ML19274G130
| ML19274G130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1979 |
| From: | Raymond W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290720 | |
| Download: ML19274G130 (35) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
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In the Matter of:
2:
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 31 of 4!
William J. Raymond Reactor Inspector 5l 6l i
7j ai l
Trailer #203 9)
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!
Middletown, Pennsylvania ll!
uw 1 1q7o 12!
(Oste of Interview) 13t June 22, 1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 14i 103 15i (Tape Numoer(s))
16i 17i ISi
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NRC PERSONNEL:
22l Dorwin R. Hunter, Inspector Specialist 23{
Thomas T. Martin, Inspector Specialist 24t 25l John R. Sinclair, Investigator t
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SINCLAIR:
The following interview is being conducted of Mr. William J.
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'laymond.
Mr. Raymond is a Reactor Inspector, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory g
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Commission.
The present time is 1:10 p.m., May 3, 1979.
The placa of 4{
the interview is Trailer No. 203 located immediately outside the ScJth gate to the Three Mile Island site.
The individuals present for the interview will be interviewer, Mr. Dorwin R. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter is an 7l Irspector Specialist, Region III, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
8 Also present is Mr. Tim T. Martin.
Mr. Martin is also an Inspector 9
Specialist, Performance Appraisal Branch, Region I.
Monitoring the 10!
interview will be Mr. John R. Sinclair, an Investigator of the Office 11 of Inspector and Auditor, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
At this E
point we will turn the interview and the questioning over to Mr. Hunter.
I 131 14' HUNTER:
Okay. We would like to--Bill, we'd like to establish your 15i arrival time and the activities that you were involved in when you 16i arrived at the site.
If you would please start at the time you were 17!
notified and then cover your arrival on site and then your activit73; ISI starting with the first activity you were involved in.
191 g
20I PAYMOND:
Okay.
The my involvement I guess started in tre regione:
21l office during the morning of the incident when the initial phone call 22l came ia at around 8:00, they'; tarted setting up the emergency respor.se 23 center by about I'd say 10 N that morning, and that is really ap-l 24 proximate.
I got called into the center to start filling in for the i
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various positions being manned in the center.
The almost immediate i
2**
position I took ':p was beina on tae line tied to the Headwarters 3
personnel and the function of that function was to receive their questions, 4l pass their questions across the room to the individuals who were in I
direct communication with persons from the site, get back the infor-l 6
mation from the site and then relay it back onto Headquarters.
7 0
HUNTER:
Okay Bill, at that time, what was your understanding of the plant conditions when you initially started communicating between 10i Region I and Headquarters and the site answering the questions?
11; 12, RAYMOND:
Could you be more specific?
13 14i HUNTER:
Uh, at uh?
15:
16' RAYM0N01 There is a lot of information coming across at that time.
17l There was reading about various loop parameters.
Now I don't, I don't 18l have anything recorded on loop parameters at that time.
The information 19 that sticks out in my mind is things like the dome radiation monitor 20 being excessively high, the loop temperatures, hot legs, being off 21l scale high.
Radiation monitors in alarm, you know at various locations 22!
around the plant.
That's about all I remember.
l 23 24; HUNTER 2 Okay.
And how long were you pert..'otr.; erst particular function?
l 25l 2003 e
I, l-3 RAYMOND:
I'd say on and off for.maybe an hour or two.
2 3
HUNTER:
And then what did you do?
4 5'
RAYMOND:
Okay.
Sometime after 10:00 they had already dispatched 6l i
whatever number of cars they had dispatched and they decided to send me 7
out there to act as a relief for either Jim Higgins or Walt Baunack 0
later on that evening.
So by about 1:00 I had been dispatched to the 9
site.
10' 11!
HUNTER:
Okay and you arrived at the site when?
12!
13 RAYMOND:
Uh, let me check.
I think around 4:10.
Yeah, the first 14!
entry I had on the log is between 3:30 and 4:25 are the times that I 15:
have.
16i 17l HUNTER:
Okay, and what was your activity, what was your --
1 ISj 19f RAYMOND:
Okay, where I went to was the Observation Center where Met Ed 20l had a, at least a part of their offsite survey team set up.
The first 21{
thing that I did do is call into the site to get in touch with Jim 22 Higgins and/or Walt Baunack.
The only thing I was doing there was 23 finding what their status was and how soon they wanted or needed relief.
24 What their situation was.
They had indicated that at that time they 25i 10 l
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were still pretty fresh and probably wouldn't want to turn over until 2
sometime later in the evening, early or late evening.
So I indicated 3
to them that I was available, onsite, and that I was probably going to 4l go to a motel to check in and get some sleep before I had to come onto
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the mid-shift.
It became apparent there I was going to be staying in all night.
So, I broke contact with them, just stayed around the Ob Center, Observation Center, trying to find out, keep abreast of what 8
had been going on since I had been out of touch with plant status since b
earlier that morning.
10 i
11 HUNTER:
Okay.
