ML19263A762
| ML19263A762 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001100 |
| Issue date: | 11/22/1978 |
| From: | Kinney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19263A753 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1100-78-09, 70-1100-78-9, NUDOCS 7901020283 | |
| Download: ML19263A762 (10) | |
Text
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
7n 11nn/7R nq Docket No. 70-1100 License No.
SNM-1067 Priority 1
Category UR Licensee:
Combustion Engineerino, Incorporated P. O. Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut Facility Name:
Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing and Nuclear Laboratories Inspection at: Windsor, Connecticut Inspection conducted: October 24-27, 1978 Inspectors:
r 4,
y.,
//
.2
.c W. W. Kinney, Proje't Inspector date signed c
/
date signed Approved bxt
& ffp
//
H. W. Crock'er, ChTiff, Fuel Facility
/date signed Projects Section, FF&MS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on October 24-27, 1978 (Recort No. 70-1100/78-09)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by a region-based inspector of licensee action on previous inspection findings; operations; internal reviews and audits; facility changes and modifications; packaging of radioactive material; and safety committe activities.
The inspection was initiated on the evening (4-12) shift.
The inspection involved 22 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC region-based inspector.
Results: Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in four areas.
Two apparent items of noncompliance were identified in two areas (infraction-failure to provide nuclear safety po tings for two work locations-paragraph 3.a.(2); deficiency-failure to use hex head bolts in securing the upper bundle bracket to the strongback of the Model 927Al shipping container and failure to have all the documents referred to in the certificate of compliance-paragraph 6.)
7}
7901020281 Apr
DETAILS 1.
F.trsons Contacted a.
Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing
- H. V. Lichtenberger - Vice President, Nuclear Fuel Nuclear Power System - Manufacturing G. J. Bakevich - Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor The inspector also interviewed a manufacturing engineering supervisor, two manufacturing engineers, two shop forenen, two health physics technicians, and three operating technicians during the course of the inspection.
~
- denotes the individual present at the exit interview.
b.
Nuclear,1aboratories J. M. Limbert - Radiological Engineer 2.
Licensee Action'on Previous ' Inspection Findinas (Closed) Deficiency (75-10-06): The licensee failed to analyze enviromental monitoring mud samples taken from wells, ponds, industrL1 stream, and the Farmington River for nitrates, pH, and fluorides.
The licensees corrective action was to request an amendment of the license which would remove these requirements. This action was inspected during Inspection No. 76-04 on August 24-27, 1976.
The insoector found that the licensee was analyzing the samples for pH and fluorides during the first and second quarters of 1976. However, the nitrate analyses had not been performed.
The license applied for an amendment to change the analytical requirements on the environmental monitoring mud samples on April 30, 1976.
During this inspection, the inspector verified the the licensee's corrective action was completed. The amendment request dated April 30, 1976, was replaced by an amendment request dated February 10, 1977.
The license was amended by Amendment No. 13, dated April 5, 1977, which deleted the requirements to analyze the environmental monitoring mud samples for nitrates, pH, and fluorides.
The samples are now to be analyzed for gross alpha, gross beta, and total uranium.
(Closed) Infraction (78-01-01):
Personnel failed to monitor their hands prior to leaving the Unclad Fuel Handling Area.
3 During Inspection No. 78-05 conducted August 1-4, 1978, the aspector verified that the procedure for entering and leaving the change room and the importance and necessity of monitoring for contamination was covered:in the March monthly safety meetino However, the licensee had not yet incorporated the written procedu,re for entering and leaving the pellet shop into the formal safety procedures, and the licensee had not yet implemented the procedure.
During this inspection the inspector verified that the licensee's corrective action was completed. A procedure coded MFG-16-05, Revision 0, dated September 20, 1978, entitled, Entering and Leaving the Pellet Shop, was incorporated into the formal procedures.
The licensee had training sessions on the procedure on September 15 and September 19, 1978.
The procedure was implemented after the training sessions were given.
(Closed) Infraction (78-05-01):
Male personnel did not monitor their hands prior to leaving the Unclad Fuel Handling Area on August 1 and 2,1978, because the alpha survey meter used to perform the required monitoring was not available in the men's change room.
