ML19269E035
| ML19269E035 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1979 |
| From: | Reed C TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906230118 | |
| Download: ML19269E035 (3) | |
Text
Commonwealth Edison One First National Plata Chicago. Ilknois g(
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago lilinois 60690 MRli 4
May 17, 1979 Mr. James G. Keppler, Director Directorate of Inspection and Enforcement - Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
Subject:
Zion Station Units 1 and 2 Additional Response to IE Bulletin No.79-06A (Revision No. 1) dated April 18, 1979 NRC Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304 References (a):
April 18, 1979 letter from J. G.
Keppler to Byron Lee, Jr. transmitting IE Bulletin No.79-06A (Revision No. 1)
(b):
April 27, 1979 letter from cordell Reed to J. G. Keppler responding to IE Bulletin No.79-06A (Revision No. 1)
Dear Mr. Keppler:
Per Item 13 of Reference (a), Commonwealth Edison Company was requested to submit technical specification changes resulting from its review of the Three Mile Island Incident.
On April 30, 1979 a technical specification change was subnitted (See April 30, 1979 letter from C. Reed to H. R. Denton) to require actuation of safety injection based on 2 out of 3 channels of low pressurizer pressure, thus deleting pressurizer level from the safeguards logic.
This request was reviewed, evaluated and approved by the NRC Staff on May 3, 1979 as Amendment Nos. 49 and 46 to the Zion Station Units 1 and 2 Operating Licenses (see May 3, 1979 letter from A. Schwencer to C. Reed).
At this time, Commonwealth Edison's reviews have not identified the need for any other technical specification changes.
However, should additional requirements be identified from Commonwealth Edison's continuing review of the Three Mile Island Incident, such changes will be evaluated and submitted at that time.
2250 090 1 8 1979 7906230)(("
f Commonwealth Edison NRC Docket Nos. 50-295/304 Mr. James G. Keppler:
2-May 17, 1979 1
Per Reference (b), Commonwealth Edison indicated that two items, Items 4 and 12, were undergoing further review. to this letter provides an update of these items.
Please address any questions that you might have concerning this matter to this office.
Very truly yours, C _. f2 - d Cordell Reed Assistant Vice-President attachment cc:
Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection 2250 09i
Commonwealth Edison NRC Docket Nos. 50-295/304 ATTACHMENT 1
\\
Item 4 The following valves have been identified as having control switches which allow them to return to their pre-accident position after the safety injection signal is reset:
FCV-BD17 Steam Gen'erator Blowdown AOV-BD0001 thru 8 Steam Generator Blowdown FCV-FP08 Fire Protection FCV-IA01A, B Instrument Air AOV-RV0001 thru 4 Containment Purge FCV-RVlll thru 114 Heating Water FCV-SS-2 thru 5 Steam Generator Blowdown Sample FCV-WD17A, B Containment Sump Pump Discharge With the exception of valves FCV-FPOS, FCV-IA01A, B and FCV-RVlll thru 114, modifications will be initiated to change the control circuits of all the other valves such that they remian closed following reset of the safety injection signal.
The valves exempted above serve systems within the containment that are not connected to the reactor coolant system or the containment atmosphere (closed systems) and that have fluid pressure in excess of accident pressure.
Item 12 The hydrogen recombiner units are to be used to remove hydrogen from the containment that is generated during a major transient.
Shielding design and requirements will be pursued after the source terms applicable to the Zion units are identified.
Any other modifications or changes will be implemented after applicable requirements betc,e kncwn.
As explained previously in Reference (b), che hydrogen purge fans will only be used to cope with events in shich the containment activity is analyzed and the concentrations are known to be within the iodine removal capability of the charcoal filters.
Furthermore, the system will not be used if any releases are calculated to exceed NRC approved limits as defined in Zion's FSAR and Technical Specifications for postulated accidents.
2250 092