ML19274D838
| ML19274D838 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/03/1978 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Udall M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19259B487 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902260255 | |
| Download: ML19274D838 (15) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y
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a we.ssmcTon.o. c. 2csss ob-. - OE Aucust 3, 1978
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%; w%v CHAmt.tAf1 The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman Subc:=mittee en Energy and the Environ =snt Cc=mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washingten. D. C.
20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As you know, the Commission _ has been meeting over an extended period of time to review and consider the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Office of the Genera'l Counsel and the Office of Inspector and Auditor of the Comission who jointly conducted an inquiry into the testimony of Mr. Lee V. Gossick, the Commission's Exc:utive Dir~:ctor. for Operaticns, at. a hearing before your-Subccmaittee on July 29, 1977. The inquiry also covered ~
Mr. Gossick's testimony at a subsequent hearing.before Chairman
, John Dingel.1 on August 8,1977.
The inquiry was carried out by the General Counsel and the Director of.the Office of Inspector.and. -
Auditor and senior members of their staffs.
The inquiry report, in three volumes, was completed in February 1978 shortly oefore the hearing before your Subccaittee on February 27, 1978, into this matter. The background of the inquiry is sumarized in Volume I of the report by OGC.and OIA. The complete text of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the inquiry board are enclosed for convenience.
The Commission's conclusiens on the recommendaticns of the inquiry board were forwarded to you with our letter of. June 19, 1978.
The Cc= mission's views on the. findings and.conclusiens of. the inqui y board are set forth below.
In several letters (May 8, June 3,
and July 10,1978) you have indicated dismay with the slow pace of the Commi-ssion's deliberations on this' matter. The Comis'sion shares your concern en this point.
However, we would note that Chairman Hendrie and Ccmissioner Kennedy indicated their concurrence with the.
findings and conclusions of the inquiry board a't the hearing before your Subcc mittee en February 27, 1978.
Co=issicner' Bradford could not be present at that hearing, but noted in a letter to you dated February 24, 1978, that he was in general agreement with the con-clusicns and rec:=mendations of the report, althcugh then as now, he 79022602SS-b a
. The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman preferred to emphasize the particular ccnclusicas set forth in his The Ccmmission's letter as being the most important points in his view.
views en the inquiry board findings and cenclusiens are as follows.
A.
General The Commission agrees idth the inquiry board that "While past
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1.and present NRC Cc=missioners have expressed individual concern over the appropriateness of statements about 'na evidence' of theft or diversion, the Ccmmission took no action to establish new policy or guidelines regarding such statements after the February 1976 The Cc= mission also agrees with the final. sentence of briefings."
this finding to the effect that some such guidance should have been provided by the Commission to make it clear to the staff that unquali-fied."no evidence" statements were-not apprcpriate and could be mis-leading.
There are differing views with regard to. the inquiry board's finding that "except for Commissioner Gilinsky's expression of concern ir.
August of 1977, about the 'no evidence' statement in the NRC MUF report, there was a pattern of Ccamission and staff actions, frca 1975 to December 1977 which reflect the positica that there is 'no If the. Commission believed evidence' of theft or diversion of SNM.
that the CIA briefing warranted particular caution or circumspection Chairman in public statements, it failed tu communicate that message.
Hendrie and Ccmaissioner Kennedy believe that while there were actions in both directions, the preponderance of such actions formed a pattern clearly reflecting a "no evidence" position. They also believe that it is fair to say that.the.Cemmission failed to communicate any message of caution or circuaspection in public statements following the CIA Commissicner Gilinsky' does not' agree that there was a briefing.
pattern of Ccmmission ind staff actions clear enough to encourage He notes that, unqualified "no evidence" statements ~by the staff.
judging by events, the Ccamission failed to communicate clearly enough a message that caution.or circumspectica in public statements was Commissicner Bradford feels that the Cc= mission never warranted.
articulated a position on this subject firmly encugh for the staff to He feels that scme indication at both hearings rely on unequivocally.
.that Commissioner-Gilinsky held d_ifferent views would have been in order.
Chairman Hendrie and Ccmmissioner Kennedy agree that these 2., 3.
general conclusions, that the evolving role of the Executive Director of Operations has an important bearing in viewing the context of Mr. Gossick's testimcny and that the high degree of secrecy attached S
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The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman *..
to the CIA briefing impeded Mr. Gessick's being preperly informed, are correct.
