ML19274G112
| ML19274G112 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1979 |
| From: | Laudermilch D, Scheimann F METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290659 | |
| Download: ML19274G112 (36) | |
Text
!
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
[
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
I I
1!
In the Matter of:
2; IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW i
3i of Mr. Fred Scheimann Shift Foreman - Unit 2 41 i
Mr. Dale J. Laudermilch Si Ops Operator B 6l 7\\
ei Trailer #203 9l NRC Investigation Site i
TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant 1 01 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11'.
March 30, 1979 12I (Date of Interview) 13!
June 27, 1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 14!
95 15i (Tape Numoer(s))
16l 17!
i 1Si i
191
\\
O 21!
NRC PERSONNEL:
I )
22; I
I Don Rutford 23]
Bob Long i
24l t
25l 2002 258 I
I
y LONG:
0231 hours0.00267 days <br />0.0642 hours <br />3.819444e-4 weeks <br />8.78955e-5 months <br />, March 30, Don Rutford and Bob Long and we have with us g
Fred Scheimann.The purpose of this investigation by the U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission is to determine exactly what occurred ragarding the incident I
at Three Mile Island, Unit 2, which began on March 28, 1979, and the respond-4!
ing actions taken by Metropolitan Edison Company.
The investigation will include a review of the condition of the plant prior to the incident and the period investigated will extend to 12:01 a.m. March 31, 1979.
You are asked to provide information in as much detail as you can recall concerning your site related activities during this period, including your recommenda-9 tions.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was given the responsibility 101 i
and authority by the Congress of the United States in the Atomic Energy Act 11:
l of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, 12!
to license nuclear power plants and to see they are operated safely to 13 protect the health and safety of the American Public.
It is from this Act 14!
(
and Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 15!
Commission's Office of Inspection and Enforcement is conducting this official 16i investigation.
You have the right to refuse to be interviewed.
If you 17 l
consent to an interview, you may have someone of your cnoice present.
To 181 assist in obtaining every comment, exactly as it is given, and to expedite 19l the inter'.iew, your permission to tape record this interview is requested.
20!
You have he right to refuse to have the interview tape recorded.
As an 21!
alternative, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigators may prepare a 22l written record of your statements and request you to sign it.
You have the 23l right to refuse to give a signed statement.
In the absence of a tape 24l recording or a signed statement, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 25(
I t
2002 ~259
?
I 2
investigators will, to the best of their abilities, write your comments for inclusion in the investigative report.
Upon your request you will be given a copy of your tapa recording or signed statement.
You have the right to request that your identity be protected and not used in the U.S. Nuclear 4l Regulatory Commission investigation report.
However, because of the deep 51 concern over this incident by the American Public and government rfficials, 61 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission cannot assure you that we will not 7\\
release your name and interview contents if we receive official requests and requests by the public through the Freedom of Information Act.
If I
specifically requested, all attempts will be made by the investigators to 10 keep from disclosing i.c Metropolitan Edison or other parties specific 11, information.
You must recognize that this is not an absolute guarantee.
12 Federal law prohibits your employer from discharging you or discriminating 13 against you because of your interview with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 14!
Commission.
Your help and cooperation in providing information to the 15l Nuclear Regulatory Commissien will be appreciated.
Fred, could you just 16i tell us your name again and an your position.
17!
ISi l
SCHEIMANN:
My name is Fred Schiemann, I'm shift foreman over in Unit 2 for 19!'
A shift.
20l l
21l LONG:
A.'d you were on duty the morning that that was initiated?
22 23 SCHIEMANN:
I was on shift, the 11 to 7 shift.
24' 25 i
'2002 260 i
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3 LONG:
Okay, I guesss what we'd like you to do, Fred, is to kind of tell us y
where you were from like an hour before the event and then a description of i
4l SCHIEMANN:
Okay, approximately one hour before the turbine trip and the g
reactor trip took place, I was over in the Auxiliary building, making a tour 6f the Auxiliary building plant, looking for any abnormal leakage or 7l any problems with the equipment over there.
Approximately ten or fifteen i
minutes prior to the trip, I had reported back up to the control room to 9{
l look at plant conditions, and determine whether anything was abnormal at 10j that time. at which time I could not see anything.
About 5 minutes prior 11!
to the trip, I'd been called down to the polisher, okay, my operator down l
there was having difficulty transferring resin from one condensate polisher 13l to another, to the receiving tank.
And I got up on top of pipes where the 141 site glass was for checking resin and all of a sudden I started hearing 15i loud thunderous noise, like a couple of freight trains.
Which time I 16i jumped down off the pipe and I heard the word turbine trip-reactor trip, 17l1 and at which time I, well, moved inyself as rapidly as possible up to the 18!
control room, in an attempt to establish plant control.
i 191 20 LONG:
The announcement was turbine trip and reactor trip?
21 22 SCHIEMANN:
Turbine trip--a couple seconds later reactor trip--come over 23 the page system.
On getting up to the control room I right away jumped 24l over to the, ah, pressure control systems for the primary plant and I 25l i
2002 261 I
s l
noticed that we had fully S injection as was required by the circumstances and I established myself to take care of pressurizer level and pressure control ir, the primary plant.
And we had noticed that pressurizer level i
4l and system pressure was restored, OK, as we would expect with the two makeup pumps and the 16's open.
On this point, once the system pressure f
was up where it should be, and makeup tank, ah, pressurizer level was 6i showing signs of being where it should be, we took off one of the makeup pumps and started shutting on the 16's.
At this point, I started noticing pressrui.ter level was starting to go high on us, and we established maximum 9l l
let down and didn't appear like it was doing us any good.
Then within 10l about one half hour to 45 minutes, pressurizer level was up to the top.
At 111 which time we again were watching our makeup tank and we were watching all 12 l
our other tanks to see where we were gettting the water form besides the 131 l
BWST.
And we couldn't find any other water source coming in, and we continued 141 l
maximum let down.
Finally, levels started showing signs of recovering back 15j on scale and it stayed high for the remainder of the time I was up on 16i l
shift.
Ah, lets see, ah.
We did notice at one time that we were starting 17) to lose pressure so we again manually reinitiated high pressure injection.
18(
19 LONG:
Is this some length of time?
20 21, l
SCHIEMANN:
Yes.
It was some length of time later we started losing pressure 22 again. But then we reestablished high pressure injection again and after 23 that point for several periods of time we were running at least one string 24' of high pressure injection going through two the 16 valves.
