ML19263D381
| ML19263D381 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1979 |
| From: | Bixel D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7903290122 | |
| Download: ML19263D381 (7) | |
Text
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GeMeril Othces: 2.2 West Micnigan Averue. Jack sor. Micmgan 43201. Area cone 5 7 7%-c 553 Yarch 26, 1979 Director,IIuclear Reactor Regulation Att Mr Dennis L Ziemann, Chief Operating Beactors 3 ranch !!c 2 US :Iuclear Regulatory Cc=ission Washington, DC 20555 anvrm :0 a,1cs rra: u- ".on._ c' -
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.x Transmitted herewith are three (3) original and thirty-seven (37) conformed copies of a proposed change to the Technical Specifications.
'"he prcposed change incorporates administrative changes necessary to implement portions of the fire protection positions prcmulgated by :GC letter dated ' cvembe. 20, 1973 and deletes information no longer applicable.
~ ne requested change is administrative in n2ture and is, thus, categorized as Class II ursuant to 10 CFR 170.22.
A check for $1,200.^0 is attached.
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David A Fixel Ziuclear Licensing Administrator CC JGKeppler, US'IEC 700329 0 /A2
CONSLES F0WER COMPANY Docket 50-155 Request for Change to the Technical Specifications License DPR-6 For the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is requested that the Technical Specifications contained in Facility Operating License DPR-6, Docket 50-155, issued to Consumers Power Company on May 1,196h for the 31g Rock Point Plant be changed as described in Section I below:
I.
Chance _s a.
Delete the sentence in Section h.l.2. (b) reading, "The shutdown cooling system shall be operable and ready :cr service at all times during pever operations" and replace it with a sentence reading, "The shutdown cooling system shall be ready for service during power operations v.th the h80 volt circuit breakers for isolation valves MO-7056, "0-7057, MO-7058 and MO-7059 checked 'open' when raletor pressure is above 300 psig."
b.
Add a sentence to Section ll.3 1.h.A reading, "The performance capability of the two core spray systems may be temporarily degraded to acconmodate normal use and testing of the fire suppression water system."
c.
Delete Section ll. 31.h.F and the last sentence of Section 11.h.l.h. A.
d.
Delete the last paragraph of the bases pcrtion of Section 11.3/h.1.h.
NOTE:
Corrected Technical Specifications' pages are attached.
II.
Discussion a.
URC letter dated Hovember 20, 197c requested Consurers Power Cc=pany to take measures to preclude a fire causing inadvertent actuation of shutdown cooling system isolation valves.
This request was in-tended to prevent potential overpressurisation of the shutdown cooling system (design pressure 300 psig).
The most effectivt cethod of accomplishing the requested action is to open the power breakers for the isolation valves whenever reactor pressure exceeds shutdown cooling syster design pressure.
(The valves are interlocked to prevent opening when reactor pressure exceeds 300 psig, but postulated hot shorts during a fire could override this interlock and _ause inadvertent valve operation.) The power breakers for these valves are located inside reactor containment within a few feet of the personnel lock.
This locati^-
"^"'d be accessible during all con-ditions in which the shutdown cooling system tust be used with the exception of a fire in the local area of the breakers.
In the event of such a local fire, use of the energency cooling syster eculd
2 maintain the plant in a safe condition.
The shutdown cooling syster is not required following a loss of coolant accident when reactor containment would be untenable.
The time required to place the shutdown cooling system in operation vould not be unauly extended by opening the isolsticn valve power breakers since the cystem cannot be placed in operation before reactor pressure has been reduced to 300 psig, b.
The water supply for the core spray systems is the fire suppression system.
Under vorst case single failure conditions (containment spray system isolation valve MO-TC6h failed in the open position in the early stages of a LOCA), analyses have shown the available water flow from the fire suppression system to be equal to that required for emergency core cooling.
Thus, any water drawn from the fire suppression system could potentially degrade core spray system performance in the unlikely event that the worst case single failure condition existed. Tests performed using the fire suppression system include flushing of hydrants, operability tests of fire nose stations, and use of the electric fire pump as a load during routine testing of the emergency diesel generator as required by Technical Specification ll.h.5.3.2.
