ML19262A829
| ML19262A829 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/09/1979 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19262A830 | List: |
| References | |
| ACRS-1650, NUDOCS 7912110105 | |
| Download: ML19262A829 (67) | |
Text
DATE ISSUED:
8/9/79 MINUTES OF THE q
yO ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON
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IMPROVED SAFETY SYSTEMS JUNE 26,1979 WASHINGTON, D.C.
The ACRS Subcommittee on Improved Safety Systems held a meeting on June 26, 1979, at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
hotice of this meeting was published on June 11, 1979, in the Federal Register, Volume 44. dumber 113; a copy is included as Attachment A.
Dr. Richard Savio was tha Designated Federal Employee for the meeting. A list of meeting attendees is included as Attachment B.
A tentative presentation schedule of the meeting is in-cluded as Attachment C.
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN Dr. Siess, the Subcommittee Chairman, convened the meeting at 8:30 a.m.,
reviewed briefly the schedule for the meeting and noted that the purpose of this meeting was to discuss the following:
1.
tac and DOE plans for research to improve reactor safety systems.
2.
Plans and accomplishments established so far for proper coordination between NRC and 00E in carrying out the Improved Safety System (ISS) programs.
3.
Changes in priorities in NRC and DOE programs be-cause of Three Mile Island accident.
4.
Philosophy used by the Office of Management and Budget, (OMB) in dividing the responsibilities between NRC and DOE with regaro to ISS programs.
5.
FY 80 (supplemental) and FY 81 budgets.
Dr. Siess indicated that the information gathered in this meeting will be used by the ACRS in its preparation of the report to the Commission and
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15 30 Mty research programs.
the third annual report to the Congress on the NRC f
% 11o10 7
Improved Safety Systems oune 26,1979 The Subcon.nittee had received a request from a representative of the NucleDyne Eng'neering Corporation to give a brief presentation on their Passive Con-tati nent System. The Subcommittee had received no written comments from members of the public.
PRESENTATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) NRC MR. RAY DISALVO History and Develcoment of NRC Imoroved Safety System Programs Mr. DiSalvo reviewed briefly the history of the development of ISS Program, indicating that the FY 78 Budget Authorization Act for the NRC modified Section 205 of the Energy Reorganization Act to require that the NRC prepare a long-range plan for the development of new or improved safety systems for nuclear power plants.
As a response to this, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research of the NRC submitted its "R1an for Research-tc Improve the Safety of Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants", NUREG-0438, to the Congress on April 12, 1978.
This plan selected the following five research projects as having significant potential for improving the safety of light-water nuclear power plants, and recommended them for initial phase of the program:
A.
Alternate Containment Concepts, especially vented containments.
B.
Alternate Decay Heat Removal Systems, especially add-on bunkered systems.
C.
Alternate Emergency Core Cooling Concepts.
D.
Improved In-Plant Accident Response (This program is now known as Human Interaction. However, in future it will be known as the In-Plant Accident Response Program to be consistent with the terminology used in NUREG-0438).
E.
Advanced Seismic Design.
In addition, research was proposed in two other areas:
F.
Improvement of the methodology for evaluating research topics and' alternate plant designs.
G.
Scoping studies of other research topics identified in NUREG-0438.
1530 206
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 It was estimated that the implementation of the plan identified in NUREG-0438 would require about $15 million over a three year period from the time work was started.
With regard to the funding level, Mr. DiSalvo noted that no funds wera r; ail-able for these programs in W 78.
In its 1979 Authorization Bill, the Congress authorized $1.5 million for these programs; however, the. Appro-priation Bill did not provide any funds. 7he NRC Staff decided tc reprogram S400,000 from the W 78 unobligated carryover funds and another $400,000 within W 79 RES budget. As of today the NRC have been able to fund only
$400,000 for these programs through reprograming of the W 78 unobligated carryover funds.
With regard to the other reprograming package which involves the W 79 RES budget, Mr. DiSalvo noted that it was sent to the Congress for approval in April 1979. In May 1979, this request was denied by the Congress in view of the possible changes in the ISS program needs because of the Three Mile Island accident. A revised request for reprogramming is being developed.
In response to some questions from Dr. Okrent as to whether a prcgram which carries a user request and not funded through ISS budget can still be called as an ISS program, and how one decides that certain programs should be carried out under the ISS program, Mr. DiSalvo noted that there are no clear-cut procedures to decide this issue. Mr. Murley added that if a specific program carries a user request, it is the normal procedure that it funded through Reactor Safety Research budget or through some other appropriate budget. Even though that program is not funded through ISS budget, it could still be directed by the people responsible for the ISS research.
Dr. Okrent commented that he believes that most of the high priority ISS programs already have some kind of user requests. He wondered why these programs are still waiting to be funded under the ISS research budget.
1530 207
e Improved Sa-
/ Systems June 26,1979 In response to Dr. Okrent's ccament and to several questions from Dr.
Siess, the EC Staff noted that when the Corgress changed the law to require that EC develop a lorg-range plan for improved safety systems, the mc accepted that as a new category, asstraing that this progra would have its own budget. We ISS programs were selected on the basis of the reccrnmendations provided by several technical communities; the EC Staff did not really go back to verify whether any of these progrms wre included under some other research program. tey realize that there are some overlaps; however, it is not their intention to get some of these programs funded twice under different categories. t ey lamented abeat the difficulty they have been havirg in funding these progras. tey still believe that these are high priority items and should be carried out as soon as possible.
If there continues to be this kind of weak support for the ISS programs, especially in the Congress, they may have to fund some of these programs under the Reactor Safety Research btriget.
In response to a question from Dr. Siess as to whether the ISS programs-receive adequate support from the Commission, Mr. DiSalvo stated that the Commission also believes that these programs are important.
Dr. Okrent commented that, in view of the fact that these programs identified in FY 78 still have significnat difficulties in getting funded, he does not believe that there is a strong support from the Commission for these programs.