Ccmmissioner Gilinsky agrees that there was a high degree of secrecy attached to 'the briefing and that the Executive Director's role was an evolving one, but he does not reach the same conclusions that the board dces on those findings.
He thinks that this point has little bearing on the matter of the ED0's testimony.
Commissioner Bradford does not see that the evolving role cf the
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Executive Director is relevant to anything of any importance.
The EDO had ample responsibility to knou that scmething.out of the ordinary was involved in the Apollo matter.
Commissioner Bradford does feet that it is important to realize the uniqueness of the " lapsed quorum" situation in which this matter arcse.
The Executive Director for Operations has neither the experience in testifying nor the policymaking role of the NRC Ccmmissioners.
If he thought that the agency's position was in favor of the "no evidence" formulati n, then he was in no position to vary frca it.
The important question as to
- the August 8 hearing remains why he paid so little heed to.Ccmmissioner Gilinsky's afforts to modify the fccmulation and why he did not bring the Gilinsky views to the Subccmaittee's attention.
B.
Testimony on July 29, 1977 Before the House Subccmmittee on Energy and Environment 1.
The Commission notes th~e inquiry beard's citations of elements of Mr. Gossick's testimony; these are simply 'taken from the hearing transcript.
.' On bafance, the' Commission agrees with the inquiry bo'ard's finding
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that it is debatable whether "no evidence" accurately described GRC's knowledge about the Apollo matter, as distinguished from Mr. Gossick's knowledge. Judged by the interviews, Commissioners serving before June 30, 1977, would not have made an unqualified "no evidence" state-ment as describing NRC's knowledge of the matter at Apollo, at least after the February 1976 briefings.. The staff, including senior members who had been present at the briefing, seems to have believed for the most part that the "no evidence" statement accurately described the Apollo situation.
In the absence of explicit Commission guidance on the matter, the inquiry board's characterization of the point as debatable does not seem unreasonable.
The Commission agrees with the inquiry board's characterization of the "no evidence" phrase as being so inherently ambiguous as to have the potential to mislead.
Ccmmissioner Gilinsky feels that the "no evidence" e
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' The Henorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman statement has in fact, been used in an ambiguous way to convey a reassurance chat the facts do not support.
(See, for instance, Co=nissioner Gilinsky's remarks on pages 26 and 27 of the report en the Februar;. 27, 1978, Oversight Hearing before ycur Subeccittee.)
Co=nissioner Bradford has noted a~ number of reservations with regard to the "no m idence" statement in his letter to you.of February 24, 1978.
The Co=ni sion agrees with the inquiry board's finding that
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3.Mr. Gossick, having chosen'to' testify about the Apollo matter, shculd-
.have.beert more expansive--either by detailing so much of the matter as he then knew, or by clearly defining his terms.
4.
Chairman Hendrie and Cc=nissioner Kennedy agree with the finding of the inquiry board that in his July -29,1977, testimony Mr. Gossick did not knowingly and intentionally misrepresent facts on knowingly and intentionally fail to present an accurate descrip-tien of the current understanding of the Apollo matter.
Ccanissioner
' Gilinsky simply notes that he does not know what was in Mr. Gessick's mind in testifying on July 29.
Commissioner Bradford does not feel that the evidence en this point.is dispositive, but frca what he knows of the matter, including the earlier meeting between Mr. Gossick and the Co=nittee Chairman, he is prepared to assume that it is true of Mr. Gossick's testimony of July 29th.
His impression is that Mr. Gossick's intention was to adhere strcngly to what he felt was the predominant position within the U. S. Government en this subfect.
5.
The Commiss'en agrees with the inquiry beard that the public record an other possible thefts or diversions of special nuclear
, material remains unclear in the light of Mr. Cenran's testimony in the July 29, 1977, hearing. The Commissicn.has moved to rectify this situation by directing the staff.to identify instances of alleged successful thefts or diversions of such material and to prepare a list of such instances,' including to the extent possible those mentioned by Mr. Conran,' in a form suitable for filing in the Public Document Rcem.
This action of the Cc-nission is noted with regard to.reccmmendation 4 of the inquiry board in the attachment to our letter to you of June 19, 1978.
C.
Testimony en Aucust 8,1977, Before the House.Subccmittee en Enercy and Power.
1.