The inspector verified that the new automatic hand monitor unit had been installed in the men's locker room and was in routine use on October 26, 1978. The licensee's record of the daily checks of the old alpha survey instrument showed that the survey instrument was found to be operational from August 2,1978, through October 25, 1978.
The inspector verified that the licensee's corrective action was completed.
(Closed) Infraction (78-05-02):
The pressure drops across the absolute filters in the ventilation systems serving contaminated equipment and hoods in the Nuclear Laboratories were not measured to determine if the filters needed to be changed because the pressure drop across the filters reached 4 inches of water.
The inspector verified that the licensee's corrective action was completed.
The licensee installed instrumentation to measure the differential pressure across the absolute filters serving contaminated equipment and hoods in the Nuclear Laboratories during the first week of October 1978. The licensee is recording the pressure drop readings across the five sets of filters on a weekly basis. The initial readings were taken during the week ending October 7,1978.
4 3.
Operations Review a.
Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing (1) Cleaning Activity The inspection was initiated on the 4-12 shift on October 24, 1978. The inspector accompanied the health physics technician while he performed his duties. The inspector observed the health physics technician work with an operating technician prior to, during, and after cleaning the powder prep station by the operating technician. The cleaning activities observed involved the opening of the lid of the box for the powder spread funnel and the sweeping powder from the ventilation ductwork serving the equipment. The operating technician read an instruction on the use of respiratory equipment and signed a form entitled, " Acknowledgement of Instructions in the Use of Respiratory Equipment". The man wore coveralls, a lab coat, rubber surgeon's gloves taped to the lab coat, heavy rubber gloves over the surgeon's gloves, a mask, and a hood over the mask.
The fit of the mask was tested by the operating technician. A nose smear was taken prior to the denning of the mask. The man also wore a 'E sampler. There was an air sample located about 30 inchm above the open box lid. The man spent about 5 minutes brushing the powder from the ventilation system and the box. After completing the work the man removed the outer gloves, washed his gloved hands in a bucket of soapy water, and took off his respirator. The surgeon's gloves were discarded into hot was'e.
The mask was placed in a plastic bag for decontamination. The lab coat was placed in a container. Another nose smear was taken, and the BZ sample filter paper was removed.
The BZ sample gave a reading of 3.78 X 10-10uc/cc. The pre-job nasal smear read 1.5 dpm and the post-job nasal smear read 6.4 dpm.
The BZ sample results showed that a respirator was required for the job, and the nasal smears showed that the respirator had been effective in protecting the operating technician's respiratory system.
5 (2) Posting of Work Stations During the inspection of the facility and operations, the inspector noted that the licensee did not have a nuclear safety posting for the storage location of standard calibration 55 gallon drums for the nondestructive assay equipment and the storage location for full 55 gallon drums awaiting assay.
Also, the licensee did not have a posting for the locations where the fuel bundle shipping containers are loaded.
The lack of postings at these locations is an item of noncompliance (78-09-01).
The licensee prepared postings and placed the postings near the appropriate work stations.
The inspector verified that the postings were properly posted on October 27, 1978.
(3) Confornance of Operations with Operating Procedures Three operations in the pellet shop operations were inspected for conformance of operations to the operation sheets for the operations.
Operation Sheet (0S) No.1023, Bulk Assay of Solid Wastes Contaminated with U09, Revision 2, dated May 4, 1977, was reviewed by the inspector.
The inspector verified that this was the current revision of the procedure and that a copy of this current procedure was available to the operating personnel.
The inspector discussed Section 3.0, Health Physics and Safety with the nuclear licensing and safety supervisor.
The discussion dsclosed that this section of the procedure should be revised.
For instance, 3.1 through 3.3 discuss the handling of the radioactive sources by operating personnel. According to the nuclear licensing and safety supervisor, handling of the sources is performed only by health physics personnel.
Also, the procedure calls for health physics to contact the assay unit manufacturer on the month source leak check results, and according to the nuclear licensing and safety supervisor this is not needed, nor is it done.
The inspector reviewed the operation with the foreman.