Chances In Priorities Mr. DiSalvo discussed the changes in priorities in mC's ISS progras because of the t ree Mile Island accident. He stated that prior to the Three Mile Island accident higher priority was given to the program on Value-Impact Methodology over the Human Interaction Progrm. At the March 7, 1979 meeting, the Subcommittee expressed serious concern about the selec-tion of the Value-Impact Methodology progrm over some other high priority 1.530 208
Improved Safety Systems June 26,1979 prog rams. Subsequent to the tree Mile Island accident, realizing the significance of the contribution of human error to the magnitude of the accident, and thus. realizing the need for additional research in this area, the NRC Staff has made some rearrangments giving higher priority to the Human Interaction Program over the program on Value-Impact Methodo)Wy.
W 80 Budget (Original)
Mr. DiSalvo noted that the original N 80 btriget submitted to 04B included
$4.3 million; *his was redtx:ed by 04B to $1.0 million with the condition (as outlined in the letter, dated January 31, 1979, from Mr. McIntyre to NRC Chairman Hendrie) that NRC shall not use these funds for physical experimentation. Se NRC intends to distribute the $1.0 million in the-following areas:
Alternate containment concepts
- $0.3M Alternate decay heat removal concepts - $0.2M Human Interaction
- $0.4M Value-Impact idethodology
- $0.1M N 80 Supolemental Budget (Attachment D)
Mr. DiSalvo reviewr.<1 the proposed W 80 supplemental budget which was developed subsequent to the tree Mile island accident. He noted that the W 80 supplemental budget requests an additional mount of $3.4 million, thus bringing the total for W 80 to $4.4 million.
If authorized, the W 80 budget of $4.4 million will be spent in the following areas:
Alternate Containment
$0. #".
Concepts Alternate Decay Heat
$0.4M Removal Concepts Alternate ECCS
$0.3M Human Interaction
$2.lM 1530 209
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 Advanced Seismic Design
$0.3M Improved Value-Impact Methodology
$0.3M Scoping Studies
$0.4M In response to a question from Dr. Siess as to how the Seismic Design Program got included in the FY 80 supplemental budget which was developed because of Three Mile Island accident, Mr. DiSalvo stated that this program is not included here because of Three Mile Island accident; they thought that this program could be done in the near-term and this is the appropria,a time to get it funded.
Dr. Okrent suggested that the NRC Staff consider exploring an area of interaction between seismic. design and improved operator r,esponse by
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including a study to determine how marrf ala-ms the operator might get during a large earthquake, what fraction of them will be spurious, and how to decide whether they.are spurious.
Mr. Disa~ vo stared that they intend to study this issue under the Human Interaction program.
Dr. Okrent further suggested that the interaction between seismic design and decay heat removal also should be looked into in terms of the avail-ability during an earthquake of the instruments and controls essential for the operation of the decay heat removal system.
The NRC Staff indicated that they will give consideration to this suggestion.
In response to a question from Dr. Siess regarding the action taken by the Congress on the FY 80 budget, Mr. DiSalvo noted that subsequent the Three Mile Island accident, the NRC has submitted a supplemental FY 80 budget requesting a total amount of $4.4 million, including the
$1.0 million previously approved by CMB. The Senate Autorization Bill 1530 210
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 authorized the $4.4 million requested by NRC in the W 80 supplemental budget. This Bill states also that the additional S3.4 million authorized
' mould be obtained from reallocation within the Reactor Safety Research Budget. However, the Acprocriation Bill did not include any additional funds other than the previously approved $1.0 million; it too states that some reprogramming action should be made for these programs as necessary.
Mr. DiSalvo indicated that these Bills have not yet been finalized.
Mr. DiSalvo stated that work is expected to start on the Advanced Seismic Design Program in W 80; the need for this program is emphasized because of the shutdown of the five operating plants due some potential pipino design d9ficiency.
Dr. Okrent corsnented that he does not see any connection between i.he
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shutdown of the five plants and the work expected to be performed under the Advanced Seismic Design Program.
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W 81 Budoet p ttachment D)
The current W 81 budget proposal includes two sets of figures:
Requested - $4.7 million, based on the W 80 authorization of
$1.0 million.
Amended
- S6.6 million, based on the suppemented W 80 total of S4.4 million.
Assuming a total funding level of $6.6 million for N 81, the distribution will be as follows:
Alternate Containment Concepts
- $0.8M Alternate Decay Heat Removal Concepts - $0.4M Alternate ECCS Concepts
- Sl.0M Human Interaction
- $2.7M Advanced Seismic Design
- $1.0M Improved Value-Impact Methodology
- $0.3M Scoping Studies
- $0.4M 1530 211
i Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 Dr. Okrent and Dr. Siess asked, what are the bases for selecting the specific funding levels for the ISS programs, and how did they decide the adequacy of the specified level of funding.
The NRC Staff responded that the specified budget level was hosen on the basis of need, past and present wrk in these areas, and on the basis of what they still need to accmplish; they arrivec. r.: this level of budget after several discussions among themselves; they believe that it represents a reasonable cost estimate.
Mr. Murley stated that the Office of Research gives very high priority to the ISS programs. 'Ihe funding levels for these progrms are small
- compared to some other programs because the NRC Staff is not allowd to do
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any physical experimentation on ISS progras; on the other hand, the other programs with higher level of fundirg include some experimental work.
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Dr. Okrent expressed skepticism, indicating that in view _of_the_ fact. _ __..-
that some other programs such as Code Developnent which do not involve any experimental work receives higher funds than the ISS programs, he does not believe that very high priority is given to these progras.
In response to a question from Dr. Siess as to whether the original FY 80 budget package ($4.3 million) submitted to 04B suggested any physical experi-mentation, Mr. DiSalvo noted that it envisioned some semi-scale tests for the Improved EECS Program, shaker-table tests for the Advanced Seismic Design Program, and filter efficiency tests for the Vented Containment Program.