12l 13 RAYMOND:
Overheard some of their reports on what was going on in the 14 offsite monitoring and one of the things that I had recorded was they 15i were getting confirmed readings of 50 mR/hr on Highway #41.
They were 16i getting more than negligible readings of air particulate activity i
17!
downtown Middletown areas.
They were confirming that a 10 R/hr direct 18!
readings of water in the building, of the auxiliary building.
I guess 19f at that time we had realized that, they were, their radiation monitoring 20j equipment was crapped up and they were looking for Dackup support.
21l They wanted to know whether or nJt the Region I van was still around, 22' had arrived on site.
I guess it had been diverted from Millstone.
I 23 tried unsuccessfully to locate the whereabouts of the van and...couldn't.
24
- 'l 30 W 4
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!li HUNTER:
Bill, who were you communicating with at this time--Met Ed 2'
l people? Which, which, who, who were actually involved in the conver-3l sations in the Observation Center?
4j i
"1 RAYMOND:
Okay.
I don't know if I have.
There were several individuals j
0 that I just adoressed questions to and it doesn't look like I recorded I
7l their names.
So I can't give you an answer.
8!
9 HUNTER:
Okay.
I 10l 11{
RAYMOND:
I did though, while being there in the Observation Center 12l find out that Jack Herbein was located in a room off to the side from 1
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where the monitoring team was.
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I 15 HUNTER:
Not, not in the location where you were? You out in a large i
16i area on the Observation Center?
17l 18!
RAYMOND:
If you are familiar with the observation center in the very 19l front of the building there is like a foyer.
20i 21j HUNTER:
Yes.
22' 23 24i i
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RAYMOND:
With glass doors.
They had the response team set up there.
2' They had their charts laid out on a table.
Immediately adjacent to 31 l
that foyer there is a room, office type, where Herbine was set up, had 4
an open communications line with the Unit 2 control room.
When I found 51 that Jack was there, I joined him and since he had more plant specific 61 information as far as plant status.
Basically reviewed, uh 7
HUNTER:
The plant status?
9 10 RAYMOND: what the plant condition was.
11l 12!
HUNTER:
Good.
Would you go through that part. We'll get that on 13 record?
14i r
15i RAYMOND:
Okay, this is I guess by about,...I'm going to call it 5:00 16 p.m.
Sitting down with Jack we just kind of drew a schematic of the 17 reactor coolant system, labelled various parameters, or pertinent 18l parameters.
I will just read off.
Now how shall I be specific enough 19!
to?
20 21; MARTIN:
Please, Dan this is Tim Martin, please be specific and try not 22 to use jargon.
You know spell out what they, uh...
23l 24 25!
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RAT OND:
Okay.
2' 3
HUNTER:
Core flood tank rather than CMT wil' help.
i 4l l
Si RAYMOND:
Okay.
Uh, I will just go around the loop here and start l
61 calling. things off, hopefully, I'll get everything.
Okay, uh B Loop 7
hot leg temperature, they had recorded 600 or greater, B steam generator O!
pressure at 180 pounds.
I've got 200 F on the 8 cold. leg going back 9
into the vessel, 500 uh 520 on the A loop cold leg going back into 10!
the vessel, 170 pounds on the A steam generator, 520 on the A uh, 520 11 on the hot leg going to the A steam generator.
Both core ficod tanks 12l sitting there at about 11 feet, inventory, essentially floating on the 13 reactor coolant system and an indicator pressure, system pressure, of 141 700 pounds.
I also have recorded 500 pressurizer temperature.
Other 15i parameters that were...given were 26.5 feet on the borated water storage 16I tank.
An estimation of about 425 GPM going into the reactor vessel.
I 171 This was from a high head injection pumps venting through the power I
IS!
operated relief valve at about 2,000 at 2,000 pounds.
Scratch that 19f last statement.
I am not sure what that meant.
At that time thcugh 20!
they in essence had the 8 loop isolaced and they felt that they were f
21l solid un the A loop.. 0kay.
They also felt that they had the B loop 22 vapor bound.
They did have a,...they were in the process I guess of 23 setting a vacuum on the condenser to use, to allow heat rejection out 24 of the A steam generator.
At one point, I asked what they considered 25!
2003 174 i
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core flow to be and their response was that they weren't sure that they 2!
l had any. We then talked about, we being Jack Herbein and I, about 31
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their need to get flow established through the core which they were in 4!'
the progress of doing.
The very next thing that he (Jack) was.
Under-
~d l
stand now, Jack was sitting there in the Observation Center, had a 61 diagram like the one I just read from in front of him going ever plant
,-l system conditions, etc., and essentially in communications with Gary 8
Miller in the Unit 2 control room.
Essentially, working out their plan to what their next evolution was and what it had to be.
At that time 10 they were still trying to get vapor pressure, or whatever out of the il loops through to the various maneuvers they had gone through.
By this 12 time, they had this time meaning when I was in there with the status, 13!
they had recognized the need to try to take the plant solid again and 14!
get pressure back up, and about this time when I was involved, Jack had 15' given the order for them to put all three high head pumps back on close 16i the PRV to try to repressurize.
