ML19275A211

Addl Sys Mod for Recirculation Spray & Low Head Safety Injection Pumps Net Positive Suction Head, Supplemental Rept

ML19275A211
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	09/28/1979
From:	STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML19275A194	List: ML19275A193 ML19275A211
References
NUDOCS 7910030323
Download: ML19275A211 (24)

Text

. _. _ _ _

ADDITIONAL SYSTEM MODIFICATION FOR RECIRCULATION SPRAY AND LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - UNIT NO. I fnisestil SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT SEPTEMBER 1979 10';2 098 A

Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation h(t 7010080 4

)

ADDITIONAL SYSTEM MODIFICATION FOR RECIRCUIATION SPRAY AND LOU HEAD SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD i

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT h

September 1979 a

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-334 LICENSE NO. DPR-66 1C/2 099

BV-1 ADDITIONAL SYSTEM MODIFICATION FCR RECIRCULATION SPRAY AND LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Description Page 1

INTRODUCTION

..1 2

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION A.e. MODIFICATION.

2 2.1 Chemical Addition System Modification.

2 2.2 Recirculation Spray and Quench Spray Nozzle Modification.

3 2.3 Loop Seal Piping Addition to Quench Spray System.

3 2.4 Technical Specification Changes.

3 a

3 SYSTEM ANALYSIS.

4 3.1 Chemical Addition System Operating Parameters and Coisiderations.

4 3.2 ThermLL Effectiveness.

4 4

SAFETY EVALUATION.

6 5

REFERENCE.

8 APPENDIX A - Proposed Technical Specification Changes.

A-1 A

1 w

T i

SEPTEMBER 1979 (Dq t l06

.-----m BV-1 LIST OF TAPJ.FR Table Description 1

System Changes

=

LIST OF FIGURES Piqure Description 2.2-1 RS G QS System Modifications - Revision 1 (Originally Submitted in the 1977 Report) 2.2-3 RWST Parameters - Revision 3 (Originally Submitted in the 1977 Report) 1 Maximum Spray pH vs Time 2

Mil.imum Spray pH vs Time 3

Maximum Sump pH vs Time 4

Minimum Sump pH vs Time 5

Thermal Effectiveness of Quench Spray Modifled Spray Header 6

Thermal Effectiveness of Recirculation Spray Modified Spray Header T

{ ') )_

k0 ii SEPTEMBER 1979

BV-1 3

ADDITIONAL SYSTEM MODIFICATION FOR RECIRCULATION SPRAY AND LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION The report

entitled, Analysis and System Modification for Recirculation Spray and Low Head Safety Injection Pumps Net Positive Suction Head, dated November 17, 1977 (the 1977 Report),

described the modifications required to ensure that the recirculation spray (RS) and low head safety injection (LHSI) pumps will be operable following a

loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

In conjunction with one of these modifications, removal of the weir within the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST),the 1977 Report indicated that eductors would be used as the driving force for chemical addition into the Quench Spray (QS) system.

Subsequent analysis has indicated that the use of eductors is not required for chemical addition.

Instead, a modification to the presc-'t gravity-feed chemical addition system would provide acceptable chemical addition capabilities.

In

addition, to improve the performance of the QS and RS and to ensure that the assumptions of 90 percent spray effectiveness are valid in all modes of quench spray operation, all Spraying Systems Company, type 1HH30100, spray nozzles will be replaced by Spray Engineering

Ccmpany, type 1713A, spray nozzles in the QS and RS syctems.

This report provides the results of the analysis of the changes

~

to the chemical addition portion of the quench spray system, the change of spray nozzles, as well as those modifications which are a result of final design development whir:h were not previously presented to the NRC.

6 s

1 SEPTEMBER 1979 E

I BV-1 3

-a SECTION 2 5

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND MODIFICATION Chemical Addition System Modification 2.1 The quench spray

system, in addition to its cooling and m

depressurization function, aids in the removal of radioactive 1

iodine from the containment atmosphere following a LOCA.

This function is accomplished by the addition of sodium hydroxide (NaOH) from the Chemical Addition Tank (CAT) to the quench spray

]

flow.

Presently this is accomplished by a 6-inch line between the CAT and the RWST.

