ML19274C859
| ML19274C859 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1978 |
| From: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19274C857 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7811280082 | |
| Download: ML19274C859 (29) | |
Text
.
UNITED STATES 3*
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
=
3
)
WASHING TON, D. C. 20555 g, -...../
YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-29 YANKEENUCLEARPOWERSTATION(YANKEE-RYE)
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OEPRATING LICENSE Amendment No. 52 License No. DPR-3 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Yankee Atomic Electric Nnny (the licensee) dated June 6, 1978 (Proposed Change No. 160),
as supplemented by letter dated August 22, 1978, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Conmission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will owrate in confonnity with the application, the provisions of
' Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of t'his amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
b 78112800
. 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility License No. DPR-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 52, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WJ Dennis L. Ziemanr., C5tef Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Operating Reactors
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: November 14, 1978
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 52 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-3 DOCKET NO. 50-29 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages.
The revised pages include the captioned amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
REMOVE INSERT VI VI XI XI 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-4 3/4 5 3/4 5-6 3/4 5 3/4 5-6 3/4 5 3/4 5-8 3/4 5 3/4 5-8 3/4 5-9 3/4 5-9 3/4 5-11 3/4 5-11*
3/4 6-14 3/4 6-14 3/4 7-14 3/4 7-14 (Blank) 3/4 7-15 (Blank) 3/4 7-15 3/4 7-16 3/4 7-16 (Blank) 3/4 7-17 3/4 7-17 (Blank)
B3/4 5 83/4 5-2 B3/4 5 B3/4 5-2 B3/4 7-4 B3/4 7-4 Overleaf pages (V, XII, 3/4 5-10, 3/4 6-13, 3/4 7-13, 3/4 7-18,'and B3/4 7-3) are provided for document completeness.
- This page is included for the purpose of correcting an administrative error which occurred during the issuance of Amendment No. 49, dated May 30,1978.
INDEX LIJtlTING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AMD SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION
_P_A_G_E_
3/4 4-12 3/4.4.6 CHE!11STRY..............................................
3/4.4.7 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY......................................
3/4 4-15 3/4.4.8 PRf.SSUnr/iEITT RA7UnC LD11TS 3/4 4-19 Main Coolant System....................................
3/4 4-25 Pressurizer............................................
3/4.4.9 STRUCTURAL INTECRITY...................................
3/4 4-26 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE con!ING SYSTEMS,([CCS) 3/4 5-1 3/ 4. 5.1 ACCUMULATO~..........................................
3/ 4. 5. 2 ECCS SUBSYS
'4........................................
3/4 5-3 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYST.'.......................................
3/4 5-9 3/4 5.4 SAFETY INJECTION TANK..................................
3/4 5-11 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.0.1 PRIMARY C0'iT/.1.':'FNT 3/4 6-1 Contair.nent Intt9rity..................................
3/46-2 Con t a i nment t e o kc g e....................................
3/4 6-4 Co n ta i nmen t Ai r Loc k...................................
Internal Pressure......................................
3/4 6-5 3/4 6-6 Air Temperature........................................
Containment Vessel Structural Integrity................
3/4 6-7 Continuous Leck fbnitoring System......................
3/4 6-0 3/4.6.2 C0"TAlf; MENT ISOLATION VALVES...........................
3/4 6-9 YANKEE-ROWE V
Amendment No, 46
INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.6.3 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen Ana lyzer.........
3/4 6-16 Hydrogen Vent Sy: tem...................................
3/4 6-17 Atmos phere Rec i rcula tion System........................
3/4 6-18 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Sa fe ty V a l v e s..........................................
3/4 7-1 Emergency Boil er Feedwater System......................
3/4 7-5 Primary and Demineralized Water Storage Tanks..........
3/4 7-6 Activity...............................................
3/4 7-7 Turbine Generator Throttle and Control Val ves..........
3/4 7-9 S ec o nd a ry Wa t e r C h emi s t ry.............................
3/4 7-10 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION........
3/4 7-13 3/4.7.3 PRIMARY PUMP SEAL WATER SYSTEM (Del eted )...............
3/4 7-14 3/4.7.4 S ERV IC E WAT ER SYST EM ( Del eted).........................