17l 18!
HUNTER:
Okay.
And the intent, did understand it was to repressurize 19) the plant?
20j i
21l RAYMOND: And ultimately get a coolant pump back on...which I guess i
22l they managed to do by 8:00 or so that evening.
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li HUNTER:
Okay.
Did you remain there any longer or did you then uh l
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depart 31 1
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RAYMOND:
I was out of there by about 5:30 or 6:00 o' clock.
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HUNTER:
And you did understand at that time that they had the 3 makeup pumps on were adding water to the primary coolant system? Uh, to repres-9 surize.
9 i
10 RAYMOND:
Yes, that was the plan that they were.noving into.
I didn't 11 hear Gary Miller come back and say, for example, the three pumps are 12 on, or something like that.
t 13 14!
HUNTER:
Ok, that was their plan, then, OK...Was there anyone else in i
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there with Jack Herbein?
16j 17 RAYMOND:
People came in and out but there was a lot of things going 1Sl on.
A lot of confusion.
191 20!
HUNTER: Was he, Jack, in communication with anyone except Gary Miller 21l on the phone? Likc o&W or..
22 23 l
24l 25!,
2003 176 f
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!Il RAYMOND:
Yeah, but I can't say who.
I was also in and out of the room 2'
l so I wasn't listening to Jack continually, I don't know who else, ne at 3t l
cne point I know he did make a phone call, close the door and was 4l talking to somebody.
I don't know who.
S!
l Ei, HUNTER:
Did he have two lines, was he having to hang up from Gary when 7l he made a phone call or could you really tell?
8 9
RAYMOND:
There were several liras available.
To add to the confusion 10 there's a guy from Bell Telephone in there trying o install a new one.
lif Uh...I don't really know if he broke continuous communicotion with uh i
12i Miller.
I 13l l
14; HUNTER:
Were you in communication with Region I while you were in the f
15 Observation Center?
16i 17I RAYMOND:
No.
I did call them as soon as I got to the motel to let 18j
.them know what my status was and my intent to come on during the mid 19!
shift to provide coverage.
20l 21l HUNTER:
And did you, in fact, did you in fact, you came back for the 22f mid shift and go to the control room or...
23 24l 25i l
2003 177 l
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11 lf RAYMOND:
By 11:00 or 12:00 that night.,
2' 3
HUNTER:
OK, Tim.
4}
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MARTIN:
Tim Martin, Bill.
What were the conditions at the Observation 6i Center when you arrived? You indicated that the outer foyer was oc-7 cupied with the response people.
And, in other interviews, we've been given information that indicated there was another smaller room next to 9
that that was occupied by three or four people that were acting somewhat 10!
like technical consultants to Jack.
Is that the case, is that what you l
11!
saw?
12l l
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RAYMOND:
If you are talking about the small room with three or four I
14 people in it, I think you are talking about the same room that I was 15 in.
Now, I don't recall anybody else coming in, at least while I was
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16 there and providing technical information to Jack about the status of I
17 the plant.
Now, there were several people coming in and out, talking 18 about new fires that were coming up in various areas as far as the 19i environmental monitoring goes.
20i i
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MARTIN:
What was the form of the communication link be tierbein i
22I and this group and the plant? How did they get their ii..cmation?
23 Obviously he has no meters or things over there in the Observation 24l Center that tell him what's going on.
So, how was he finding out 25 conditions in the plant?
2003 178 I
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1.
j RAYMOND:
As far as radiation levels of plant status?
2.
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1 MARTTN:
Plant status items.
4l 5
RAYMOND:
I know from plcnt status it was through.a direct phone com-61 munication link-up with a phone in the control room.
7 l
MARTIN:
OK, this is the one that Gary Miller apparently was... utilizing.
9l l
10 RAYM0ND:
Was talking.
Let me back off.
I don't really know if Gary 11f was in the Unit 2 contrc,1 room for a fact.
I surmised that, in listening 12f to the conversations '.nat they were having.
i 13l l
14 MARTIN:
Ok.
What was the nature of the conversations that were going 15'i back and forth between the group in the Observation Center and someplace 16!
on-site?
t 17!
i 18 RAYM0ND:
Reports were coming in...what Met Ed off-site monitoring 191 teams were finding.
That sort of thing. I guess they were also looking l
20j for support.
They were looking for more support, more support. OK 21j which is when the question was directed toward to the NRC in the person i
22' of me for when the Region I van might get on site. A... general type, 23 24l 25l I
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the rest of it was general type, tactical type, logistics type problems, you know, getting teams out here, and that sort of thing.
It is very 3
hard.
I can't be more specific.
4l
"*I MARTIN:
OK relative to the plant status and changing tactics for handling the situation within the plant, who was making the decisions?
7 8l RAYM0ND:
There is no question in my mind that at least for the times 9
when I was in there with Jack, that Jack was calling the shots.
101 i
11!
