ML19274G079

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Transcript of 790422 TMI-2 Investigation Interview W/T Daugherty
ML19274G079
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/22/1979
From: Daugherty T
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 7908290485
Download: ML19274G079 (35)


Text

I i

t-l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

l

'd In the Matter of:

2 IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3!

of Terry Daugherty Auxiliary Operator 4!

A-Nuclear Si i

6j 7i 8l Trailer #203 9!

NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!

Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!

April 22, 1979 12!

(Date of Interview) 13!

June 29, 1979 (Data Transcript Typec) 48 15:

(Tape Numoer(s))

16i 17i 18!

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NRC PERSONNEL:

og,'

Bob Marsh 23l Jim Creswell i

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2001

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1 MARSH:

April 22,1979, 3: 31 p.m.

Bob Marsh, Investigator, Nuclear Regula-l 2!

tory Commission Region III.

We're about to start an interview and I'm l

3l going to ask each individual in the Room to identify himself and his title 4

and position.

After we cover that then I'm going have a couple of comments.

t 5

But to start off with, Jim if you would give me your name and your position.

6l 7

CRESWELL:

This is Jim Creswell.

I am a Reactor Inspector out of Region 8

III-9l DAUGHERTY:

I am Terry Daugherty.

I am an Auxiliary Operator, A-Nuclear, 10 Three Mile Island.

11, I

12f MARSH:

Is " Terry" okay? What is your preference?

13 14!

15 erry s U ne.

16!

MARSH:

Terry, I would appreciate it if you would spell your last name.

18l DAUGHERTY:

Daugherty.

191 20t MARSH:

Thank you.

Terry before we started here I gave you a two page memo there that we will have inserted in the actual transcript at this point.

I would like you to indicate your answers to those questions on the last page.

The first one I've indicated is:

do you understand what was written in the first part?

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2001 248 i

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2 1

DAUGHERTY:

Yes I do understand the above.

2h 3

MARSH:

And do we have your permission to tape the interview?

4 5

DAUGHERTY:

Yes you do have my permission to tape the interview.

6 7

MARSH:

I reading up side down here.

Thats the hesitation.

Do you want a 8

copy of the tape?

9 DAUGHERTY:

Yes, I would like a copy of the tape.

10 11 MARSH:

12 Is that tape or transcript?

I could provide you either.

13 DAUGHERTY:

The transcript will be fine.

l 15i MARSH:

16!

And one final question, which doesn't appear on there, although it is covered in the body of the letter itself is we did discuss whe*'er you 7

j do or you don't what a company representative or any representative present i

at this time?

19l 20l DAUGHERTY:

No, I do not.

I don't feel that I need a company or union representative present because I am an officer of the local union.

23' MARSH: Fine.

At this point, Jim, I am going to turn it over to you and let you cover the areas that you want to discuss.

i 2001 249 i

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1 CRESWELL:

Terry, I wonder if we could get a little bit of your background i

2{

and training since you come to Metropolitan Edison? How long have you been 3

with the company?

4 5

DAUGHERTY:

I came to work for Metropolitan Edison in March 1973.

I came 6

to work here immediately after my discharge from the United States Navy in 7

which I was in the Nuclear Submarine Program.

I had standard nuclear power 8

training in the navy.

Beginning my employment with Metropolitan Edison I gj was put through a six month training program which consisted mainly of 10 theory training.

We didn't concentrate on system training so much as we 11' did mainly theory, reactor principals, reactor physics, chemistry.

That was six months.

Since that time, at the completion of that training program, 12!

13 I was assigned as a auxiliary operator, A-Nuclear, in the Unit 1 startup 14; pr gram.

The training from that point on consisted mainly of on the job type training as far as the systems startups in the Unit 1 startup program.

Up n c mpletion of the Unit 1 startup program and commercial operations of 16i Unit 1, I did my training mostly was on the job type training, again, just g

continuation of systems training on the job.

The training department from 8

time to time would update us on modifications of systems and what have you.

Last June, I believe it was, which would have been June of 1978, I was 20\\

reassigned to Unit 2 and I participated in a startup program of Unit 2, and 21{

my training consisted mostly of on the job training again during the startup program--systems training as the systems were started up and turned over.

That's basically the extent of my training located at Three Mile.

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CRESWELL:

You were a reactor operator in the Navy?

2!

31 DAUGHERTY:

No, I was a machinist mate in the Navy.

I was qualified on the 4

engineering watch stations, outside the maneuvering areas.

I wasn't assigned 5l any watch stations within the maneuvering area.

I 6i 7

CRESWELL:

Terry, now I'd like to take you back to the time that you went 8

n shift on March 27.

We just today got some security logs and the security gl log would indicate that you came in to work on about 2240 hours0.0259 days <br />0.622 hours <br />0.0037 weeks <br />8.5232e-4 months <br /> on March 28.

I 10j Is that accurate time?

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DAUGHERTY:

Yes, that's correct.

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131 h

CRESWELL:

Could you tell me what sort of ccndition you found the plant in 15i 16i DAUGHERTY: When we came on shift the night of the 27th the plant was in a steady state condition.

To the best of my recollection we were approximately 18!

95% reactor power, thereabouts.

Everything, from an auxiliary operator's 19,1 standpoint, was in a normal condition with the exception of the polishing system, condensate polishing system.

Was in the process of a resin bed i

21l transfer from the polisher vessel to the receiving tank and the resins were jammed up at that, time which I understood had been't. hat way.;ince some 2.,s time in the afternoon of the 27th.