3/4 7-16 3/4.7.5 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN.....
3/4 7-18 3/4.7.6 S EAL ED SOURC E CONTAMINAT ION............................
3/4 7-19 3/4.7.7 WASTE EFFLUENTS Radioactive Solid Waste................................
3/4 7-21 Radioactive Liquid Waste...............................
3/4 7-22 Radioactive Gaseous Waste..............................
3/4 7-23 3/4.7.8 ENV IRONMENTAL MONITORING...............................
3/4 7-24 3/4.7.9 SH0C K SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS )...........................
3/4 7-27 3/4 7.10 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS...............................
3/4 7-30 3/4 7.11 PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS..............................
3/4 7-35 YANKEE-R0WE VI Amendment No. ;&f, 52
I INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT.....................................
B 3/4 6-1
~
3 / 4,. 6. 2 CONTAINME NT I SOLAT I ON VALV ES............................ B 3/4 6-3 1
3/4.6.3 COMBU ST I BL E GAS CONTR0L................................. B 3/4 6-3 3/4.1 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE.........................................
B 3/4 7-1 3 /4. 7_. 2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE /TEMERATURE LIMITATION..........
B 3/4 7-4
~
3 / 4,*. 7. 3 PRIMARY PUMP SEAL WATER SYSTEM ( Del eted )................ B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WAT ER SYSTEM (0el eted ).......................... B 3/4 7-4 3/a.7.5 CONTROL ROOM VENTIL ATION SYSTEM EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN...... B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.6 S EAL ED SOURC E CONTAMI N AT ION............................. B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7 WASTE EFFLUENTS....................................... B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.8 ENVIRONMENTAL MONIT0 RING................................
B 3/4 7-6 3/4.7.9 SHOC K SUP PRESSORS (SNUBBERS )............................ B 3/4 7-6 3/ 4. 7~.10 F I R E S U P PR E S S IO N S Y S T E MS................................ B 3/4 7-7 3/4. Z_11 P EN ET RAT I ON F I RE BARR I ERS...............................
B 3/4 7-7 3/4'8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8 1 A.C.
SOURCES............................................
B 3/4 8-1 7
3/4.8 2 ONSIT E POWER DISTRIBUT ION SYSTEMS.......................
B 3/4 8-1 3/4.( REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/ 4. 9.1 REACTIVITY..............................................
B 3/4 9-1
~
3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION.........................................
B 3/4 9-1 YANKEE-ROWE XI Amendment No. ff( 52
l
)
INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME..............................................
B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS.......................
B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS..........................................
B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.6 SHIELD TANK CAVITY MANIPULATOR CRANE OPERABILITY.......
B 3/4 9-2 l
3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL PIT..........................
B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.8 COOLANT CIRCULATION....................................
B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE FAN SHUTDOWN SYSTEM..................
B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL AND SPENT FUEL PIT....................................................
B 3/4 9-2 1
3/4.9.12 SPENT FUEL PIT BUILDING IS0LATION......................
B 3/4 9-3 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN........................................
B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 CONTROL R0D OPERABILITY AND INSERTION LIMITS...........
B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.3 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS-REACTOR
{
CRITICALITY............................................
B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 PHYSICS TESTS..........................................
B 3/4 10-1 i
i I
YANKEE-R0WE XII Amendment No. Af 49
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 The ECCS subsystemt shall be OPERABLE with:
Three OPERABLE independent ECCS safety injection subsystems a.
with each subsystem comprised of:
1.
One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump, 2.
One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump, 3.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the safety injstion tank on a safety injection signal.
b.
An OPERABLE ECCS recirculation subsystem with an OPERABLE flow l path capable of taking suction from the containment sump and recirculating to the safety injection header.
An OPERAELE ECCS long term hot leg injection subsystem with c.
an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the ECCS safety injection subsystem and discharging to the Pain Coolant System #4 hot leg.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4* and 5*
l ACTION:
With one ECCS safety injection subsystem inoperable, restore a.
the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN with Main Coolant pressure < 1000 psig within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b.
In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Main Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specificacion 6.9.6 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.