The Commission agrees with the findings of the inquiry board that Mr. Gossick testified incorrectly en August 8,1977, when, in connection with a discussion on the Apollo matter he told Mr. idard O
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-S-The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman that it was correct that "the Commission has also given assurance that they believe that no significant quantities have ever been diverted or stolen." The Commission agrees that Mr. Gossick also testified incorrectly in going on to state "I can only say, Mr. Hard, that the statement of the Commission that they had no evidence that indicated any diversion had taken place was made in full knowledge of the briefing that they had received.
So while.I personally was not briefed cn that matter, the Ccmmissicn tid make, and has reaffirmed the judgment that, in their view, there has been no evidence to indicate ~ that any diversion has taken place."
The Commission notes Mr. Gossick's testimony at the February 27, 1978, hearing before your Subectaittee to the effect that the inquiry board's explicit reference to the MUF report (NUREG-0350) in connection with these two statements was in error, and that he believed that Mr. Ward and he were referring to various "no evidence" statements made in the 1976-1977 time fra'me.
Howaver, the particular phrasing of Mr. Ward's question; "no significant quantities have ever been diverted or stolen," is unique, so far as we can determine, to the MUF report-ano it seems fair to assume that Mr. Hard tcck that phrase frca the MUF report. Since the MUF report was understscd to be limited to the post-1968 time frame, any assurance frca that report could hardly be applied to the Apollo matter, as the inquiry beard noted.
As noted, Mr. Gossick has asserted that he was not thi *.ing of the MUF report in his answers to Mr. Ward, but rather of "no evidence" state-ments from other dccuments that might apply to the pr'-1968 period.
However, the argument that the Ccmmission has'in the past'faile.d to provide clear and explicit guidance to the staff with regard to "no evidence" types of statements cuts both ways here.
If the etaff had not been cautiened against the un ualified use of such statements s
by the Commission in any clear way, neither had the Ccmmissica clearly established such statements as representing its collegial position.
The Commission agrees with the inquiry board that Mr. Gossick should have limited his testi.,ny to the period covered by the MUF report.
We note Mr. Gossic.<'s agreement with this conclusien at the February 27th hearing. We believe that in the absence of a clearly stated Cemaissicn view, Mr. Gossick should not have attempted to reflect a Commissica positicn on the Apolle matter.
The Ccmmission notes the inquiry board's finding that it has no information indicating that Mr. Gossick's August 8th testimony was given with an intent to deceive or mislead the subccmmittee.
Chairman Hendrie t.nd Ccmmissioner Kennedy. believe_ that Mr. Gossick O
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.. The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman testified in accordance with his understanding at the time of the Cor::nission's position and that he had no intent to mislead the Subecmmittee.
They note their. confidence in Mr.' Gossick's character, honesty, and integrity, and the similar endorsements of former Chairmen Anders and Rowden and former Commissicner Mason.
Commissioner Gilinsky adds that he centinues to hold to the views expressed.in his letter of December 12, 1977, to Chairman Dingell. There he expressed his opinion that Mr. Gossick's testim ny was not only incorrect but inexplicable in view of the two meetings held on August 2.
As noted previously, it is Commissioner Bradford's impression that it was Mr. Gossick's intention to adhere strongly to what he felt was the predominant position within the U.S. Government on this subject.
What Comissioner Bradford finds most difficult is Mr. Gossick's failure to tell the Subecmittee on August 8th at least that Commissioner Gilinsky held a separate view.
(The inquiry report does not have a finding C.2; further, since they do not deal directly with the August 8 hearing, the next two L'e maintain findings apparently should have been desi'gnated D. and E.
the nunbering of the original report, however, to avoid ccnfusion.)
3.
Chair. nan Hendrie and Comissioner Xennedy agree.with the inquiry boai-d finding that Mr. Gossick's absence from the February 1976 briefings was not due to any lack of confidence in him.
Cc=missioner Bradford agrees that the finding reasonably represents the evidence available in the inquiry report.
Comissicner Gilinsky notes that he does not know why Mr. Gossick.was not present at the 1976 briefings.
4.
The CoEnission agrees with the inquiry board's findings that no packet of information was offered by the CIA briefer or refused by NRC at the 1975 briefings.