And the pres-25 2002 262
i i
f l
y surizer level still stayed high.
It was visible, though, for most of the l
time.
And pressure gradually stabilized out.
Ah, sometime later it was decided to start trying to cool down and we started coming down.
31 4l LONG:
You've got a feeling for the time interval?
Si SCHIEMANN:
Ah, crap, everything was happening so weird.
I think it was probably late morning.
Early morning we started cooling down as soon as we noticed we were having all kinds of radiation alarms and everything.
And 9I we were told to go ahead and cool it down.
And while we were cooling it 101 1
down, we were having difficulties with pressure hanging up, didn't want to 11; I
go down like it should have, we tried spraying down, spraying down some 12j We tried--well, when we couldn't get anything out of spray down, we more.
131 tried the electromatic relief, and that seemed to bring pressure down some, 141 but we still couldn't get down below about 900, 950 pounds.
Ah, let's see.
15i We stopped the makeup--I mean the coolant pumps, when we started seeing 16i i
pressure was down and we were getting abnormal readings on our current 171 l
indicators, so we shut them down. This was again later in the morning and 18j we continued to try cooling down in such a way we could get on the decay lol heat removal system.
All the time though our 20!
I 21lj LONG:
When you say later in the morning, you mean like...?
22!
23 SCHIEMANN:
More towards probably noon or so.
11 or noon.
24 25i l
i 2002 263 l
t i
6 LONG:
OK.
g 2l SCHIEMANN:
'cause I'd been here from 11 p.m. the following night; I think 4(
I finally left around 6:30 the next evening.
And it was a very rough time.
i i
5 LONG:
Can you back up a little bit and describe the events leading to the initiation of the site emergency?
8 i
SCHIEMANN:
OK.
What had happened that was--I'm trying to figure where it 9l l
all tied together.
That would be probably the emergency itself was declared 10<
somewhere around 6:30, Ok.
Can we continue from that point? Quarter to 7.
11!
OK.
Ah the reasons it was dec!ared was, when we were first seeing, first 12!
l saw, our signs of radiation monitor going off in more than one building, up 13}
until that time from the time of the trip, we had had no signs of any 14!
I radiation problems.
O k.
Once the two monitors came in, we declared the 15i site emergency, and then everybody else--we start getting all the other 161 alarms coming in on us.
17!
l 18!
LONG: Who made that decision?
19l 20!
SCHIEMANN:
The shift supervisor, Bill Zewe.
He called the emergency.
21:
22' LONG:
OK.
When we were talking with Ed, he described the times in the 23 control room like from the turbine trip up to this point as being kinda of 24 i
a team decision.
Could you comment on the communication that was going on?
25l l
2002 264 1
I
7 SCHIEMANN:
Communications were, I'm proud to say, very good at the time of the problems.
I had myself on the pressurizer control system, Ed himself, if I remember correctly, was over on the makeup system and high pressure
[
injection system, Craig was over on the heat feedwater and associated systems, and the supervisor was keeping an overall watch out over them then.
I thought that, for the conditions we were in at that time, I thought 61 we had good communications and I felt that we handled it very well, 8
LONG:
Do you remember any particular trouble areas where you had to make decisions and and who was kinda the lead in making the decisions?
i 11!
SCHIEMANN: Overall, the decisions were made by the shift supervisor, Bill 12 1
I Zewe. There were times like when I told the operator to cut back on makeup 13l a couple of times that I thought my pressurizer level was getting too high, 14!
l and I directed him to take an increase let down flow and such as that.
I 151 would say it was pretty much a joint effort as far as making decisions on 16i what actions we were taking at the time.
17 181 i
LONG:
Did, did you make any recommencations at any time over that whole 19}
span of time, really?
20j i
21' SCHIEMANN:
Ah sure, on most.
It amounts to--exactly what ones they were, 22 I really can't remember that well.
At the time, everything was happening 23 so fast for a while there.
24 25[
i 2002 265 I
8 LONG:
What other type things?
i 2l l
SCHIEMANN:
Well.
We talked earlier about the ah cen1ral emergency.
Do you remember what the date that the statement was over the. rjiation 4;;
reading or level? There was a high alarm.
I believe it was HPR 219 and I believe it was also the Auxiliary building or the fuel handling building i
monitor.
It was two separate areas--the alarm made in it.
7l 81 LONG:
How about the dome monitor?
In the containment building?
91 10' SCHIEMANN:
Yes.
That was in also.
But like I was saying, as far as I 11!
remember the first one that come in, as close as I can remember, was some-12 where in the vicinity of quarter to 7.
Then, after that we were getting 13 j
one after another coming in.
14!
15i LONG:
Maybe migilt near that.
16i i
17lI SCHIEMANN:
(Laugh) They do a good job of pulling some of it.
I can't 181 afford to lose any.
19!
20f I,
LONG:
What point Fred, did you decide that you had something other than a 21!
I normal kind of turbine trip, reactor trip sequence?
22 I
23l SCHIEMANN:
I would say the point where I was concerned was probably at the j
point where we were starting to get the radiation monitors and the different i
25 I,
2002 266 6
9 alarms, such as that.
Up until that it looked to me that we were still pretty much in control of things and just before the alarms is when we started seeing that the pressurizer level was going out high on us.
That was the point where I was concerned that it was more than an ordinary trip 4,;
that we had seen in the past.
6 i
LONG: Well, that was like 6:30.
8 SCHIEMANN:
Yea, about 6:30.
Even though it did take us a longer time than 9l normal to take and establish everything under a controlled evolution.
I 10J l
wasn't really too concerned, you know like, there was a major problem until 11 after that time.
13 l
LONG:
Have you been in the control room before during turbine reactor 14!
trip?
a 15:
16j l
SCHIEMANN:
Ah, yes, I have.
17 181 LONG:
OK.
19f 20!
SCHIEMANN:
I've been in for manual trips as well as trips that--one trip 21 that occurred that wasn't scheduled.
22l 23 LONG:
Did, did you use any procedures?
24 25!
l 2002 267 I
a t
l 10 l
i SCHIEMANN:
Yes, sir.
As soon as we got over the initial actions on the l!
trip itself we pulled out our emergency procedures drawer--books rather--
i 2;
I and we went through the turbine trip, reactor trip, and let's see what was 31 I
the other one we looked at? Well, the loss of coolant, loss of pressure 4l 1
procedure, we were looking at.
