ML19274G056

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Forwards IE Bulletins79-05C & 06C, Nuclear Incident at TMI - Suppl. Action Required
ML19274G056
Person / Time
Site: Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date: 07/26/1979
From: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Brian Lee
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
References
NUDOCS 7908290284
Download: ML19274G056 (1)


Text

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'o UNITED STATES 8 " 3, ( [',o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TQ W j.. E REGION 111 a

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GLEN ELLYN,ILLINOls 60137 Docket No. 50-295 Docket No. 50-304 Commonwealth Edison uompany ATTN:

Mr. Byron Lee, Jr.

Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Bulletin Nos.79-05C and 79-06C is forwarded to you for action. Written responses are required.

If you desire additional information rage-ding this matter, plesse contact this office.

Sincerely, James G. Kep &

AH pler Director

Enclosure:

IE Bulletin Nos.79-05C and 79-06C cc w/ encl:

Mr. N. Wandke, Station Superintendent Central Files Director, NRR/DPM Director, NRR/ DOR PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC Hr. Dean Hansell, Office of Assistant Attorney General g ]/t {

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENTORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555 July 26, 1979 l.

IE Bulletin Nos.79-05C & 79-06C NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND - SUPPLEMENT Description of Circumstances:

Information has become available to the NRC, subsequent to the issuance of IE Bulletins 79-05,79-05A, 79-05B, 79-06,79-06A, 79-06A (Revison 1) and 79-06B, which requires modification to the " Action To Be Taken By Licensees" portion of IE Bulletins79-05A, 79-06A and 79-06B, for all pressurized water reactors (PWRs).

Item 4.c of Bulletin 79-05A required all holders of operating licenses for L bcock & Wilcox designed PWRs to revise their operating procedures to specify that, in the event of high pressure injection (HPI) initiation with reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) operating, at least one RCP per loop would remain operating.

Similar requirements, applicable to reactors designed by other PWR vendors, were contained in Item 7.c of Bulletin 79-06A (for Westinghouse designed plants) and in Item 6.c of Bulletin 79-06B (for Combustion Engineering designed plants).

Prior to the incident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI 2), Westinghouse and its licensees generally adopted the position that the operator should promptly trip all operating RCPs in the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) situation. This Festinghouse position, has led to a series of meetings between the NRC staff and Westinghouse, as well as with other PWR vendors, to discuss this issue.

In addition, more detailed analyses concerning this matter were requested by the NRC.

Recent preliminary calculations performed by Babcock & Wilcox, Westing-house and Combustion Engineering indicate that, for a certain spectrum of small breaks in the reactor coolant system, continued operation of the RCPs can increase the mass lost through the break and prolong or aggravate the uncover-ing of the reactor core.

The damage to the reactor core at TMI 2 followed tripping of the last operating RCP, when two phase fluid was being pumped through the reactor coolant system.

It is our current understanding that all three of the nuclear steam system suppliers for PWRs now agree that an acceptable action under LOCA symptoms is te trip all operating RCPs immediately, before significant voiding in the reactor coolant system occurs.

Action To Be Taken By Licensees:

In order to alleviate the concern over dela LOCA, all holders of operating licenses for following actions:

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