Upon a containment isolation Phase B signal two

=

redundant valves

open, allowing the NaOH solution to enter a mixing chamber in the RWST from which the QS pumps take suction.

-e As part of the modification, to ensure that the RS and LHSI pumps i

are operable following a IDCA, the weir in the RWST which forms the mixing chamber will be removed.

This necessitates a

modification to the chemical addition piping which delivers NaOH to the quench spray system.

As shown on revised Figure 2.2-1 (original submitted in the 1977 Report), the 6-inch line from i

the CAT to the RWST will be replaced by two lines which will J

deliver the NaOH directly into the QS pump suctions.

This system will be designed to minimize the delay of caustic addition to the 9

QS.

An orifice is used in each line to limit the flow that would a

result immediately after the block valves opened as the CAT attempted to reach an equilibrium level with the RWST.

While the QS system is in operation, and the containme.nt pressure is above j

atmospheric, spray pH w3.ll vary between 8.8 and 9.5.

Additionally, final containment sump pH will vary within the range of 7.2 and 8.1.

In all

cases, the parameters fall within the guidelines of the NRC Standard Review

Plan, Sections 6.1.1 (Engineered Safety j

Features Materials) and 6.5.2 (Containment Spray As a Fission Product Cleanup System), and are a

result of analyses which considered the minimum and maximum chemistry limits, tank levels, and the possible pump and valve combinations.

3 um a

q 2

SEPTEMBER 1979

--i--mens-numeumiimieimm--nnisim

BV-1 2.2 Recirculation Spray and Quench Spray Nozzle Modification In order to improve the performance of the quench and recirculation sprays, the following modifications will be made (as shown on revised Figure 2.2-1, originally submitted in the 1977 Report) :

1.

Replace all 236 Spraying Systems Company spray nozzles, type 1HH30100 in the QS system with 156 Spray Engineering Company spray

nozzles, type

1713A, symetrically plugging the balance of the fittings.

2.

Replace all 388 Spraying Systems Company spray nozzles, type 1HH30100 in the RS system with 256 Spray Engineering Company, type 1713A, symmetrically plugging the balance of the fittings.

This modification will ensure that the assumptions of 90 percent for the thermal effectiveness of the sprays is valid for all modes of operation, including the cutback mode of the quench spray.

2.3 Lcop Seal Piping Addition to Quench Spray System A

pioing loop seal will be added to each of the existing QS flow paths.

This will prevent water in the RWST from draining into the containment

sump, if after a

LOCA a

QS pump is not in operation and the valves along the flowpath are open.

Technical Specification Changes 1

2.4 In order to achieve the flows required to maintain proper chemistry, certain technical specifications will require changes.

In both the RWST and CAT, levels and concentrations must be kept within the limits given below:

Tank Level Concentration RWST 787 '-3" to 787 '-6a 2050 t 50 ppm Boron CAT 786*-9" to 785'-9" 12 i 1/2 percent by weight NaOH

^

The RWST proposed limits are also shown on revised Figure 2.2-3, originally subnitted in the 1977 Report.

Appendix A provides the proposed revisions to technical specification pages which indicate the surveillance requirements.

These supercede only those pages (i.e. : 3/4 5-9; 3/4 6-15; and 3/4 6-16) previous submitted in the 1977 Report.

3 SEPTEMBER 1979 l

i e s_

10 r]

=

BV-1

=

SECTION 3 3

SYSTEM ANALYSIS i

3.1 Chemical Addition System Operating Parameters and

=

Considerations i

The modification to the chemical addition portion of the QS T

system (as shown on revised Figure 2.2-1, originally suhaitted in the 1977 Report),

has been analyzed to ensure that the system will provide QS and ultimate sump pH in accordance with the NRC Standard Review

Plan, Sections 6.1.1 and 6.5.2.

The analysis

-~~

indicates that the spray pH will be between 8.8 and 9.5 for all operating conditions while the containment pressure is above s

7 atmospheric.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the system operating a

parameters and considerations.

Figure 1 shows QS pH vs time for the maximum spray pH case.

The curve is based on a maximum CAT Q.

level and NaOH concentration, with minimum RWST level and boric j

acid concentration, and the safety injection pump and QS pump combination which would result in the maximum flow of NaOH.