Design and review efforts pertaining to core spray systems since plant construction have included an inherent under-standing that normal use of the fire suppression system could degrade core spray system performance.
The requested administrative change incorporates this under3tanding explicitly in the Technical Specifi-cations.
In the event the degraded situation persisted for more than 2h hours, the reactor would be shut down in accordance with Technical Specification 11 3 1.h.E.
- c. & d. The sections to be deleted were incorporated by Amendment 15 d Cetober 17, 1977 and pertained to the exemption from core spra:
ingle failure requirementa which was in effect for Cycle 15 operations.
This exemption is no longer in effect and, thus, the cited Technical Specifications' secticns are no longer needed.
III.
Conclusions Based on the foregoing, both the Big Rock Point Plant Review Committee and the Safety and Audit Review Board have concluded that these changes are acceptable from a safety standpoint.
CC3!SUMERS PCWER CCMPA'iY t
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w C R'Bilby, Vice Pre ^.de at Production & Trans i se_on Sworn and subscribed to before me this 26th day of March 1979 L/Tl g
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dinda R Thayer, :Ict[ichigan ry Public Jackson Cou.It;", -
My ec= mission expires July 9, 197c.
,-14 h.l.2 (Contd)
Minimum Time To Put System 30 in Full operation Fci_owing Signal, Seconds Core Scray System:
Type Sparger Ring With Spray No: le Capacity of Sprays, Gpm h00 Nozzle Pressure, Psia 115 Backun Core Scray System:
Type Sparger Horsle Centered Over Core Capacity of Sparger, Gpm h70 Nozzle Pressure, Psia 115 Core Scray System Recirculation:
Number Pumps 2
Number Heat Exchanger 1
Heat Removal Capacity, Stu/h 3 x 10
@ 28.h F Log Mean Temperature Difference (b) Operatine Beauirements A minimum of one reactor recirculating loop or its equivalent shall be used during all reactor p:ver operations. The maximum operating pressure and temperature shall be tne same as the reactor vessel.
The controlled rate of change of temperature in the reactor vessel shall be limited to 100 F per hour.
All other components in the system shall be capable of following this temperature change rate.
The safety relief valves shall be set appropriately for all planned reactor operating pressures so that the allevable pressure of 1870 psia (1700 plus 10%)
in the nuclear steam supply system is not exceeded.
The emergency condenser shall be operable and ready for service at all times during power operation.
However, should one emergency condenser tube bundle develop a leak during power operation, it will be permissible to isolate the leaking tube bundle until the next outage.
Both bundles of the emergency condenser shall be available for service during cold to hot plant heatup for power production.
The shutdown cooling syrten shall be ready for service during pcVer cperations with the h80 volt circuit breakers for isolation valves MO-705o, MC-7057, MO-7058 and M0-7050 checked "open" when reactor pressure is above 300 psig.
The shutdown cooling system shall be operable and ready for service during refueling operations and the breakers for MO-7070 and M0-7071 shall be tagged "cpen."
The primary coolant shall be sampled and analyzed daily during
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Limiting Conditions for Operation Surveillance Requirement ll.3.1.h EMERGEIICY CORE C00hING SYSTEM 11.4.1.4 EMERGEIICY CORE C00LIllG SYSTEM Applicability:
Anplicability:
Applies to the operating status of the Applies to periodic testing requirements for the emergency core cooling system.
emergency core cooling systems.
Objective:
Objective:
To assure the capalility of the emergency To verify operability of the emergency core core cooling system to cool reactor fuel in cooling systems.
the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident.
Specification:
Soecification:
A.
Each month the following shall be performed:
A.
The two core spray systems (original and M
Ge opeMM W of MO-TOS1, -7061, -7070, redundant) shall be operable whenever the
-7071 and
,TO 6 by remote manual actuation.
plant is in a power operation condition.
The origir.al core spray system shall also Leak testing of the core spray heat exchanger.
be operable during refueling operations.
Automatic actuation of both fire pumps.
The performance capability of the two core spray systems may be temporarily Verify that valve MO-7069 is locked or sealed in degraded to accommodate normal use and open position.
testing of the fire suppression water Veri fy that the fire system transformer deluge system.
valve is shut and its upstream isolation valve is ed or sealed in % e shut pos N on.
B.
The core spray recirculation system shall be operable whenever the plant is in a Verify that the hose required for backup cooling power operation condition.
water to the core spray recirculation heat exchanger is installed on a designated rack C.
The core spray recirculation heat In the screenhouse.
exchanner shall not be taken out of service during power operation for periods exceeding four (h) hours.
The heat exchanger shall be considered in-operable and out of service if tube bundle lenhage exceeds 0.2 gpm.
130
Limiting Conditione for Operation Surveillance Requirement ll.3.1.h EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (Contd) ll.h.1.h EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (Contd)
D.
Both fire pumps (electric and diesel) and B.
At each major refueling outage, the following the piping system to the core spray system shall be performed:
tie-ins shall be operable whenever the Calibration of core spray system actuation and plant is in a power operation condition and refueling.
pressure and flow instrumentation.
Verify that the two core spray system contain-E,.
If Specifications A, B, C and D are aot ment isolation check valves are not stuck shut.
met, a normal orderly shutdown shall be initiated within 2h hours and the reactor Calibration of fire systun basket strainer shall be shut down as described in Section differential pressure switches.
1.2.5(a) within twelve (12) hours and shut down as described in Section 1.2.5(a) and Operability check of the core spray recircula-tion system through the test flow tank flow (b) within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
No path.
work shall be performed on the reactor or its connected systems when irradiated fuel Verify manual and autountic actuation of the is in the reactor vessel which could core spray system valves MO-7051, -7061, result in lowering the reactor water
-7070 and -7071 with water flow normally level below elevation 610'5".
blocked.
F.
Deleted.
Verify manual actuation of MO-TO66.
Verify that the hose used for backup cooling G.
Instrument set points shall be as water to the core spray recirculation heat specified in Table 11.3.1.
exchanger is operable and free of obvious defects.
Perform a ]cak check and flow check of the backup cooling water hose when connected between the screenhouse fire water connection and the core spray recirculation heat exchanger.
C.
Instruments shall be chee md, tested and calibrated at least as frequently as listed in Table ll.h.l.h(al.
131
Bases:
(Contd)
The operable status of the various systems and components is to be demonstrated by, periodic tests.
Some of these tests will be performed while the reactor is operating in the power range.
If a component is found to be inoperable, it will be possible in most cases to effect repairs and restore the system to full opera-bility within a relatively short time.
For a single component to be inoperable does not negate the ability of the system to perform its function, but it reduces the redundancy provided in the reactor design and thereby limits the ability to tolerate additional equipment failures.
If it develops that:
(a) The inoperable component is not repaired within the specified allowable time period, or (b) a second component in the same or
" elated system is found to be inoperable, the reactor will initially be removed from service which will pro-vide for a reduction of the decay heat from the fuel and consequential reduction of cooling requirements after a postulated Loss of Coolant Accident.
If the malfunction cannot be rapidly corrected, the reactor will be cooled to the shutdown condition using normal cooldown procedures.
In this ccndition, release of fission products or damage of the fuel elements is not considered possible.
The plant operating procedures require immediate action to effect repairs of an inoperable component and, th e re fo re, in most cases, repairs will be completed in less than the specified allowable repair times.
The 1initing times to repair are intended to:
(1) Assure that operability of the component will be restored promptly and, yet, (2) allow sufficient time to effect repairs using safe and proper procedures.
The leakage rate limit for the core spray recirculation system heat exchanger has been established to assure detection of any degradation of the in?.:grity of the heat exchanger.
By Commission Memorandwn and Order dated May 26, 1976, Consumern Power Company was granted a plant life exemption from the single failure criterion requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, 50.h6 and Appendix K, Paragrnph I.D.1, for the specific case of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) caused by a break in either core spray line.
This exemption was based on conditions specified in the Memorandum and Order and supporting NRC staff documents with which Consumers Power Company has complied.
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