However, CMB reduced the budget level to $1.0 taillion and directed NRC not to spend this money on physical experimentation.
Status Of Work Scopes For Improved Safety System Programs And Future Planning Mr. DiSalvo discussed briefly the status of the ISS Narms (Attachment d). He stated that, based on the outcome of the hvestigations being 3 gn 712
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 performed by various groups on the 'Ihree Mile Island accident, such as the Lessons Learned Task Force, Presidential Ccrnmission, ACRS, and other Technical communities, the ISS program Plan may N revised in the future as appropriate.
NRC-DOE Coordination on Imoroved Safety Mr. DiSalvo stated that, as recommendM by CMB in its January 31, 1979 letter to NRC Chairman Hendrie (Attachment F), proper coordination should be established between NRC and COE to carry out the ISS programs. Several mechanisms (such as telephone contacts, mutual meetings, exchanging pertinent documents and program plans) have been made available for
.establisning proper coordination between NRC and DOE.
In addition, steps are being taken to establish a NRC-DOE Coordination Committee to review both K'RC and DOE programs and provide guidcce as appropriate.
Comments on OMB's Prohibition of the NRC Involvement in Physical Exoerimentation With regard to the directive issued by mB (in its letter dated January 31, 1979, to NRC Chairman Hendrie) that NRC should not involve in physical experimentation, Mr. DiSalvo commented that he believes that, in order to accomplish some of the ISS tasks and in order to provide some rational recomendations on the feasibility of certain new concepts, it is necessary that the NRC should get involved in physical experimentation to a certain extent; the reasons given by mB for prohibiting NRC's involvement in physical experimentation are not convincing. Although DOE cculd do some physical experimentation for NRC under its guidance and get the work done, it may not be the same as NRC getting directly involved in physical experimentation.
Direct involvement of NRC in physical experimentation would provide significant contribution to the effective accomplishments of some of the goals of ISS activities.
Dr. Siess commented that, in view of the fact that NRC is allowed to play an important role in deciding what physical experimentation is rcquired, he does 1530 213
i Improved Safety Sy:tems June 26, 1979 not see how the conflict of interest is reduced simply by funding this work with n,ney appropriated to the DOE rather than to the NRC. He believes that it is appropriate for NRC to get involved in physical experimentation to a certain extent so as to obtain some data necessary to evaluate the potential of a new concept or to determine its feasibility prior to recomending a detailed engineering work.
Work Orders Issued to Date on ISS Programs Mr. Disalvo stated that in April and May 1979, work was begun en the following three programs using the reprogrammed unobligated FY 78 carryover funds (S400,000) and some ($100,000) reallocated within the RES budget:
Venced containment concepts
- S03M Alternate Decay Heat hemoval Concepts - S0.1M Human Interaction
- S0.lM Since the program on Alternate Decay Heat Renoval Concepts has a user request from the Offices of Standards Development and Nuclear Reactor Regulation, it is funded from the RSR confirmatory research budget. 'Ihe objectives, contractors, ext.:nded funding levels, and schedules for completion of these program are included in Attachments D, E and G.
In response to a question from Dr. Okrent, Mr. DiSalvo noted that the Vented Containment Program is intended to look at various types of containments, such as ice-condenser, Mark I and Mark II types, because of the variation in their designs.
Mr. DiSalvo stated that the In-Plant Accident Response Program (Attachment G Pages 10-12), which is a sub-program of the Human Interaction Program, is in-tended to evaluate the feasibility of ISS and propose the necessary requirements for those systems so as to assist reactor operators. He indicated that this is somewhat similar to a program which is underway at Halden, Norway. The Halden Program is intended to increase the plant availability by providing the operator 1530 214
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 with some auvance warnings of situations which might lead to reactor trip; it was devised so as to provide graphic. information on the status of the plant, and also to provido some guidance to the operator on the possible corrective actions he might have to take in the event of some abnormal conditions.
Initiation of work on the In-Plant Accident Response Program is pending due to lack of sufficient funds; based on the availability of funds, work will be initiated on this progra in FY 79.
With regard to *J = program on Value-Impact Methodolcqy (Attachnent H),
Mr. DiSalvo statt.- _ hat he believes that the need for this progra is em@asized because of the tree Mile Island accident. mis program would be helpful in assessing the values and impacts of the NRC require-ments developed subsequent to the tree Mile Island accident and also in detecnining which of those requirements can be laid upon the industry.
mis progre will also be helpful in assessing the values and impacts of -
the propsed concepts in the ISS area.
Dr. Ckrent expressed skepticism, indicating that he does not believe that the values and impacts of certain concepts can be quantified in a generic sense. He believes that the existing methodology is adequate to make judgments on the values and imycts of certain concepts. Ebr>
- __e, the information provided in WASH-1400 could be used in making judgments.
We methodology proposed may refine the existing methodology, but it may not necessarily be a better one. He is not completely against developing such a methodology for broader use. However, in view of the fact that limited funds are available for ISS programs, he does not believe that it is justifiable to spend a substantial mount Sr this program.
Mr. DiSalvo sunmarized briefly the status of the ISS programs, indicating that:
l.
Se priorities of the ISS programs have been revised as appropriate to reflect the concerns expressed due to tree Mile Island accident.
2.
Contracts have been issued to initiate work on three of the highest priority items; a. Vented Containment, b. Human Interaction, and c. Alternate Decay Heat Removal.
1530 215
. June 26, 1979 Improved Safety Systems 3.
We initiation of work on tne other programs and the overall progress of the ISS programs depend on the availability of frads.
PRESENTATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGUL'ATION (NRR) OF NRC -
MR. ROGER MATTSON Mr. Mattson discussed the role of NRR in the developnent of the NUREG-0438 Report and the NRR views on the adequacy of the ISS programs. NRR played the role as necessary in developing NUREU-0438. Mere wre no disagreements betwen NRR and RES on the technical contents of NUREE-0438.