5 Figure 2 shows QS pH vs time for the minimum spray pH case.

This curve is based on minimum CAT level and NaOH concentrations with maximum RWST level and boric acid concentration, together with the injection pump and QS pump combinations which result in i

minimum flow of NaOH.

J The analysis performed to determine the final sump pH indicates 1

that the ultimate sump pH will be between 7.2 and 8.1.

This is j

consistant with the NRC Standard Review Plan, Section 6.1.1 and Beaver Valley Unit No. 1 Final Safety Analysia Report (FSAR)

Section 6.4.2.

Figures 3 and 4

illustrate the containment u

j sump pH parameters and considerations.

Figure 3 shows maximum 9

sump pH vs time for the case of maximum safeguards with one L

chemical addition valve failing to close either at cutback or on

]

low level in the CAT.

Figure 4 shows minimum sump pH vs time for the case of maximum safeguards with one chemical addition valve failed in the closed position.

Table 1 lists the additional system changes and considerations required for the chemical

[

addition system modification.

3.2 Thermal Effectiveness i

. -==

An analysis was made to predict the minimum thermal effectiveness of the sprays with the modification.

This

analysis, using i

Parsly's method (a),

assumes minimum ESF.

The results, shown on j

Figures 5 and 6 show that the thermal effectiveness of the QS is

=

nearly 100 percent for all but the cutback mode, where it drops to approximately 98 percent, and the effectiveness of the PS is at least 95 percent.

s l

4 SEPTEMBER 1979 i

a ir O 10 4)

BV-1 An analysis was made using the computed thermal effectiveness for the modified spray systems.

The results show a reduction in containment second,

third,

and fourth pressure peaks and depressurization time.

However, the calculated results are so nearly identical to those previously siihmitted that no revisions are made to Figures D-1 through -7 and E-1 through -7 of the September 11, 1978 submittal to the NRC.

An analysis was made to assess the effect of the modification on spray coverage in the containment.

The results show less than 1 percent reduction in quench and recirculation spray coverage.

This analysis methodology was identical to that of the

Response

to Question 6.26 of the FSAR.

m v

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106 5

SEPTEMBER 1979

DV-1 SECTION 4 SAFETY EVALUATION A

safety evaluation of the chemical addition modifications and replacement of the spray nozzles has been performed.

This safety evaluation supplements the safety evaluation included in the 1977 Report.

The modifications addressed in this report are being made in conjunction with previously reviewed modifications to the recirculation spray and low head safety injection systems.

These modifications ensure that system performance is consistent with the basis established in the FSAR.

1. FSAR Chemical addition is a feature of the quench spray subsystem of the containment depressurization system.

The design

basis, system description and system evaluation were presented in Section 6.4 of the FSAR

and, the effectiveness of the spray system for iodine removal is evaluated in Section 14.3.5 of the FSAR.

The modifications do not alter the design basis or system mrrluation presented in the FSAR.

Changes in the system

' tion are presented in Section 2 of this report.

Specifications

'he 1.2

r. conditions of operation, surveillance requirements, nv or the technical specifications related to the eer. c depressurization system and its interf aces were ved and proposed changes are presented in Appendix A of this

't.

. jes to the CAT and RWST technical specifications will

'U in.rease the volume of liquid available for post-accident use but they do not alter the basis for the existing technical specifications.

Changes to tank levels,the spray

nozzles, and the system piping introduce additional surveillance requirements to the technical specifications but no changes to the existing specification basis, Sections 3/4.5.2, 3/4.5.3, 3/4.5.5, 3/4.6.1 and 3/4.6.2, are introduce or requ' red.

3. Unreviewed Safety Question w

The additonal system modifications described in this report do not create an aunreviewed safety question" as defined in 10CFR50.59.

The modifications are being made in conjunction with the analysis previously submitted for the RS and LHSI systems.

i 6

SEPTEMBER 1979

/2 1

BV-1 The modifications will ensure that the RS and IJISI pumps will be operable following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and will improve spray performance.

The modifications do not:

a.

Increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report.

As stated in the 1977

Report, the modification does not change plant parameters which would adversly affect a

LOCA analysis.