MARTIN:
OK, was it is this case where Miller and whoever else was at I
12l the opposite end would make suggestions and Jack would say "let's go 13 with umpty umpty or was he acting pretty much independent of that group 14!
at the plant?
i 15; 16l RAYMOND:
Are you asking me did Jack make a suggestion as to what they 17l should be doing and Miller came back or the plant came back and said, 18i "no we've had other suggestions to do it this way?"
19f 20i MARTIN:
I a trying to find out really who was in control and how 21l control was exercised.
i 22' 23 HUNTER:
This is Hunter speaking.
Realizing that you are, in fact, 24l having to give us your impressions.
i 25i I
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11 RAYMOND:
Yeah, and I've been trying to make that impres:, ion as accurate i
2!
l as I can be.
You know, because when you think back at the conversations, 3l it is not as though Herbein said do something and then Miller said "no, t
4f I am not going to do it that way.
I w going to do.it another way."
c
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It wasn't a direct confrontation.
There was a lot of going back and forth.
OK, Miller may have appeared uncertain as to which way he 7
should be going.
I mean the plant's coming down on his ears, etc.
8 Herbein, I guess was going through the alternatives and showing him 9f how, you know, why he had to go in this, you know, whatever path they 10f had decided on.
- 11f, 12l MARTIN:
Would you characterize something like a safety committee 13!
meeting where they decide what action to take by committee?
14k i
15; RAYMOND:
Let me think...it had the characteristics of a committee 16i meeting but I am not sure would.
i 17l 18I MARTIN:
Ok, let's pursue another line of questioning.
You indicated 19l that at approximately 5:00 pm they felt that they were solid in the A 20l loop.
Whht was the basis of their assumption that the A loop no longer 21 had a bubble in it?
i 22l 23 24 25!
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^l RAYMOND:
I think it was the uniform temperature c,etween hot and cold
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legs.
3i 4l MARTIN: Was this point discussed at all or just implied?
Si l
O!
RAYMOND:
Between myself and Met Ed I think it was just implied looking 7
at the plant conditions.
8j l
9l MARTIN:
What problems were they having at this time on setting up the I
10f vacuum? Was that discussed at all, the vacuum in the condenser?
ll!
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RAYMOND:
No, did not get into that.
13}
14 MARTIN:
You talked about they were doing some maneuvers to remove 15; vapor from the loops.
Do you know any of the details of what they were 16i doing, line-ups or discussion of techniques?
17!
l 18r RAYMOND:
Only through the use of the high head pumps and the open 19!
valve.
Now I don't think they were trying to jockey a reactor coolant 20, pump around or anything.
It was more get high head pumps or with the l
21; POR power operated relief valve opened trying to increase pressure and 22 give any voids elsewhere in the cooling system someplace to go if you 23 understand the simplicitic approach.
24 QQOb t
s
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1 MARTIN:
You don't know of any special lineups they chose...
2 3
RAYMOND:
No, you realize I'm pretty blind, jumping into the middle of j
what's going on and then just really kind of drawing a sketch listing 5l line-up or essentially just listing pretty basic, some of the basic 0
parameters.
I had really no other information as to what was, what 7
procedures they may have been following.
You know, etc. things like 8
that.
9f i
10l MARTIN:
OK.
And in one part of our interview earlier, we talked about i
11 a very key decision, the one to repressurize plant and operate all high 12!
pressure injection pumps, take the plant solid.
Was this decision any 13 different than the earlier decision that you had observed being made, 14l was this one more of a direct order-this is the way you are gonna go.
1ri 16I RAYMOND:
Pretty much a direct order, you know.
In fact I recall those i
17l words, " Gary, you gotta do it."
And that sort of thing.
18j 19!
MARTIN:
Was this order following some phone conversation that Herbine 201 had with other people? Do you have any idea how this came about?
?
21:
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l' RAYMOND:
No, and I can't ok and he may have very well may have had 2'
input from engineering or off-site support groups and I can't address 3l that.
I really don't know.
4l 5
MARTIN:
Were you ever aware of an NRC concern for the core being 6l uncovered and being communicated to the licensee by someone maybe from 7
Unit l?
8l i
9I RAYMOND:
Ouring this time in the afternoon?
(
10!
tlli MARTIN:
It should have occurred earlier.
Looking at the.other inter-12 views and knowing what the communication occurred between NRC in Unit 1 1
13!
before we had a link to Unit 2 and we are really trying to find out if 14 that information ever got from Unit 1 to the people that made the 5!
decisions.
16!
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RAYM0ND:
I don' t know... You' re right, you know, after going on this t
13!
road tour and seeing the transient, when that pressure came down for 19l four or six hours or whatever it was.
Somebody should have realized 20l l t.
l 21l 22 23 24 25 100 i
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!It SINCLAIR:
OK.
This is John Sinclair.
Were going to break at this 2lI point to change the tape.
The present time is 1:33 pm.
This is Sinclair 31, again.
The time is presently 1:40 pm and this is a continuation of the 4
interview with William Raymond.
