ML19269D906
| ML19269D906 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1979 |
| From: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Goodwin C PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906200303 | |
| Download: ML19269D906 (6) | |
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April 18,1979 Docket No. 50-344 Mr. Charles Goodwin, Jr.
Assistant Vice President Portland General Electric Company 121 SW Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204
Dear Mr. Goodwin:
On March 9,1978, the NRC fire protection Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Trojan Nuclear Plant was issued.
Subsequent to that date you submitted various revisions to PGE-1012, " Trojan Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Review," and several letters related to fire protection.
These revisions and letters included various design details requested by the SER and further information to resolve items identified in the SER as incomplete. We have reviewed the information provided in these revisions and letters and find that further information is required to complete our review. The enclosed request for additional information identifies the details required for each incomplete item and for each proposed modification that required design details.
In order for us to maintain our review schedule, your response is requested within 60 days of receipt of this letter.
Please contact us if you have any questions concerning this request.
Sincerely,
//
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A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/ enclosure:
2252 065 See next page 79062003g,3
Mr. Charles Goodwin, Jr.
Portland General Electric Company April 18, 1979 cc:
Mr. H. H. Phillips Portland General Electric Company 121 S.W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Warren Hastings, Esquire Counsel for Portland General Electric Company 121 S.W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Mr. J. L. Frewing, Manager Generation Licensing and Analysis Portland General Electric Company 121 S.W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Columbia County Courthouse Law Library, Circuit Court Room St. Helens, Oregon 97501 Director, Oregon Department of Energy Labor and Industries Building, Room 111 Salem, Oregon 97310 Richard M. Sandvik, Esquire Counsel for Oregon Energy Facility Siting Counsel and Oregon Department of Energy 500 Pacific Build
- 99q9 nbg 520 S.W. Yamhill LLsL U Portland, Oregon 97204 Michael Malmrose U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Trojan Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 0 Rainier, Oregon 97048
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-344 SER Item 3.l.4 Sprinkler System Details provided on design density, type of system, and method of actuation is still under review.
No further information is required at this time.
3.1.7 Smoke Exhaust Fans The PGE letter of January 9,1979 indicates that alternate means of performing smoke removal for the cable spreading room and switchgear rooms are being investigated in lieu of a fixed manually operated smoke exhaust fan.
Identify when the alternate means will be selected.
3.1.12 Remote Shutdown Capability Staff requests have previously been transmitted to PGE concerning the design of this system.
The following information is also required:
PGE 1012 (Page C-20) Amendment 3 indicated that neither the nonnal in-plant communications system or the sound powered comunications system would be affected by a cable spreading room fire, and thus could be used for performing shutdown functions independent of the cable spreading room.
- However, this statement was deleted by Amendment 7 to PGE-1012 in December 1978.
Describe the communications system to be used by operators in achieving safe shutdown independent of the cable spreading room.
3.2.1 Cable Penetration Fire Stops Prior to the SER PGE had committed to test two different fire stop designs.
Subsequently, by letter of January 9,1979, PGE has indicated that cable penetration seals through 3-hour fire walls will be upgraded as required to be identical to configurations that have been tested to meet the NRC criteria.
Details should be provided on the configuration to be used.
3.2.2 Cable Tray Tests (Train B Switchgear Room) 7 The PGE letter of January 9,1979 indicates that adequate test data is available in lieu of performing additional tests to obtain information related to switchgear room fire protection.
PGE 1012 (page C-50) indicates that the results of the test would be used in performing an analysis to show the adequacy of the air recirculation units in the safety train B switchgear
. room to remove the energy generated by a fire.
Identify when the msults of this analysis will be provided using the available test data.
This analysis should consider maximum temp-eratures that train A equipment in this room can withstand without malfunction in addition to the maximum allowable cable temperature identifed in PGE-1012, pages C-49 and C-50.
Alternatives acceptable to the staff in lieu of performing this analysis are:
(a)
Provide an alternate shutdown capability independent of cabling and equipment in this room to achieve safe shutdown; (b)
Provide an automatic total flooding gas suppression system in this area; or (c)
Install a 3-hour rated barrier to separate the train A cabling and equipment in the room from the train B cabling and equipment.
3.2.3 Effects on Safe Shutdown Where Redundant Cables Are In Proximity (a)
Further information provided by Amendments 5, 6 and 7 to PGE-1012 in response to staff. position P.F.8 (pages C-30 through C-32s of PGE-1012) parti. ally addresses the staff concern related to potential fire damage to redundant safe shutdown cabling that may be in proximity to each other but do not crossover.
Fcr most of the areas, adequate detail is provided describing the separation between redundant safe shutdown cabling.
However, additional detail is required for certain areas as described below:
Area: (1)
Intake Structure - Service Water Pump Area The separation of safe shutdown cables in conduit from the redundant cabling is not adequately described.
Details should be provided, such as marked up drawings, showing the routing and separation of safe shutdown cabling within the area.
Area: (2)
Fuel Building - Elevation 45 Feet 2252 068 Details, such as marked up drawings, should be orovided showing the routing and separation of the channel A cable tray and the channel B conduits within this area.
Area: (3)
Fuel / Auxiliary Building - Elevation 45 Feet, and Area: (4)
Fuel Building - Elevation 77 Feet The information provided is not clear as to whether any safe shutdown cabling is contained in conduit in these areas.
If
- any safe shutdown cabling is in conduit, provide details, such as marked up drawings showing the routing and separation of safe shutdown cabling within the area.
Area: (10)
Turbine Building - Elevation 45 Feet Details should be provided, such as marked up drawings, showing the routing and separation of the channel A conduits and the Channel B cable tray.
(b)
From the information provided in TZ-1012 (page C-31) it is not clear as to whether the adequacy of cable separation for redundant instrumentation was analyzed in the cable study.
Verify that the separation of minimum instrumentation required for safe shutdown was reviewed to assure that postulated fires would not damage redundant instrumentation where redundant cabling is in proximity to each other.
3.2.4 Water Shielding PGE-1012 (page C-54) indicates that fire suppression piping is generally not routed through safety related areas, that a pipe routing check was performed, and that it was concluded that fire water piping could not detrimentally impact on any safety related equipment.
For each safety related area. containing fire water piping, provide details supporting your conclusion that failures in this piping will not degrade safety related equipment.
3.2.5 Administrative Controls No further information is required.
3.2.6 Containment Fire Suppression (a)
To preclude the potential for a large oil fire which could not be promptly suppressed as required by BTP 9.5-1 and Appendix A, one of the following should be provided at the reactor coolant pumps:
1.
An automatic sprinklcr system; 2.
An automatic AFFF ( Aqueous Film Forming Foam) system ;
~
3.
An oil collection system to collect leakage at potential leakage points and drain oil to a closed container.
Potential leakage points to be protected should include:
f1anged connections; drain plugs; fill points; upper and lower reservoirs;; sight glasses; lift pump; and external oil cooler.
2252 069
. (b) To provide the capability to suppress fires in electrical cable trays and residual oil at the reactor coolant pumps, manual fire hose stations should be provided inside containment.
These may be provided by hose connections to an existing water system if fire water demards will not degrade capability of this system to meet safe shutdown demands.
3.2.7 Cable Penetration Area Fire Protection PGE-1012 (pages B-25 and C-39) indicates that the spray system to be provided for this area will Se a two zoned system that will be actuated by redundant photoelectric detectors.
Provide details on the actuation logic for this system, definition of detector zones, and identification of which trays are to be covered with 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. (Zone 1) and which are to be covered with 0.15 gpm/sq. ft. (Zone 2).
2252 070