Howver, NRR may not support the idea of funding these programs by taking money away frcxn more important safety questions such as meesolved safety issues or confirmatory research on some long-standing safety problens. Based on the lessons learned so far from the tree Mile Island accident, he believes that consideration should be given to the following issues:
1.
Degraded cooling of a core - measures for prevention and/or mitigation, etc.
2.
Anomalous transients - analysis, experimentation and simula-tion of anomalous transients and accidents (both those within the design envelopes of the current regulations and those beyond the existing regulations).
3.
Instrunentation to follow the course of an accident and hman factors - better instrunentation to detect and control anomalous transients - control rooms with better diagnostic capability to aid the operator, etc.
In rasponse to a question from Dr. Siess regarding the changes in priorities of the unresolved safety issues, Mr. Mattson noted that as a result of tree Mile Island accident the priorities on some of the unresolved safety issues nave been changed.
Kh
_ane 26,1979 Improved Safety Systems w
With regard to an earlier statement by Mr. Mattson that exploratory research and improved safety should mean the same, Dr. Ckrent ccamented that he believes that the exploratory research program 13 to give freedom for some research irrespective of the origination of the idea. Q2rrently, to initiate certain research study in RES, it seems that it has to have some user requests. He believes that if an idea originates at some non-profit organization, at a laboratory, or at an university, there should be some flexibility to explore that idea throtx3h some exploratory research.
We aim should be not only to make improvements in the operating reactors but also to improve the future reactors. New ideas should be explored and developnents should be mMe as appropriate; otherwise the PRC will find themselves in a difficult situation to evaluate the new types of reactors as they ccrne in.
Mr. Mattson stated that he believes that the function of the RES is not only to provide service in the licensing area, but also to provide in-creased understanding and increased insights of several things that are not thought of in the licensing process. However, the motivation for looking at thigs in a broad sense is offset by the fact that the funding of certain programs needs some kind of user requests.
Dr. Siess pointed out that the ACRS has said in several of its previous reports that RES not only should manage contracts and respond to user needs, but also they should look at other things in a broad sease. They should serve as a resource for the rest of the NRC, and they s.~,ld be in-volved in the research rather than simply acting as contractors.
Mr. Mattson stated that, althotx3h he supports the idea that RES should look at things in a broad and exploratory sense, he believes that NRR and RES should wrk together more closely for effective achievement of recearch activities. This could be achieved by establishing proper coordination between these two offices; at present, the resources in NRR are not adequate to accceplish this; he has been requesting an in-crease in NRR resources for research coordination, and so far he has not been successful in accomplishing this.
)h
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 In response to a question from Dr. Siess regarding the nunber of NRR personnel involved it. research coordination, the NRC Staff indicated that they will provide this information at a later date.
NRC CORE RETENTION RESEARCH PROGRAM 3 - FR. SILBERBERG Mr. Silberberg reviewed briefly the current NRC Core Retention Research programs in the INR and Advanced Reactor areas, their objectives, scopes, and some of the key questions expected to be answered through these pro-grams (Attachment I).
In response to a question from Dr. Siess regarding the funding level for the core retention prograus, Mr. Silberberg noted that the approximate funding levels needed to carry out these programs are as follow 3:
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FY 79 about $0.2M
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N 80 between $0.25M and $0.3M W 81 about $0.35M We FY 80 and 81 funding levels depend on the number of tests to be run.
In addition to the above funding levels, this program may need another
$1.0 million, especially for FY 81 and 82, to meet the NRR needs relating to the Floating Nuclear Plant. Mr. Silberberg pointed out that the FY 80 budget does not include any specific funds for these programs; although the FY 81 budget includes some funds, they do not meet the proposed levels.
Dr. Okrent commented that the Core Retention Research Program seems to have a limited scope. He believes that it should include also a program to examine, from a systems point of view, the possibility of maintaining the containment integrity for IWRs with regard to downward penetration of the molten core.
Mr. DiSalvo stated that, under the Alternate Containment Program, they intend to take a broader look at the core retention devices from a systems pint of view. Some analysis to determine the risk reduction ptential of the core retention devices has already been done within NRC. Mey also try to identify
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Lmproved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 the various failtre modes of the containment in these analyses.
Even though this program is nct sreci.ica. ly included in the ISS budget, he believes that work is being h e ir tM s area. He believes also that the core retention research work being done both in the LhR and Advanced Reactor areas is respnsive to the ACRS recomendations.
Dr. Okrent commented that he does not believe the NRC Staff is very responsive to ACRS recomendations because:
1.
adequate information on the feasibility of retaining a molten core within the containment has not been identified, 2.
risk reduction potentials of the core retention devices and the associated uncertainties have not yet been determined, and 3.
it is not clear whether the factors associated with hydrology have been considered in these analyses.
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Mr. DiSalvo responded that he believes the liquid pathway stedy at the Sandia Laboratories,to determine the risk associated with the migration of radionuclides through liquid pathways will provide additional information.
to judge the risk reduction potential.
Dr. Okrent requested a copy of the results of the Sandia study. Mr. Dahlgren from Sandia noted that he will check the status of the Sandia report and provide a copy, if available.
Indicating that the scope of the core retention program provided in NUREG-0438 states that the function of core retention measures would be to cool and retain the molten core materials athin the containment, and thus reducing the potential for penetrating the contairment floor, Dr. Siess commented that the core / concrete interaction studies included in the NRC Core Retention Research Program do not seem to have any rela-tion to the program in NUREG-0438.
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Improved Safety Systems June 26,1979 Mr. DiSalvo stated that he believes that the core / concrete interaction studies would provide some baseline information for the core retention research program identified in NUREU-0438. He stated further that since he is not convinced that the molten core will even gnetrate the containment base mat, he believes that a core retention device is not needed after all.