That evening try assignment was on the j

progress of the plant and that is where I took my turnover.

At the time 25; i

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5 lj there really was nothing abnormal going on.

What I mean there were no i

2 releases going on, no liquid releases or gases releases, normal type func-3l tions going on.

The primary side was, as we knew it, pretty quiet.

The i

4l information that I have about the secondary side of the plant was limited 5

because of the way that we operate our shift rotation, the way we take our 61 turnovers.

That night, I was assigned to the primary, by myself, because 7

we had one man off that night.

So everything was, with the exception of 81 the polishing system, to my knowledge, functioning in a normal state.

1 9l 10l CRE5WELL: Who did you take you turnover from?

11 1y DAUGHERTY:

I can't remember specifically who the person was.

i 13l 14l CRESWELL:

If you can't recollect, why that's okay.

After when you came on shift what sort of duties did you assume? What sort of task did you do?

16i I

DAUGHERTY:

My main duties that evening, because of the fact that we had no 17l1 releases or anything going on off our normal nature, I took my normal logs, 18{

my normal shiftly logs, on the primary side.

As I recall, I don' t even 19I l

think we had any surveillance to perform that night unless it was a routine 20i 21;i pump oiling check which we have several of them, and a lot of them are done

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on the eleven to seven shift.

I don't remember specifically doing any, 22 other than that.

It was just routine, taking my logs and keeping an eye on the equipment, mainly on the radwaste panel.

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CRESWELL:

Did you report to the control room or did ycu report to someplace 2l in the plant when you came on shift?

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DAUGHERTY:

When I came on shift I reported directly to the radwaste panel.

4l 5

That's where I relieved a man.

61 7l CRESWELL:

Do you eemember W.t'*. the conditions of the tanks were? Were they 8

drained out, ha?/ full?

91 DAUGHERTY:

We were full of water.

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CRESWELL:

You were full of water?

131 DAUGHERTY:

Most everywhere.

The one thing that I soecifically remember, g

y that I got from my relief, and I may think of his name as I go along.

The one thing I remember he specifically told me was the auxiliary building sump was within 8 inches of the floor which he meant was within 8 inches overflowing.

The auxiliary building sump tank was also at a very high 18l level, the level I don't specifically remember.

The miscellaneous of routine things they have to do.

I really don't know the reason why the tanks were in the capacities that they were or why we were not able to release the two tanks.

The two tanks that we do release are the neutralizing tanks.

We pumped from our auxiliary uilding sump tank and from our miscel-laneous waste holdup tank into those neutralizing tanks, and those are the source tanks for the releases.

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7 11 CRESWELL:

So in the ways you mentioned are just some ccnsiderations in 2

what might have caused the tanks to be full?

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4 DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

5 6l CRESWELL:

Now you mentioned that the auxiliary building sump was within 8 7

inches of overflowing?

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DAUGHERTY:

Yes it was.

Approximately 8 inches.

10 CRESWELL:

Had some tanks overflown in the sump or had the sump.. how did 11; 12 the water get into the sump?

13 DAUGHERTY:

Where the water came from into the sump- -

Now, the water that 14 was there initially, I don't really know where did it come from before.

15 M st all the floor drains in the auxiliary building drain in to that sump.

16 I

y7j I would just have to say from leakage, pump packaging gland leakage, possibly some valve packing leakage.

As far as a specific point I could g

not really say.

g 20l CRESWELL:

If at anytime you don't know, just say you don't know.

So as I 21j i

interpreted it, you came on shif t and a lot of your tanks were full or 22' nearing being full.

The sump was full.

That sort of actions did you take say to alleviate that problem?

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OAUGHERTY:

I talked to the foreman about it and asked him if he was aware 2f of the fact, and he was, and I checked to see if there was paper work in 3

the mill on the two neutralizing tanks.

He said that the paper work was in 4

the liill.

So that was just about, I couldn't do any water transferring to 5

alleviate the immediate problems I had.

It was to the point where...

6l 7

CRESWELL:

Where you say paper work that would be for release to the...?

8 gl DAUGHERTY:

Yes, release permits.

The foreman has to generate the release t

10' permit, make the initial paper work out, and then that paper work is submitted 11, to the health physics chemistry department to do the analysis on.

12, CRESWELL:

But they had not done one.

Well let's I say about 4:00 a.m.,

on 13 the 28th, they had done a...?

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CRESWELL:

So let's move on in time, say between 11:00 p.m. when you came on shift until about 4:00 a.m., when the turbine trip occurred, what mainly were you involved with, beyond what you have already stated?

21!

DAUGHERTY:

Well, it was a very quiet night up until that point.

I say the main thing I did on the primary side was to just take the logs more or less just a surveillance type of shift.

In other words, maintain the panel, watchi'ng the radwaste panel, the pumps, the equipmerit, what have you.

We 25

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9 Jj had some junior people that were on the secondary side of the plant.

In i

2l other words some of our C&B operators, which are training modes, on the i

3f secondary side of the plant and we also had one Senior A operator from 4j Unit 2 that was helping us that night.

It was a standard part of our cross 5

unit training prtgram.

Now there was myself, and one other A operator that I

61 are permanently assigned to Unit 2 that were on the Unit 2 side that night.

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The third A operator, experienced Unit 2 A-operator, was in Unit 1 that nightasthecrossmemberofthetraining.

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CRESWELL:

Do you recollect who those individuals were?

