Text

Amend 59 to License DPR-3,incorporating Limiting Conditions & Surveillance Requirements for Proper Operation of RCS Overpressure Protection Sys
	ML19275A353
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	09/14/1979
From:	Ziemann D; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML19275A343	List: ML19275A342; ML19275A353; ML19275A356; ML19275A361;
References
	TASK-05-03, TASK-5-3, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7910040160
	Download: ML19275A353 (23)
	v • d • e

.

pu nto fi uq[g UfJITED STATES y } g( 3 g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

.; j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

%; N %. /

YANKEE ATMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-299 YANKEE NbCLEAR POWER STATION (YANKEE-ROWE)

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amandment No.59 License No. DPR-3 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Yankee Atomic Electric Company (the licensee) dated June 5,1978, (Proposed Change No.161) compl'as with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissi a's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in confomity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities autnorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of tl:e public, and (ii) that such activities will be ccnducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

T010040160 4 i100 028

, 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment' to this license amendment. and paragraph 2.C.(2) of facility Operating License No. DpR-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specification The Technical S'pecifications contained in Appendix A, as revised th.ough Amendment No. 59, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This ifcense amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Yhus t/

p 4

t Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: September 14, 1979 4

1100 029

s.,

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 59 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-3 DOCKET N0. 50-29 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the following pages and inserting the enclosed pages.

The revised pages contain the captioned amendment number and vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Overleaf pages are included for document completeness.*

PAGES IV V

3/4 4-4 3/4 4-5 3/4 4-Sa (new page) 3/4 4-7 3/4 5-9 3/4 5-10 3/4 5-11 3/4 5-12 B 3/4 4-1 B 3/4 4-2 B 3/4 5-2

'; age 3/4 4-6 is only incluced for overleaf deletien.

I100 030'-

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION Pa,qe, 3/4.0 APPLI'CABILITY.............................................

3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL Shutdown Margir. - Tavg " 330*F..........................

3/4 1-1 Shutdown Margin - T,yg < 330*F..........................

3/4 1-3 Scron Dilution.........................................

3/4 1-5 Moderator Temperature Coefficient......................

3/4 1-7 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS Flow Paths - Refueling.................................

3/4 1-8 Flow Paths - Shutdown..................................

3/4 1-9 Flow Paths - Operating.................................

3/4 1-11 Charging Pumps - Refueling.............................

3/4 1-13 Charging Pump - Shutdown...............................

3/4 1-14 Cha rging Pumos - Operating.............................

3/4 1-15 Boric Acid Mix Tank Gravity Feed Connection - Shutdown and Refueling........................................

3/4 1-16 Boric Acid Mix Tank Gravity Feed Connection -

Operating............................

3/4 1-17 Borated Water Sources - Refueling.......

3/4 1-18 Borated Water Sources - Shutdown......................

3/4 1-19 Borated Water Sources - Operating......................

3/4 1-21 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL R005 Control Rod Operability................................

3/4 1-23 Position Indicator Channels............'................

3/4 1-25 Rod Drop Time..........................................

3/4 1-26 Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit..............

3/4 1-27 Control Rod Insertion Limits...........................

3/4 1-28 gg g)g ~

YANKEE-ROWE III vv V i

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION Page 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 PEAK LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE.......................

3/4 2,1 3/4.2.2 NUCLEAR HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACT 0R...................

3/4 2-7 3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR...............

3/4 2-9 3/4.2.4 Cc.3 PARAMETERS.........................................

3/4 2-11 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION..............

3/4 3-1 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION...........

3/4 3-11 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation...................

3/4 3-17 Incore Detection System................................

3/4 3-23 Meteorological Instrumentation.........................

3/4 3-24 Fire Detection Instrumentation.........................

3/4 3-27 3/4.4 MAIN COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 MAIN COOLANT LOOPS N o rma l 0 p e r a t i o n.......................................

3/4 4-1 Isolated Loop..........................................

3/4 4-3 Main Coolant Loop Startup..............................

3/4 4-4 l

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES - SHU100WN...............................

3/4 4-5* l 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES - 0PERATING..............................

3/4 4-6 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER............................................

3/4 4-7 3/4.4.5 MAIN COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE Lea k,a ge Detecti on Systems..............................

3/4 4-8

, ' O p e ra t.i o n a l L ea k a g e....................................

3/4 4-10

With 3/4 4-Sa.