This discussion and observation of the full drums of low activity burial waste stored awaiting assay disclosed that the operating instruction was not followed precisely.
The procedure called for labeling of the drums and identifying the enrichment of the uranium in the waste prior to placing waste into the drums, and some of the full drums on hand were not so labeled.
TI,e foreman stated that they would reviu the operation to have the operation agree with the written instructions.
6 OS No. 597, Residue and Scrap Handling and Processing Operations, Revision 4, dated November 17, 1977, was reviewed by the inspector.
The inspector verified that this was the current revision of the procedure and a copy of this current procedure was available to the operating personnel.
The inspector discussed the operations covered in this procedure with an operating technician. The technician was aware of the requirements given in section 3.0 Health Physics and Safety _ of the procedure.
For instance, he was aware that transferring of residue from one container to another container was an operation in which dusting may occur; therefore the ' operation must be done in a hood.
He was aware that the operators must wear rubber gloves during this operation.
OS No. 684, Virgin Powder Storage Area Operating Instruction II, Revision 3, dated June 7, 1977, was reviewed by the inspector and discussed with an operating technician. The inspector verified that this procedure was the latest revision and that a copy was available to the operator.
The operator was aware of the requirements given in section 3.0 Health Physics and Safety of the procedure.
For instance, he was aware that supervision was to be notified any time a can of powder was dropped. i'e was also aware that the cases of powder had to be olaced on their sides while being transferred, weighed, or stored.
b.
Nuclear Laboratories The inspector inspected the laboratories.
The nuclear safety postings for the control areas had the amounts of U-235 listed on them. The amounts of U-235 in the areas were less than the posted license limits.
The nuclear criticality alarm panel indicated that all the alarms were working. The general housekeeping in the laboratories appeared to be satisfactory.
4.
Internal Reviews and Audits a.
Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing On May 25, 1978, License No. SNM-1067 was amended to change the internal audit requirements.
The audits discussed below were performed by the licensee to be in accordance with amendment No. 17, dated May 25, 1978.
7 (1) Daily Audits by Health Physics Technicians Each weekday a health physics technician inspects the manufacturing facilities for signs, logs, contamination levels, airborne radioactivity levels, radiation alarms, and criticality safety compliance.
The inspector inspected the reports for the period of March 14,19~', through October 23, 1978.
There were no reports for the period from July 15-30 because the plant was down for a vacation period.
The reports for six separate days gave contamination levels above the license action levels. The required clean up was taken to reduce the contamination to acceptable levels.
Five reports cited actions taken on criticality control signs.
Seventy-four of the reports cited personnel being on the special control program to avoid overexposure to airborne radioactivity.
The licensee took appropriate action for all the above items.
The daily audits mentioned that the samples of air from the stacks were above the limits on two occasions.
The filters on the furnace hydrogen burnoff system gave considerable problems from March 29, 1978 until May 9, 1978. The licensee installed new filters which had a higher temperature rating on May 9, 1978.
These filters have filtered this exhaust qq that the airborne radioactivity has been within the 1 x 10 uC/cc license limit for this stack.
(2) Monthly Audits by Nuclear Safety and Licensing Supervisor The Nuclear Safety and Licensing Supervisor started making monthly audits of the fuel manufacturing operations for nuclear criticality safety and radiological safety on June 30, 1978, to be in conformance with sections 8.3.2.5 and 8.3.2.c of the approved license application.
Since that time monthly audits were performed on July 17, August 30, and September 29, 1978.
These audits disclosed 5 criticality safety items and 4 radiological safety items needing corrective action.
Corrective action was taken in all of these instances.
b.
Nuclear Laboratories The Nuclear Safety and Licensing Supervisor made monthly audits during the time period of March 1978 through September 1978, according to licensee records.
The audits included signs, material inventories, alarms, instruments, instructions, procedures, drills, and other items of consideration.
The findings were "all OK" for each audit.
8 5.
Facility Changes and Modifications The inspector reviewed the records of the review and approval of process, equipment, or facility changes performed by the Nuclear Safety and Licensing Supervisor for criticality safety and radiological safety.