20 11!

DAUGHERTY:

12 Yes, the A operator who was in Unit 1 that night was Dennis Buchter.

13 The A operator, who was working with us that night from Unit 1, was Harold Furst.

The other A operator, who was working with us that night 14!

was a Unit 2 assigned operator, wl. Don Miller and he was the one who was 15 y

operating the polishing system.

Now we had one 8 operator, Dale Laudermilch, who was working on the secondary side that evening, and Juanita Hetrick, l

181, who is C operator, who was on the secondary side that evening.

We had one other 8 operator on the crew, Steve Mull, who was working out in the indus-trial waste treatment plant, which is outside the building, that evening.

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CRESWELL:

Were there any particular radwaste problems in Unit 1 that 22' night?

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10 DAUGHERTY-That would be very hard for me to say.

We don't normally have 1,

2!

a communication between the two primary sides of the plant, unless we are l

3 doing a transfer from one unit to the other or in the case of the liquid i

4 releases.

So actually what was going in Unit 1, I couldn't really say.

5 61 CRESWELL:

So between 11:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. these were basically your 7

duties and what went on?

8 1

DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

It was like I say, it was really a very quiet night on g

10l the primary side.

A normal night on our primary side, we might be doing a y

liquid release or we might be transferring some water around you know from one tank to another we might be doing a gas release.

But that night we didn't, we just didn't have anything going on.

r 14!

CRESWELL:

When did you first become aware that there had been, say a 16l; turbine trip?

17l i

DAUGHERTY:

When the trip occurred, I had just left the contr71 room, this 18i is something I have been trying to remember in my mind, I'd gone to the control room, I don't recall what it was for now, but I had just left the 20l control room and had walked back around through the instrument shop to go down the back stairway to go back over to the primary side.

I was in the 22!

office area of the instrument shop when the trip occurred.

I heard the safeties blow, which I'm familiar with.

I knew immediately when I heard it 24j' what it was.

My immediate concern was with the secondary side, primarily, 25j l

2001 257 4

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two-fold, because I knew that the people that were on the secondary side 2.

that were not that experienced for one thing plus I felt that probably we 3t had had the turbine trip first anyway.

I turned and left the instrument 4j shop to go back through the control room to the secondary of the plant to 5

help.

As I was going through the control room the shift supervisor was 61 announcing a turbine trip and immediately after he announced turbine trip 7

he announced reactor trip.

I continued out after the turbine hall on the g

turbine floor elevation.

I made a trip around the turbine, just a quick g

cursury examination of the turbine, and then I went down the stairsay on 10f the west side of the building by the elevator.

I went down the stairway to lij the first floor, the 305 elevation, the ground floor.

I just made a quick g

trip around that floor also just generally looking for any signs of real, a bad sign of something, not looking at anything specific.

I did make a 13 quick ?. rip into the lube oil purifier room just to check and see what 15{

c ndition that the purifier was in.

To see if the oil system was still, functioning.

IT CRESWELL:

Excuse me, that was the lube oil? DAUGHERTY:

Yes, the lube oil ourifier room.

19I

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t 20l CRESWELL:

Is it something like a subtrifuge.

21(l 22 DAUGHERTY:

Yes, it is.

In Unit 1 we have a bowser system.

Unit 2 has a 23 lube oil purifier just like a...

It's a regular centrifugal bowl type purifier.

We have had some problem with it time to time tripping off or i

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losing water seal or what have you or losing a good bit of oil out of it.

2 It's a common thing with a centrifugal purifier I think.

I know purifiers I

3l that I was experienced with in the Navy we had the same problem with it.

4i They were the same type of machine.

But through my training, that is one i

Si of the things that I felt concerned about in the event of the trip, is the I

6l oil systems to the turbine.

7 MARSH:

8l Can I ask before you go on of what you observed on the turbine g

floor and what you observed at each of the points where you stopped and icoked? Was there anything abnormal that you noted?

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DAUGHERTY:

When I came through the turbine floor I noticed nothing abnormal.

13 The turbine was coasting down.

That was just a very short time after the trip.

I noticed no steam leaks, no abnormal vibration, no oil leakage, EHC 14 15 leak ge, (electro-hydraulic control) or anything from the control valves, y

throttle valves, that sort of thing, which is what I was looking for.

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'yGS;H:

Would you define EHC?

19l DAUGHERTY:

That's the electro-hydraulic fluid, the controlling fluid for 20[

I throttle valves vid the governor valves on the turbine.

After I checked 21j the lube oil pur.fier room, I just continued around floor, and all I was 22l l

looking for there was, I was going through the feedwater heating system.

There again, I was looking for mainly for big things, line ruptures or what j

have you, something that would really stick out to me.

I continued to the 25j l

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13 1l basement and my main concern in the basement was with the polishing system 2

and with the 8 feed pump.

The B feed pump turning gear is, and has been I

3l for some Ure, out of service.

And the one concern that we have had in 4

losing t%t feed pump is tne problem of the pump coasting down and coming Sj to a dead stop with sealing steam and oil still on it.

We have a large 6

chain wrench, just a regular chain wrench, that we use to jack that staft 7

over by hand if it does come to a full rest.

So I wanted ta go downstairs.

g I knew that of the people on my shift that there were very few of them that gj really experienced a trip and I wanted to go downstairs to make sure that ne f them would watch the feed pumps.

When I got down there, I found 10 11l Don Miller was working on the polishing system.

Now what he was doing 12 specifically I don't really know.