100 032 I

YANKEE-R0WE IV Amendment t!o. 46, 59

- ^-

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND_ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE MAIN COOLANT" SYSTEM (Continued) 3/4.4.6 CHEMISTRY..............................................

3/4 4-12 3/4.4.7 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY......................................

3/4 4-15 3/4.4.8 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS Main Coolant System....................................

3/4 4-19 Pressurizer............................................

3/4 4-25 3/4.4.9

. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY...................................

3/4 4-26 3/4.4.10 STEAM GENERATORS.......................................

3/4 4-3?.

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATOR................

3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS........................................

3/4 5-3 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS.......................................

3/4 5-9 3/4.5.4 SAFETY INJECTION TANK..................................

3/4 5-12 l 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEBiS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CON"AINMENT Containment Integrity...............

3/4 6-1 Containment Leakage....................................

3/4 6-2 Containment Air Lock...................................

3/4 6-4 Internal Pressure......................................

3/4 6-5 A i r Temp e ra t u re........................................

3/4 6-6 Containment Ves sel Structural Integrity................

3/4 6-7 Continuous Leak Monitoring System......................

3/4 6-8 3/4.6.2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES...........................

3/4 6-9

'Li00 033,?

/

YANKEE-ROWE V

Amendment No. 46, 54, 59

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PAGE SECTION 3/4.6.3 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen Analyzer......................................

3/4 6 16 Hydrogen Vent System...................................

3/4 6-17 Atmosphere Recirculation System........................

3/4 6-18 3/a.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Valves..........................................

3/4 7-1 Emergency Boiler Feedwater System............

3/4 7-5 Primary and Demineralized Water Storage Tanks..........

3/4 7-6 3/4 7-7 Activity...............................................

Turbine Generator Throttle and Control Valves..........

3/4 7-9 3/4 7-10 ~'

Secondary Water Chemistry..............................

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION........3/4 7-13 3/4.7.3 PRIMARY PUMP SEAL WATER SYSTEM (Deletedl...............

3/4 7-14 3/4.7.4 SERV I CE W AT ER SY ST EM (D el e t e d ).........................3/4 7-16 3/4.7.5 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM EMERGENCY SHUTDCWN.....

3/4 7-18 3/4.7.6 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION............................

3/4 7-19 3/4.7.7 WASTE EFFLUENTS 3/4 7-21 Radioactive Solid Waste................................

3/4 7-22 Radioactive Liquid Waste...............................

3/4 7 23 Radioactive Gasecas haste..............................

3/4 7-24 3/4.7.8 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING...............................

3/4.7.9 SHOC). SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS).....................,.....

3/4 7-27 3/4 7-30 3/4 7.10 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS...................

3/4 7-37 l 3/4 7.11 PENEiRATIO" FIRE BARRIERS.................

1100 034 YANKEE-ROWE VI Amendment No. 47, 52, 56

MAIN COOLANT SYSTEM ISOLATED LOOP LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.2 The boron concentration of an isolated loop shall be maintained greater than or equal to the boron concentration of the operating loops.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, do not open the isolated loop's stop valves; either increase the boron concen-tration of the' isolated loop to within the limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months with the unisolated portion of the Main Coolant System borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN (all rods inserted) equivalent to at least 5% ak/k at 200*F.

(

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 4.1. 2.1 The boron concentration of an isolated loop chall be determined to be greater than or equal to the boron concentration of the operating loops at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . With Main Coolant System loop isolation valve controls removed from service at.d mechanically prevented from operation by lock and key, the frequency of determination that the boron concentration of the isolated loop is greater than or equal to the boron concentration of the operating loops may be reduced to 3 times per week with a maximum of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months between analyses.

An isolated loop shall be determined to be borated to at 4.4.1.2.2 least 5% AK/K at 200*F before loop temperature is reduced > 30*F below With Main th'e highest cold leg temperature of the operating loops.

Coolant System loop isolation valve controls, main steam line isolation valves and main coolant pump controls removed from service and mechanically prevented from og.eration by lock and key, the boron concentration of the isolated loop may be reduced to that existing in the Main Coolant System at that time.

~

l YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 4-3

MAIN COOLANT SYSTEM MAIN COOLANT LOOP STARTUP LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.3 An isolated main coolant loop shall remain isolated until:

a.

l.

The temperature of the cold leg of the isolated loop is l

within 30*F of the highest cold leg temperature of the operating loops.