~
Si i
61 LONG:
So you, how do--how did you use those?
8 SCHIEMANN:
Well, we tried to direct it once we had our initial actions 9l' taken care of, we got out the book to make sure that we didn't miss some, 10f and also to see that we were going on properly for the following events.
11!
i 12l LONG:
You stayed on that day until...?
13 14!
SCHIEMANN:
I stayed on that day 'til about 6:30 in the evening.
15i 16i LONG:
And then when did you come back?
17!
18!
i SCHIEMANN:
I came back in tonight.
19!
20l LONG:
OK.
Tonight.
21
'"2 SCHIEMANN:
Yes.
Ah, I had a slight misunderstanding about when I was due 23 here. And I was told to come in tonight.
24 25i i
2002 268
11 LONG:
There were various communications off site.
Were you involved in any of these?
31 SCHIEMANN:
Ah, no, sir I was not.
I was involved in trying to keep the plant in as safe condition as I possibly could.
5 I
Gi 7l LONG:
So you, ah, how ' bout, how ' bout your auxiliary operators, were.they I
sending information to you, volunteering information or how were you working 8{
on it?
9 10l SCHIEMANN:
11j Well, as soon as we were starting to have problems t.d once the I
word come out on the page, our operators were feeding back wnatever informa-12l l
tion they could, you know, get ta us at the time.
Until such a time as we 13!
were unable to staff the Auxiliary building and fuel handling building 141 j
areas, we had to pull people out of there, then. As far 's the turbine 15!
plant and such as that, as long as we had people out in the area we were 16i getting feedback as to what conditions were, such as when the turbine had 171 stopped rolling and such as that.
18j 19l LONG:
As you look back now in retrospect do you see any actions that you 20l j
took that you might have done differently?
211 22 SCHIEMANN:
No, sir.
The way I look at it I don't feel that I would have 23 done different under the circumstances we had.
I followed what my indica-tions said, what I thought I needed to do as a judgment, and I think if I 25I i
2002 269 0
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j 12 i
had that same situation over again, I would probably carry on pretty much l
the same way I did.
I I
31 LONG:
OK.
Did, could you comment on any kind of equipment malfunctions?
Were there things that probably should have functioned and didn't, that you 5'
remember?
Si l
7l I
SCHIEMANN:
Well, it seems to me what our whole problem started out with 8j was that the polisher outlet valves had gone closed on us.
And COB 12, 9f which is the polisher bypass, it didn't come open.
As a result, we tripped 101 the condensate pump, then the feedpump plant, and then the cone nsate ll!
booster pump.
About that time, the turbine tripped and then the reactor 12!
j tripped.
So, I don't believe that bypass valve operated as it was supposed 131 to have.
OK.
As far as once I left that area, I went, like I was saying, 14!
directly up to the control rocm to try to establish what was going on, and 15; it seemed to me like we had two eme gency feed pump discharge valves that 16, hadn't been opened.
And that had delayed our doggone time, for you know it 17{
i had delayed feeding the steam s.1rators.
But other than that, I would say 18j the equipment as far as the ESAS actuation, that went as it was supposed to 19:
have.
The diesels started as they were supposed to have.
And I felt that 20!'
we really didn't have any major problems as far as core coolant.
21 22 LONG:
How about your various alarms and indicators? Any of those that 23 you...?
24l 25l 1
2002 270 1.
f f
13 SCHIEMANN:
Well. We were suspicious for quite a while about pressurizer level. As I referred to earlier that when we stopped the injection going to one, into the primary system, the pressurizer level still is going up and up and up, and it had actually gone to the point where it was off scale.
And we seriously had doubts as to whether that was accurate or not.
We had instrumentation people check the reading going to the computer, and it 6i appeared that it was as it should have been, the uncompensated level.
So we took--and once we did reestablish level on the gauge, pretty ah you know, the comp, yea.
Once we established level indication on the console, we went and verified that versus what our uncompensated on the computer 10 was, and we kinda figured that we were pretty close to being where it 11' should have been.
So, evidently, we didn't really have a problem with 12, pressurizer level.
As far as any other indication we saw, we were getting 13 l
back chemistry reports that were saying that our primary was down on 700 14!
l and 400 ppm boron, which seemed awful strange to me from a point that we 15!
were chugging in water that was 2270 ppm or greater.
The only thing we 16i could have figured was that maybe we were flashing a little bit in our 17 letdown line where they drew the sample off'in.
That could have accounted ISf for why we wern't seeing you know, what we expecting to see.
And I think 19f that was another thing there that didn't look right to us, the concentration.
I 20 l
As we had sent quite a bit from the BWST right into the primary plant, and 21l the concentration should have been much higher.
Ah, let's see if there is I
22' anything else I can remember. Another "'ing that had us worrying, was our 23 pressurizer--our system pressure.
WI in we were trying to come down, we 24 could only come down so far, and pressu e would stop coming down.
It'd 2~5 just sit there and hold.
3 I
2002
?71
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I 14 l
LONG:
Remember what pressure it was?
2!
I SCHIEMANN:
That was approximately 950 to 1000 pounds in the primary.
And 3t it seemed like it just come down that far and then stopped.
We did have 4l some difficulty with steam generator pressures.
They didn't seem to be responding the way they should.
They should have been coming down at a el nice smooth decrease and I didn't really see what the problem was there.
One of the other operators had mentioned about it, and we had indications 8!
that the B generator evidently had a leak in it. Probably primary to secon-9 dary, and when we bottled it up, OK, the pressure just held there in the 101 l
generator, 11; I
121 LONG:
Do you remember the circumstances or roughly the time when you 13 noticed that?
14!
15i SCHIEMANN:
Oh.
Let'ss see. What were we doing at the present--at that 16!
time. Right off the top of my head I really couldn't remember it. That's i
17 what I was saying, you know, if we had a group where we had the people bac<
18I l
and forth you know, like we normally communicate with, we'd probably take 19) uo a lot more of this.
20!
i 2 11 LONG:
Well, we're going to do that.
I 22l 23l SCHIEMANN:
I'm trying to think of what
' were--and what we saw--for 24i t
different reactions.
But following up that steam generator, we thought had 25i l
2002 272
l 6
[
15 taken, cured one problem for us, and I'm trying to remember what the problem was.
I think it had to do with building pressure.
Ah, yea.