I just saw that he was there so I continued 13 n by nd left him take care of that.

i 14!

MARSH:

15 When you arrived at your stations can you review who you saw or who was present down in the that area?

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DAUGHERTY:

In the basement, I came across Don Miller, who was at the 18(

polishing system.

He had been there all evening, he was at the panel.

Now I

he was running around.

Specifically what he was doing, I don't really 20(

know.

And like I say, he is a A operator and he qualified on the job, so I didn't hesitate to even question him what he was doing.

I just continued on to the feed pump.

To backtrack just a little bit, when I came out of 23 the control room, and started through the door the turbine building, I did 24 run into Juanita Hetrick and I literally almost did run into her because l

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she had the door cracked open and was just peaking out into the turbine l

2 hall because she was frightened.

Understandably so.

She had never been 3l through a trip before and the safety valves are right outside the walls of l

4l the turbine building.

It sounded like the turbine building was coming i

5' apart.

I was in a hurry and I went by her.

She had followed me.

At some 6

time between the turbine floor and the first floor I lost her.

I think 7

what she did was went down the other stairway because I then did come g

across her again in the basement.

As I came down to the feedpump, that I g

was concerned about, the B feedpump, I ran into Harold Furst, who is the A operator from Unit 1.

He asked me what to do.

He said that he felt very 10l ll{

incompetant and understandably so, because he had very limited experienced i

12l on that unit.

He is very experienced and a very good operator in Unit 1, 13 but he had limited time in this unit.

So I asked him if he could just 14l watch that feedpump and explained why the turning gear was out of service

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15 and it didn't come to stop to turn it by hand.

He said that he would watch that.

Everything else in the-basement looked like it was under control.

16!

g; Like, I say, Don Miller was at the polisher, and he was at the feedpump, 18j and Juanita showed up and I told her to just stay with Harold or go and see if Don needed help and that I was going to go back upstairs, wnich I did.

yg I went to the contrcl room and naturally there was a lot going on in the control rovn.

22 MARSH:

As you entered the control can you estimate how many people were 23l I

there than?

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i lj DAUGHERTY:

There were four people in the control room.

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I 3j MARSH:

Do you recall V10 were there?

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5-DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

There was the shift supervisor, Bill Zewe, the shift 61 foremen Fred Scheimann and the two control room operators Ed Frederic: and 7

Craig Faust.

8 MARSH:

And this would be about how long after the reactor trip?

g; 10l DAUGHERTY:

I would estimate it to ce no more than 5 to 10 minutes?

11l 12l CRESWELL:

Let's go back in time while we are kind of broken here.

You 13 g

mentioned that you were in the control room and then you went out by the insuument shop.

I was just asMng Terry about Ms being in the conuol 15 r m r thereabouts, whenever the trip occurred.

The question I wanted to 16 ask was, since you have been working at the radwaste panel, had somebody g

called you up to the control room around this time?

g 19!

DAUGHERTY:

That's what I've been trying to recall exactly why it was I had 20!

l gone up there.

I think, very possibly, it was around 4:00 in the morning, 21!

I think very possibly what I had done was to take my logs up for the shift foreman to sign.

That's the one thing..

I think what happened was, everything happened so fast after that, is that my memory and exactly what was going on just prior to that was very vague.

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MARSH:

Do you recall having you logs signed after that point?

In other l

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words if we found you logs and they are signed can we assume that they i

3l would have been signed?

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5 DAUGHERTY:

If you find my logs and they are signed I am very sure it was 6l signed before that time because I know it wasn't after that.

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MARSH:

We can check the logs and see about that.

91 10l DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

i 11!

CRESWELL:

To return back to the sequence, you had come back from the turbine building and entered the control room.

You had noted the four 13y personnel that you described to us being in the control room.

15:

DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

16!

17 CRESWELL:

Could you describe what your impressions were whenever you came 18 into the control room? Where were the people?

20!

DAUGHERTY:

I can't recall exactly which man was at~which panel, but the 21' I

i four people were spread across the various panels.

In other words, one of 22' them was on the second of the panel watching the turbine.

There were two of them on the main panel watching the pressurizer level and feedwater, and i

what have you, I cm not all that familiar with the panel itself.

And the 25l l

7001 263 h

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other man was stationed on the left wing of the panel.

I came into the I

2 control room and I did what I felt I should do on a trip which I have done 31 in the past which was made myself available.

They knew I was there and I 4

was just more or less wc ing for further instructions or to do anything 5

that they needed to be done.

6{

t 7l CRESWELL:

I think we'll break here.

We are very close to the end of the 8

tape.

i 91 10 The time is now 4:02 and I am reading 465 on the meter and I am MARSH:

11l g ing to break to change the sides on the tape.

i 12l MARSH:

The time is still 4:02 and we will resume at this time.

3 14i 15 erry, you had ccme into Me control room and you saw Ge 16; pe pie at the different panels like you described here.

Did it appear like l

a normal reactor trip to you at that point or was there any abnormal type 171 I

of situation that you detected?

18[

19!

DAUGHERTY:

At that time, everything appeared to me to be a normal reactor 40 21;l trip.

Everything appeared to be under control.

The four people appeared i

to be working very well together.

They were communicating between each 22' other quite well and there was no indication of a panic type situation or that they were seeing anything that they hadn't seen before.

Now, here 24l 25; again, I can remember the instance but I'm a little bit vague on the sequence.