From November 28, 1977, through July 10, 1978, Engineering requested twelve reviews and approvals of equipment changes. The requests were reviewed and approved by the Nuclear Safety and Licensing Supervisor with conditions imposed as needed for criticality and radiological safety. Two of the twelve requests involved criticality safety conditions. Both of these requests were independently reviewed for criticality safety by a person designated by the Nuclear Safety Committee who meets the qualifications for a Criticality Safety Specialist. This individual signed the approval forms which documented the review and approval of these changes.
6.
Packaging of Radioactive Material The inspector reviewed the procedures, operating sheets, for the fuel bundle shipping container renovation and the loading of the fuel bundles into the shipping container.
OS No. 1467, Fuel Bundle Shipping Container Cleaning and Preparation, provides instructions for the inspection, cleaning, and renovation of the 927Al or 927Cl shipping containers prior to use.
This includes inspection and replacement of the closure gasket, if neec%d.
OS No. 727, Prepare Shippino Container, provides instructions for preparing the shipping container to receive the fuel bundles. OS No. 728, Placing of Fuel Bundles Into Containers, provides instructions for placing and securing the fuel bundles in the shipping containers. There was no operating sheet which specifically addressed the closure of the shipping container. The ship traveller simply called for closing the shipping container. The licensee had a procedure, MFG-03-02, Packaging of Fuel Bundles, which addressed the entire packaging activities from inspection and renovation of the container through closure of the loaded shipping container.
However, this procedure was not used by the operating personnel.
The inspector observed a portion of the packaging of fuel elements for shipment.
The fuel elements were secured in position on the strong back except the upper bundle bracket at the end opposite the trunnion was not yet bolted and pinned in place when the inspector started observing the operations. A quality assurance technician ran a tool down the absorber rod guide tubes to make sure they were clean. Then the operating technician bolted and pinned the upper bundle bracket in place to finish securing the fuel assembly onto the strong back. The use of eight 3/4 inch diameter steel clevis pins
9 is not approved for the Model 927Al container. The drawings for the container show only bolts being used to secure the upper bundle bracket to the strongback. This is part of an item of noncompliance (79-09-02).
The strongback was lowered into position in the shipping container and was bolted in place. The technician vacuumed the places where the fuel bundles were clamped in place and placed desiccant in the holder in the container.
The quality assurance technician then inspected the placement and clamping of the fuel bundles in the shipping container. He required a clamp to be moved to be snug against a fuel bundle. He also inspected the shipping container gasket. The operating technician placed the top on the shipping container and bolted the top in place.
Records were kept of all the operations on the shop traveller.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's copies of the drawings referred to in the certificate of compliance 6078 for the fuel bundle shipping containers.
The licensee had the drawings for the 927C1 container on file.
The licensee had copies of the Applied Design Company Drawing No. 927A1, Sheets 1, 2 and 3; however, they did not have the Applied Design Company Drawing No. 927Al (Modified) Sheets 1, 2, and 3, which modified the design to provide a six inch separation between the two fuel bundles in lieu of the borated steel poison plate.
Failure to have all the documents referred to in the certificate of compliance is part of an item of noncompliance (78-09-02).
The licensee had a record of the test's performed on a 927A shipping container demonstrating conformance of the container to the 10 CFR 71 requirements effective in 1969.
The tests also demonstrated conformance of the container to the tests called for in the licensee'sspecification MFG-03-01.
7.
Safety Committee a.
Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing only has the nuclear safety comittee as a formal safety comittee. As reported in Inspection Report 78-01, this committee last met on December 7, 1977.
b.
Nuclear Laboratories The inspector reviewed the minutes c' che meetings of the Development Department Safety Coma. u.ee for the August, September, and October 1978. The committee had demonstrations and drills on the use of Scott Air-Paks; reviews on asbestos in Buildings 5 and 18; and fire extinguisher training program discussions during these meetings.
10 8.
Exit Inte' view The inspector met with the licensee representative (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on October 26, 1978. The inspector sunmarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The inspector notified the licensee of the item of noncompliance concerning the failure to meet the regualtions in the use of the 927Al shipping container by telephone on November 9, 1978.
.