Dr. Okrent commented Wt if Mr. DiSalvo's corclusion, that the containment failure in the downwan sirection is unlikely, is assumed to be correct, it will have a significant impact on the conclusions of ' ASH-1400. He would like to know whether Mr. DiSalvo's conclusion represents the opinion of the Risk Assessment Group of EC, and/or whether that conclusion is based on the results of the Sandia Study.
Dr. Sier : stated that, as far as the core retention program listed in NUREG-0438 is concerned, the NRC could get around CMB's prohibition on @ysical
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exprimentation by doing this under the appropriate confirmatory research programs where they already have some @ysical experimentation underway.
PRESENTATION BY THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET - m. J. KEARNEY Mr. Kearney discussed 04B's @ilosophy in dividing the ISS program responsi-bilities between NRC and DOE.
He stated that it is 'the total Federal responsibility to develop safe ntx: lear puer. Realizing the importance of the improved reactor safety, the total budget for FY 80 in this area has been increased to $8.0 million between both NRC and DOE.
Mr. Kearney stated that the following factors were considered in dividing the responsibilities between NRC and DOS:
1.
NRC being a regulator of nts: lear energy needs to play a proper and independent regulatory role.
2.
In order to assure the effective use of the taxpayers money, innovative concepts should be developed and implemented throtx3h 1530 220-
Improved Safety Systems June 26,1979 research.
It is not appropriate to make the taxpayers pay all the expenditures for the developnent of improved safety concepts; the nuclear industry also should share the burden alorg with the taxpayers.
If the industry has to participate, NRC being a regulator cannot work closely with the industry.
Based on the above principles, the ISS responsibilities are divided between NRC and DOE.
Responsibilities of the NRC 1.
In view of the fact that NRC has the most expertise in the reactor safety area, idea generation should occur in NRC; NRC sh'ould study the acceptable levels of risk, and improvements in risk by design modifications.
2.
Perfonn evaluations of the safety concepts to identify the.
need for further study of such concepts.
3.
Propose scope for experimental wrk, to be used by DOE in its formulation of more detailed research activities.
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4.
Review and certify any proposed specific designs and implement them in the overall reactor systems as appropriate. Perform confirmatory research, as necessary, to determine the adequacy of the proposed designs.
5.
Make sure its regulatory activities and procedures are oriented to acecrnmodate the concepts proposed by the industry or ECE.
Responsibilities of the DOE 1.
Conduct analyses and evaluations of candidate concepts; conduct laboratory research and add infonnation to these analyses; carry out detailed. engineering wrk and develop new design concepts.
2.
Since ECE.h not a regulator, they do not have any conflicts in working closely with the industry. 'Iherefore, DOS should wrk closely with the industry and share the cost of ISS developnents with the industry.
1530 2s21
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 3.
Perform evaluations necessary to incorporate economically the developed safety concepts into reactors.
Mr. Kearney stated that NRC and DCE should establish proper coordination between them in carrying out the ISS activities.
With regard to the $7 million budget for DOE program specified in the OMB letter dated January 31, 1979, Dr. Siess pointed out (the clarification provided by Mr. Gavigan of DOE at the March 7,1979 ACRS Nbcommittee meeting) that only $4 million was for DOE's ISS programs, and the other S3 million was assigned to In-Plant Radiation Dose Reduction Program. He commented that although In-Plant Radiation Dose Reduction Program is.
certainly desirable as a research and developnent effort, it may not be considered as an ISS program. Also he does not t:elieve that this is what the Cergress had in mind in terms of improved reactor safety.
Mr. Kearney indicated that OMB does not generally review each individual project. 'Ihat is one of the reasons they try to set up a process so as to give proper guidelines to DOE and NRC in these areas. Sometimes some of the things an agency wishes to do under a specific category may not fall in that category, and this is something the OMB may have to look into in the future.
Dr. Okrent expressed his personal opinion, indicating that the process being set up by CMB may not be responsive unless very drastic measures are taken. He does not believe that the NRC improved safety system activities are moving along we31; the pace is much slower than it should have been. He believes that CMB's action has delayed the ISS work discussed in NUREG-0438.
There are some areas in which differences in philosophy exist between these two agencies; one such area is the improved containment designs intended to deal with accidents that go beyond design basis accidents; NRC considers this as one of the high priority items; however, DOE believes 1530 222
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 that they do not have enough technical basis to substantiate a program in this area which deals with accidents beyond the design basis.
He asked whether CMB has any practical mechanism to give appropriate priority to ISS ac'.ivity, if they think that it deserves high priority.
Mr. Kearney stated that in the program being set up, DCE should act as an independent contractor to NRC. Proper coordination should exist between DOE and NRC; if it does not seem to be the case, Cl48 may have to monitor these activities to mke sure proper coordination is established. He believes that the delay in initiating the ISS activities will be minimized in the future.
Mr. Norin from DOE commented that DOE does not feel Phac certain types of research should be initiated by them. However, if NRC performs the necessary preliminary studies to substantiate the need for a specific pro-gram, DOE will consider performing the detailM engineering wott.
Dr. Siess comented that he does not believe much progress is being made in the ISS programs.
Procedures necessary to implement the CMB guidelines have not yet been worked out; the DOE-NRC Coordination Comittee has not yet been set up to establish proper coordination between these two agencies.
Furthermore, he does not believe that a proper mechanism exists to enable NRC to participate in the development of DOE's improved safety system program plans.
Mr. Kearney stated that he would like to get the ACRS coments on the NRC and DCE ISS activities; 048 will take action as appropriate af ter reviewing those coments.
1530 223
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 PRESENTATION BY DOE - MR. M. NORIN (DOF.), 4.JAHIEREN (SANDIA IABC 'ATORIES)
Mr. Norin revie eed briefly the structure and status of the DOE's IWR Safety Technology program and some of the responsibilP.ies of DCE.