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I do remember at one time Ed Frederick, the control room operator, said to

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5 the other three men there, they were watching the pressurizer level and he 2

3 did say to the other men "All right, we're going solid, what are we going i

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+- eo now?" Now he didn't say that...

That sounds a little bad because it 5l sounds like he was saying I don't know what I am doing, but he was thinking, l

6-he was talking to them, and talking to himself like he was running it over 7

in his head exactly what he was going to do.

In other words, he looked 8

like he was planning ahead of time for the eventuality.

I can't recall...

p{

I was in tbs control room several times.

I'd go out and I'd check something a

10 rd a job for them and then I would be back again.

Now that is where I 11l am n t quite certain, I am not quite certain if that was said my first i

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visit back into the control room or whether it was after I had gone back ut.

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CRESWELL:

15 So there is a possibility that it might have been.

16!

DAUGHERTY:

It might have been some time later.

Ed Frederick did send g

He asked me to go out and check the breakers for the booster pump, me..

the B booster pump.

He asked me to go and check the breaker for the B 19l booster pump.

I went downstairs and Don Miller was arriving about the same 201 21;f time I was.

Now I don't know whether he had called him or whether Don l'

Miller had just see the...

He was in at the polisher vicinity so he may 22l I

have seen that the booster pump was gone and had just gone up to check it 23}

l himself.

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CRESWELL:

When you say the booster pump was gone, it had tripped off?

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DAUGHERTY:

Yes, right.

He and I both checked the breakers and we found...

i 4

We didn't find anything on the front of the breaker panel that lookeJ 5{

abnormal.

In other words, the 69 bypass switch, which is on the front of

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6i it, which gives control to the control room operator, was in its cor rect 7

p sition.

There was no indication on the front of the breaker panel that g

there was anything wrong.

9f CRESWELL:

In other word, the breaker would still be closed then..

10 11, DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

In other words it looked to me exactly like that breaker 12 w s under his control in the control room.

I didn't know when I went down 13 there exactly why I checked it.

I found out later on that the reason he was Sending me to Check it was because he had tried to restart that pump 16!

and c uldn't restart it.

I went back up to the control room, told him what I had found and at that time he told me that the intermediate close (cooling 17 water system) temperature was increasing and asked me to go over and throttle 18j the river water to the intermediate closed coolers. Now the reason for the 19i increase in temperature was because of the reactor coolant pumps, I assume.

That is what I assumed on the way down.

Now when I came to the control room I was just getting ready to tell Ed Frederick that I was going to go back to the primary side to make a check, just to look everything over to see that everything is still fine over there, wnen he sent T.e down there 24l 25l anyway.

i i

I 2001 266

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3

20 l

1!

CRESWELL:

This was Ed Frederick again.

i 2!

l 3

DAUGHU.TY:

Yes.

I hadn't been back over to the primary side before that 4

time because I knew what I had going on over there beforehand and I Sj didn't really feel that anything that had happened had affected what I had l

Gi over there.

That is why I hadn't been back so far because I felt more 7l compelled to help the people out on the secondary side of the plant.

I i

g went down...

The intermediate close temperature was increasing.

I went to g

the basement and I throttled the river water valve to their main intermediate 10l closed coolers. It's a logistics problem because the temperature indicator is on the 305 elevation on the cooler and the throttle valve is in the i

12 basement in 281. So I made two or three trips up and down those stairs 13 before I got it set.

He'had told me that it wanted it maintained around 90 Q

to 100 degrees which would be a normal type temperature.

I did get it 15 throttled fairly steady in that range and I called him and reported that I 16 had and I told him that I was going to make a quick trip down to the rad-g waste panel just to look it over and see that everything was set and then I would be back over to help out.

He said " Fine."

I proceeded down the

19l, hallway to the radwaste panel and as soon as I came to the radwaste panel I

[

saw things that first gave me an indication that it was an abnormal trip.

The two things that I saw that bothered me was I noticed first off that 21 I,

both of the reactor building sump pumps were running.

When I saw they were 22l I

running I looked at the level indicator on the panel and the level indicator was pegged out above 6 feet, which is the high level or the indication.

Six feet is the highest indicated level.

The other thing that was bothering l

2001 267 i

21 i

1l me was there was an RN14 frisker that was setting over at the door going i

2:

into the model room area which goes between the two units.

It's a normal i

3 access path between the two units.

The health physics people use it quite 4j a bit and the chemistry people to go back and forth to draw samples plus 5

the operators travel back and forth between the two primary sides.

So 6

there is an RN14 frisker at that door to monitor the people going between 7'

the two units.

That RN14 was on the "1" scale.

It had been setting there 8

all night just with very low background on it.

I had been down there with g

it most of the night.

I 10 CRESWELL:

When you say los background..?

11!

i 121 DAUGHERTY:

And its right in the vicinity. Well, when I say low background 13 I'm talking about in the range of say twenty to thirty counts possibly.

15i 16!

17!

DAUGHERTY:

Yes you would hear it clicking.

It's abot.t oh twenty to thirty 18 feet from the desk at the radwaste panel.

The thing that I noticed, as I 19 {,

came up to the panel, was the fact that those two, the reactor building sump pumps, were on, the level was pegged high, and the RN14 was alarming.

Now I went over to the RM14 and I reset it and moved it up on to the times

~

i 2 21, ten scale and it was reading about 5000 counts, approximately.

I had an 23l E520 on the desk.