2.

The boron concentration of the isolated loop is not less l than the main coolant system bcron concentration, ar.d 3.

The reactor is subcritical by at least 1 percent ak/k l

b.

A main coolant punp shall not be started unless, either:

1.

There is a bubble in the pressurizer, er 2.

The associateri steam generator temperature does not exceed MCS temperature by more than 100 F.

APPLICABILITY: All MODES.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend startup of the isolated loop or of a main coolant pump, as applicable, and re-isolate the loop 7d stop the pump, as applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS

4. 4.1. 3.1 The isolated loop cold leo temperature shall be determined to be within 36'F of the highest cold leg temperaturt of the operating loops within 30 minutes prior to opening the cold leg stop valve.

4. 4.1. 3. 2 The isolated loop boron concentration shall be determined to be not less than the Main Coolant System boron concentration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to opening the cold leg stop valve.

4.4.1.3.3 The reactor shall be determined to be subcritical by at least 1 percent ak/k within 30 minutes prior to opening the cold leg stop nive.

4.4.1.3.4 The pressurizer shall be verified to have a bubble or the steam generator-MCS temperature shall be verified to be within the limit within 30 minutes prior to starting a main coolant pump.

YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 4-4 Amendment No. /9, 38,59 r

J100 036

MAIN COOLANT SYSTEM SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.2 At lea,st the followin safety and/or relief valves shall be OPERABLE; a.

A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 psig +0, -3% or 2560 psig.

+0, -3%.

b.

T,3 Main Coolant System (MCS) pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) PR-50V-92 shall be OPERABLE in the low pressure mode whenever MCS temperature is 5 324*F.

c.

Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) safety valves SV-204 and SV-205 shall be OPERABLE whenever MCS temperature is 5 300 F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5.

A_C710N :

a.

With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, inmediately l

suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place the Shutdown Cooling System into operation.

b.

With PR-50V-90 inoperable and MCS temperature between 300"F and 324*F:

1.

Within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , either; a)

Raise the MCS temperature to > 324 F, or b)

Lower the MCS temperature to < 300 F and place the SCS safety valves into operation by:

1)

Ocening SC-MOV-551, 552, 553 and 554, and 2)

Verifying that the safety valves are 1Ined up to di' harge to either the low pressure surge t:nk (LPST) or the primary drain echcing tank (PDCT),and 2.

Restore PR-SOV-90 to CPERABLE status within 7 days, or.

3.

Within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , depressurize and vent the MOS to the atmosphere, the LPST or the PDCT.

YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 4-5 Amendment No. 59 H 00 GH

.. y

MAIN COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITTON FOR OPERA 1'0$!

ACTION (Continued) c.

With one SCS safety valve or PR-50V-90 inot vable and MCS temperature < 300"F, res'. ore the inoperable valve to 07.iRABLE status withiii 7 days or 03 pressurize and vent the MCS to the atmosphere, the LPST or th? PDCT within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

d.

With more than one pressurizer PORV and/or SCS safety valve inoperable and MCS temperature is < 300 F, depressurize and vent the MCS to the atmosphere, the LPST or the PDCT within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.4.2.1 The pressurizer code safety valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE l

per Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.

4.4.2.2 The MCS pressurizer PORV PR-50V-90 low setpoint system shall be l

demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per:

a.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying the low setpoint system keylock switch to be ir, the armed position.

b.

31 days by verifying valve PR-M0V-512 to be open and valve PR-V-608 to be locked open.

c.

18 months by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION and verifyirj that the PORV opens at 500 ; 30 psig and closes at 470 + 30 psig.

4.4.2.3 The SCS safety valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE; a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that 1.

Valves SC-MOV-551, 552, 553 and 554 are locked open.

2.

Safety valves SV-204 and 205 are lined up to disenarge to either the LPST or the PDCT.

b.

Per ASME Section XI, Summer 1975 Addenda with a setpoint of 425 psig +3'..

1100 038 YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 4-5a Amendment No. 59

MAIN COOLANT SYSTEM SAFETY VALVES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3 Two 'ressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with lift settings of c485 PSIG +0, -3% and 2560 PSIG +0, -3%, respectively.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.3 Each pressurizer code safety valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with lift settings of 2485 PSIG +0, -3% and 2560 PSIG +0, -3%, respectively, in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1974 Edition, and Addenda through Summer 1975.