The pro-visions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
- Main coolant pressure > 1000 psig.
i' YANKEE-ROWE 3/45-3 Amendment No. 52
_ EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVELLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS safety injection subsystem, the recirculation sub-system, and the long term hot leg injection subsystem shall be demon-strated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:
1 Verifying that each high pressure safety injection pump:
a)
Starts (unless already operating) from the control room.
b)
Develops a discharge pressure of 1 850 psig on re-circulation flow to the safety injection tank.
l c)
Operates for at least 15 minutes.
2.
Verifying that each low pressure safety injection pump:
a)
Starts (unless already operating) from the control
- room, b)
Develops a discharge pressure of t 250 psig on recirculation flow through CS-MOV-532.
c)
Operates for at least 15 minutes.
b.
At least once per 31 days by:
1.
Verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed by opening at least two breakers in series:
Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position
- a. CH-MOV-522
- a. Charging Header /LPSI
- a. Closed Isolation
- b. CH-MOV-523 b.&c. Charging Header /Lcop
- b. Open 4 Hot Leg Injection
- c. CH-MOV-524 Long-Term
- c. Open Recirculation YANKEE-R0WE 3/4 5-4 Amendment No yf 52 3
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
' 2.
Verifying that the following valves are in their normally opened positions with power to the valve operators removed by removal of the circuit breaker from the motor control center:
Valve Number Valve Function
- f. SI-MOV-46 HPSI Flow Control I
3.
Verifying that power to the valve operators is removed by l
disconnecting the power cables as they leave the motor starters:
Valve Number Valve Function
- e. MC-MOV-301 MCS Loop Isolation
- f. MC-M0V-302*
MCS Loop Isolation
- g. MC-M0V-309 MCS Loop Isolation
- h. MC-MOV-310*
MCS Loop Isolation
- i. MC-MOV-318*
MCS Loop Isolation J. MC-MOV-319 MCS Loop Isolation
- k. MC-MOV-325 MCS Loop Isolation
- 1. MC-MOV-326*
MCS Loop Isolation
- In MODE 2, 3*,
4*, 5*, power cables may be connected to the MCS loops isolation valves when required to close the valves for main coolant pump (s) starting. After the pump (s) has been started, the valve (s) shall be reopened and power cables disconnected.
YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 5-5 Amendment No.
52
_ EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) 4 Verifying that the following valves are in their normally l
closed position with power to the valve operator removed by disconnecting the power cables as they leave the motor starter:
Valve Number Valve Function
- a. CS-MOV-532 LPSI Recirculation Line
- b. CS-MOV-534 LPSIPumpHeaderIsolationValveBypassl Note: CS-M0V-532 may be opened for < 30 minutes once per l
week for safety injection tank mixing or low pressure safety injection pump testing after restoring power to the valve operator.
Insure that power to the valve operator is properly removed after closing the valve.
5.
Verifying that the following valves are in their nomal position with power to the valve operator motors separated by dual contractors from the motor control center:
Normal Valve Number Valve Function Position
- f. SI-MOV-515 Hot Leg Injection Isolation Closed
- g. SI-M0V-514 Hot Leg Injection Isol** en Closed
Verifying that each ECCS safety injection subsystem is I
aligned to receive electrical power from an OPERABLE emergency bus.
7.
Verifying that each pair of ECCS recirculation subsystem redundant valves is aligned to receive electrical power from separate OPERABLE busses.
8.
Verifying that each pair of ECCS long term hot leg injection subsystem redundant valves is aligned to receive electrical power from separate OPERABLE busses.
YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 5-6 AmendmentNo.)d[,52
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 9.
Verifying that the charging header flow metering in-l strument is OPERABLE by observing charging flow rate at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
c.
By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:
1.
For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing containment integrity, and 2.
Of tne areas affected within containment at the comple-t'.on of each containment entry when containment integrity fs established.
d.
At least once per 18 months by visual inspection of the con-tainment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion, e.
At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
1.
Cycling each power operated (excluding automatic) valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
2.
Verifying that valve CS-MOV-532 actuates to its correct position on a safety injection signal.
3.