He stated that one of the constraints put on DOE by CMB is that DOE should make sure that their programs will be transferable to LMustry. ECE also should work closely with industry and share the safety system developnent costs with them. Accordingly, they haa set up a cooperative funding program in the IWR technow y area in which M eral industries' participate and share the c.use Another responsibility ef the DOE is to be respnsive to NRC needs. At present, they are in the ptocess of developing an expanded program to accommodate the lessons learned from the tree Mile Island accident.
DOE-NRC Coordination Mr. Dahlgren discussed the DOE-NRC coordinatio. for the ISS propsns. He stated that DOE has been contacting with Mr. DiSalvo, the designated NRC representative, to discuss the improved ufety research activities. DOE and NRC have been exchanging information, documents, progress reports of the programs, and other pertinent materials. Were have been approximately thirty DOE-NRC meetings related to the ISS programs. IC has participated in the review of NUREG-0438, and the NRC had participated in the DOE-Sandia FY 79 Program Planning meeting. IDE programs are almost in parallel with NRC programs with certain exceptions. One such exception is in the area of Alternate ECCS. IDE is not doing any work on alternate ECCS because NRC program incitdes the necessary exprimental work in this area. At present, DOE does not plan to do any wark in the Class-9 accident area.
Due to lack of sufficient technical basis to substantiate a program in this area, DOE believes that this is not an area where safety research should be focused. However, (he reiterated an earlier pint made by Mr. Norin) if NRC performs the necessary preliminary sttdies to substantiate the need for a specific program, DOE would consider performirg the detailed engineering werk.
1530 22i
Improved Safety Systems J.tne 26, 1979 In view of the fact that failure of a certain system could lead to a major accident of core damage, Dr. Ckrent asked, are there any IDE programs to examina:
how a failure beyond the current design basis could lead to a major accident if not interdicted?
Miat kind of design modification needs to be made to improve this situation and is it economically feasible?
Mr. Dahlgren responded that EOS has some programs to investigate these issues.
DOE's LWR Safety Technolocy Program Mr. Dahlgren reviewd the EDE's LWR Safety Technology program, indicating that it falls into the following categories:
1.
Risk Methods Utilization 2.
Improved Safety Systems
~
3.
Man-Machine Interface 4.
Safety Data 5.
Utility Training Program 6.
anergency and Recovery Measures Items 5 and 6 have been added because of the tree Mile Island accident.
DOE is also in the process of revising its priorities and expanding the existing program to accommodate the 1ersons learned from the tree Mile Island accident.
He discussed the various elements of these programs and their objectives '(Attachment J). Se detailed technical aspects of some of the programs elenents being added because of tree Mile Island accident have not yet been determined. Bere is a possibility that some of the identified tasks may not be done by IDE, but may be done by some other Organizations. Me expected funding levels, detailed objectives, and the schedule for completion of these programs have not yet been determined.
However, the magnitude of these programs depends on the level of funding.
)
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 Mr. Dahlgren stated that most of the DOE programs which wre not funded at the time of the ACRS Subcommittee meeting on March 7,1979 have been funded now (Attachment K).
In relation to one of the elements of the program on Safety Data "E'ission Prodtrt Release and Meteorological mdel Validity Verification", Dr. Okrent asked what do they expect to achieve through this.
Mr. Dahlgren responded that this task is to obtain afeguate information en the fission product release and the meteorological conditions so as to make proper decisions on evacuations.
Dr. Siess asked, wouldn't it be better to put sufficient monitors around the plants to obtain the necessary information.
Mr. Dahlgren responded that the monitors may not provide very accurate information for use in the decision making process. Ebrthermore, it is not sure whether installing monitors around the plants is the correct solution for this issue. Unless a definitive solution is in hand, it is better to use different approaches to resolve the issue.
With regard to the " Hydrogen Explosion Generation and Physical and Gemical Behavior" program element, Dr. Siess asked does it consider hydrogen problems both inside the containment and in the primary systems.
Mr. Dahlgren stated that be is not aware of the passibility of hydrogen explosion in the primary systems; however, if there is a significant possibility, they may look into that.
Dr. Siess pointed out the experience at 7hree Mile Island where a hydrogen bubble in the primary system caused significant concerns and raised several questions.
He state.d that this experience may be used as a basis to investigate further the hydrogen explosion problem in the primary systems.
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 With regard to the program on " Emergency and Recovery Measures", Mr. Dahlgren stated that this is to develop design guidance to facilitate decontamination and accident r;covery; it would also identify the necessary design modifica-tions at the existing plants to facilitate tnese things.
In response to a question from Dr. Siess as to whether this program is intended to help Bree Mile Island accident recovery or for use in the future, Mr. Dahlgren stated that this muld be more useful in the future. However, the advanced decontamination techniques being developed could be useful in the tree Mile island accident recovery.
Dr. Siess mndered whether this program has the flexibility to allow for the pssibility that there may not be any significant problens in the cleanup process at the t ree Mile Island. He further stated that if DOE ~
intends to develop new techniques for future use, it is advisable to get all the facts from Three Mile Island accident recovery and, decide whether any new techniques or design modifictions are really needed; any new techni-ques developed without adecuate basis may turn out to be useless in the future.
Mr. Dahlgren stated that he agreed with Dr. Siess.
In response to a question from Dr. Okrent as to what DOE proposes that NRC should do for carrying out the guidelines provided by CMB on DJE-NRC coordination, Mr. Griffith stated that the exact procedures for implenent-ing the CMB guidelines have not yet been worked out. He believes that the DOE-NRC Coordination Committee being set up muld provide adequate and specific guidance on this issue.
In response to anot.her question from Dr. Okrent, DOE stated that an NRC recommendation to DOE on a specific program should ha.
some justification with regard to its need, economic attractiveness, and other safety benefits; it would be difficult for DOE to carry out. any prograns which do rut have such justification.