Si i
Of MARTIN:
This is Tim N rtin continuing.
We just discussed Mr. Herbein's order to have all high pressure injections pumps turned on to repressurize 8
the plant.
And I'd like to confirm the approximate time of that.
You 9l indicated that you believe you left the Observation Center around 6:00
(
10f and so it would have had to occur sometime before that.
11l I
12!
RAYMOND:
Yeah, my notes indicate that.
Sometime between 5:10 pm and i
13l 6:00 is when it would have occurred.
14!
i 15.
MARTIN: 'Allright, Bill.
Did you, while you were present in the Obser-16i vation Center, did you participate in any discussion concerning the i
17!
status of the plant, and how they got themselves into the situation i
18j that they found themselves at that time?
l l
19f I
20l RAYMOND:
No, I didn't.
21f i
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MARTIN:
And your return to the plant after midnight, I guess when you 23 came on the mid-shift, did you participate in any discussions to try to 24 fathom out how they got into this condition?
25i N
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19 lt i
RAYMOND:
Which condition? The incident or?
2 f
MARTIN:
The initial incident and then whatever else you might have 4
heard that might assist us in this investigation.
51 i
6!
RAYMOND:
Yes, I did, Tim.
And if you are going to ask me for details...
7 8
MARTIN: That's the next question.
9 10l RAYMOND:
They will be sketchy, because, particularly that first night.
11l There was a lot going on.
i 12{
13 MARTIN:
Understood.
14i i
15l RAYMOND: Why don't you ask the question maybe I can try to answer it.
I 16!
17l MARTIN:
Allright.
Specifically, lets isolate then on the event where 181 we had the trip.
Had you heard any rumors of why that occurred, any 19l discussion of abnormalities in the plant that could have led to the 20l event?
21 221 RAYM0ND:
Basically, and without being able to give names, because 1
23' there were several individuals in the control room area that first 24 night as well as during the subsequent days.
Yes, I did hear that the 25j I
20 I
11 l
trip, or the transient had started in the condensate system thru a 2l' process where they were trying to fluff up a demineralizer.
And in the 3l process of using the service air system, whichever one it is, to fluff 1
4!
up that demin, water had backed up through the service air lines and c!
]
ended up causing valves in the condensate system to go closed which caused the condensate pump to trip which brought the feedwater pumps 7
down on low section pressure.
Uh, also picked up on the fact that, 8
yeah, the 12A and 128 valves had been isolated.
No one seemed to know 9
how or why.
In talking with operations, operators who had been there 10 op w,.re or who relieved, I am not sure really which group it was, I 11l think it was the operators who were there, the sequence was, Yeah, as 12 they were doing their post trip recovery procedure, they, at sometime 13 after the trip knowing now it was eight minutes later, they realized, 14!
someone looked at the board and saw that 12A and B valves were closed 15l and hollered that out, and jumped on them, and opened them up as quick 16:
as he could.
Oh, let me see now, as far as the open power operatad 17!
pilot operated relief goes, not really much sticks in my mind abriut 181 that, as to why it took so long tc identify the fact that it was still 191 open.
201 i
21l MARTIN:
Was there any discussion relative to the modificatiion on the 22 indic8 tion for that valve and why it had malfunctioned? They've added 23 that another indicator on that as a result of an earlier event which 2%
i 25!
zgG5 \\Y i
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f 21 was supposed to provide the operators direct indication of that valve f
position.
Was there any indication from anybody why they thought that f,
didn't work?
4l c!
- l RAYMOND:
No, I have no knowledge of that.
6l 7
MARTIi4: Was there any discussion of why the pressurizer heaters ap-8 parently failed them at a time of need?
9i i
10' RAYMOND:
Yes.
There is a buss that one or several of the groups are 11 energized from, that also has attached to that buss a pump, and I don't 12i know if I got the details as to which pump it was.
The point is, that l
131 pump became flooded.
They got a trip, I guess, on that buss because of 14l a short and ended up having to go in and strip the buss...to isolate 15!
it.
Now, I believe that was part of their problems.
16i I
17l MARTIN:
Was there any discussion of why they chose to trip the reactor ISI cool pumps initially the first ones in the 8 loop arounds between 73 191 minutes and the ones in the A loop later on around 100 minutes?
20f 21 RAYMOND:
No.
22 23 MARTIN:
No discussion on the basis for causing those trips?
24l 25l
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10 0
22 l
1 RAYMOND: Well OK.
During the course of that week, I picked up on 2'
information such as the pumps are running at a 100 amps, when they 3
j normally sit there at 400 amps operating current.
They did have high 4'
vibrational alarms coming in on the pumps.
And last we,...oh they had c
to sit there and watch it -core flow drop of from a nominal value of 60 OI million pounds per loop down to whatever it was when they finally 7
stopped them.
8' i
9 !
MARTIN:
Was their tripping of the pump simply based upon seeing the 10!
flow drop off or was it based upon some form of some administrative 11!
limit that the operators were observing.
Was that discussed?
1 12!
i 13 RAYMOND:
I would like to know what was really going on in their minds 141 and it's so easy now to look back in hindsight.
15i 16i MARTIN:
Sure.
17l 18 RAYMOND:
Hey, yeah, you might damage the seal package and get out 191 uncontrolled leakage through that seal but at the same time, you don't 20l really know.
I'm sure they could have.
This is speculation so I don't 21,I know what it is worth.
They may have thought that they could have 22, relied upon natural situation not realizing that the loops are going te 23 be blocked.
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23 1j MARTIN:
To your knowedge has this plant ever demonstrated natural circulation?
31 4
RAYMOND:
Unit 2?
i 5l 1
6 MARTIN:
I know that the pre-op test natural circulation was not teecause 7
this was not considered a prototype plant.
8 9
RAYM0ND:
No, I don't know.
I don't think it did.
I think the last 10 tiro it was done was probably done at Oconee.
Unit 1.
11t 12j HUNTER:
Jim Hunter speaking.
One more item as we going along the i
13i sequence a little bit.
The reactor building sump pumps had run, the 141 one had run for 3 minutes and the second one started and run for another i
15; 28 minutes for a total run time of 31 minutes.
Did you have any dis-16i cussions concerning the water being pumped to the Auxiliary Building?
17!
i 1Sl RAYMOND:
I did, I did and even the people that I talked to, even 191 though they were there that night, I'm talking about Zewe as well as 20!
some of the other operators.
They were not knowledgeable of what tank i
21 overflowed in the Aux. Building or how they got into that situation and 22i relating could not get any information as to why they hadn't noticed 23 the pumps going.
I 24i 25l y
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i 11 MARTIN:
Was there any indication in these discussions of what keyed 2
them into the site emergency and subsequently into the general emergency?
3 b
RAYM0N31 What I remember from the time when I was in the emergency response center, was that they predicated the general emergency based 6
on the high rad levels in containment.
7 8
MARTIN:
Is this part of their emergency procedure? Do you know?
9l 10 RAYMOND:
I don't know.
I think when the individual was passing that' 11l information on he indicated in accordance with our procedure assessment.
I 12!
They got into that, went into that status.
13 14I MARTIN:
Was there any indication in your discussions of why after 3 1
151 hours0.00175 days <br />0.0419 hours <br />2.496693e-4 weeks <br />5.74555e-5 months <br />, almost 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> into the event they chose to start the reactor 16l cooling pumps up again, that ultimately led to the high radiation 17 levels that they did detect.
I 18!
19 RAYMOND:
No. You are telling me that by 8:00 in the morning they had i
20f restarted the coolant pumps, one coolant pump?
21l 22f HUNTER:
This is Hunter speaking.
Bill, at that time what they had i
23l done is started a reactor coolant pump and ran it for approximately 19 24 minutes.
The pump basically sloshed water in and out of the core.
You 25!
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know, just pushed some water into the core.
It looks like into the 2
core area the pump once it had gone through instead of like a 9 second i
31 i
starting current time, the pump only tcok about 3 seconds to come off its starting current so it went to 100 amps again indicating that they 5
were not pumping.
Si 7
RAYMOND:
Passing a two phase meeting or whatever.
8 i
9 HUNTER:
Pumping any liquid.
Basically it was running unloaded and 10j then they turned it off.
I 11!
i 12!
RAYMOND:
What was system pressure and temperature?
13 14
,H8JNTER:
At that particular time they were sitting right at saturation.
15i They said saturation on and on and on and on.
They set at saturation 16l almost all of the time.
The saturation pressure varied by the amount 17 of high pressure injection or cooling water they provided because in 18 that type of machine, the reactor, you couldn't move out of saturation 19l except by superheat and they had some areas of superheat also, but 20!
basically they stayed at the saturation pressure during the operating I
21l of the plant, of the reactor coolant pumps.
Once the pressure had 22l gotten down to like 1,300 to 1,500, 1,350 pounds or so generally it i
23l stayed pretty much at that level.
There was time when they turned the l
2 41 pumps off that the pressure went all the way down to 575.
We had been 25 g@ \\@
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26 i
1l spending some time looking at that where the reactor is no longe,r the 2*
pressurizer. The steam generator is new the pressurizer.
In other 31 l
words the A steam generator that is the saturation curve on the A steam 4!
generator, and is combined to combine steam flow from the A steam c!
generator through the reactor cold leg through the core and at the 1
6!
pressurizer relief valve and the saturation pressure really is being 7
developed by the water being discharged from the steam generators, the 8
primary side of the steam generators being pulled through the plant 9
then out.
And then when they shut the power operated relief valve, 10' this is what happened.
lli 12!
MARTIN:
Bill, Tim Martin again, which gets us back to the next question.
13 Was there any discussion of why they chose to isolate the EMOV, given 14:
that there was the electromatic or relief valve, given that there was 15i every indication that it was shut on the panel itself?
16l l
17' RAYMONO:
No, I--
18l 19l HUNTER:
This is Hunter speaking again.
