ML19262C712
| ML19262C712 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1980 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19262C708 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002150479 | |
| Download: ML19262C712 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y
g E
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 2
o 49.....,o SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR RESULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT N0. 40 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-35 BOSTON EDISON COMPANY PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-293 Introduction By application dated July 6,1979, Boston Edison Company (EECo or licensee) proposed an amendment to the Technical Specifications in se/eral areas, each of which was described in an attachment to the letter.
Attachment A and concerning a change to the method of calibrating the APRM syste'1, Attachment B concerning the duration of IPCLRT were not adc-essed in this SER for reasons explained in the amendment issuing letter.
On September 27, 1979, BECo proposed an Administrative TS c,e 6which suppleinented Attachment D to the July 6,1979 submittal.
Eath subnittals are evaluated in this report.
I.
Uodate Safety Related Snubbers 1.
Discussion Attachment C proposed four changes in Table 3.6.1.
They are:
1.1.
The deletion of snubbers 55-2-10-17, SS-2-10-lE, and 55-3-3-1 from Table 3.6.1.
1.2.
The change of designation of snubbers SS-6-lC-1 to SS-6-10-10, and SS-2-20-5 to 55-2-30-5.
1.3.
The change of elevation to 42' for snubbers SS-20-20-1, SS-2-20-2, 55-2-20-3, and 55-2-20-4.
1.4.
The change of prefix SS to S for snubbers looted outside the drywell.
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. 2.
Evaluation 2.1 Deletion of Scabber-The proposed deletion of three snubbers from Table 3.6.1 is an updating effort to reflect plant revisions made in 1976 and 1978.
Snubbers SS-2-10-17 and SS-2-10-18 were attached to the reactor recirculation pump discharge valve 4" by-pass lines.
Both lines and snubbers were removed in 1976 as reported in the 197C annual 10 CFR 50.59 report. Snubber SS-3-3-1 was attached to the control rod drive system return line.
This line and snubber were removed as eported in the 1978 annual 10 CFR 50.59 report.
The updating effort on Table 3.6.1 has no impact on plant safety.
2.2 Change of Designation of Snubbers The re-number of snubber designation, corrects some previous typographical errors.
It has no impact on plant safety.
2.3 Chance of Elevation for Snubbers The change of elevation of snubbers reflects the a'8Yual position.
It has no impact on plant safety.
2.4 Chance of Prefix for Snubbers The change of prefix for snubber designation offers better identification of the snubber locations.
It has no impact on plant safety.
3.
Conclusion Since the proposed revisions add to the clarity,f Table 3.6.1, and do not compromise plant safety, their implementation should be permitted.
II.
Station Organization Chart and ORC Composition 1.
Discussion Attachment D proposed restructuring Figure 6.2.2, " Pilgrim 1 Station Organization" to accommodate organization changes at the Station.
Specifically, several new positions were created to increase the station management's attention toward the Health Physics Program.
In particular, the position of Chief Radiological Engineer was created to head the Health Physics i
Program.
In addition, the Composition of the Operations Review Committee (ORC) was revised to ir.clude the Chief Radiological Engineer as a member.
The Septe.ber 27, 1979 submittal proposed further restructuring of Figure E.2.2 to provide for an Assistant Station Manager who will also serve as Vice Chairman of the ORC.
2.
Evaluation We agree that the creation of r.ew cositions including Senior ALARA Engineer, ALARA Engineer, ALARA Fealth Physics Technicians, and Senior Waste Management Engineer ur. der the Chief Radiological Engineer should improve the Health Dhysics Program at Pilgrin.
Further, we concur with the change in the organization to imorove the workload distribution througr tqe Station, including the position of Assistant Station Par ager and additions to ORC membership.
3.
Conclusion We conclude that the proposed chances to the Pilgrim 1 Station Organization are designed to strencthen the station management and are therefore, acceptable.
III.
Response Time Recuirement for ADS l.
Discussion Attachment E proposed a change ir toe setting of the Automatic Depressurization System ( ADS) blowcown timer from "120 + 5 sE Conds" to " greater than or equal to 9C :o less than or equal to 120 secords".
The purpose of this change is to assure that the actual value used is less than that used in the ECCS analysis (120 seconds) and to provide margin in setpoint to account for calibration errors and drift.
2.