,M
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 Dr. Okrent commented that some times research may be needed just to choose between two issues and to get additional information on a specific issue to decide whether that should be recommended for further research. Under these circumstances, NRC may not be able to provide all the justifications required by DOE.
Mr. Griffith stated that DOE has to look at NRC recommendations on an ad hoc basis. However, if NRC feels that certain programs are ireportant
'and needed for making decisions in the licensing process, DOE would cooperate with NRC and get that done.
~Dr. Siess requested from DOE a copy of the letter, dated February 1, 1979, from Mr. McIntyre (CMB) to Mr. Schlesinger (DCE).
Dr. Okrent requested that DOE provide a copy of their expanded program plan as soon as it is developed.
Dr. Siess suggested that NRC take a look at DOE programs to identify the areas in which DCE conducts physical experimentation (either by chance or due to NRC request) to complement NRC programs and provide that information at a later meeting.
PRESENTATION BY NUCLEDYNE ENGINEERING CORPORATION - PASSIVE CONTADMENT SYSTEMS NorE:
Mr. Etherington did not participate in the discussion of NucleDyne's Passive Containment System owing to a conflict of interest.
Mr. Falls reviewed briefly the Passive Containment System developed by NucleDyne Engineering Corporation, and pointed out the difficulties they have been having in getting this system reviewed by NRC (Attachment L).
\\
Improved Safety Systems June 26, 1979 In response to a question from Dr. Okrent as to whether they have performed a full spectrum of pipe break analyses for the passive containment system, Mr. Falls Stated that the analyses they have performed cover only the major accident range and they still 'ne.ed to perform the necessary analyses to cover the full spectrum of accidents.
Mr. Falls requested that the ACRS recommend funding of the passive containment system research and developnent progran.
SUBCOMMI'ITEE COMMENTS Dr. Siess solicited the opinien of the Subccomittee msnbers on the following issues:
1.
Are the proposed funding levels for EY 80 (supplemental). and EY 81 appropriate?
2.
Are the levels of support for the various areas appropriate?
3.
Should the report to the Commission contain comments on 04B's restrictions on physical experimentation or should the ACRS inform its opinion directly to CMB?
4.
What should the ACBS do about NucleDyne's passive containment system?
Dr. Siess requested that the answers to these questions be provided by 4:00 p.m. on the following day.
'1he meeting was adjourned at 5:45 p.m.
NCTTE: A copy of a transcript of this meeting is available in the NRC Public Docunent Room at 1717 H St., N.W., or can be obtained from Ace-Federal Reporters, 444 North Capital St., N.W., Wash-ington, D.C.
i59
Federal Register / Vol. 44. No.113 / Monday June 11. 1979 / Notices 33S01 l
obtained by a prepaid telephone call to NUCt. EAR REGUt.ATORY nresday. June 26,1979.-The meeting the Designated Federal Employee for COMMISSION pr/11 commence at &JO c.m.
this meeting.Dr.nomas G.McCreless.
The Subcommittee may meet in I!*Iephone 202/634-3267) between 8:15 Advisory Committee on Reactor Executive Session, with any ofits.
a.m. and 5:00 p.m EDT.
Safeguards. lmproved Safety Systems consultants who may be present. to Subcommittee; Mileting explore and exchange their preliminary Dated: June 4.1s7s.
opinions re8arding matters which should. John C. Hoyle.
The ACRS Improved Safety Systems be considered durmg the meetkg and to Advisory committee. Manegement cgicer.
Subcommittee will hold an open meetmg formulate a report and pioes.mri:s med us. mas e.i on June 26,1979. In Room 1048.1717 H Street. N.W. Washington. DC 20555.
,, recommendations to the full Committee.
eun.o coon vs ss Notice of this meeting was published on At the conclusion of the Executive May 24.1979 (44 ER 30177).
Session.the Subcommittee will hold Applications for 1.lcenses To Expo In accordance with the procedures discussions with representatives of the Nuclear Facilities cr Materials outlined in the Federal Register on NRC Staff and the Department of Energy October 4.1978. (43 FR 45926). oral or (DOE). and their consultants, regarding Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.40. "
lic written statements may be presented by their program plans for research to Notice of Receipt of an Appl' tion,"
members of the public.recordinas will improve the light-water resctor safety please take notice that the uclear be permitted only during those portions systems, and expected changes in these Regulstory Commission s received the j
following applications r export of the meeting when a transcriptis being programs due to the March 28,1979 licenses. A copy of e application is kept. and questions may be asked only Three Mile Island.Un" ? Accident.The or. file m the Nucle Regulatory by members of the Subcommittee. its Subcommittee may then caucus to Commission's P' ic Document Room consultants, and Staff. Persons destring determine whether the matters I cated at1717 Street NW.
to make oral statements should notify identified in the initial session have WasMngton.
.C.
the Designated Federal Employee as far been adequately covered.
Dated thf ay June 1.19's at Bethesda, In advance as practicable so that Further information regarding topics appropriate arrangements can be made to be discussed whether the meeting MI '"d'.,uclear Regulatory Commission.
I For th l
to allow the necessary time dhring the has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Cual. Ophger.
meeting for such statements.
Chairman's ruling cn rauests for the A### ##.f Ulf'Clof. Export /ImPoff and The agenda for subject meeting shall opportunity to present oral statements be as follows:
and the time alloted therefor can be ern Pg
% mtsogame courey or a
Name o_r apohcare eare _ce am catiors
[otal ehemers o..
Total tuotape uswer Amence corp-.osio7ns,os/ cons xsmsoisio 111ss enactied e2o ooo vs.sts For use m "Joevoo" eroerr,ee el Jagert tast troeder reactor.