Verifying that each of the following pumps start auto-mat 1cally upon receipt of a safety injection signal:
(a) High pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump (b) Low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 5-7 Amendnjent No. 52
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4 Verifying that two low pressure safety injection pumps develop a combined flow 2180 gpm. Test every LPSI pump at least once per 36 months.
5.
Verifying that each charging pump stops automatically upon receipt of a safety injection signal.
6.
Verifying that the charging header flow metering l
instrument is OPERABLE by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
7.
Verifying that each valve listed in Specification 4.5.2.b.4 is in its nonnally open position.
8.
Verifying the proper positioning of the HPSI throttle valves SI-V-671, 672, 673, and 674 by performing an inspection to insure that; a)
Each valve locking device is in place and securely welded to the valve handle and to the valve yoke.
b)
The scribe mark on each valve body aligns with the scribe mark on the valve yoke.
9.
Verifying the proper positioning of hot leg injection throttle valve SI-V-645 at least once per 36 months by flow testing.
f.
At least every 36 months, and/or any time either test under 4.5.e.8 is failed, by developing a backpressure of 875 psig in the high pressure safety injection header with two HPSI pumps operating as follows:
1.
Pressure to the suction of the HPSI pumps to be 170t 10 psi.
2.
LPSI flow is isolated.
3.
Injection flow is to one loop with the other loops isolated by closing the appropriate injection gate valves CS-MOV-536, CS-MOV-537, CS-MOV-538, and CS-MOV 539.
4 The flow to the injection loops shall not be less than 200 gpm.
5.
The above test shall be repeated to include the operation of all HPSI pumps.
YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 5-8 AmendmentNo.M 52
9 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 The ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with:
As a minimum, one OPERABLE ECCS safety injection subsystem a.
comprised of the following:
1.
One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump, 2.
One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump, and 3..
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the safety injection tank.
b.
An OPERABLE ECCS recirculation subsystem with an OPERABLE flow l
path capable of taking suction from the containment sump and recirculating to the safety injection header.
An OPERABLE ECCS long term hot leg injection subsystem with an c.
OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the ECCS safety injection subsystem and discharging to the Main Coolant System #4 hot leg.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 4* and 5*.
l ACTION:
With the ECCS safety injection subsystem, the recirculation a.
subsystem, or the long term hot leg injection subsystem in-operable, restore all subsystems to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or reduce main coolant pressure to < 300 psig within the l
next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.
b.
In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Main Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.6 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.
- Main coolant pressure < 1000 psig but > 300 psig.
YANKEE-ROWE 3/45-9 Amendment No.,49) 52
EMERGENCY LORE COOLING SYSTEMS
')
tCCS SUBSYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.3 The ECCS subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the ap-plicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.
b YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 6-10
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SAFETY INJECTION TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4 The safety injection tank (SIT) shall be OPERABLE with:
a.
A minimum contained borated water volume of 117,000 gallons, equivalent to a level of > 25.5 feet, b.
A minimum boron concentration of 2200 ppm, and c.
A minimum water temperature of 40*F.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4* and 5*
l ACTION:
With the safety injection tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STAND 5Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN with Main Coolant pressure < 300 psig within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.4 The SIT shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 7 days by:
1.
Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and 2.
Verifying the boron concentration of the water.
b.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the SIT temperature when the outside air temperature is < 35cF.
- Main coolant pressure > 300 psig.
l YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 5-11 Amendment No. 49
TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 5
TESTABLE DURING N
VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION PLANT OPERATION ISOLATION TIME g
-- TVes or No)'~~~
(Seconds) 5 B.
CHECK VALVES (Continued)
SW-V-820*
Service Nater to Containment Cooler #1 NA NA SW-V-821*
Service Water to Containment Cooler #2 NA NA SW-V-822*
Service Water to Containment Cooler #3 NA NA SW-V-823*
Service Water to Containment Cooler #4 NA NA IIC-V-Il99*
Steam Supply to Containment Heaters NA NA
[
C.