~51100039 t

YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 4-6 O

MAIN COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.4 The' pressurizer shall be 0?ERABLE with a bubble.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 4*.

l ACTION:

a.

In MODE 1 or 2 with the pressurizer inoperable, be in at least HOT-l STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers opet. within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , b.

In MODE 4* with the pressurizgr bubble volume < 198 ft, restore the bubble volume to 1 198 ft within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.4.4.1 No other requirements other than those specified in accordance l

with10CFR50.55a(g).

4.4.4.2 In MODE 4* the pressurizer level:

129", equivalent to a pressurizer Shall be verified to bg <at least once per 30 minutes.

a.

bubble volume 1 198 ft,

b.

Channel (s) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a:

1.

CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , 2.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST when shutdown longer than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months if not performed within the previous 31 days, and 3.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 mor.ths.

Whenever MCS temperature is between 300 F and 324 F.

Il00040 YAN"EE-ROWE 3/4 4-7 Amendment No. g, y, 59

, MAIN COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.5 MAIN COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS _

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERAT'.ON The following Main Coolant System leakage detection systems 3.4.5.1 shall be OPERABLE:

At least one containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity l

a.

monitoring system, The containment drain tank level monitoring system.

b.

The incore detection system thimble leak alarm sy; tem.

c.

APPLICABILITYi MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:_

With the above required radioactivity monitoring leakage detection system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 7 days provided:

a.

Main Coolant System water inventory balance is performed at 1.

least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

The other above required leakage detection systems are OPERABLE, 2.

and Appropriate grab samples are obtained and analyzed at least 3.

once per hour:

otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , With the containment drain tank level monitoring system inoperaole, b.

restore the incperable syster to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

With 1;he incore detection system thimble leak alarm system inoper-able, restore the leak alarm system to OPERABLE status within 7 days c.

or close all thimble isolation valves; restore the leak alarm system to OPERABLE status within 31 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 4.B Amendment No. 58

. _ j.j.CO. I}

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM 3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 T'he ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with:

a.*

As a minimum, one OPERABLE ECCS safety injection subsystem l

c'omprised of the following:

1.

One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump.

l One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump,# and l

2.

3.

An OPERABLE flow path ## capable of taking suction from l

the safety injection tank.

b.*

An OPERABLE ECCS recirculation subsystem with an OPERABLE flow l

1 pathcapableoftakingsuctionfromthecontajgmentsumoand recirculating to the safety injection header.

j c.*

An OPERABLE ECCS long term hot leg injection subsystem with an l

OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the ECCS safety injection subsygem and discharging to the Main Coolant System loop 4 hot leg APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 and 5.

I

Main coolant pressure < 1000 psig but > 300 psig.

A maximum of one HPSI pump and one LPSI pump shall be OPERABLE whenever MCS temperature is between 200*F and 324 F.

All HPSI pumps and LPSI pumps shall be inoperable whenever MCS temperature is < 200 F, except that:

l a.

One LPSI pump may be energized for surveillance testing require-ments or for mixing the safety injection tank provided that either:

i 1.

The reactor vessel head is removed, or 2.

Tho LPSI pump recirculation valve (s) are open to limit pump discharge pressure to < 280 psig.

b.

Two HPSI pumps may be energized Tor surveillance testing requirements provided that either:

1.

The reactor vessel head is removed, or 2.

At least one pressurizer code safety valve is removed.

aa l

' Whenever the MCS temperature is < 324 F, the reactor vessel head is

~

bolted on and both oressurizer code safety valves are installed, all four loop injection M0V's and all four LPSI MOV's shall be closed and the LPSI pump recirculation valve shall be open, except that loop SI system header isolation valves to the MCS cold legs may be open provided that the associated MCS loop isolation valves are closed or when r? quired to be open to perfonn Surveillance Pequirements 4.5.2.a.1, 4.5.2.e.3(a) and 4.5.2.f.

YANKEE-R0WE 3/4 5-9 Amendment No. A9, 52,59 a 1100 042

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION:

a.

With the ECCS safety injection subsystem, the recirculation subsystem, or the long term hot leg injection subsystem in-operable,* restore all subsystems to CPERABLE status within 1 l

hour or reduce main coolant pressure to < 300 psig within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months .

b.

