ML19270F694
| ML19270F694 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1979 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Barton A ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7903080559 | |
| Download: ML19270F694 (2) | |
Text
TSSa UNITED STATES pa ntoug'o,,
I
/
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
REGION 11 0
E 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
~f ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30303 o
%*..../
FEB 161979 In Reply Refer To:
RII:JPO 50-364 Alabama Power Company Attn:
Mr. A. R. Barton Executive Vice President P. O. Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 Gentlemen:
This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter.
It is expected that recipients will review the infor-mition for possible applicability to their facilities.
No specific action or response is requested at this time.
If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular, Bulletin or NRR Generic Letter will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions.
If you have questions regarding the matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Y
} LW 4 James P. O'Reilly Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Information Notice No. 79-04 2.
List of IE Information Notices Issued in 1979 790308 o 559
1 FEB 161979 i
Alabama Power Company cc w/ enc 1:
Mr.
R. E. Hollands, Jr.
Quality Assurance Supervisor Farley Nuclear Plant Post Office Box U Ashford, Alabama 36312
t UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 February 16, 1979 IE Information Notice No. 79-04 DEGRADATION OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Summary On September 16, 1978, an unusual sequence oi events occurred at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2.
The events involved the electrical power sources and culminated in the spurious activation and degraded operation of Unit 2 Engineered Safety Features (ESF). Analysis of the course of the incident has identified three safety concerns in the electrical distribution system operation and design.
(1) The offsite power supply for ANO Unit 1 Engineered Safety Feature loads was deficient in that degraded voltage could have resulted in the unavailability of ESF equipment, if it were to be needed.
(2) The design of the ANO site electrical system that provides offsite power to Units 1 and 2 did not fully meet the Commission's Regula-tions, 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Desiga Criterion 17, because in certain circumstances a loss of one of the two offsite power circuits would also result in a loss of the other such circuit.
(3) Deficiencies existed in the operation of the Unit 2 inverters that convert DC to AC power for the uninterruptable 120 volt vital AC buses.
Description of Circumstances Initially Unit I was operating at 100 percent power; Unit 2 was in hot standbyperforminghotfunctiona}testinginpreparationforinitial criticality and power operation.
Unit I auxiliary electrical loads were being supplied from the Unit 1 main generator via the unit auxiliary transformer. Unit 2 auxiliary electrical loads were being fed from the offsite grid through Startup Transformer No. 3.
The normal operating status was interrupted by the failure of the Unit 1 Loop "A" Main Steam Line Isolation Valve (MSIV) air operator solenoid causing the MSIV to close as designed.
The Unit 1 Reactor Protection System sensed conditions requiring reactor shutdown and tripped the react 3r.
The 1The Unit 2 Operating License did not permit criticality of power operation at the time of the incident.
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