Building pressure was going up on us, and we took and we bottled up the steam generator, and it slowed its increase so we thought maybe we had a steam generator y
problem from that. But later on, I would say more like about 8:00 in the morning, 8 or 8:30 one of the people came up and said something about closing the. isolation valve for the electromatic relief.
OK?
'cause we suspected that might possibly have been leaking by.
Upon closing the electromatic relief isolation valve, the building pressure actually turned i
91 and started decreasing, so at that point we knew for sure that we had had a 10 problem as far as a rupture in the RC drain tank, as well as a leaking lli i
relief there.
And by closing that we managed to take and turned building 12l
(
pressure around and come down.
13l 14!
LONG:
All right. Was there any equipment that you needed that wasn't 15i available anytime that you recall?
1 61 17!
i SCHIEMANN:
To my knowledge, everything that we needed when it started-you 18j know, when it was required to start--it started.
All the equipment that we 191 were required to have actually did start.
And to my knowledge I can't 20!
i think of anything that didn't start.
21!
I 22l LONG:
OK.
We about covered things.
Don, did you have any...?
23f 24i 2sj 2002 273 I
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t 16 RUTFORD:
Just one question I have was-you mentioned primary to secondary y
leak.
How did you determine, or what was the assessment that led you to I
think you had a leak?
3 41 i
SCHIEMANN: Well, at one time, let's see if I can remember how to word--how this came about to us, now. At one time we were lower in pressure in the 6,!
I secondary side o' the generator than the primary system pressure was and we were seeing an increase in steam generator level.
A very gradual slcw, increase but we were seeing an increase, and we had that generator bottled up as far as feeding steam to it. That's the point in which we thought we might have had a secondary, primary to seandary leak.
11j l
12l RUTFORD:
Did they see any radiation level increases in the...?
13 i
14!
l SCHIEMANN:
PA 748 did go off and alarm.
That's our offgas monitor from 15t the condenser.
That did alarm.
That was another of our indications that 16i we possibly had that problem.
17 181' RUTFORD:
OK.
This is the end of the interview with Fred Scheimann.
19l 20 l
LONG:
This is Bob Long, Don Rutford and I are interviewing Dale Laudermilch.
21l Ah it's about 15--no, excuse me, it's 0315 hours0.00365 days <br />0.0875 hours <br />5.208333e-4 weeks <br />1.198575e-4 months <br /> on the 30th of March.
The 22 purpose of this investigation by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is 23 to determine exactly what occurred regarding the incident at Three Mile 24 Island, Unit 2, which began on March 28, 1979, and the responding actions i
25!
i 2002 274 i
i
[
17 g
taken by Metropolitan Edison Company.
The investigation will include a review of the condition of the plant prior to the incident and the period investigated will extend to 12:01 a.m. March 31, 1979.
You are asked to 3
provide information in as much detail as you can recall concerning your i
site-related activities during this period, including your recommendations.
Si l
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was given the responsibility and Gi 7l at 9ority by the Congress of the United States in the Atomic Energy Act of l
1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, to 81 license nuclear power plants and to see they are operated safely to protect 9l the health and safety of the American Public.
It is from this Act and 10!
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of Inspection and Enforcement is conducting this official 12, investigation.
You have the right to refuse to be interviewed.
If you 131 i
consent to an interview, you may have someone of your choice present.
To 14l assist in obtaining every comment, exactly as it is given, and to expedite 15j the interview, your permission to tape record this interview is requested.
You have the right to refuse to have the interview tape recorded.
As an i
17I alternative, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigators may prepare a 18[
written record of your statements and request you to sign it.
You have the 191 righ+, to refuse to give a signed statement.
In the absence of a tape 20 recording or a signed statement, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 21 investigators will, to the best of their abilities, write your comments for 22 inclusion in the investigative report.
Upon your request you will be given 23 a copy of your tape recording or signed statement.
You have the right to 24l 1
request that your identity be protected and not used in the U. S. Nuclear 25!
2002 275 i
I
18 Regulatory Commission investigation report.
However, because of the deep concern over this incident by the American Public and government officials, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission cannot assure you that we will not release your name and interview contents if we receive official requests l
and requests by the public through the Freedom of Information Act.
If 51 l
specifically requested, all attempts will be made by the investigators to Gi keep from disclosing to Metropolitan Edison or ather parties specific information.
You must recognize that this is not an absolute guarantee.
Federal law prohibits your employer from discharging you or discriminating i
9l 10 against you because of your interview with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory i
Commission.
Your help and cooperation in providing information to the 11!
l Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be appreciated.
Dale, could you just 12t tell us your name so that the secretary will know your voice and your 13 l
position.
14l 15j LAUDERMILCH:
Dale Laudermilch, and I'm an Ops Operator B.
16) i 17!
l LONG:
And you were on shift, this shift, morning of the trip?
18!
19!
LAUDERMILCH:
Yes.
2 I
21 LONG:
Ok.
Ah, can you tell us kinda what you were doing, like an hour 22 I
before the trip occurred and then give us your recollections of the events 23 during the trip and following the trip.
24I 25l 2002 276 8
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yj LAUDERMILCH:
For one hour prior, I believe I was--I was involved with the hydrogen supply.
I was lining up hydrogen for the main generator.
We had 2
some problems with the lineups and so forth and had a small leak out there.
So Id just gotten finished with putting hydrogen in the generator, and, 4
y ah, I was just 61 LONG:
This is the electrical generator now, right?
7l 8
LAUDERMILCH:
Yeah.
And, ah, I was just walking in the door when I heard the safeties go.
So, I made it over to Unit 2 control room as fast as I i
lor cbuld.
11:l From there, you know, I, I went into the control room and just I
waited to be dispatched to a job.
I did a number of things, and I'm not 12l i
real sure the order that I did them, but the first thing I did was, Don 13)
Miller had called or came back up to the control room, and I think he 14!
l called the control room and stated he had a leak on the suction to the A 15!
Booster Pump.
So Terry Daugherty and myself ran down to the A Booster Pump 16 and when we got there there was a leak--I'd say, maybe 2 feet downstream of 17'1 the suction valve in the A Booster Pumps.
So, we started to help out but 18h they started calling me on the page, so Terry went and answered the page, i
19!
and he was dispatched on a job from there.
I can't remember what ne was 20i j
doing, but Don and myself and an engineer that had been stand.ing by, we 21i f
asked him for his help and so the three of us got the valve shut.
Then I 22iI think I went, you know, went back up to the, reported to the control room.