Bill, during your discussions 20l early in the event, following the unit trip at this plant the power 21!
operated-relief valve the EMOV operates automatically on high pressure.
22 It is nothing unusual.
It operates every time they have a unit trip 23l especially if it is a turbine site trip.
24 25 f
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l 27 1
RAYMOND:
Yeah.
2 HUNTER:
Uh, so, the operators apparently would,...did in fact look to 4
the high temperature on the exhaust of that valve and the other valves 5
and the reactor coolant drain tank, but early in the event the reactor 6
coolant drain tank rupture disc blew.
Did you get any information or 7
hear any discussions concerning the rupture disc on that tank blowing 8
and the reactor building sump level being high indicating that they 9
were dumping water into containment during, at the same time, or could 10l be, could have been construed to being actually or determine that it i
11 really was the rupture disc that had blown and they were in fact either 121 had a safety valve stuck or a power operated relief valve stuck? Did 13 you have any discussions concerning that?
Particularly that?
14!
15!
RAYMOND:' Yes.
Uh, I would say that as I remember now in the quesi.ico 16i answer exchange that occurred while I was still in the office that 17 piece of information came up.
I really don't have much to add the way 18j you just described it, Dory, with the exception of I don't recall 19i anybody coming to that conclusion that they had a relief valve stuck.
20l i
21l HUNTER:
And that would be the conclusion coming frcm the plant to the 22!
Region?
l 23l 24l 25l
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i 2003 I
{
28 l'
RAYMOND:
Anybody.
I 2) i 3
HUNTER:
In answer to that.
4f 5
RAYMOND:
I never.
6l 7
HUNTER:
That was never discussed along in that light.
8 9
RAYMOND:
Right.
10 lli HUNTER:
One more question concerning again trying to visualize if you i
12!
would what you heard what the conversations that you were involved in 13 or that you were privy to hearing.
After a high pressure injection 141 occurred, in this particular plant, it doesn't isolate containment and i
15; you may be aware of that also you know going through.
That left 16l certain valves open on the containment which were not closed during the 17 high pressure injection which included the containment sump valves, it 18l included the vent valves off the reactor coolant drain tank which go 19, over to the vent header via the bleed tank vent header and the discharge 20l of the reactor coolant drain tank to the bleed tank are all open until 21 approximately 8:00 when the first building isolation occurred and all 22 of those valves were closed.
At that point it would appear that the 23l containment is totally isolated with the exception of let down and seal 24 25i l
o w, l
L-i
L 4
h 29 s
I water inject on, steam line, feed lining and them let down seal eat.er 2
injection you have got the complete loop.
Did you hear any discussions 3
about the containment isolation, the lack of containment isolation; or 4'
the possible flow paths, source of water into the auxiliary building at 5
that time?
Si 7
RAYMOND:
No, I didn't dare. Other than it was standard knowledge that 8
on SI you know, you don't get containment isolation until you get 4 or 9
5 pounds building pressure whichever it is.
It goes the other way.
10 You get SI. You get an SI in this case.
11l 12.
HUNTER:
Right.
The building pressure is at SI, but it includes con-13 tainment isolation alsc,, the building isolation. One thing that happenel 14!
is that the radiation alarms in the auxiliary'ouilding.
They had high l
15!
radiation levelf t,ut the reactor building supp pumps were shut off at 16!
4:15 in the mo ning. Would you believe t. hat?
I 17 18i RAYMOND:
Sump pumps were--shut off 19f 20l HUNTER:
Shut off 4:20 in the morning to stop pumping the water frorrr i
21l the reactor coolant drain tank containment sump to the auxiliary building.
22l At that time they have got people in the building, the auxiliary building 23 walking around, y u know.
i 24l t
25!
70B3
1 l
30 l
lj RAYMOND:
If they shut them off at 4:15 in the morning, how tha hell 2l did they get all that water over there?
3t I
4 HUNTER:
Did you, in fact, hear any discussions concerning that particular 5'
item which you just brought up where, in other words between 4:15 and 6
8:00, they, in fact, pumped an enormous amount of water from the reactor 7'
coolant system, high activity water after 7:00 until 8:00.
There is an 8
hour there where everything is hot.
They, in fact, transferred an 9l enormous amount of water to the Auxiliary Building, apparently an i
10l enormous amount of water that had an enormous amount of radiation in it 11l because the floor drains are reading 50 R/hr or something.
Did you l
12l hear any discussions concerning how that water may have been transferred?
13f 14 RAYMOND:
The understanding that I had been operating under based in 15i part from discussions with people in the control room was that the 16i transfer path was from the sump to A tank in the Aux Building which my 17 guess is going to be it is going to be in the Aux Building sump tank 18f which ov~crflo,ed.
19:
20l HUNTER:
Are the miscellancou:, drain tank or the Auxiliary Building 21 sumo in the Auxiliary Building sump tank, but it overflowed.
That is 22l your understanding. Right. Now.