Evaluation The lower value is sufficiently creater than the High Pressure Coolant Injection Systen (HDCI' s tarting time (25 seconds) and (in the licensee's opinion) the resJonse time of a trained coerator to maintain the probability of falss initiation of the ADS at an acceptably lower level. The pro:osed ADS timer trip setpoint is consistent with the Standarc ecnnical Specifications (STS) for General Electric Boiling Water Reacters, N'JREG 0123 Revision 2 August 1979 and satisfies tne re:ui enents of IEEE Std. 279'971.
i
. 3.
Conclusion We find that this change will not compromise the effectiveness of the ADS to provide its design protection and ' hat it is desireable to assure compatibility between the Technical Specification and LOCA analysis.
We therefore conclude that this change is acceptable.
IV.
Reactivity Shutdown Margin Demonstration 1.
Discussion Attachment F requested a change in the wording of the Technical Specification bases to allow shutdown margir demonstration by a method different than thht listed in the bases for Specification 3.3.A.l.
The two rod method (pulling the strongest worth rod and a diagonally adjacent rod to a specified position) is listed in the bases as the method of demonstratThg shutdown margin at PNPS.
2.
Evaluation The licensee desires to have the option of using the di_spersed uniform insequence control rod withdrawal sequence method of demonstrating shutdown reactivity margin.
The reason is to avoid highly peaked flux distributions which can lead to sudden unexpected criticals with fast per.iods. The dispersed uniform withdrawal sequence is designed specifically to minimize rod worths, thus substantially reducing the probability of high reactivity insertion incidents.
The licensee proposed to perform this test at beginning of life (BOL) fuel cycle conditions, col?
xenon-free. This is consistent with the NUREG-0123 Revision 2 August 1979 bases.
3.
Conclusion We agree that the proposed reactivity shutdown margin demonstration offers a more conservative approach and is acceptable.
V.
!RM High Flux Instrument Calibration 1.
Discussion In Attachment G, the licensee has proposed a Full Calibration of the IRM Figh Flux Channels once per operating cycle.
This was done to clarify the functional and calibration test requirements of the Nuclear Instrumentation Intermediate Range Monitoring (IRM) system, in response to an IE Inspection Report 50-293/78-18 and followup correspondence dated September 21, 1978.
2.
Evaluation We have reviewed the licensee's proposal in conkaction with the current TS requirements to verify overall conformance with GE STS.
We find that the proposed chang. is consistent with STS requirements for IRM Channel Calibration and is therefore acceptable.
- Further, we find that the current TS requirement for IRM Funcational Test in Table 4.1.1 is consistent with STS functional test requirements.
Also, the current TS requirement for IRM Calibration Test in Table 4.1.2 is the equivalent of the STS Channel Check, except that the minimum frequency is not specified.
The STS requires an IRM Channel Check- (Instrument Check, as defined in PNPS 15) at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. We verified that station procedures require the equivalent of an IRM Channel Check each shift. This is acceptable until such time as BECo adopts the STS for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.
3.
Conclusion We conclude that the licensee's proposal is consistent with GE STS and satisfies the requirements of IEEE Std. 279-1971 and is therefore, acceptable.
VI.
MSIV Test Requirements e-1.
Discussion Attachment H requested removal of the current power restriction requirement of 50% reactor power when verifying closure time of Main Steam Isolation Valves.
Durint a previous refueling outage at Pilgrim, a pressure averaging manifold was installed to allow the testing of MSIV's and the turbine stop and control valves at full power levels and thus eliminate the need for costly power reductions. Amendment No. 34 to Facility Operating License No.
DPR-35 dated September 19, 1978 changed the trip level setting for the High Flow Main Steam Line instruments from. <120% to. <140%
of rated steam flow.
The setDoint was changed to decrease the possibility of an automatic closure of all MSIV's and the attendant reactor scram which can occur when performing valve closure time testing.
2.
Evaluation The licensee has stated that the proposed change was intended to be included in Amendment No. 34 and was inadvertently omitted.
We have reviewed the previous Safety Evalua' ion associated with Amendment No. 34 and agree that it satiMes all concerns related to safety.
4 3.
Conclusien We conclude that the removal of the power restriction for testing MSIV's is accep;able.
Environmental Considerations We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluen". types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not resrlt in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact, and pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of the anendment.
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Conclusion We have conciuded based on the considerations discussed above that:
(1) because the amendment does not irvolve a significant increase in the pro 0 ability or consequences
- v. eccidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the,.
amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration,'~(2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by oreration in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated:
February 4,1980