ML19270F292

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Forwards Rept of 780209 Accident Involving NAC-1 Cask.Finds Accident Is Not Reportable Due to Absence of Cask Damage. Cask Will Be Subjected to Thermal Performance,Containment & Structural Tests.W/Certificate of Compliance 6698
ML19270F292
Person / Time
Site: 07002623, 07106698
Issue date: 02/22/1978
From: Best R
NAC INTERNATIONAL INC. (FORMERLY NUCLEAR ASSURANCE
To: Macdonald C
NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
Shared Package
ML19270F270 List:
References
REB-78-14, NUDOCS 7902060130
Download: ML19270F292 (7)


Text

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, S. ATOM!c agsgy agpH-mila7csas i m s727s RECUL:,icgv EIN February 22, 1978 REB /78/14 e

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4 Mr.

C.

E. MacDonald, Chief b

Transportation Branch 2 WOag, Division of Fuel Cycle & Material Safety

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NA4ss y

Nuclear Regulatory Commission CT g Washington, D.C.

20555 Qter f

Dear Mr. MacDonald:

4 Attached for your information are six (6) copies of an accident report.

This report presents a comprehensive description of an accident which occurred on February 9, 1978, and involved an NAC-1 cask (unit number NAC-1-C).

We are of the opinion that the accident is not reportable under the requirements of 10CFR71.61 or 10CFR21 since nc cask damage has been observed.

Please note, however, chat the cask will be subjected to thermal performance, contain-ment and limited structural test / examinations in March 1978 in compliance with provisions of COC 6698.

.e If you have any questions, please call.

Sincerely, NUCLEAR ASSURANCE CORPORATION Q4 Ralph E. Best Manager, Engineering Services REB /jss Enclosure 790206013c b

//'hb76 9

MEMO To:

Distribution Date: 2/20/78 From:

R.E. Best

Subject:

Transportation Accident Involving NAC Truss-Type Trailer and NAC-1 Cask Serial Number C Summary At 9:30 p.m., February 9, 1978, the author received a telephone call from C.C Hoffman giving notification of the subject accident. The accident occurred at approximately 8:30 p.m. EST on February 9,1978.

In the accident vicinity weather and visibility were good. Roads were clear of ice and snow. Mr. Hoffman had been contacted by a T7i-State Motor Transit Company dispatcher. The accident occurred as a result of structural failure in the truss-type trailer. No in-juries or other property damage were reported or occurred.

Illinois highway 54 near the town of Gibson City, Illinois was closed to traffic for approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> between 8 p.m. CST February 9, 1978, and 11 a.m. CST February 10, 1978.

A TV camera crew (reporter and cameraman) from a Peoria, Illinois TV station arrived at the accident about 1 a.m. CST on February 10, 1978, and shot pictures for news use. Othem news agencies had arrived and departed earlier without gaining access to the accident.

The author arrived at the scene of the accident at 4 a.m. CST on February 10, 1978.

Early observations, later confirmed by closer visual examination, in-dicated no visible damage to the NAC-1 cask.

Cask, trailer and tractor had re-mained upright and had been skillfully maneuvered to the roadside. The cask was retained in the trailer structure. The top compression longerons of the trailer side trusses had buckled in their forward most segment resulting in near total loss of vertical load path strength (section modulus) and subsequent trailer collapse. Forward cask trunnion hold-down-clamps had failed when the side impact _ limiter cradle rotated (top to rear) through the trailer bend angle.

Rear trunnions remained in place in the trailer trunnion blocks.

Forward motion of the tractor-trailer was slowed and subsequently stopped due to friction between the trailer frame and rear bogies of the tractor. The stopping point was approximately two (2) miles southwest of Gibson City. The author traveled Illinois routes 54 and 47 along the route traveled by the Tri-State Company vehicle. The road was observed to be of concrete construction and 08698

' inter weather and general patch-work type of repair of these roads re-aged suited in a very rough surface which tossed and pitched the author's rented compact automobile. Approximately 100 yards behind the tractor-trailer stopping point a sharp surface undulation was observed.

The accident was responded to by the Gibson City Police Department, Illinois State Highway Patrol, Illinois State Department of Public Health, Commonwealth Edison Dresden Plant Personnel, Tri-State Motor Transit Company Safety Inspector, Nuclear Assurance Corporation, Bob Thompson - who works for a Gibson City firm, and a mobile crane operator from Bloomington-Normal, Illinois.

The Gibson City manufacturer's welding equipment and highly skilled and pro-fessional welder and an equally qualified crane operator and mobile 30-ton crane from Bloomington-Normal arrived at the accident site at approximately 7:00 a.m.

Tri-State Motor Company had previously dispatched a second tractor / trailer CST.

rig to the accident for transfer of the cask. Mr. Joe Wolf of the Comonwealth Edison's Dresden Plant directed cask handling operations and provided other advice which helped to assure the successful transfer of the cask from the damaged trailer to the back-up vehicle.