24l 25l 2001 268

22 1

l 1

CRESWELL:

An E520?

i 2l I

31 DAUGHERTY:

A beta gamme survey instrument on the desk that the primary i

4f operator routinely has for going different areas.

I went back over to the i

5-desk.

I got the E520 and I just did quite of a quick survey in that area 6l because I didn't understand.

I was concerned about why the RM14 was read'ng 7

what it was.

I got nothing on the E520 above about.1 mr,.01 mr.

8 gl MARSH:

Where were you ::urveying?

~

l 10 DAUGHERTY:

I was surveying just in the area immediately around the RM14, 11!

l within say a ten foot radius of the RM14 instrument itself.

12l 13 74{

MARSH:

Is this down low to the floor, the walls, the ceiling? What speci-fically were you checking with the meter?

15i 16l DAUGHERTY:

g I wasn't irakino really contact type readings, I was just taking generalized type readings, it was about waist high, just sort of moving g

gl around in the area and I saw nothing right away.

I went back over to the l

desk and I called Ed Frederick in the control room and I told him what I 201 had down there.

I told him that I had both reactor building sump pumps 21 running, the level was pegged high and the RM14 was going off.

I told him, at that time, that something appeared very wrong to me.

That it wasn't the sort of thing that I had experienced seeing on a trip before.

He relayed that information to Bill Zewe, I heard him in the background relay that i

2001 269 I

23 1l information.

He got back on the phone to me and he didn't tell me anything l

2!

specific to do. He just told me, he said, " Stay in the area of the radwaste 3l panel if we need you."

And he said to me, he said, now these aren't exact 4!

words, but something to the effect

" Keep your eye out for anything, i

Si Terry, because it looks like we've got something going on in the building.

l 6

Now he indicated to me that he felt also that there was something abnormal 7

about the trip but he didn't exactly know what it was at that time or any a

other than the control room, I guess.

10 MARSH:

Terry, can you approximate the time this is going on?

11!

I 12l DAUGHERTY:

This was between, it was between 4:30 and 5:00 o' clock I wucid 13 say closer to 4:30.

Now, here again, I don't believe it was when I was 14 talking to Ed that first time on the phone.

But if it wasn't then it was within just a couple of minutes.

He called me back, he told me to put both 15 16 the reactor building sump pumps in off and to be sure that they stayed

  • here.

Now these reactor building sump pimps were in automatic at the ti TO.

They had caution tags hanging on tiem that said leave them there because of the leak rate tests.

Now I am not totally familiar exactly what it was, but it had something to do with the leak rate that they take on a shift basis in the building.

22 MARSH:

Had those tags been on your previous tour?

24 25) i i

2001 270 i

(

24 11 DAUGHERTY:

Yes, they had.

Those tags had been on for some time.

I am 2j talking several weeks.

31 4l MARSH:

To be sure I understand it then, you noticed the frisker going off 5

and passed that word to the control room prior to shutting down the two 6l sump pumps at their direction.

I 7

DAUGHERTY:

That's correct.

g MARSH:

10 So the sequence of events, you had already noted the frisker going ff bef re the sump pumps were shut down?

11 12 DAUGHERTY:

That's correct.

I didn't shut the sump pumps off until I was 3

directed to from the control room.

I would estimate the time to be around 4:45, somewhere there abouts, when he directed me to shut those sump pumps 5

down, to put them in off, and make sure they stayed there.

17l CRESWELL:

Terry, where were the sump pumps aligned to? Where were they...?

1st l

19e DAUGHERTY:

The sump pumps were aligned together to the miscellaneous waste 20l l

holdup tank.

Now like you say, both of the pumps were running and the 21; level indication was pegged hard above six feet and it hadn't moved.

Now I don't know how long the pumps had been running but assuming that the pumps had been running for some time period, say ten minutes or fifteen minutes 24 before I got there, they hadn't made any ap> eciable headway on the level 25 apparently.

2001 271 l

t

l l

25 1l CRESWELL:

By the level indication?

l 2

i 3l DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

4 Sl CRESWELL:

The containment level was above the maximum limit for some time.

l 0

7 DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

8 CRESWELL:

Now going back to when you came on shift, how much level did you g

10j say was in there, 7?

11l lg DAUGHERTY:

7.4 feet in the miscellaneous waste holdup tank.

13lj CRESWELL:

And at this time do you recall looking and seeing what the level was?

15 16; DAUGHERTY:

Yes I did, and it was about the same place.

That's why I say I don't think the pumps had really been running for any appreciable amount of 18l time because I saw no level changes in either the indication for the reactor building sump or in the miscellaneous waste holdup tank.

It was a 20t l

very very close to the same point.

2 11 22 CRESWELL:

So you shut the pumps off locally at the panel?

24l 25l l

2001 272 i

l i.

26 i

If DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

2 3

CRESWELL:

What about the auxiliary building sump level at this point?

4 5

DAUGHERTY:

At that time everything in the basement, in other words the 6

water in the sump, and in the tanks, sump tank, everything was still as it 7

was, I assume.

I didn't go to the basement to look at it but there is a 8

large opening in the floor right by the radwaste panel there.

I did go to gj the railing and I looked to the basement.

Directly below that opening is a 10 floor grate.

There was no water in the basement at that time.

lli CRESWELL:

This is the time that you shut the pumps off?

12 13 DAUGHERTY:

Yes that's correct.

After that was done I went back down, I 14 15 checked the intermediate closed temperature again to see if it was holding 16 where it was and it had in fact dropped somewhat.

