indicate in what way the proposed retraining operations of Sub-paragraphs a-e fail to embody the concept.
1-19
'(NUREG-0560,
- p. 8-11):
This excerpt is so vague and so lacking in nexus to Rancho Seco that we see no way it could form the basis for an issue.
It is therefore rejected.
1-20 (NUREG-0560,
- p. 8-12):
This excerpt is vague and without nexus to Rancho Seco.
We see no way it could lead to an issue.
It is rejected.
1-21 (NUREG-0 560,
- p. 8-13):
This excerpt is vague and shows no nexus to Rancho Seco.
We see no way it could form an issue.
It is rejected.
1-22 (NUREG-0560,
- p. 8-14):
This excerpt is vague and shows no nexus to Rancho Seco.
It is rejected.
I179 140
1-23 (NUREG-0560,
- p. 8-15):
If this excerpt includes any issue at all, it is a challenge to Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, and as such, it is inadmissible under 10 CFR 92.758.
1-24 (NUREG-0560,
- p. 8-16):
We see neither nexus nor specificity here.
CEC may rewrite this issue to show what technical specifica-tions (in addition to those which may be covered in Subparagraphs a-e of the Commission's Order of May 7) must be altered and how.
1-25 (Letter Mattimoe to Engelken):
We find this excerpt vague.
CEC may reword it to establish why the modifications and actions of Subparagraphs a-e do not accou,nt for this.
Issue 2:
This issue merely restates a part of the Commission's Order of June 27 and alleges that the Board should consider
" additional actions" without specifying wha t those actions may be.
It cannot be read to present a specific issue in any sense and is rejected.
Issue 3:
This issue addresses the matter of operator training and suggests that the operator training matters dealt with in (b) and (d) of Subparagraphs a-e of the Commission's Order of May 7, and in the final matter among the long-term modifications
!179 141
. of the Commission's Order of May 7, have not properly included certain features.
We have decided this issue in sub-parts, and have ruled upon them below.
3-1 This question is acceptable as a contention in issue here to the extent that it inquires whether the subjects mentioned are included in operator training.
3-2 This question is acceptable as a contention to the extent that it inquires whether new information will be regularly incorporated in the training program.
3-3 This question is acceptable as a contention pro-vided it is not meant to include training in emergency response plans offsite, but only in-plant responses to emergency conditions.
3-4 This matter is clearly beyond the scope of the present hearing and is rejected.
3-5 We see no indication of any specific control room changes which are needed.
We will allow CEC to reword this issue, specifying what changes must be made.
I179 142
. 3-6 We view this issue as too vague as stated.
We will allow CEC to rewrite it, indicating which design margins have been reduced.
3-7 This appears merely to repeat matters mentioned under Issue 1, above.
It is included under Issue 1.
Issue 4:
As noted above, emergency planning will not be con-sidered in this proceeding.
Issue 5:
This issue ident f tes in its sub-parts certain modifica-tions which CEC apparently believes may be needed in addition to the modifications and actions of Subparagraphs a-e and the long-term modification set forth by the Commission in its May 7 Order.
We will accept the first two sub-issues (5-1, 5-2) as issues in this proceeding.
We note, however, that CEC is expected to offer evidence that these additional measures will be required.
As to sub-issue 5-3 and its parts a,
b, c, d, and e, we rule as follows:
5-3a This sub-issue raises a subject for consideration in this proceeding.
Board Question CEC-5-3a :
Are the special features and instruments installed at Rancho Seco adequate to aid in diagnosis 1179 l43
. and control after an off-normal condition engendered by a loss-of-feedwater transient?
5-3b This sub-Issue is subsumed in previously addressed issues, Issues 3 and 1 above.
5-3c CEC may reword this issue to indicate what systems at Rancho Seco have deficiencies of the types in-tended and what those deficiencies are.
5-3d CEC may reword this sub-issue to identify specific design feature inadequacies at Rancho Seco.
5-3e This sub-tss,ue appears to urge inclusion of a hydrogen recombiner as an additional modification to Rancho Seco.
If so, this issue is hereby con-solidated with Castro-Hursh Contention 20.
Issue 6:
We see no indication that operation at reduced power is a proper precaution against feedwater transients.
CEC may rewrite this issue to show which margins of safety would be so reduced and by how much.
Issue 7:
CEC has not raised a succinct contention in its present form.
CEC may rewrite to indicate wha t specific features are being required of "new plants" which Rancho Seco lacks.
1179 144
. Issues 8-10:
We understand that CEC has withdrawn these issues.
(Motion of CEC for Leave to Reply to the " Response of SMUD to Revised Statement of Issues of Concern to CEC," August 27).
In cummary, the following CEC issues are rejected for the reasons given above:
1-8, 1-12, 1-13, 1-15, 1-19, 1-20, 1-21, 1-22, 1-23, 2, 3-4, 4.