Manual Valves NA h
SC-MOV-5514553*
Shutdown Cooling - In No NA SC-MOV-552+554*
Shutdown Cooling - Out No NA CH-MOV-522*
MC Feed to Loop Fill Header NA NA CS-V-601 Shield Tank Cavity Fill NA NA CA-V-746*
Containment Air Charge NA NA HV-V-5*
Containment H2 Vent System NA NA IIV-V-6*
Containment 112 Vent Sys tem NA NA CA-V-688 Containment H2 Vent System Air Supply NA NA CS-MOV-500 Fuel Chute Lock Valve No NA
- Not subject to Type C tests
5 TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES A
e x-TESTABLE DURING VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION PLANT OPERATION ISOLATION TIME
~
~~Tves or no)
Seconds C.
Manual Valves (Cont'd)
CS-CV-21S Fuel Chute Equalizing NA NA CS-CV-216 Fuel Chute Dewatering NA NA Pump Discharge VD-V-752*
Neutron Shield Tank-Outer Test NA NA VD-V-754*
Neutron Shield Tank-Inner Test NA NA w
1 BF-V-4-1 Air Purge Inlet NA NA m
BF-V-4-2 Air Purge Outlet NA NA HC-V-602 Air Purge Bypass NA NA SI-MOV-516 ECCS Recirculation No NA SI-MOV-517 ECCS Recirculation No NA g
BF-CV-1000*
SG#1 Feedwater Regulator No 30 m
BF-CV-Il00*
SG#2 Feedwater Regulator No 30 E
BF-CV-1200*
SG#3 Feedwater Regulator No 30 2
BF-CV-1300*
?,
SG#4 Feedwater Regulator No 30 PR-V-623 Main Coolant Heise Pressure Gauge NA NA h
PU-V-543 Purification System Containment
\\
x Sump Suction NA NA PU-V-S44 Purification System Containment m"
Sump Suction NA NA
~~*Not subject to Type C tests
4 I
PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4._7_. 2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.2 The steam generator temperature and pressure shall be limited as required below:
a.
The temperature difference across the tube sheet shall not exceed 100'F.
b.
The secondary side of the steam generator must not be pres-surized above 200 psig if the temperature of the vessel is below 70*F.
The maximum heatup and cooldown rate for the steam generators c.
shall not exceed 100'F in any one hour period.
d.
The primary side of the steam generator must not be pres-surized above 500 psig unless the temperature of the Main Coolant System is above 70'F.
(
APPLICABILITY: At all times.
ACTION:
With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied:
a.
Reduce the steam generator pressure or temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes, and b.
Perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effect of the overpressurization on the structural integrity of the steam generator. Determine that the steam generator remains acceptable for continued operation prior to increasing its temperatures above 200'F.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.2.1 The pressure in the primary and secondary sides of the steam generator shall be determined to be < 500 psig or < 200 rsig, respectively, at least once per hour when the temperature of either the primary or secondary coolant is < 70*F.
4.7.2.2 The steam generator shall be determined to be within limits at least once per 30 minutes during heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.
YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 7-13
(INTEf4T10tiALLY BLANK)
YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 7-14 Amendment No. 52
(IriTEt;TIONALLY BLAtiK) 7 YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 7-15 Amendment No. 52
I (INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 7-16 Amendment No. 52
4 f
(INTENT 10NALLY BLANK)
YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 7-17 Amendnent No. 52
PLANT SYSTEMS
}
3/4.7.5 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.5 The control room ventilation system emergency shutdown shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With the control room ventilation system emergency shutdown inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
5URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4./.5 The control room ventilation system emergency shutdown shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by verifying that tne control room ventilation system can be shutdown r.9anually from the control room.
YANKEE ~ +.
3/4 7-18 O
i 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATOR The OPERABILITY of the accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the Main Coolant System pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulator.
This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large Main Coolant System pipe ruptures.
The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the acci-dent analysis are met. A minimum useable water volume of 700 cubic feet require accumulator water volume to be at least 850 cubic feet.
The limits for operation with the accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed or pressurization system inoperable minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrently which may result in unacceptable peak cladding tempera-tures.
If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the
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full capability of the accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a MODE where this capability is not required.
3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of three independent ECCS safety injection subsystems, the recirculation subsystem, and the long term hot leg injection sub-system ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one safety in-jection subsystem.