The modifications do not adversly affect the iodine removal capability, containment depressurization, the capability to remain depressurized, or the calculated offsite dose.

Thus, the original safety analysis performed per 10CFR100 remains valid.

b.

Create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report.

The modifications represent refinements in the final system design as opposed to major system revisions.

As such the modifications, ensure system operation and performance within the conditions of the license.

c.

Reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.

4.

Safety Implications The additonal modifications described in this report do not affect normal power operation of the station or automatic operation of the systems.

The changes are final system design refinements which ensure system operation consistant with the licensing commitments.

7 SEPTEMBER 1979

/2 l

BV-1 REFERENCE 1.

Paraly, L.

F., ORNL-TM-2412, Design Considerations of Reactor Contaimmt Spray Systems - Part VI, The Heating of Spray Drops in Air / Steam Atmospheres, January 1970.

g 8

SEPTEMBER 1979

BV-1 4

SYSTEM CHANGES TABLE 1 Changes Considerations i

T 1.

Existing 6-inch motor-operated Upon loss of power, valves valve actuators in the chemi-will trip closed preven-cal addition lines will be ting uncontrolled flow be-replaced by electrohydraulic tween the RWST and CAT.

valve actuators which trip closed upon loss of power.

2.

The new electrohydraulic

'Ib prevent freeze-up of the valve actuators will be heat mechanism during the winter traced and insulated to main-months.

tain a minimum 500F.

3.

The chemical addition block valves will be shut upon receipt of the following signals:

a.

Low-low level in CAT To prevent uncovering the (747 * - 0")

level transmitter tie-in point and prevent air from being drawn into the QS

~

pump suction lines due to a dry tank.

b.

Cutback To prevent a high pH condi-(747 * - 6" RWST) tion in the containment spray.

c.

Low QS pump discharge To prevent uncontrolled flow flow rate (800 gpm) between RWST, CAT, and the containment sump.

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1 of 1 SEPTEMBER 1973 mm--.

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QUENCH SPRAY RING

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• NEW ELECTROHYDRAULIC RS E. OS SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS

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VALVE OPER ATORS 9/ 4/79 -REVISION 1 BE AVER VALLEY - UNIT 1

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APPENDIX A PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES I

I I

I The following pages are enclosed:

3/4 5-9 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-16 I

I I

I I

I 1 m, _ n t I

A-1 SEPTEMBER 1979 I

I EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS REFUELING WATER STORAGE TAJK I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I

3.5.5 The refueling water storage tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A contained volume of between 439,050 and 441,100 1' 2 gallons of borated water.

b.

A boron concentration of 2,050 i 50 ppm, and l2 c.

A minimum water temperature of 430F.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT I

STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

4.5.5 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the water level in the tank, and 2.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temper-ature when the RWST ambient air temperature is < 430F.

I I

i u 100 I

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 5-9 PROPOSED CHANGE 2 SEPTEMBER 1979 I

I CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.3 The chemical addition system shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A chemical addition tank containing a volume between 5,000 and 5,150 gallons of 12 1/2 percent by weight I, 2 I

NaOH solution, and b.

A chemical addition flow path, capable of adding NaOH I

solution from the chemical addition tank to both containment quench spray system pump flows.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the chemical addition system inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the chemical addition system to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.3 The chemical additional system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by:

1.

Testing each power operated or automatic valve in the flow path in accordance with the requirements I

of proposed Section 4.0.5.

2.

Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not

locked, I

sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its corrected position.

b.

At least once per 6 months by:

1.

Verifying the solution level in the tank, and 2.

Verifying the concentration of the NaOH solution by chemical analysis.

jP

)

j2h BEAVER VALLEY - UFIT 1 3/4 6-15 I

PROPOSED CHANGE 2 SEPTEMBER 1979 I

I CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued) c.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1.

Cycling each valve in the spray addition system l

I flow path that is not testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

2.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a

test signal.

I d.

At least once per 5 years by verifying flow from the chemical addition tank through the drain lines.

I I

I I

I I

I I

l a 120-I I

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-16 REPRINTED WITH PROPOSED CHANGE 2

SEPTEMBER 1979 I