At approximately 11 a.m. CST the Illinois St. ate Highway Patrol released the shipment for continued movement to it', destination - Babcock and Wilcox, Lynch-burg, Virginia. Disposition of the camaged trailer was, at the authors request, to the Tri-State Seneca terminal in Seneca, Illinois.

Accident Analysis It is the author's opinion that the poor road surface condition of Illinois State Routes 47 and 54 was a major contributor to the cause of the accident. The second major contributor is opined to be the lack of design and construction standards for vehicles of this type. Excessive speed was unlikely only 115 miles from a stopping point for the heavy vehicle.

A scenario for the accident sequence is offered as follows:

1st Occurrance - vehicle traveling at approximately 50 mph (estimated),

tractor strikes sharp road surface heave (sleepi c driver Kelley reports being thrown in bunk and awakened).

2nd Occurrance - tra'.t:r bottoms hard after road heave - trailer rear bogies strike road heave.

3rd Occurrance - trailer top longerons fail by buckling (confirmed by inspection after the accident) causing trailer bottom to drop to road surface (Kelly reports hearing thud after being

'akened and seeing sparks in drivers mirror).

4th Occurrance - trailer frame resting on rear tractor tires causes loss of speed - driver Luetzow manuevers vehicle to edge of road surface and stops.

In accordance with this scenario the author believes that the ccmbined loadings imposed on the trailer by the tractor suspension bottoming after the frost heave and the trailer suspension being driven upward by the heave caused an overload of the trailer top longerons. This overload caused buckling failure of the longerons.

Analysis of Emercency Response Based on information from various sources the following is believed to be an accurate representation of the response chronology:

Thursday, February 9,1978 7:30 p.m. CST -

Approximate time of accident 7:30 to 7:57 p.m. CST - Tri State drivers perform preliminary radiation survey - determine no abnormal radiation con-dition. Tri-State flags down motorist for ride to Gibson City.

7:57 p.m. CST -

Assistant Chief L. Rced, Gibson City PD, noti-fies the PD answering service to begin calling emergency response agencies, Illinois State Police, Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA). Officer Reed was contacted by the Tri-State driver at a Gibson City Dairy Queen.

8:00 to 8:15 p.m. CST - Local ESDA officials collect instruments and begin organizing response.

8:15 p.m. CST -

Route 54 closed to traffic

- Channel 19, Peoria, Illinois news team arrives -

tapes coverage of accident scene.

2:00 to 4:00 a.m. CST - R. Best (NAC) arrives at accident scene, drives route 47 and 54, is briefed on accident itatus and performs preliminary visual inspection of cask and trailer; determines that no major cask damage has occurred.

4:00 to 7:00 a.m. CST - no action.

7:00 a.m. CST

- mobile crane arrives

- local welder with metal cutting torch arrives, begins removing trailer frame members to permit lifting access to cask.

7:00 to 10:00 a.m. CST - trailer is cut away from cask to permit lifting access. Lifting yoke present on damaged trailer

  • is used to lift cask for placement onto alternate trailer brought to scene by Tri-State. Visual inspection and radiological survey of cask is performed during these operations.

Impact limiters and lifting trunnions received special close attention. No visible damage observed.

10:00 to 11:00 a.m.

- Illinois State Patrol releases shipment to con-tinue to Lynchburg, Virginia, destination.

In this particular accident the emergency response seemed to be relatt -ly rapid, coordinated and cceplete. However, underlying detracting factors shcJd be mentioned here for completeness. These are as follows:

1.

Local ESDA officials do not have an estab'ished program of training for response officials. Instruments used are not calibrated or otherwise checked on a routine or planned basis. Fortunately, in-struments had been inspected only a few days before the accident because someone thought it would be a good idea.

2.

Local ambulance service and hospital have no provision for protective clothing or contaminated victim isolation.

Note - this is not normal transport arrangement.

3.

-No single individual was designated to be in charge when the author arrived at the accident scene.

4.

The trailer design made recovery operations difficult. The damaged trailer structure encased the cask thus requiring torch cutting for cask removal.

5.

NAC's knowledgeable responding individuals until a very short time prior to the accident had all been unavailable.

6.

Federal response agencies (IRAP, DOT, 00E, NRC) were not notified at any time.

7.

Immediately available mobile crane equipment operators could not be rapidly identified. Considerable time was lost in obtaining crane services.

Condition of Transportation Eouioment Prior to Accident Trailer - Approximately 5,000 miles since major maintenance and inspection -

considered to have been in better than new condition. No prior history of top longeron buckling during 5 years normal service for six trailers of this type.

Cask

- Maintained and inspected in accordance with NRC Certificate of Com-pliance 6698 - considered to be in original manufactured condition.

Tractor - Vehicle in good mechanical condition - all tires in good condition.

Recommendations Cask - Although the cask appeared not to have been damaged in the accident, it -

considered prudent to perform inspections to verify the observations. The every-three-year major inspection and thermal test required by C0C 6698 offers the opportunity for such verification. Dye penetrant examinations of trunnion root welds and impact limiter casement selds as well as thermal performance and containment tests are to be performed in early March 1978.