23 I
241 t
25j
~2002 277 4
I l
i i
20 t
LONG:
Was that within a few minutes of this event or do you have a feeling g
l for the time?
2!
3 LAUDERMILCH:
A few minutes.
I would, I'm gonna say that's within 45 41 minutes of me hearing the safeties.
'cause 'til I got back, 'til I got back, well, I had gone, when I went back to the control room initially, after hearing the safeties, you know, I took the outside route, and I went i
7\\
out around, 'cause I was, you know, I had out buildings, and I just made a 81 quick tour outside, and came back in the West 7th turbine building and came 9l t
through.
I noticed the gland exhausters were blowing steam.
10!
11!
LONG:
I was just going to ask you, when you were coming back, did you 121 l
notice anything unusual?
131 14!
LAUDERMILCH:
Ah, well, the only thing was the gland exhausters, OK, were 15i blowing steam.
I looked down at on the way by, and made a judgment that 16i that wasn't a very critical thing to be worrying about right now, that I 17i should get 'o the control room, you know, as soon as I could.
So, I went 18f up to the control room, and then I was dispatched down from the booster 19
pump job from Mcdonald, then I went back up.
Ah, the next job I remember 20i i
is Craig saying he's having trouble with hot water level.
So, he sent me 21' down to throttle open on C0060 four turns, because they had a throttle, you 221 l
know, that's, that's a downstream isolation of the main reject valve--the 23 condensate reject valve. So I went down, throttled open on that, watched 24l the hot well level, the hot well level was high, was completely out of site 25j 2002 278 l
t
6
(
21 i
glass.
I came back to Craig told them, and well then I went back upstairs, as a matter of fact.
I teld them that--they sent me back down to keep an eye on it, and Ed told m6 to.8 dowr and open it more until we get level.
It was really confusing et this point, because grry was down there, Don was down there, Bill Zewc hac.::ane down. They wire t?A' to work on the I
5l I
polisher bypass valve and the polisher bypass valve was minta me handwheel, 61 the manual hand wheel, OK?
In that course there, when I was sent back down 7
for the, to try to maintain hot water level, Ed I remember Ed saying you know, open it up all the way and maintain, you know, when I get hot water level down that you know close her back down and try to maintain it manual.
I Well, I did and in the course of that you know I noticed Juanita, and 11!
Harold Farce were over at the BP pump jacking it by hand.
So then I came 12 back and they were trying to, Donny and Bill Zewe and Terry Daugherty were 131 i
up on top of the ventilation deck by COB 12 trying to get it open. Apparently 14!
they had found the handwheel or something up there, and got it on and they 15, i
were trying to open it.
Bill was called back to the page. They wanted to, 16' there was a, (;raig had called and I was down at the page, and Craig, or 17.
j when Bill was up on, when Bill Zewe was still up that COB 12 helping out, 18{
the guys yelled down to me, "Have him knock off the condensate pump," OK?
19i' So, I was you know calling to, to have him knock off the condensate pump, 20{
but that ' ever came about--they never knocked it off, OK? And in that j
n 218 interim, Zewe had come down, OK? And he was talking to Craig, 'cause Craig 22 was, had a question for him about opening up the turbine bypass valve, OK?
23 So they were having trouble getting C0812 open, they cranked it, and I was 24l I
their communication on the ground, becatse I wanted to hang by the phone, 25 2002 279 t
i t
l" 22 anyhow because Ed said, " Stay by,the phone.
If I need that reject line 3
h i
shut, I want you to shut it."
So at, ah, they, a couple of time.S (tape I
21 I
ended h middle of 'his sentence.
Side 2 started wir.h:)
3{
t 4!
LONG:
Ok.
Can you back up just a little bit?
Gj LAUDERMILCH:
OK well, we're back on COB 12, they were having trouble getting it open.
Ah, I was their comcunication on the ground.
I called the, twice I
told 'em to try COB 12 up in the control room.
It woulcW t open, and I 9
10;.
told, I told Terry and Donnie, I said, you know, they wert going to keep
[
f.rac kirg.
I was going to go up and trip and reset the tN'cals on the 11l breakr
't' +' e COB 12 and, you know, reset the breaker.
F M then I'd come 12l back down and see wha'. W cnuld, you know, if that would P L us out to get 13 l
it open.
And I told Terry you know if he lears them call v for hot water 14!
level, he'd have to corm down and take over there. I went a ud reset the e
15!
breaker, and I think by the time I got back down they had p tton COB 12 16i open.
Now, I don' t know whether it was my reiett.ing the brceder, or whether 17 they had just gotten it off the seat far enough at that time to get it 18 i
open.
I remember, Donnie said that the polishers had gone to pot, that the 191 pneumatic valves hadn't shut the outlet valves on the polishers.
We had--I 20!
l think it was on the A vessel or number 8, number 8 vessel, the one going 21f i
furtherest West--we had a leak there, and anyhow we got COB 12 open.
And I 2
was, you know, coming back down and Terry said that they're having a problem 23' that the circ water plumes were supposedly overflowing.
He said, "You want 24 to take care of that?," and he'd watch the hot water level.
I said, "OK."
25 2002 280 t
I t
j 23 So I had a radio with me.
I ran upstairs and ran over to the coagulator building 'cause that's, you know, the shortest distance to the circ water I
house. I called the guards and told them to meet me at the gate over 3l there. I got out there before they did and I waited for them.
They came and I had them stand by.
I went over and checked the plume level, and the plume level was maybe 2 inches from overflowing.
It hadn't yet overflowed.
but...
I called in and paged, and told him about it, and he said, you know, hang on and then he got back with me and he says, OK, let's secure makeup.
So I secured makeup to the plume, and ah ab 101 LONG:
And who was that that you were talking to?
11l 12 LAUDERMILCH:
That was Ed Fredericks.
I secured makeup.
Then, I well I 13l then, after I secured it, I yelled it over the page, ah, that, ah, makeup 141 was secured in the plume, and on the way out the door I heard Ed acknowledge e
15i
~
me that he got the message you know.
So I ran back over and the guards let j
me back in.
And I'm thinking I went directly downstairs to see if there 17l l
was anything else I could do.
I went down and I was with Harold Torks, and 18j one engineer down at the feed pump and I was keeoing my eye on hot well 19 level. The one thing that still sticks in my mind and I don't understand 20 this but, ah, the hot well level, all the that time that I had watched it, 21!
Ok, it was high of course, it was out of sight glass, it was crystal clear.
22 Sometime in that interim when I came back, I had looked at it and the water 23 in the site glass was cloudy, very cloudy, and almost a cust or muddy 2A color.
And, you kn s, I thought, well, you know, it could mean a couple of l
25i 2002 281 O
i
24
{
{
things, you know, either we drew water out of the storage tanks that was sitting in there for a long time, or even, I don't know, speculation of a possibility of a circ water tube rupture in the main condenser. That was my I
31 concern.
I told Terry about it. He didn't say much, and then Bill Zewe had 4
~
5l come down later, and I told him.
I said that you know, Bill, you know, the 3
water is muddy, so he acknowledged it, and didn't say much about it and I'm trying to think exactly when that was.
It might even have been when we, before I even secured makeup to the circ water.
Because Bill was still down there on the phone, and I don't, I can't remember if Bill came down 9
the second time, when I came back in from circ water, or it was--I remember 10l telling Bill when he was downstairs.
11!
12' LONG:
This is like what, an hour maybe two hours later after the trip?
13 14; l
LAUDERMILCH:
We're talking about m going to say an hour and a half or 15i so. Those sequence of events that I rully went back and I can remember 16j being downstairs when these guys were up on
? I can remember some 17l l
horrendous water hammer down there, you know.
I don't know where it was 18!
coming from--I was guessing the condensate system, but I don't know.
196 20-LONG:
Did you hear it or see it?
21 22 LAL'3ERMILCH:
I heard it.
23l 1
24j 2s]
2002 282 l
25 LONG:
You heard it.
You didn't see any pipes or
?
1, I
26 1
LAUDERMILCH:
No (almost inaudible).
But I remember Donnie saying that he 3
was at the polisher and come around the polisher panel, and he was down 5l there when the whole thing happened, I think, or shortly thereafter.
And he said the water hammer down there at that time was really herrendous, 6!
that suction to the booster pump line was, you know, from the hanener had moved a good 2 maybe even 3 feet horizontally.
Well, I'm sure tha?.'s what broke, or caused the leak, you know, to the suction in the booster pump.
9l After we got done, after I got done there, wa were all dcwnstairs, and ah...
We better back up here a minute.
There was times I ran up to the 12{.
control room back, instead of calling on the phone for communications and stuff like that.
And then, in that time period, when I was upstairs, Terry 13l Daugherty had already been sent to the primary side.
I can't remember what t
141 he was checking over there', I can't remember.
15i 16i LONG:
To the Aux Building.
17!
18; l
LAUDERMILCH:
Yes.
The Aux Building.
O k.
He was over there taking care 19 of something in the Aux Building.
OK.
Then I was in the control room, you 20!
21,l know, and I was waiting to be dispatched out on another job, and this was one of the other jobs that I had talked about earlier, OK? And I remember, 22 I think it was Ed Fredericks said, you know, look at this alarm over here 23l and it was a fire alarm in the reactor building, OK? And there was another 24l fire alarm, then.
That was the control building area.
That alarm comes in 25i l
2002 283 i
I i
{
26 I
every time we trip, every time a safety goes, OK.
It's hot downstairs.
I 2f But I remember seeing the, you know, reactor building alarm and you know they showed real concern about it, you know. They didn't understand that.
3 And then, ah, I remember Bill looking at the (interview was briefly inter-g{
ruped with a visitor). They had the reactor building, OK, fire alarm. Bill d
went over and looked at the pressure indicator for the building, reactor 01 l
building.
And he said, pressure's going un in the reactor building, OK?
7l l
Then shortly tiiereafter, Terry Daughtery, who was in the Aux Building had 8l called Ed Fredericks on the phone, and when Ed got off the phone, he said 91 the reactor building sump level was pegged high and both sump pumps were 10!
running, OK? And, you know, I made a statement to Ed then, you know, I 11!
overheard, I said Ed with both pumps running, we've had a fair amount of 12 water in the miscellaneous tank all week.
And I said, you know, if you've 13l
{
got that much water, I said you're going to be pumping.
He said, "I don't 14!
know where that, I don't exactly--where that tank overflows to, but I know t
15; it's vented to vent header.
"And I said, you know, if you don't knock off 16i those pumps, you know there's a possibility that, you know, we could be 17!
putting water into that vent header."
'Cause I just worked primary side a 18l couple nights before that, you know.
I remembered the high levels in the 19l tanks and stuff.
So he said, " Yea, you're right," and he told Bill about 20t it, and this was all.in a matter of seconds, and Bill said knock the sump 21{
pumps off.
He called Terry right back and Terry knocked the reactor building 22 sump pumps off.
O k.
So, anynow, after I was down there, and back down in 23 the turbine building basement when we were all around there, you know, and 24 Terry had the, you know, looking at the, trying to maintain hot well level 25j i
I 2002
?84
27 and stuff, I went over to Terry and Terry was looking at the valve, you y
know.
And, the automatic reject valve, C.., and it was shut all the time.
I'm taking it all the time from the water hammer, because the air line, 3
too, it was severed.
And, you know, I remember saying you know, did you 4
^"
5 know, and I hadn't seen it you know. So they called instrument guys down, 61 and that's when the instrument guys started to tear it down, you know, and try to get it open.
I imagine they did get it open, but all that time apparently we weren't doing a heck of a lot of good throttling the down-9l stream isolation on it.
You know, I just at the time I assumed that, you 10j know, with the high hot well level, that the reject valve was going to be 1 11 l
open, and I just never checked the valve.
So, apparently they got to work 121 i
on that. So, Donnie Miller and myself said, well, we're going to go back 13l l
upstairs. So I went back up, stopped by the lunchroom and grabbed a sand-14!
wich.
And, well, on the way back up, we got off on the turbine deck there, 15i j
and Steve Mull was isolating the main steam to the moisture separater 16!
reheaters.
Donnie says, "Well I'm going to help him." OK.
I says, all 17!
l right, I'm going to grab my sandwich, and I'm going to go into the control 18 room and see, jou know, if there's anything else they need.
So, I went in 19i j
the control room shortly thereafter. Ed Fredericks came up to me, he said 20 we need the breakers for CS91A and IB for flood valves closed, and he told 21 me w
'h breaker cabinet they were on, and he says we need them fast.
So 22f anyhcw, I ran down there, I thought I had the keys with me, but I didn't.
23 You know, and they're locked, they're locked valve kays.
Those locks 24 aren't that strong to begin wi'.h, so I just ripped the locks off them, and 25l 2002 285 i
l t
i l
28 f
,y I got the breakers closed, and I yelled to Ed over the phone that, you know, the breakers were closed and again he acknowledged.
OK.
And then he called me up, and he told me to stay on the primary side, because Terry, in 4l the meantime, was back on secondary. So I stayed down the primary side. And i
Terry called me up and said they were trying to maintain intermediate 5
Closed temperaturc7.
He said throttle on the 54 valves, which is, that's a normal thing that's where we throttle for temperatures not even being closed, you know. So, I went down the hallway and I looked at those, and I remember there was maybe a 8 to 10 degree difference in the coolers.
They were running a little hot.
One was l'te a 110, the other might have been close to 100, on the other one, you know.
It might have been a 10 degree 11l difference.
So I went downstairs and I throttled down on those.
Then I 12!
came back up, and after awhile I checked those, and they started to go 13 back.
They started to come down too much, you knos.
And so I said, "Well, 14!
you know, we've let it get too cold now." So, I went back downstairs and I 15l reopened, you know, on the intermediate close. So then I stayed, I stayed 16i j
between the Aux Building side and the other door, when you actually get 171 l
into that area.
Then we came back downstairs, and I was with Terry. And 18{
Donnie had checked the other part of the floor, I guess, and he had left.
19 We went downstairs, and...
20 21.
LONG:
This was still before the site emergency was declared?
22 23f LAUDERMILCH:
Oh, yeah, yeah.
2002 286 24 25lj l
t k
l l
I
29 t
LOM:
And a long time, short time?
I'm just trying to fit the time when the fire alarm triggered.
3 LAUDERMILCH:
I'm gonna say, yeah, I'm gonna say within, I'm gonna say it's a
a a an ur e e
a, e re e s he emergency, w W 2ey 5
declared--at least a half an hour, maybe longer then that.
I remember when I was upstairs, or before I got called for that lineup, you know, after I had followed that intermediate close and stuff, but when I checked that intermediate closed temperature in there, I went back to the one RPS cabinet 9l that we check on our readings, and there's a gauge threre for reactor building 10[
pressure, and I checked that and I remember about 2 1/2 lbs. on that.
So, 1 11 l
I knew there was definitely was a problem in the reactor building, you 12!
i know, 'cause there is never--I don't think I ever even noticed, seen it 13!
close to a pound. Maybe
.8,
.9, and thats about the highest I've seen it.
14l It's normally--it's running like between.50--so I knew there had to be 15; some problem there.
16; I
17i I
LONG:
Did you comment on that, or report on that to the control room?
18i i
191' LAUDERMILCH:
Yea, 'cause I knew they had an indication up in the control 20i i
room.
T'sy had looked at it and, you know, I didn't want--I wanted to stay 21 off the page, you know, as much as I could.
22I 23 LONG:
I forgot to ask you a question earlier, and I want to ask you while 24 I'm thinking c.f it.
Have you been on shift when there has been the turbine-25 reactor trips before?
l 30 l
LAUDERMILCH:
Yea.
I 2l LONG:
OK.
You knew the normal routine?
3 4!
LAUDERMILCH:
Yea, I knew the things, you know, you worry about.
I was 5
6;!
here when we had our, when we had a trip from 75 or 80 percent power, when we were doing our power trips, you know.
81 LONG:
Right.
9 10' LAUDERMILCH:
I'm trying to think of the other ones when I was here--for but I was, I've been here for a couple, you know, and I know that-quite 12; i
shaken and a lot of noise gets to some, and you know that kind of thing.
13{
Especially when I came in from the outside, the thing I was concerned about 14!
was, one of the first things they want to do is, when they trip, is we want 15l; to establish feedwater heating, you know.
And I figured somebody would be 16i on that.
So I came through by the 213 stake heater.
There wasn't anybody 17 there and, I don't know, for some reason things just didn't sound right to 18{
me.
I don't knew if it was a lot of noise or what it was.
There wasn't i
19!
j anybody there and I figured, well, you know, I'm not going to go up there 20i and just take it on my own to cut it in.
I knew that was one of the things 21.
they were going to ask us about, you know, to do, you know, if it was a 22 normal sequence of events.
Then, I went from there right up to the control 23i j
room.
I'm trying to think of some of the other things I looked at.
I 241 I
rememberlookingatthe--whenIwasdownattheradwastedanel20 2 2
6emember 251 f
P
1 t
i 31 looking at the vent header pressure and that was 21/2 to 3 lbs., there wasn't anything out of the ordinary there because I remember the, I remember 7
g the miscellaneous waste hold up tank hadn't been, hadn't been, you know, overflowed.
I remember looking at the level and that because Terry had knocked the pumps off earlier.
But, uh, you know, with everything going on
]
I thought well, I wanted to look over the building pressure.
I remember bl they had problems with the RC drain tank, because when I was in the control
/
room earlier I remember them saying, " Hey, we don't have any level in the RC drain tank." You know, we lost all our water. So, I was trying to think 9!
of the things that I knew when I was in the control room, that as soon as 10!
we started building pressure go up and stuff, I knew things weren't normal.
11!
I knew we had a problem, somewhere, you know.
And I, they were talking 12l about, you know, and they said well, you know, it can't be a primary leak 13l because were not having, you know... Bill, I think it was Bill but I'm not sure, somebody said about, well, we don't have a LOCA because we've got our 15i water inventory or something to that effect, but the building pressure was 16i i
going up so, you know, I knew that something was wrong. When I got to the 17f I
radwaste panel'I figured, well, I'm going to try and think about things 18l that can affect, you know, the outside or, you know, and one of the first 191 things I thought about was the, the waste gases.
So I went and I looked at i
201 l
that.
I don't remember what was in the tank, but I was concerned about 21 the, about the vent header, and the vent headerlooked good.
So, I put.
22I 23 24 25l 2002 289 i
i t
b
32 LONG:
Who--who was giving you most of your directions? Was it more than one person in the control room? You've mentioned Ed Frederick a number of times.
Did you get it principally from Ed or.
.?
41 LAUDERMILCH:
Well, primary side it was mostly Ed.
Initial hot well level instructions was from Craig Faust, too. And then Bill Zewe had come down in the basement then when we were trying to get the polisher bypass valve open.
So he--he was there helping us out there as far as direction-wise goes.
9 i
10 LONG:
Where were you went the site emergency took place?
lli 12!
l 13]
LAUDERMILCH:
I'm trying to remember.
No, I can't remember that but I can 14!
[
remember...
15!
16i i
LONG:
It's not important, I'm just trying to get the sequence of..
17l
. events 18j
- 191, LAUDERMILCH:
But I remember being in the Auxiliary building with Terry, 201 and, of course, this was after we lined up the boron injection path and all i
21 that, OK.
We went back down to the radwaste panel, and Ed called Terry and 22 said that they were having a problem, that they were getting demin water 231 j
injection into the, into the, you know, primary system.
And trying to 24' think of anything we could think of where we might be getting this demin 2s!
2002 290 5
I i
f l
33 water from.
So Terry and I sat there and, you know, thought about it and 2;
thought about it.
We had the print out, and we were looking at it, and I
then Adam Miller had called and said about checking the demin water to the i
3i 6
make up pumps, and another demin water valve--and I can't remember what the j
valve was--but it was three valves to the mdke up pump and one other valve--
Si l
and I can't remember what that valve was at this time.
So, we were getting 61 ready to check that--and, well, I--in the meantime Terry was working on the print, and I had out-buildings tour earlier in the evening.
I had secured the demin water to the sodium thiosulfate tank. I knew that was a-you know--initially a tank was full for primary purposes, but I didn't know what the piping layout was now, you know.
And I knew that the, you know, 11!
we had demin water in there.
So I, I called Ed back, you know, and I said, 12l "Ed, I don't know how it ties in or anything."
I said, "But could that 13 i
sodium thiosulfate tank be, you know, harming it?" He said no, there's no 14!
piping up to the primary system.
We had used that to store caustic after 15!
the polishers. Well, I guess we had a bad batch of caustic or something 16!
that we used that was in a sodium hydroxide tank and we had transferred it 17l 6ver to that tank and used it for neutralizing secondary neutralizer tank.
181 l
So anyhow, we were there, we were figuring it out and then Adam had told us 19l about the other valves to check, and we were getting ready to go.
We 20l l
walked over to where, to the hole in the floor there on the first floor of 21l the Auxiliary building, and looked down in the basement and Terry said, 22
" Hey, you know, we're getting water out of the floor drain. We immediately 23 came back and told him that, you know, the Aux building sump is over flowing, 2 41 l
and we don't know where we're getting the water from.
So, Terry got off 25i i
2002
?91 i
t
34 f
the phone and he started marking the sump level, you know, trying to mark y
the sump level, sump tank level and everything that was apparent.
And we ncentrated our efforts then on where all this water was coming from, you 3
4; know, because we knew that if there was going to be a radiation problem--
well, we knew there was a radiation problem because the HP techs had been around and they told us it was 5 R in the 305 make-up valve alley, it was 61 10 R inside the door where you go into the make up pumps, and I saw one of 7
the guys earlier and he said there was, that he had gotten water in the PR 227, the rad monitor in the aactor building, and that the water that was in it was hot.
So, we knew there was a definate radiation problem.
So we 101
~
l were...
11' 12 LONG:
So this is still before the site emergency times.
131 14!
LAUDERMILCH:
Right. Richt.
We knew there was a problem and we were concerned 15l about the water coming Jp because we' thought man, oh man, you know, we're 16!
i really going to be crapped up around here, you know.
So we were sitting I
17[
there trying to figure out where in the devil was this water coming from.
18j And in the mean time, Mike Janouski, the RadChem tech came running down the 19i I
- 20j, hall and he just said get the hell out, you know.
Apparently he had air-borne readings or something, but he was, you know, he was running down the 21(
hall and saying get your stuff and get out.
So we got, Terry shut off the, 22 I think, I'm sure in the Aux building, sump pumps would read off or he shut 23 them off.
He secured things there.
And the reactor building pumps he i
24l I
checked, now when I remember seeing those, those were still off.
The sump 25i I
l l
2002 292 i
35 pumps in the reactor building were off the whole time that we went back.
So, we left and we went over to the Unit 1 HP.
We called the Unit 2 patrol and told them we had been evacuating out of the Auxiliary Building and we were over there.
So, Terry said well, heck, we might as well go back over 5}j to Unit 2 because we're su e there is still a lot of stuff going on there.
Sl We better get back over there and see if we can help out with anything.
i And that's what we did.
We came around to the upstairs there, and he says, well, did you get it checked out real well, you know, frisked and everything?
8 We said no.
So we went downstairs and Terry was relatively clean, and my i
9l shoes and pants and shirt was crapped up because when we went to the fire 10' alarm upstairs, I took off running and took a flop on the floor.
So I got 11!
crapped up there, but--and the HP techs, you know, had been taking samples 12!
in the Unit 2 HP area--and they said, " Hey, look.
We got to get respirators 13 l
on here.
We don't have time, you know, to mess around with your clothing.
14!
Get them off, get into paper coveralls and get out."
So they were putting 15i' on respirators, and I took my clothing off and gave my valuables to Terry, 1Si and he went up, and I got changed and went upstairs.
And by that time, i
17 somewhere in between there, I'm sure the site emergency had been declared.
IS{
As a matter of fact I'm sure it had.
It had to be right after we were 19{
evacuated out of the Auxiliary building, OK? Because I remember people 20l over there, you know, gathering at the Unit 1 HP area, when we went over 21 there.
And it might have been the time between we were there and walking 22 around in the Unit 2 HP area that they announced it.
Then we went upstairs, 231 and we stayed upstairs.
I'm trying to think what we did next.
24 25l t
l l
2002 293
36 LONG:
Do you remember how long you stayed that day?
2 LAUDERMILCH:
I think it was, it was pretty close to 12:00, pretty close to 3
noon time until we got out of here.
It was a little after one, 'til we got 4
checked out over at the 500 kev station.
Other than that, I don't, you know, that's a lot of stuff I guess.
6 7
LONG:
Yea, it is.
There's a lot of stuff and a lot of things that other people have not commented on.
10 LAUDERMILCH:
That's right.
12 LONG:
That's why we wanted to get each individual's perspective.
13l 14!
j LAUDERMILCH:
Yea.
15!
16i LONG:
Then we try to put it all together and they help really sort out the 17 things.
18i 19!
LAUDERMILCH:
Are we going to get together as a group and discuss this?
20 21 i
(End of tape) 22 23 24, 1
25!
4 1
2002 294 l
1