Now I don' t know whether i

it had dropped because I didn't have it set, had it stabilized before I 17(;

left it, or whether things had cooled down a little bit.

I went back to 7g the basement and I throttled that again and adjusted it again and got it g

back into a 90 to 100 degree range.

O!

I 21l I

MARSH:

Did that require a couple of trips again, or could you...?

22l 23!

DAUGHERTY:

No.

In fact the one temperature indication was the only one 24l 25l that was, of the two coolers, the one was the only one indicating a little l

2001 m]7 es i

27 l

1l bit low.

I just throttled that one slightly and brought it back into the i

2:

range.

I 31 i

4 CRESWELL:

Does that system have an automatic temperature control on it?

5 61 DAUCuSRTY:

No, it doesn't.

It has automatic valves.

In other words it 7

has motor driven valves on it, but we normally do the temperature throttling g

on that with manual valves.

9 CRESWELL:

Locally?

10l I

11 DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

It is not something we do on a routine basis because it g

13 is one of those sort of things that after it is initially set up in this 14[

temperature range, unless something happens to cause a pretty good load on 15 the system, the temperature maintains very close.

16i CRESWELL:

Did you notice any other radiation alarms, beside.

.?

Well the frisker is really not an area monitor.

191 DAUGHERTY:

No.

There were no other alarms going off at that time.

It was 20!

very shortly after that.

Now, I was at the panel...

i 22 CRESWELL:

This was after throttling the intermediate cooling water or before?

24 25 l

2001 274 I

i

I i

(

28 l

1l DAUGHERTY:

This was afterward.

I went back down to the panel.

Ed Frederick l

2!

called me and he told me that we were...

Lets see, trying to think exactly l

3 how he said that.

He wanted me to start looking, he said that we were 4

getting demin (demineralized) water into the primary system.

And he wanted i

5(

me to try and find out any way that it was happening.

Just to look and see l

6 if I could come up with anything.

I got the impression..

I wasn't in the

/

control room any more from that time.

I got the impression from talking to 8

Ed--I have worked with Ed for a good long while and he is a very cool, gj reliable type person to work with in a high stress situation.

He was very 10 cool about the whole thing.

But, by the same token, he gave me the impression 11-just from talking to him and knowing him that there were a lot of things 12 g ing n that a lot of people weren't understanding.

And he was basically 13 asking for anybody to come up with any information that could help.

That was another thing that indicated to me that we weren't really into a normal type situation.

I took my prints that I had on the desk and I went immediately 15 to the make-up system.

And I just started, really more or less just looking g

through the make up system and trying and thinking and trying to think what it was that I wanted to look at or where I wanted to go specifically or 18l what have you.

HP people had moved into the area at that time.

gl 20!

1 CRESWELL:

Could you identify who those were?

21,l 22 DAUGHiRTY:

The only one that I remember specifically was Mike Janouski.

l Now there were some other HP people but I can't recall any o# them in 24l particular.

I remember Mixe Janouski because he was the one tnat told me 25j i

2001 275 1

{

29 1

to get out of the building eventually, when I final'y did evacuate the 2l building. Now that was sometime later.

I 3

4 MARSH:

Had you encountered anyone else down around that panel or around 5l that frisker in the interim?

i 6i i

7 DAUGHERTY:

No.

Dale Laudermilch, the B operator on the secondary side who g

was working over there, had come over to see if I needed any help.

They gi had things, what they felt, were under control, anyway, on the secondary 10l side.

They were watching the feed pump and what have you and everything I

11j seemed to be shutting down.

He had just come over to ask me if I needed 12j any help.

l 13l MARSH:

What time would that have been? After you starting adjusting that 14 15 water flow for the temperature?

16i DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

It was after that time period.

I had told him..

It was after Ed Frederick had called me about the demin water problem.

Ar.d I had 18 gj told him what I was doing, what I was looking for, and to start picking his

,j brains to see if he could come up with anything.

c0 !

I 211 CRESWELL:

Did Ed Frederick indicate to you why he thought that there was a 22j 3

23I demineralized water leak into the primary system?

i 24l 25l l

2001 276 i

l 1

30 1.

DAUGHERTY:

No. he didn't.

I 2t i

31 CRESWELL:

Let's go back to the point that we were talking about earlier i

4!

when Janouski came by the first time.

You had mentioned that there were HP i

5 people in the area.

You recall that Janouski was there.

How was he acting 6l at this particular time? Was he, did he seem uneasy or...?

7 g

DAUGHERTY:

No.

At that time, like you say, everything...

Janouski had a g

teletector with him and he went on down the hallway.

He was more or less 10j doing surveys.

Who had directed him down there, whether he had done it on i

11l hit own or whether the shift supervisor directed him down the hallway or 12j wherever ne went, I don't even know exactly where he went because I was 13, trying to work on my own problem.

I just recall seeing him go through.

t 14; And, like I said, the reason I remember him is because of later on that he 15; was the one that told'me to leave.

16i

?

17l MARSH:

Any conversation with him at that time or just that you saw him go f

.hrough?

18l 19i DAUGHERTY:

No, there was no conversation.

I just saw him go through.

20i I

21:

221 MARSH:

Was he by himself?

I i

23l I

DAUGHERTY:

I do recall another, one of the other fellows.

In fact, it 24l embarrasses me a little bit.

I don't really know the guy's name.

Tiny is 25!

2001 277 I

I

I

\\

31 l

if his name.

I am sure you can find out who he is.