Truss Tyne Trailers - Continued use of Transport Systems, Inc. truss type trailers should be limited to well maintained roads and extra transport pre-cautions. Even under such cenditions of use the structure of these trailers

should be closely surveiled after each trip. Unless or until a detailed structural evaluation of the trailer design is completed and necessary struc-tural modifications are made the above restricted use should be conti5Jed.

Resoonse - NAC should encourage greater Federal, State, Local Emergency and industry cooperation and effort in developing adequate emergency response capabilities.

Emercency Resconse Ecuicment - Mobile crane operators should be contacted throughout the regions where the casks travel.

Emergency response plans should contain a list of such operators who have been briefed on response procedures and have agreed to provide emergency response services.

Notifications The following organizations / individuals have been contacted by the author or other NAC employees regarding this particualr accident:

1.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission - R. Odegaarden 2.

Duke Power Company - D. Frech 3.

Southern California Edison Company - J. Handshuh 4.

General Electric Company - Morris, Illinois - K. Astrom 5.

General Electric Company - San Jose - R. Jones 6.

Chem Nuclear Systems, Inc. - K. Dufrane 7.

Higgins Erectors & Haulers - R. Higgins 8.

State of Illinois Department of Public Health - 0.E. Mecheski, J. Blackburn 9.

Tri-State Motor Transport Company - E. Rutenkroger, B. Southwick, J. Cronwell, D. Kelly, luetzow, F. Martin.

10.

Gibson City Police - Officer Higgins 11.

Illinois State Highway Patrol - Sgt. J. Jeffers - Star No. 621 12.

Babcock and Wilcox Ccmpany -

K. Prince 13.

Commonwealth Edison Company - Dresden Plant - D. Adam, J. Wulf 14.

Gibson City manufacturer - Bob Thcmpson

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'D CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 3g C R For Radioactive Materials Pscrages 1.ta) Certificate Nurrber 1.!b) Revision No.

1.(c)

P g agg jqeg N

1.[d) P Usa / covo/t ficat io.

f es No. 1.(e) Tott.1 No. F i

6693 8

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2. PREAMBLs 2.fa)

This certificate is issued to satisfy Sections 173.092a.173.234.170.035, and 173.338 of the Cecartment of Trsnscortation Hazar Materials Regulations (49 CFR 170189 and 14 CFR 103) and Sect: ens 146-19-1Ca and 146-19-1CQ of the Department of Transcortation Cangerous Cargoes Regulations (46 CFR 146-143), as arrended.

2.(b)

The cackaging and contents described in item 5 below, meets the safety standards set forth in Suecart C of Ette 10. Code of Federal Regulatens. Part 71, "Pacxaging of Ra:ioactive Materials for Transport and Transportation of Radioactive Matenal Unct Certain Conditions.

2.fc)

This cartificate does not relieve the consignor from corncliance with any recuirement of the regulations of the U.S. Ceoartment c Transportation or other apoficsole regulatory agencies, inesucing the government of any country througn or into which the packa4 will be transcorted.

3. This cartrficzte is issued on the basis of a safety analysis report of the paccage design or acclicatiore-3.(a)

Prepared by (Narne and address):

3.fb)

Titfe and identification of report or acclication:

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.

f:FS application dated October 6,1972, P.O. Box 124 as supplemented.

West Valley, NY 14171 3.tc) occuer No.

71-6698 4 CCNOITIC NS This certrficato is conditionel uoan the fulfilling of the requirstnents of Subcart O of 10 CFR 71. as acclicable, and the condition-cifi in item 5 below.

5. Description of Packaging and Authori:ed Contents. Model Nurneer. Fissile C: ass. other Concitions and

References:

(a)

Packaging (1) Model No.: NFS-4 (2) Description A steel, lead and water shielded shipping cash. The cask is a right circular cylinder with upper and lower steel encased balsa impact limiters. The overall dimensions are 214 inches in length and 50 inches in diameter. The gross weight of the cask is approximately 50,000 pounds. The inner cavity is 178 inches long and 13.5 inches in diameter.

The thickness of the inner shell is 5/16 inch and 1-1/4 inches for the outer shel.l. The two stainless steel shells are welded to a 2-inch thick stainless steel shield disc at the bottom. The annulus between the inner and outer shells is filled with lead (max. lead thickness 6-5/8 inches, minimum 5 inches).

The lid is stainless steel frustum of cone 7.5 inches thick.

The lid is secured to the cavity flange by six ASTM-A320, Grade L43,1-1/4 inch diaceter bolts. The seal is provided by two poly-tetrafluoroethylene 0-rings.

Four neutron shield tanks, each with surge tank and ruptima N'

'd water-ethylene glyc s,

DUPLICATE DOCUMENT Entire document previously 1h(\\OCD:MO entered into system under:

ANo 78// b 20 N d No. of pages: