ML19263B470

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IE Insp Rept 70-1113/78-20 on 781031.Noncompliance Noted: Failures to Follow Established Operating Procedures & to Provide Operable Photoelectric Device in Vaporization Chambers to Aid in Leak Detection
ML19263B470
Person / Time
Site: 07001113
Issue date: 11/27/1978
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19263B402 List:
References
70-1113-78-20, NUDOCS 7901180286
Download: ML19263B470 (5)


Text

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UNITED STATES ska at00 9[o,,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION il c

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101 M ARIETT A STREET. N.W.

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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30303 o

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Report No.:

70-1113/78-20 Docket No.:

70-1113 License No.:

ShM-1097 Licensee:

General Electric Company Post Office Box 780 Wilmington, North Carolina 28401 Facility Name: Wilmington Nuclerar Fuel Facility Inspection at: Wilmington, North Carolina Inspection conducted: October 31 - No ember 3, 1978 f

Inspection:

J. B. Kahle f

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7 Reviewed by:

s J. P. Potter C 1e r Fuel Facilit e and Materials Safety Section Fuel Facilit and Materials Safety Branch Inspection Sumary Inspection on October 31 - November 3, 1978 (Report No.

70-1113/78-20)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of safety committees, operations review and training.

Results: Of the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompli-ance or deviations were identified in two areas. One apparent item of noncompliance and one deviation were identified in one area, (78-20-01) failure to conform to established operating procedures, paragraph 6.b, and (78-20-02) failure to provide an operable photoelectric device in the vaporization chambers to aid in leak detection, paragraph 6.c.

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RII Rpt. No. 70-1113/78-20 1-1 DETAILS I Prepared by:

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}77 J. B.

ple, El Facilftif Inspector Fuel F tilities and Materu)ls Saf ty Section Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch Dates of Inspecti 0 o 31 - November 3, 1978 I

ilN Reviewed by:

J. P.

t te r, 'Cflie f Bath Fuel ilities and Materials Sa ty Section Fuel Facility and Materir.ls Safety Branch 1.

Persons Contacted

  • E. A. Lees, Quality Assurance Manager
  • J. E. Bergman, Fuel Manufacturing Manager
  • W. J. Hendry, Regulatory Compliance Manager
  • W. B. Haverty, Compliance Auditor
  • W.

C. Peters, Senior Criticality Engineer

  • G. E. Powers, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer
  • G. M. Bowman, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer
  • E. M. Rollins, Nuclear Safety Engineer
  • G. E. Green, Financial Operation Manager
  • W. W. McMahon, Planning and Prcjects Manager
  • P. J. von Herrmann, Fuel Process Technology Manager
  • L. J. Kuba, Materials Manager
  • C. E. Cliche, Fuel Fabrication Operation Manager
  • B. F. Bentley, Fuel Chemical Operation Manager
  • T. R. Crawford, Powder Production Manager
  • G. W. McKenzie, Fuel Manufacturing Engineering Planager A. L. Kaplan, Licensing and Compliance Audits flanager G. F. Finders, Compliance Auditor J. A. Mohrbacher, Nuclear Safety Engineering Manager R. J. Owen, Shop Foreman L. A. McGowan, Shop Foreman J. W. Ludes, Fuel Bundle Component and Assembly Manager W. J. Kemp, Gad, lina Fuel Fabricatica Manager J. E. Gardner, Inspection and Testing Foreman S. W. Dsle, Chemical Manufacturing Engineering Manager

RII Rpt. No. 70-1113/78-20 I-2 B. L. Beane, HVAC Engineer C. L. Beane, Manufacturing Engineering Engineer The inspector also interviewed nine operators.

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  • Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected during this inspection.

3.

Unresolved Items None.

4.

Safet'y Committees The Wilmington Technological Safety Council met on Sep'tember 1, 1978. The minutes showed that personnel in attendance met the quorum requirements. The elapsed time since the previous meeting met the license requirement of not greater than 120 days. Topics discussed dealt with the Wilmington Manufacturing Department Emer-gency Plan and status of the new criticality warning system.

5.

Training The inspector verified from the files that employee orientation training was given to new employees and that they had successfully passed an examination of the material presented before permission was granted to work in the fuel manufacturing operating areas.