With more than one HPSI pump and/or one LPSI pump OPERABLE and MCS temperature between 200 F and 324 F, de-energize all except one HPSI and one LPSI pump within one hour by opening and locking the associated power supply breakers in the racked-out po>ition or removing the associated power supply breaker from the cubicle.

c.

With any HPSI or LPSI pump OPERABLE and MCS temperature

< 200 F, unless the exception conditions are satisfied, ce-energize all HPSI and LPSI pumps sithin one hour by opening and locking the associated power supply breakers in the racked-out position or removing the associated power supply breaker from the cubicle, d.

With any loop injection MOV or LPSI MOV or with the LPSI pump recirculation valve closed, and MCS temperature is

< 324*F, the reactor vessel head is bolted on and both pressurizer code safety valves are installed, restore each valve to its required position within one hour.

e.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the l

Main Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.6 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

Main coolant pressure < 1000 psig but > 300 psig.

l

\\)GD DU YANKEE-R0WE 3/4 5-10 Amendment No. 59 v

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.3.l*

The ECCS subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the ap-l plicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

4.5.3.2 The above specified HPSI and LPSI pumps shal' be verified to be inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months whenever K~.5 temperature is

3. 324'F by determining that the associated pcwer suoply breakers are open and locked in the racksd-out position or ar-c :emoved from the cubicle.

4.5.3.3 The following valves shall be varified to be in the indicated positions at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months wheneycr MCS temperature is 1.324 F, the reactor vessel head is bolted on and both pressurizer code safety valves are installed es specified above.

Valve Number Valve Position CS-MOV-536 Closed CS-MOV-537 Closed CS-MOV-538 Closed CS-MOV-539 Closed SI-MOV-22 Closed SI-MOV-23 Closed SI-MOV-24 Closed SI-MOV-25 Closed CS-MOV-532 Open

Main coolant pressure < 1000 psig but 3.300 psig.

1100 044 YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 5-11 Amendment No. 59

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SAFETY INJECTION TANK LIMITING CON'ITION FOR OPERATION D

3.5.4 The safety injection tank (SIT) shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 117,000 gallons, equivalent to a level of > 25.5 feet.

b.

A minimum boron concentration of 2200 ppm, and c.

A minimum water temperature of 40*F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4* and 5*

ACTION:

Witi, the safety injection tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HGT SHUTDOWN with Main Coolant pressure < 30 psig within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.5.4 The SIT shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the contained berated water volume in the tank, and 2.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the SIT temperature when the outside air temperature is < 35*F.

Main coolant pressure > 300 psig.

1100 045 YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 5-12 Amendment No. 49,59 l

3/4.4 MAIN COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.1 MAIN COOLANT LOOPS The plant is designed to operate with all main coolant loops in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. With one main coolant loop not in operation.

THERMAL POWER is restricted to < 75 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER.

With four loops operating, a loss of flow or low SG water level in two loops will cause a reactor trip. A loss of flow or low SG water level in one loop will cause a reactor trip with three loops operating.

Adequate main coolant loops are required to provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing core decay heat.

Single failure con-siderations require placing the Shutdown Cooling System into operation if the required main coolant loops are not OPERABLE A steam generator is capable of removing core decay heat by natural or forced circulation provided the conditions specified in 4.4.1.1.2 ar e met.

The requirement to maintain the boron concentration of an isolated loop greater than or equal to the boron concentration of the operating loops ensures that no reactivity addition to the core could occur during startup of an isolated loop. Verification of the boron concentration in an isolated loop prior to opening the stop valves provides a reassurance of tae adequacy of the baron concentration in the isolated loop.

Startup of an isolated loop will inject cool water from the loop into the core.

The reactivity transient resulting from this cool water injection is minimized by delaying isolated loop startup until its temperature is within 30*F of the operating loops. Making the reactor subcritical prior to loop startup prevents any power spike which could result from this cool water induced reactivity transient.

The prohibition on starting a main coolant pump.withcut a bubble in the pressurizer or with a SG/MCS temperature difference of >.100*F requirement is necessary to prevent exceeding the isothermal Appendix G curve limits under the most restrictive MC flow initiation transient if the PORV or SCS relief valves fail.

3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES i00 04(3

~

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the Main Coolant System from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig.

Each safety valve is designed to relieve 92,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point.

The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown.

In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating Shutdown Cooling System connected to the Main Coolant System provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent Main Coolant System overpressurization during shutdown.

