ML19270G279
| ML19270G279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1979 |
| From: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906060023 | |
| Download: ML19270G279 (4) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES i
p yi NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON g,&.x..h1 h
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 j
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April 24,1979 i
Docket No. 50-409 i
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Mr. Frank Linder General Manager Dairyland Power Cooperative l
2615 East Avenue South i
La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601
Dear Mr. Linder:
I We have completed a preliminary review of your February 26, 1979 request for Technical Specification changes to allow Cycle-6 operation of the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor.
We find that we need additional information to continue our review.
Please provide responses to the items identified in the enclosure at least two weeks before your planned start of Cycle-6.
Sincerely,
') w A Dennis L. Zieman, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/ enclosure:
See next page 2276 338 7906060o23
Mr. Frank Linder. April 24,1979 cc w/ enclosure:
Fritz Schubert, Esquire Staff Attorney Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue South La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601
- 0. S. Heistand, Jr., Esquire 1
1800 M Street, N. W.
l Washington, D. C.
20036 Mr. R. E. Shimshak La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Dairyland Power Cooperative P. O. Box 135 Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Coulee Region Energy Coalition ATTN:
George R. Nygaard P. O. Box 1583 La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 La Crosse Public Library 800 Main Street La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 2276 339 9
O
f ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LACBWR CYCLE 6 1.
Your February 26, 1979 submittal (LAC-TR-067) states that the Rod Withdrawal Error (RWE) is the limiting transient which sets the operating limit MCPR.
Provide the LHGR as a function of rod position / time / block for the RWE.
2.
In accordance with your submittal, you have evaluated other transients including pressure increase, moderator temperature increase, temp-erature decrease, coolant inventory decrease, core coolant flow increase and decrease, and positive reactivity insertion. Please provide a summary of these analysis for Cycle 6, including the ACPR values, input parameters, initial conditions, and sequence of events assumed in the analyses.
Those events summarized in LAC-TR-067 need not be resubmitted. Trans-ients that potentially determine the limiting MPCR's LHGR's and pressures include:
Generator load rejection without bypass, Turbine trip without bypass, MSIV closure, Loss of Feedwater Heating, and Feedwater Controller failure-maximum demand.
Where the severity of the transient is exposure dependent, identify the limiting cycle exposure. Specify whether your EOC analysis is based on a E0C-ARO (End of Cycle-All Rods Out) condition, or LACBWR's EOC conditions which are limited by the 15000 Mwd /t burnup limit on the lead assembly.
3.
Provide scram reactivity curves used in your analysis for cycle six a/id demonstrate that these curves are conservative.
4.
The use of a larger number of Type III fuel assemblies in Cycle 6 results in less negative mo'derator void, temperature, and full Doppler coefficients.
Described how these parameters are accommodated in your Cycle 6 analyses for the Control Rod Drop Accident, and transients that increase core reactivity.
Describe the effects that both the Type III fuel and the stainless steel shroud cans have on these analyses for Cycle 6.
5.
Justify that your ECCS analysis and resultant MAPLHGR, PCT, values for Cycle 5 bound the proposed Cycle 6 fuel loading scheme.
6.
Provide a discussion of your planned fuel surveillance at the end of Cycle 5.
You stated that minor adjustments to your discharge / reload scheme may be required.
If adjustments are required, show that these adjustments are bounded within all the Cycle 6 reload analysis, and evaluations.
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. 7.
Provide your EOC-6 core configuration showing projected fuel assembly exposures at EOC and define E0C.
8.
The safety analysis for a reloaded core is based upon a soecifically designed core configuration.
In our review we assume that the re-loaded core configuration will conform to the designed configuration.
A physics startup test program provides some assurance that the core confonns to the design. We believe that the minimum list of tests should be:
1.
A visual inspection of the core including a photographic or videotape record.
2.
A check of core power symmetry by checking for mismatches between symmetric detectors.
3.
Withdrawal and insertion of each control rod to check for criticality and mobility.
4.
Comparison of predicted and measured critical insequence rod pattern for nonvoided conditions.
Please describe your physics startup test program.
In particular, note that the acceptance criteria should be based on assuring that the core conforms to design not that the Technical Specification. limits are met as proposed in your Cycle 5 reload submittal.
Likewise~ note that the actions to be taken if acceptance criteria are not met may be different than. those basad only on meeting Technical Specification requirements.
Therefore also please provide the following:
(1) A description of the test sufficient'for us to evaluate the adequacy of the test.
(5) The acceptance criteria and the bases that provide assurance that the core conforms to design.
(3) The specific actions to be taken if the acceptance criteria are not met.
9.
On pages 8 and 9 in Section 3.4.4, Misplaced Assembly, it is stated that the core loading is checked at least twice.
Please explain what these checks include, particularly in terms of independent verifi-cation of assembly location.
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