It was verified from the records that nuclear safety training sessions were held by the Nuclear Safety Engineering component the first week of each quarter.

These sessions consisted of training for new hires and retraining of personnel who work in the fuel manufacturing operation.

An examination of the Round Table Meeting Report files verified that nuclear safety topics were discussed in monthly management round table meetings held with operators. Discussions with several operators revealed that they had received the nuclear safety training.

It was apparent that the training program require-ments outlined in the licensee's procedure P/P 40-17, General Nuclear Safety Requirements and Training, wsre met.

6.

Operations Review a.

Procedures During tours of the operating areas, the inspector examined several operating procedures (PRODS) to verify that they were

RII Rpt. No. 70-1113/78-20 1-3 current and contained nuclear safety controls and requirements.

The procedures ware posted near the operator's work station or in a nearby area cognizant to the operating personnel.

Operating personnel stated that they had read the operating precedures.

b.

Handling and Storage of SNM During tours of the plant, the inspector observed the handling and storage of special nuclear material (SNM). Along the wall behind the hammer mill, near the door to the powder storage warehouse, a five gallon can containing material was stored in an unapproved location. An operator stated the can was there when he came on shift. After examining the contents, he

. stated that the can contained baghouse filters contaminated

.with uranium.

Licensee representation acknowledged that the can was not stored in a designated approved location and the can was transferred to an approved location. On the conveyor to the recycle input to the calciners, the inspector observed that a stainless steel beaker (approximately one liter) of ADU had been placed between two 5-gallon containers of uranium.

The two 5-gallon containers were sitting on spacers which assured that a 12 inch separation would be maintained between the containers. Licensee representatives acknowledged that special nuclear material should not be placed between the separated containers.

The beaker was removed to a proper storage location. Exhibit 4 of the licensee's procedure P/P 40-17, General Nuclear Safety Requirements and Training, states that accumulations of uranium (powder, pellets, etc.)

should only be placed in approved locations.

Plteing of special nuclear material in locations which did not meet the criticality safety controls is an item of noncompliance with the requirements of the license (78-20-01).

c.

Instrumentation and Controls Observation of the process control, instrument display and alarm panel in the control room showed that the " Gas Leak UF6" alarm displays for the chambers, pigtails and line heaters were on for all vaporization lines.

An operator was unable to explain why the alarm lights were on but stated there was not a UF6 leak because he had recently had intercom communications with the floor operator. Another licensee representative stated that the alarm sensors, because of corrosion,' had not worked in a long time. The consequence of the corrosion would simulate an alarm condition.

It was further learned that the bulbs for the indicatia, alarm lights had been removed but during a very recent campaign to exchange all alarm panel light bulbs, the bulbs had been replaced.

Licensee repre-

RII Rpt. No. 70-1113/78-20 I-4 sentatives were informed that it was apparent that they had deviated from their commitment made in the Demonstration of the License Application (78-20-02).

Section 9.1 states that a photoelectric device is installed in each vaporization chamber to aid in leak detection.

It was further explained that issuance of the license was based upon the premise that these safety devices, among others, would be operable and utilized for safe operation of process equipment.

Licensee representa-tives stated that there were inherent operational problems with these devices but an evaluation would be made to assess the problem.

d.

Housekeeping

.0bservation of the conditions in the operating areas in the plant showed the general housekeeping to be adequate. There were no apparent industrial safety or fire hazards.

e.

UF6 Cylinder Valves The replacement of valves in the 30 inch UF6 cylinders was discussed with licensee representatives. They stated that they used the procedure depicted in OR0-651, Rev. 3, " Uranium Hexafluoride: Handling Procedures and Container Criteria", and that the target date for revision of the procedure to assure compliance with ORO-651, Rev. 4 was fiscal week (FW) 52. The inspector stated that, because the 30 inch UF6 cylinders were DOT specification containers, the valve replacement should carry the same degree of quality assurance (QA) as the certifi-cate of compliance containers or the QA program required by 10 CFR 71.51.

Licensee representatives acknowledged the safety significance pertaining to the UF6 cylinder valves.

7.

Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph

1) on November 3, 1978, at the conclusion of the inspection. The scope of the inspection und findings were discussed. The apparent item of noncompliance and deviation were discussed in detail.

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