RECOMMENDATIONS' As coted previously, the Commission's actions on the recommendations of the inquirj board were previously forwarded to you with our letter of June 19, 1978. A copy of the Ccmmissicn meccrandum en the subject is enclosed to provide in this letter a ccmplete record of the Coi::nission's views and actions on the inquiry report.
Your letter of July.10,1978, listed fcur questiens with regard to Mr. Gossick's testimony which you believe should be answered by the Comissicn.. Answers to the four questions posed in your July 10th letter follow. Ccmmissicner Gilinsky has chosen to answer these questions separately in a letter dated July 28, 1978, which he has left with me for delivery to you with this letter.
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" The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chaircan.
"1.
Was Mr. Gossick's July 29 testimony, with regard to whether there was evidence of a diversion, an accurate representation of the facts?"
No.' As noted under finding B.3 in the discussion of the inquiry board's findings, the Commission believes that Mr. Gossick, having chosen to testify about the Apollo matter, should have been more expansives-
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either 'cy detailing so much'of the matter as P,e then knew, or by clearly defining his terms.
"2.
Did Mr. Gossick's August 8 testimony accurately.
describe the Comission's position with-regard to whether there was evidence of a diversien?"
As detailed under finding C.1, the Ccamission believes that-Mr. Gossick testified incorrectly on August 8,1977, with regard to the Commission's position on the Apollo matter, and believes that Mr. Gossick should have limited his testimony to the period covered by the MUF report and, in the absence of a clearly stated Ccamission view, should not have attempted to reflect a Cc=ission position en the Apollo /NUMEC matter.
"3.
Did Mr. Gossick's testimony en July 29 and August 8 reflect accurately his state of knowledge of the Apollo /NUMEC situation?"
Noting that his testimony at both hearings included statements that he had not been present at the Cccmissica briefings on the Apollo matter, as viell.as the "no evidence" statements that he believed repre-sented the Cccmission's position, Chairman Hendrie and Commissioner Kennedy believe that Mr. Gossick's testimony on the two occasions cited did reasonably reflect his state of knowledge of the Apollo /NUMEC situation. They note,.however, as stated in the discussion of finding B.3, that Mr. Gossick should have more clearly detailed the limitations on his personal knowledge or'more clearly explained the sense in which he Commissioner Bradford does not feel was using the "no evidence" statement.
that the evidence on this point is dispositive, but from what he knows of the matter he is prepared to assume that it is true of Mr. Gossick's Comissioner Bradford's impression is that it testimony en July 29th.
was Mr. Gossick's intention to adhere strongly to what he felt was the What predcminant position within the U.S. Government en this subject.
Commissioner Bradford finds most difficult is the later failure to tell the Subectaittee on August 8th at least that Ccemissioner Gilinsky held a separate view.
. The 'Jenerable Forris K. Udall, Chairman "4.
To what extend does Mr. Gossick's testimony on July 29 and August 8 represent a failure to fulfill his obligation to keep appropriate committees of Congress fully and currently informedT' As indicated in the discussicas of. findings B.3 and C.1,.the Comissica believes that Mr. Gossick should h' ave been clearer about the' limitations en his cun knculedge, suitable qualified or otherwise explained the "no evidence" statements, or limited his testimony to the post-1958 period, add should not have attempted to reflect a Ccamission position en the Acollo matter in the absence of a clearly stated Ccmission view cn 'the subject.
His failure to do so represents a failure to keep appropriate ccmmittees of Congress ~ fully and. currently informed.
The Comission notes Mr. Gossick response to-a question by you at the 27, 1978, in which you ask Mr. Gossick if he hearing on February believes that his statement of "no evidence" ccmplied with the spirit and the letter of the law to keep the Congress fully and currently inforn ed. Mr. Gossick answered, "Mr. Chairman, I guess I would have to say that I cannot consider my statement of my answers to the questien brought out during that hearing as being unto themselves full ccmpliance with keeping you fully. and currently informed."
Based on its review of this matter, the Comissicn is directing the Executive Director to correct the records of the July 29th and August 8th hearings with regard to his testimony about Apolic/iiUMEC.
Further, the Commission is re-emphasizing to the Executive Director and the staff its centinuing ccmitment to a, policy of full and timely disclosure in all matters in our relationships with the Comittee and Members of the Ccngress, and of complete candor in these relaticnships.
There are some general observations that should be made about both the CGC/0IA inquiry and our assessment of it.
That inquiry was not intended to be a definitive look into the Apollo /NUMEC matter.
It was intended to give the Ccmmission a reascnably thorough basis for assessing the Executive Director's testimeny in the context in which it was given.
Limitaticas of time, rescurce, and scope preclude its having been an exhaustive investigation in which every possible lead was followed and every inccasistency reconciled.
For our purposes in arriving at an assessment of the testimony and of necessary management and policy actions, the investigation has been sufficient, and no further investi-gative steps are prcposed.'
The definitive word on what, if anything, actually cccurred at NUMEC will have to come frca some other sources.
Fcr NRC purposes, it is enough that our assumpticas about safecuards and possible threats
The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman
~9-have changed a Sreat deal since that time.
There is no comparison between the safeguards planned and already in effect as against those that were.in existence in the time at which the material in-question was determined to be unaccounted for at NUMEC.
The Apollo /HUMEC matter remains important in terms of whether violations of law cccurred, in terms of proliferati~on assessments, and to some extent in terms of possible methods of diversion.
As to possible diversion paths, we have indicated that we do not believe that the conditiens that existed at GUMEC in the early 60's could possibly be repeated at any facility that we regulate today.
The cuestion of legal violation and of proliferatica assessment, while of importance to us, are the primary responsibilities of other agencies.
Consequently, we do not believe that we.can justify the expenditure of further resources of any substantial amount in any HRC investigation of the Apollo /NUMEC matter at this time.
The Commission has answered separately your letter of May 25,1978, with regard to the lessons learned frca the Apollo /NUMEC matter.
Commissicner Ahearne has not participated.in this matter.
Sincerely, 1
1 M[ "
bM Joseph M. Hendrie
Enclosures:
As stated 6
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FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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Our findings and recc5nendations are the end products of an extensive investigation conducted within an understandably tight time frame.
The investigators and supporting staff who assisted in this matter were fully aware of the sicnificance of this incuiry to the individuals concerned, the congressional subcommittees, and NRC, and made their best efforts, within the deadline,- to render a full and accurate account of all ralevant facts.
Our findings, conclusicas, and recc=endaticas are subnitted wich the realization that they pass upon issues conceming which reasonable people hold, and.will probably centinue to hold, differ-ing views. We also recognize that there are investigative leads and areas which might have been further examined had there been mere time.
We can only state that the findings, conclusions and recommendations represent our best and.most forthright juc: ment under the circumstances.
It should be noted, too, that while this, aspect was not emphasized in our investigation, we have no reason to helieve that the inquiry arose cut of perscnal animosity.
Finally, we note that neither the NRC nnr the Chairman or any other Commissioner has reviewed this report prior to its release.
In stating these findings and recercendaticns, we make no ju ement on whether there was in fact a theft or diversion of SNM at NUMEC-Apollo.
We made every effort to develop from all participants a full account of the February 1976 briefing but, despite our need-to-know and the significance of the matter involved we encountered some difficulties, as previously noted. We cemend Chairman Udall's publicly expressed intention to get to the bottom of the MUMEC-Apollo case and we hope that this report alght be of some assistance in this regard.
Findings and Conclusions A.
General.
l.
While past and p esent NRC Ccmmissioners have expressed individual ccncern over the apprcpriateriess of statements about "no evidence" of theft or diversion, the Ccmmission took no action to establish new policy or guidelines regard-
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ing such statements after the February 1975 briefings.
Except for Cc=missioner Gilinsky's expression of cencern in August of 1977, about the "no evidence" statement in the URC MUF report, there was a pattern of Cccissicn and staff actions, from 1975 to December 1977 which reflect the position that there is "no evidence" of theft or diversion of SNM.
If the Ccamission believed that the CIA briefing warranted particciar
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caution or circumspection in public statements, it failed to ccmmunicate that message.
In cur view, because the inherent O
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ambiguity in the "no evidence" phrase cculd, and aNarently did, create a misleading impression, scme such message shcuTd have been sent.
2.
'We believe that the problems posed by Mr. Gossick's testicony should b viewed in the context of the evolving role or, che Executive Director of Operations (E00).
1"ne statute authorizes Director's of certai~n components to "cc=unicate vnta or report directly to the Cc mission" when they deem at necessary.