YANKEE-ROWE B 3/4 4-1 Amendment No. A9, 59

MAIN COOLANT SYSTEM BASES SAFETYVALVES(Continued)

During, operation, all pressurizer code safety valves 5mst be OPERABLE to prevent the Main Coolant System from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rti.e resulting from a complete loss of load assuming no reactor trip unt'l the first Reactor Protective System trip set point is r+ acned (i.e.

1 credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) anci also assuming no operation of the power ocarsi.ed relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be perfomed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

The SCS passive code safety valves, SV-204 ar.d SV-205, are available to relieve expansion or mass addition at all MCS temperatures < 300'F.

Each of the two valves has the capacity to relieve 101 gpm of T00 F water at a set pressure of 425 psig plus 10% accumulation. The low setpoint PORV, PR-S0V-90, is available to relieve expansion or mass addition at MCS temperature < 324 F.

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER A bubble in the pressurizer ensures that the Main Coola..t l

System is not a hydraulically solid system and is capable of accom-modating pressure surges during operation. The bubble also I

protects the pressurizer code safety valves and power operated relief valve against water relief. The power operated relief valve and l

bubble function to relieve Main Coolant System pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the power operated relief valve minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves.

The pressurizer surge volume of > 198 ft requirement provides sufficient time for corrective operator action to prevent exceeding the isothemal Appendix G curve limits under the most restrictive mass input accident should the PORV fail to operate at the low setpoint.

; oo 641

~

YANKEE-ROWE B 3/4 4-2 Amendment No. 59

.w.

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATOR The OPERABIL'ITY of the accumulator ensures that a sJffiCient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through edeh of the colo legs in the event the Main Coolant System pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulator. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large Main Coolant System pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, baron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the acci-dent analysis are met. A minimum useable water volume of 700 cubic feet require accumulator water volume to be at least 850 cubic feet.

The limits for operation with the accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed or pressurization system inoperable minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrently which may result in unacceptable peak cladding tempera-tures.

If a closed isolation valve cannot be intnediately opened, the full capability of the accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a M)DE where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of three independent ECCS safety injection subsystems, the recirculation subsystem, and the long term hot leg injection sub-system ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one safety in-jection subsystem. Tv:o safety injection subsystems operating in con-l junction with the accumulator are capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest Main Coolant System cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, the safety injection subsystems, the recirculation subsystem and the lor.g term hot leg injection subsystem provide long term core cooling and boron mixing capability during the accident recovery period.

1100 048 3

YANKEE-ROWE B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 43, 52 9

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

With the Main Coolant System temperature and pressure below 330 F, and 1000 psig, respectively, one OPERABLE ECCS safety injection subsystem, with the OPERABLE recirculation subsystem and the OPERABLE long term hot leg injection subsystem, is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis.of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor, the decreased probability of a LOCA and the limited core cooling require-melts because of the negligible energy stored in the primary coolant under these conditions.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

Complete system tests cannot be performed when the reactor is operating because of their inter-relation with operating systems. The method of assuring operability of these systems is a combination of complete system tests performed during refueling shutdowns and monthly tests of active system components (pumps and valves) during reactor operation.

The test interval is based on the judgement that more frequent testing would not significantly increase reliability.

Some subsystems power operated valves fail to meet single failure criteria and removal of power to these valves is required.

In order to eliminate potential for reactor vessel low temperature over-pressurization by the inadvertent operation of ECCS pumps, the pump circuit breakers are opened and locked in the racked-out position or removed from the breaker cubicles. Also selected SIS isolation valves are positioned to remove the possibility of an overpressurization event during that portion of MCS heatup and cooldown when an inadvertent injection could result in an overpressure event.

3/4.5.4 SAFETY INJECTION TANK The OPERABILITY of the Safety Injection Tank (SIT) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injec-tion by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on SIT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to pemit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain suberitical in the cold condition following mixing of the SIT and the Main Coolant System water volumes with all centrol rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses, which is based on allowing a minimum of 77,000 gallons to be injected by the safety injection sui) systems before the recirculation is manually established.

LOCA analyses show that an injection of 77,000 gallons is sufficient to limit core temperatures and containment pressure for the full spectrum of pipe ruptures. This leaves up to 40,000 gallons in the SIT as reserve. The boren concentration cf 2200 ppm is the highest value assumed in any accident analysis.

YANKEE-ROWE B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 52, 59

{&O ObE

.

ML19275A353

Text

Attachment:

Navigation menu

Search