The following issues may be rewritten and resubmitted by CEC in 15 days if CEC wishes to pursue them:
1-1, 1-3, 1-5, 1-9, 1-16, 1-17, 1-18, 1-24, 1-25, 3-5, 3-6, 5-3c, 5-3d, 6,
7.
We have based Board Questions on the following issues:
1-2, 1-4, 1-6, 1-7, 1-10, 5-3a.
The following issues have been consolidated with other admitted issues:
,1-11, 1-14, 3-7, 5-3b, 5-3e.
The following issues are accepted as contentions in this proceeding:
3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 5-1, 5-2.
For convenience, we set forth below the admitted CEC issues and the Board Questions based upon proposed CEC issues.
The parties are cautioned, however, that the scope of certain of these issues is limited in accordance with our discussion of the bounds of this proceeding in the paragraphs above.
Board Question CEC-1-2:
Can poor understanding of natural convection in the Rancho Seco system result in a situation that will lead to inadequate cooling despite the modifications and actions of Subparagraphs a-e?
1179 i45
17 -
Board Question CEC-1-4:
Will the failure of safety and/or relief valves in the Rancho Seco primary system result in an unsafe condition despite the modifications and actions of Sub-paragraphs a-e?
Board Question CEC-1-6:
Will the modifications of Subparagraphs a-e still leave the Rancho Seco emergency feedwater system in a condition of low reliability?
Board Question CEC-1-7:
Do the operator training actions responding to Subparagraph (d) of Subparagraphs a-e for Rancho Seco fail to give sufficient attention to providing ap-propriate analytical bases for operator actions?
Board Question CEC-1-10:
Is the physical configuration of the Rancho Seco primary system such as to permit unsafe accumulation of steam or other gases despite the modifications and actions of Subparagraphs a-e?
CEC 1 :
Whether personnel adequately understand the mechanics of the facility, basic reactor physics, and other funda-mental aspects of its operation?
CEC-3 -2 :
Whether personnel are properly apprised of new informa-tion pertinent to the facility's safe operation and ability to respond to transients, particularly information on 1179 146 operating experience of other reactors?
. CEC-3-3:
Whether NRC and SMUD adequately ensure that emergency instructions are understood by and are available to plant personnel in a manner that allows quick and effective implementation during an emergency?
CEC-5-1:
Whether those systems identified as contributing to releases of radioactivity during the TMI accident, which are outside containment, should be changed to vent into the containment building?
CEC-5-2:
Whether the containment building should be modified to provide overpressurization protection with a controlled filtered ven. ting system to mitigate unavoidable releases of radionuclides?
Board Question CEC-5-3a:
Are the special features and instruments installed at Rancho Seco adequate to aid in diagnosis and control af ter an off-normal condition engendered by a loss-of-feedwater transient?
Ii79 147
. CONTENTIONS OF CASTRO AND HURSH The Board has reviewed the August 17, 1979 filing of revised contentions of Gary Hursh and Richard Castro and has considered the comments and filings of all parties.
Contentions 2, 3,
4, S,
6, 7,
8, 9,
10, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 34 are accepted.
Proposed Con-tentions 1, 11-15, 17-19, 23, 27, 28 and.33 are denied.
Contentions 1 and 27, dealing with the sensitivity of B&W reactors and separate control and operation of the feed-water and auxiliary system respectively, are vague and lack the specificity and basis required under 10 CFR $2.714(b) and accordingly, must be denied.
The subject matter of these contentions does however appear to be included among the list of subjects both Applicant and NRC Staff will address in the course of this proceeding.
Intervenors Hursh and Castro will therefore be able to address the subjects encompassed under denied Contentions 1 and 27 by cross-examination of Applicant and Staff testimony.
Contentions 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19 and 23 dealing respectively with the subjects of Emergency Plan Upgrading, Emergency Operation Center, Offsite Radiation Monitoring, State / Local Emergency Plans, Emergency Plan Instrumentation, Evacuation Capability, Evacuation Plan Adequacy and Emergency 1179 148 Notification Procedures, although, in this Board's opinion, are within the scope of this proceeding, are denied as being 1/
the subject of imminent Commission rulemaking.-
Contentions which are about to become the subject of general rulemaking 2/
are not proper subjects for litigation in individual proceedings.-
Contentions 15, 28, and 33 dealing with the subjects of Waste Management Capabilities, Offsite Power, and Adequacy of NRC assistance,respectively, are outside the scope of these proceedings there being no demonstrated nexus between these sub-jects and any of the stated issues in this proceeding and accordingly are denied.
The contentions of Petitioners Gary Hursh and Richard Castro as accepted by the Board are as follows:
Contention 2, Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, is designed with a steam generator which operates with relatively small liquid volume in the secondary side and therefore is unsafa and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Contention 3 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has a lack of direct initiation of reactor trip upon the occurrence of off-normal conditions in the feedwater system, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of the Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
1,/
44 F.R. 41483, July 17, 1979.
2/
Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79 (1974).