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the Apparently th.is option was utilized by Mr. Chapman, the head o,g
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- Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards at the time or In2 CIA briefing, who stated that he normally did not go through Mr. Gossick in dealing with sensitive safeguards matters.,
Mr. Huberman, the Director of the Office or Policy c.valuatica at o,.
the time of the CIA briefing, cc=ented upon the " cutting ouu Mr. Gossick frca important matters.
He characterized this praculct
'as " atrocious," and said it had left Mr. Gossick a "second--class citizen." He understand that in April of 1977, an attempt was mad to correct this practice.
'When a Ccmission c;uorum iapsed,,
Mr. Gossick took over the stewardship of the agency -- confrontTng heavy new responsibility and several uptcming congressional hearings - without having been recularly informed about many thing.s.
3.
Much of Mr. Gossick's difficulties before the two subccamittees was due to the degree of secrecy which was au. ached uo he CIA briefing.
Only a few knew th'e facts; and the few, Jusv1-fiably or otherwise, failed to cc=unicate to Mr. Gcssic.)e.
enough information of substance to permit him to 1ndepenu ntly make a meaningful assessment of the accuracy or,i.he no evidence" statement.
This problem was ccmpounded by tne turnover amena high-level officials who attended the briering.
adherence to secrecy should never be permitted to;beccme so pervasive that it impedes effectives continuity in management.
3.
Testimony on July 29, 1977 before the Hcuse Subccmhittee on Eneray and invircnmenc l.
Mr. Gossick's testimony on NUMEC-Apollo en July 29, 1977, before the House Subcc=ittee on Energy and Environment is not entirely -
clear.
Parts of it disavcw knowlecge cf NUMEC-Apollo; other parts, such as the "no evidence" statement seem to suggest knowl edge.
Moreover, en page 25, speating cf HUMEC-Apolio, 1/ Sec. 209(b) Energy Recreanization Act of 1971
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r 45-Mr. Gessick said "...this matter predated the NRC..."
But on page 37, in a statement which Mr. Gossick acknowlecged encompassed the NUMEC-Apollo matter, he said "We have investigated every incident...I can say we have no evidence that...a significant amount of SNM has been stolen." Later, in an apparent reference -
to NUMEC-Apollo, he said "Minety-four (kilograms) would be a f
significant quantity. We have no evidence.that such an amount has been stolen." Shortly thereafter, when asked whether the f
Apollo circumstances would cause a reasonable person to wcader he replied...."I am not fumiliar with the alleged circumstances about that...all kinds of answers have been rumored or speculated...
I just can't speak to that."
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.2.
Whether "no evidence" accurately described NRC's knowledge about HUMEC-Apollo as distinguished frca Mr. Gossick's knowledge --.
is debatable.
Some of those who heard the CIA briefing agree with the term; others who heard the same briefing would qualify it.
We believe that the phrase-is so inherently ambiguous as to
.have the potentia 1 to mislead.
Under all the circumstances we believe that Mr. G'ossick, 3.
having chosen to testify about NUMEC-Apollo, shculd have:
been more expansive -- either by detailing so much of the matter as he then knew,'or by clearly defining his~ terms.
before the House Subcom:hiittce 4.
In his testir.ony cn July 29, 1977, on Energy and Envircnment, Mr. Gossick did not knowingly and intenticnally misrepresent facts or knowingly and intentionally fail to present an accurate descripticn of the current under-standing of the Apollo matter.
In cur view, Mr. Gossick believed (and still believes) that there is "no evidence" of diversion frca NUMEC-Apollo Whether he was right or wrong is a.
different issue.
i Mr. Gossick believed that his statement on evidence ci theft or diversica did r.at differ frca a number of similar-statements made by the Commission and staff, both before and after the February 1975 briefings.
As noted above, the Ccanission furnished no guidance on public stateme.nts on theft or diversica after the briefing.
We found no informatica indicating that Mr. Gossick knew any details about the substance of the February 1975 CIA briefing (which he did not attend) except fcr the con-clusion in document 102 of the Ccnran Task Force report N
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..s that it " raised sericus questiens and did not provide cen-clusive answers."
Also, there are indications that at least one person who was at the briefing (and perhaps more) had advised Mr. Gossick, without furnishing substance, that the briefings were incenclusive.
Mr. Gossick was aware of Mr. Strauss' caution in docume6t 102 abcut cualifying "no evidence" statements, but Mr. Gossick discounted this because NRC has continued to make unqualified "no evidence" statements after the briefings.