23f 24i 25f i
h 1
f l
31 1{
HUNTER:
Did you hear anything? Did you hear any discussions concerning 2lt that decon--
l 3
4{
RAYMONO:
Now understand my understanding specifically came from my 51 d,scuscions with operators who were on shift at that time.
61 i
7 HUNTER:
Yes, that is my understanding.
I hope you know that is what 8
we are trying to make sure that we that we get what you know the way 9
they felt, too. We have got some in our interviews we have got some 10l ideas about where it came from.
Uh, did you hear any discussions I
11l concerning the fact that the containment was at 4 pounds? And that 12l those valves were opened and with the --
13 i
141 RAYM0ND:
Uh, which which valves?
i 15j 16; HUNTER:
The containment isolation va'ves were open.
All of the con-l 17]
tainment isolation were open and that would in fact put an open re ture i
18j disc uh uh reactor coolant drain tank with an open rupture disc directly 3
19l communicating that system with the bleed tank there throughout the 20l event until 8:00.
It a130 puts a 4 pound pressure on the reactor i
21f building sump and puts that sump and that differential pressure between 22 here and here throughout the event until 8:00 when the first building 23 isolation and with a 4 pound differential pressure and these tanks 24 being somewhat at the same level or if you had a tank overflowing, they 25 i
32 1
might syphon water out of the containment sump to the Auxiliary Building 2!
suitp and then everything would overflow.
Did you hear any discussions 1
3(
along that line?
4l l
Si RAYMOND:
No.
l 6[
i 7!
HUNTER:
What time.
We are just trying to --
I a
9 RAYMOND:
It has merit.
I don't know if you get enough driving head if i
10 anybody sat down and figured that out.
11!
I 12 HUNTER:
It looks like if the tank overflowed through its normal overflow 13 and built and had a siphon then you can have like a 2 inch line contin-14!
uously for an hour and a half or two hours to siphon water out of the i
15i containment into the Auxiliary Building.
That type of thing can happen 16l because the containment did not isolate on safety injection and the 17l water in fact was transferred across.
Whatever the mechanism was, we 18 don't know yet because I, apparently they have not in fact determined 19 what tank overflowed or what tank runs it.
Tim, any, let me see, I 20 want to make sure.
21 22 MARTIN:
While you are looking, I have one final question, for Bill.
23 Was there any discussion of what caused the turbine trip?
l 24!
251 i
2003 199 1
I
33 1
RAYMOND:
Uh, not a lot of discussion, just that it was loss of feed, 2
feed water.
31 4l MARTIN:
To your knowledge, is there a direct trip from loss of feed?
i Si l
6!
RAYMOND:
You asked me this last week.
I thought there was.
I 7l 8
HUNTER:
Uh, Bill, one thing that I am interested in is in your discus-9 sions and listening to the operators, if there was a cause for this 10l event, in other words a cause, one single outstanding most predominant 11 cause for this event, what did those operators feel like the cause of 12 this event was, or maybe two? Did you hear them discuss, well, if 13 something had not have happened we would have been all right? Or --
14!
151 RAYMOND:
Not really, Darwin.
I think there wasn't much free and open i
16i talk, you know, along those lines, at least not in any of the conversa-17 tions I was a party of.
ISI HUNTER:
19l Uh, one question, general question concerning Jack Herbein.
20l
.Was he in control of the situation? Was he in fact what you would i
21l consider a person in control and not and or did did he --
i 22l 23l RAYMOND:
I knJw what you are asking.
l 24l 25j i
(
t l
2003 200
l L
i 34 1
HUNTER:
Did he appear to you?
2 3
RAYMON[;:_ But I don't know if I can give you the answer you are looking 4
for.
Okay, I can say this, that whether or not Jack had complete and 3
adequate control of what was going on over there, I can't answer, 6!
because I don't know what the total scope of his information was and i
7 how he was assuring himself he knew exactly what, you know, plant 8
status was.
Uh --
9l 101 HUNTER:
Even more so, was he in control of himself?
l lli l
12f RAYMONO:
He was in control of himself.
In my dealings with this man 13 in the past --
141 15i HUNTER:
Okay.
16i 17l RAYMOND:
He has demonstrated his ability to the utmost to.
181 i
19!
HUNTER:
And his actions at the time you were dealing with him the 20j other da;, the 28th, he appeared also to not be in, he still appeared 21 to be in control of himself and not uh --
l 22 23 RAYMOND:
Absolutely.
24,
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2sj 1@b h
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35 l
If HUNTER:
Uh no problems.
Okay.
2 3l RAYMOND:
I mean he was he was taking things off the wing left and 4!
right and still had a level head upon him.
5l l
6f HUNTER:
Okay.
Good.
7l 8!
SINCLAIR:
This is John Sinclair again.
The interview is now being 9f concluded and the present time is 2:05 p.m. eastern daylight time.
10 Something I failed to mention earlier was that William Raymond requected 11 a transcript of this for recordkeeping purposes.
12!
13l 14i 15; 16i i
17!
18t 19!
20!
21l 22 23 1Q1 24l 25j p%
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