1i79 149 Contention 4 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has a reliance on integrated control system to automati-cally regulate feedwater flow, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Contention 5 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has an actuation before reactor trip of a pilot operated relief valve on the primary system pressurizer which, if the valve sticks open, can aggravate an accident, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Contention 6 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has a low steam generator elevation, relative to the reactor vessel, which provides a smaller driving head for natural circulation, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Contention 7' Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has insufficient timeliness and reliability of the emergency feedwater system, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, con-stituents of Petitioners and the public.
Contention 8 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor does not have operating procedures for initiating and controlling the emergency feedwater system independent of the integrated control system control, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Ii79 150 Contention 9 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed recctor, has not installed adequate hard-wire control grade reactor trip on loss of main feedwater and/or on turbine trip, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Contention 10 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has not completed an adequate analysis for potential small breaks in a loss-of-coolant accident nor developed and implemented operating instructions to define operator action in such event, and therefore is unsafe and en-dangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Contention 16 SMUD, the licensee, has done insufficient analysis of the failure mode and effects analysis of the integrated con-trol system, and therefore Rancho Seco is unsafe and en-dangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Contention 20 Rancho Seco,'being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, does not have a hydrogen recombiner which may be necessary in the event of an accident caused by a loss of feedwater transient, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Contention 21 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has a pressurizer tank and quench tank which are of in-adequate size to accommodate the volume of gas or liquid that may be required to be stored in the event of a loss of feedwater transient, and therefore is unsafe and en-dangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Contention 22 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, does not provide control room operators with sufficient data on the water level in the pressurizer and vessel because the operators must inter ret information on temperature and oressure in the rimary loon and extrap-olate water level and therefore is unsafe End endan the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents ofers Petitioners and the public.
}jfi}} Contention 24 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and 'Wilcox designed reactor, is unable to avoid or control bubble formation in the primary system which may occur subsequent to a loss of feedwater accident, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public. Contention 25 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, does not have control room instrumentation which would indicate if the auxiliary feedwater or pressurizer relief valves are open or closed or the instrumentation to open or close such valves automatically, and therefore is un-safe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public. Contention 26 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has a once through steam generator which makes the plant more susceptible and sensitive to a loss of feedwater transient, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public. Contention 29 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has insufficient instrumentation and capability to immediately retrieve necessary information or data during a loss of feedwater transient and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, con-stituents of Petitioners and the public. Contention 31 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has a control room configuration which is poorly and in-adequately designed for plant operators to avoid a loss of feedwater transient, and therefore is unsafe and en-dangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public. Contention 32 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, is operated by personnel and management whose competence 1179 I52 has not been adequately tested and evaluated, namely testing has not been conducted as to whether such employees can act responsibly and appropriately to make judgment decisions during a loss of feedwater transient, personnel interviews have not been con-ducted to properly evaluate the test results with such employees and some employees have never been tested because of grandfathering, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the pub lic. Contention 34 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has not adequately trained unlicensed operators to respond to orders necessary for action which would be required in the event of loss of feedwater transient, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public. CONTENTIONS OF EDE The Board has reviewed the August 1, 1979 revised list of contentions of consolidated Intervenors Friends of the Earth, Enviror. mental Council of Sacramento and Original SMUD Rate-payers Association (FOE) and has considered the comments and filings of all parties. Contentions III(a) and III(d) are accepted as proposed. Contentiom III(c) and III(e) are accepted as modified by the Board and stated herein. With specific reference to Contentions III(d) and III (e ), Intervenor FOE will be expected to identify any procedures not taken that would lead to a level of adequate safety, i179 153 Paragraphs I and II are considered introductory in that they contain general comments as to the purpose and scope of the proceeding. They do not contain any contentions that meet the specificity and basis requirements of 10 CFR $2.714 (b). Contention III(b) concerning emergency response and evacuation planning is denied because the Commission is currently considering ~ rulemaking on the subject of emergency planning. Individual proceedings are not proper forums for subjects involved in or about to be involved in Commission 3/ rulemaking proceedings.- The contentions of F0E as accepted by the Board are as follows: Contention III(a) The NRC order,s in issue do not reasonably assure adequate safety because the orders fail to evaluate or comment upon the acceptability of 27 feedwater transients over the past year in nine Babcock and Wilc ox (B&W) reactors, a frequency which is 50 percent greater than the corresponding rate for other pressurized reactors. Contention III(c) The NRC orders in issue do not reasonably assure adequate safety because there is no reasonable time for implementation of the long-term modifica-tions established in the Commission orders. 3/ ALAB-218, supra. 1179 154 Contention III(d) The NRC orders in issue do not reasonably assure adequate safety because no procedures have been taken to assure facility management competence. Contention III(e) The NRC orders in issue do not reasonably assure adequate safety because no procedures exist or have been taken for the determination of the adequacy of operator competence. IT IS SO ORDERED. FOR THE A'IOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD RichaFd F. Cole /* 'Y Q s Frederick J. Sh p/ Y l'( fO g Michael L. Glaser, Chairman Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 5th day of October, 1979. 1179 155}}