Mr. Gossick also was aware of media reports on NUMEC-Apollo and knew the CIA briefing had caused NRC to contact the Executive Branch.
But he discounted these events because he knew that the briefing had been inconclusive.
In the final analysis, Mr. Gossick chose to adhere to wha.t he believed to be the NRC position on the.
matter, while expressing his perscnal lack of knowledge, regarding NUMEC-Apollo.
'de find that, in these circumstances, Mr. Gossick did not intentionally misrepresent facts.
5.
Because of emphas'is on the NUMEC-Apollo matter, the public record on other possible thefts or diversicas of SHM remains unclear in light of Mr. Conran's testimony in the July 29, 1977 hearing that:
"There are cther instances of theft and mat'erial stolen than from the NUMEC-Apollo installation, thefts or suspected thefts.
"There have been other successful attempts to steal nucicar material - not always a large cuantity, not always bcmb grade' material.
There have been a number of instances in in which nuclear material was stolen."
"In scme instances it was recovered so we know it was stolen."
' "The documentation that I have in my haad is so extensive that I really cannot re= amber which part is classified and which is not, so I would really rather not say in
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public, but all. of the informatica I have referred to is in the draft overview study report, or I have identified it in scme other way for the subccmmittee...I would get very specific in a closed hearing."
.C.
Testi=cny on August 8,1977 before the Heuse Subccomittee cn Enercy and Power 1.
While we have no information indicating that it was done with an intent to deceive or mislead the subcccmittee, Mr. Gossick
47 in his August 8,1977 testimony before the House Subecmittee testified incorrectly when he agreed that the Ccanission, in releasing the MUF report, has "also given assurance that they believe no significant quantities have ever been diverted or stolen."
Referring to the same report, Mr. Gessick also testi-fied incorrectly in stating "The statement of the Cc=nission that they have no evidence that indicated any diversicn had taken place, was-nde in full knowledge of the. briefing that they had received..So while I personally was not briefed on that matter, the Ccanission did make, and has reaffired that judgment that, in their view, there has been no. evidence to indicate that any diversica has taken place."..
.This testimony is incorrect' because it failed to take into consideration tha fact that the MUF report, as earlier stated by Mr. Ecssick in his prepared testimony at the hearing, covered caly the period.beginning on January 1,1968.. It.Was this 1958 '
limitation regarding "no evidence" of theft or diversion that
.was particularly significant to Cc=nissioner Gilinsky in the August 2,1977 briefing about the MUF report (in which Mr. Gossick had participated) and in the rewriting and approving of the press release acccmpanying the MUF report. Mr. Gossick in his interview admitted that in his August 8 "no evidence"'
testimony he should have limited his testimony by reference to 1968, or by adjectives such as " conclusive" or "hard."
Because Mr. Gossick now recognizes that he should have used such limita-
.tions, v;e do not reach the question.whether circumstances, including the August 2 briefing and the meeting which followed, should have, in any event, led Mr. Gossick to articulate those limitations in his testimony. We agree that Mr. Gossick should have limited his testimony to the pericd covered by the MUF report, or used adjectives such as "cenclusive" or "hard."
Mr. Gossick's absence,frca the February 1975 briefir.gs was not
~3.
due to any lack of confidence in him.
4.
No CIA packet of information was offered to or refused by URC at the s
February briefings. The results of the interviews indicated generally that the briefer spoke informally frca a folder or icose papers.
Recommendations Un the basis of the information developed in this inquiry it is recommended that:
1.
If further informatici, about the possibility of theft or diversica at MUMEC-Apollo is relevant to NRC's continuing safeguards respcnsi-bilities, then the Ccanission shculd arrange for briefings from the E
e
48 FBI and the General Accounting Office, both of which are conducting current inquiries into the matter, and frca the fiSC, which agency briefed Congressmen.Udall and Tsongas.
In the future, NRC should adhere to the position adopted in the August 1977 MUF report with respect to theft or diversion - that 2.
statements should be qualified by language re uncertainties in the material accounting system.
Tne Commission should consider the propriety of continuing to use the term "no evidence" in view of our experience in this matter.
'3.
NRC safeguards experts.siould. identify, clarify publicly, and take.-
whatever action may be appropriate with respect to the other allege 4.
successful thefts or diversions mentioned by Mr. Conran in his July 29,1977 testimcay.
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