He's a big fella. He came 2f through, this was before I saw Janoski, and 1 made mention to him the fact l

3l that I had found an RM14 alarming.

He was going over to the Unit 2 HP lab 4

and I told him what I had done.

I told him I had found the RM14 alarming, S'

I had taken the E530, and done a quick survey and I didn't find anything 6i and he more or less just...

He said "well, I don't know what to tell you."

7 And he went on.

Of course, I am sure, he had a jcb that he was going to do p

anysay.

I don't know what it was.

9 101 MARSH:

Did he have survey instruments with him at that time?

i 11l i

12{

DAUGHERTY:

No, he didn't.

I 131 CRESWELL:

You mentioned that Janouski had a teletector with him.

That's 14 15;

  1. 'at? Detector mounted so that you can extend it?

161 DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

It has a range of 15 feet fully extended.

It's just a 17 telescoping survey instrument taat has a high range.

19i

^

9 "

"9'

  • I" 201 21 DAUGHERTY:

Yes.

I am just thinking.

Also there was a time period behind i

22l this. I got ahead of myself.

I thought of something else that I did.

24 25j 2001 278 I

t

l 32 1

i 1l CRESWELL:

Go on back in time.

i 2!

l 31 OAUGHERTY:

Yes, going back now here again I remembered doing all of these 4

things and I am having difficulty putting the time frames in.

I did go to 5l the secondary side to help Don Miller open the bypass valve around the I

6j polishing systems, COV12.

We had a lot of trouble with it.

It's a motor 7

driven valve and they couldn't open it from the control room.

Now Don i

Miller and I had manually opened it, locally, right at the va?ve using the 8l g

manual hand wheel on the motor.

10l MARSH:

How did you come to go over there? Did he phore you and request 11 your assistance or had you just stopped over?

t 12 f 13 DAUGHERTY:

I think that I had just gone back over.

I don't believe anyone 74j directed me over there. I think that I had just gone back to more or less 15j check and see how everything was going on.

This was, here again the time frame is eluding me somewhat, but it was sometime after I had shut off the reactor building sump pumps.

So I would put it at sometime after 4:45, g

19!

I CRESWELL:

And probably after you had adjusted the...?

20t 21 I

DAUGHERTY:

Yes it was after that.

The intermediate closed (closed cooling 22l water system temperature).

It was after that time.

Now there were a couple of things that happened over there in that same time slot.

All of 24l the operators were pretty much congregated right at that point at that 25l time.

i 200b 279

t l

{

33 i,

l!

CRESWELL:

That was five pas'.... ?

i 2

3 OAUGHERTY:

Yes. It was for several reasons.

They were having trouble with 4l the hot well level.

Cale Laudermilch was working on that job.

He was i

5l manually bypassing the normal reject valve and was trying to bring hot well l

level down.

The COV12 valve, the polishing system bypass, they were having 6j I

7!

trouble opening from the control room.

The suction to the A cooster pump, 8

a collar, it's within insulation, I don't think its been ripped off yet, gj but something had ruptured on the..., it would be the down stream side of 10 the A booster pump suction valve.

Now whether it be a flange or flexitalic ig I don't know what it was, but Don Miller and Dale Laudermilch and myself i

12 had worked at shutting that valve to isolate that leak.

Don Miller was 13 there at the time and he had told me that it nappened shortly after the 14l trip, presumably from water in the line because be said that the line scared him because it moved about two feet.

Now at some time after that 15 they were having trouble dropping the hot well level.

And investigating that a little bit, I found the air supply line to the normal reject valve, I

the pneumatic ' valve and I can't pluck the number of it out of my head right 18!

gl now, but the pneumatic valve, the air supply line was snapped off right where it goes into the pistor to the pneumatic actuator on the valve.

Now that valve is in close proximity to the suction pump or the booster pump suction line, and I am making the assumption that that line separated as a result of that water hammer and the movement of that pipe.

241

}00\\

(

i

34 1l CRESWELL:

Did you notice any water on the floor in the area of the air l

2 line.

3' 4;

DAUGHERTY:

No., I didn't.

But Don Miller had told me that he had water 5

blowing out of the pneumatic actuators on most all of the pneumatic operated 6l valves on the pulishing system.

On all of the vessels and on the receiving i

7l tank and the storage tank.

He said that he had noted water blowing out of 8

the air actuators on those valver.

9 U

1C, MARSH:

People present at this time are L'audermilch, Miller and yourself.

11l Is there anyone else in the area?

12!

l DAUGHERTY:

Harold Furst was in the area also.

Harold Furst and Juanita 131 14 Hetrick were, the most part, always at the B feed pump spel'ing each other 15 ff and on, turning that pump over by hand.

Miller and myself were up on 16 the ventilation duct manually opening the COV12 valve.

Dale Laudermilch 17l was working on controlling the hot well level.

i 18l MARSH:

One other question.

In the earlier time leading up this, had you yg been aware of any water hammer? Did you hear any rattling or slams or any 20 n ises?

2 22 DAUGHERTY:

No, I hadn't.

23 24 25l 2001 281 i

l 35 1

MARSH:

All right, I am going to break at this time and we'll change tapes.

2 The time is now 4:30 and I read 886 on the meter.

I'll be shutting down to 3

change tapes.

4!

i 5

~

61 7

8 9

10 11' 12 13' 14I 15i 16!

17l 18l 19 20l 21f 22 23 24l 25 l

l 2001 282 1

l