Two safety injection subsystems operating in con-
]
junction with the accumulator are capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest Pain Coolant System cold leg pipe downward.
In addition, the safety injection subsystems, the recirculation subsystem and the long term hot leg injection subsystem provide long term core cooling and boron mixing capability during the accident recovery period.
YANKEE-R0WE B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No.
52
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)
With the Main Coolant System temperature and pressure below 330*F, and 1000 psig, respectively, one OPERABLE ECCS safety injection subsystem, with the OPERABLE recirculation subsystem and the OPERABLE long term hot leg injection subsystem, is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor, the decreased probability of a LOCA and the limited core cooling require-ments because of the negligible energy stored in the primary coolant under these conditions.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
Complete system tests cannot be performed when the reactor is operating because of their inter-relation with operating systems.
The method of assuring operability of these systems is a combination of complete system tests performed during refueling shutdowns and monthly tests of active system components (pumps and valves) during reactor operation.
The test interval is based on the judgement that more f.equent testing would not significantly increase reliability.
Some subsystems power operated valves fail to meet single failure criteria and removal of power to these valves is required.
3/4.5.4 SAFETY INJECTION TANK The OPERABILITY of the Safety Injection Tank (SIT) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.
The limits on SIT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and
- 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the SIT and the Main Coolant System water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.
These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses, which is based on allowing a minimum of 77,000 gallons to be injected by the safety injection subsystems before the recirculation is manually established.
LOCA analyses show that an injection of 77,000 gallons is sufficient to limit core temperatures and containment pressure for the full spectrum of pipe ruptures. This leaves up to 40,000 gallons in the SIT as reserve.
The boron concentration of 2200 ppm is the highest value assumed in any accident analysis.
YANKEE-ROWE B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 52
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant off-site radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to sec-ondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line.
These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
The steam breek accident is based upon a postulated release of the entire contents of the secondary system to the atmosphere using a site boundary dose limit of 1.31 rem for thyroid dose.
The limiting dose for this accident results from iodine in the secondary coolant. The reactor distribution of iodine isotopes with 1".
failed fuel was used for this calculation.
1-131 is the dominant iso-tope because of its low MPC in air and because the other iodine isotopes have shorter half-lives and therefore cannot build up to significant concentrations in the secondary coolant, given the limitations on primarysystemleakrateangactivity. The entire secondary system contains approximately 132m of water at standard conditions. One-tenth of the contained iodine is assumed to reach the site boundary, making allowance for plate-out and retention in water droplets.
3/4.7.1.5 TURBINE GENERATOR THROTTLE AND CONTROL VALVES f
The OPERABILITY of the turbine generator throttle and control i
valvesensuresthateachsteamgeneratorwillbeiso}atedattheinstant l
of scram for a LOCA with an area smaller than 0.1 ft, as assumed in the accident analysis. The OPERABILITY of the turbine generator throttle and control valves within the closure times of the surveillance require-ments is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
I 3/4.7.1.6 SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY The limitations on secondary water chemistry assures that the potential for stress corrosion is reduced. The time interval during which operation is permited to continue provides time for taking corrective action to restore the contaminant concentration to within limits. The effects of exceeding the chloride limit are time dependent and corrosion studies show that operation may be continued without a significant effect on structural integrity for the specified limited g
time.
YANKEE-ROWE B 3/4 7-3 I
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations are based on a steam generator initial RTNDT plus 60 F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
3/4.7.3 PRIMARY PUMP SEAL WATER SYSTEM (Del eted) 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (Deleted) 3/4.7.5 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN The OPERABILITY of the control room ventilation system emergency shutdown enhances the opportunity for the control room to remain habitable for operations personnel during and following accident conditions.
3/4.7.6 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION The limitations on sealed source removable contamination ensure that the total body or individual organ irradiation does not exceed allowable limits in the event of ingestion or inhalation of the source ma terial. The limitations on removable contamination for sources re-quiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. Leakage of sources excluded from the requirements of this specification represent less than one maximum permissible body burden for total body irradiation if the source mat-erial is inhaled or ingested.
YANKEE-R0WE B 3/4 7-4 Amendment No. 52