&btsA and Compaay o5/o1/79 r4/o7/7s.YsNuotsit s.ss%
armsn s0.4st D42 flesoed fuss ear FuausrmmaL urut s. Japert Trarernaciser, irs. 05/03/79. os/04/7s. xuossat osoieved wa 12sJXO Used ear twast snsposes and Francet trust ce9eralOectic,o6/o7/7s.os/10/79 XCoWC250 se ng necre croce der essamtm.es sur tarapur.
s t12.oco, to7.sor so Menazne servi sor estacam or Francet prenehanne, anc, os/sns, os/ tans, naosast to.aa&3 yttwo to tpe reseks commermany-warmen we be p1 oos. 79-1s05s Filed be-7R aes ami aumo coot tsso 49as fDocket No. 50-313(
various transient events. In additio the reactor trip that would be actuated on s of Order confirmed that the licensee ould main feedwater and/or on turbine Arkansas Power & Light Co.'
maintain ANO-lin a shutdown (dl complete analyses for potent-small i
Authorization To Resume cration condition until the following a ions had breaks and deveop and impleme operating Instructions to define operator - tion.
geen satj3{actori}y comp}ete (el Assign at least one 1.ic sed Operator The United States Nucl r Regulatory Commission issued an der on May 17 (alUpgrade of the timeline and reliability who has had Three Mile I nd Unit No. 2 1979 (44 FR 29997). Ma 23.1979), to of the Emergency Feedwate EFW) System training on the Babcoe Witcox simulator Arkansas Power & I.:. t Company (the by performine the items a cified in to the control room e each shift).
I Enci eure 1 of the lica e's tenu of May it.
licensee). holder of acility Operatmg tr9. Provide change o design for NRC By submitta f May17.1979 as Ilcense No. DPR-for Arkansas i
Nuclear One. U t No.1 (ANO-1)*
(b) Develop an mplement operating and 22.19. the licensee has confirming the the licensee accomplish procedures for ' duling and controllmg EFW docume ed the actions taken in a series of a ona. both immediate and independent Integrated Control System respo e to the May 17. Order. Notice is Iong term, increasa the capability and control.
he y given that the C; rector of reliabilit i ANO-1 to respond to (c) Imp ment a hard wired control-grad
- clear Reactor Regulation (the l
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ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEE*fDG ON IMPROVED SAFETY SYSTDiS JUNE 26, 1979 WASHINGTON, D.C.
ATTENDEES LIST ACRS NRC C. P. Siess, Chairman R. W. Krf nt D. Okrent, Member T. Murley S. Lawroski, Member R. DiSalvo H. Etherington, Member R. Mattson R. Savio, Staff
- R. Sherry S. Duraiswamy, Staff M. Silberberg D. L. Basdekas
- Designated Federal Employee OMB B&W J. Kearney G. Schleck D. Repici T. M. Palmieri NUCLEDYNE ENGNG CORP BBR, GER%NY
- 0. B. Falls, Jr.
K. O. Layer NUCLEONICS WEEK MHB TECH ASSOC.
~
R. P. Smith G. C. Minor SANDIA R. B. Habbard D. Dahlgren GPU R. L. Coats C. W. Smyth DOE WESTINGHOUSE - OPS J. M. Carlson M. Norin P. B. Haga J. Griffith R. Heraeeser PICKARD IDWE & GARRICK PUBLIC G. Paras C. G. Rubler EPRI ACE J. Burns Leyse BCS B. K. Feamster ATTACHMENT B 1530 231
A TEttrATIVE PRESENTATICH SCHEDULE IMPROVED SAFETY SYSTEMS SUBCCMMITTEE MEEFDG JUNE 26, 1979 NASHING' ION, D.C.
EXEClTTIVE SESSION 8:30 am - 8:45 am PRESENTATICN BY RES - (Ray DiSalvo)
Current Status of NRC's Improved Safety System Programs (Discuss available funds, completed work scopes, and the status of work scopes for other programs.)
8:45 am - 9:00 am Work Order Issued to Date on Improved Safety System Programs (Discuss objectives, funding level, con-tractors, schedule for completion, etc.)
9:00 am - 10:00 am PRESENTATICN BY OMB 10:00 am - 11:00 am PRESENTATICN BY RES (CCNT'D) - (Ray DiSalvo)
Proposed Changes to NRC's Improved Safety System Programs due to Three Mile Island Accident (Discuss changes in priorities, need for new programs, etc.)
11:00 am - 11:30 am Status of Research Programe on Core Catchers for IMRs (Discuss past, present, and future programs.)
11:30 am - 12:00 noon Coordination Between NRC and ME (Provide evidence, if any, such as memos, letters, etc.).
12:00 pm - 12:15 pm FY 81 Budget Information 12:15 pm - 12:30 pm LUNCH 12:30 pm - 1:30 pn PRESENTATICN BY DOE - (Marvin Norin)
Brief Description of New Developnents in DOE's Improved Safety System Programs Since the March 7, 1979 ACRS Subcommittee Meeting.
1:30 pm - 1:45 pm Proposed Changes to DOE's Improved Safety System Programs due to Wree Mile Island Accident (Dis-cuss changes in priorities, need for new programs, etc.)
1:45 pm - 2:45 pn Coordination Entween DOE and NRC (Provde evidence, if any, such as memos, letters, etc.)
2:45 pm - 3:00 pn PRESENTATION BY NRR Discuss NRR Needs for Improved Safety System Programs; NRR's Comments on the Adequacy of the
}
Programs Identified in NUREG-0438 aM the Selection of Priorities; Need fn arty New Programs because of Wree Mile Island Accid:;nt'.
3:00 pn - 4:00 pm SUDCOMITTEE CabENTS 4:00 pm - 4:15 pn A
&n T
C
EFFECT OF TMI-2 ON PROGRAMMINE 1979 1980 1981 PIE EDSI PlE REQUESTED REQUESTED AMENDED ALTERNATE CONTAINMENT 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.8 ALTERNATE DECAY llEAT REMOVAL 0.2 0.1 0.2 0. 11 0. 11 0.Li ALTERNATE ECCS 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.3 0. 11 2.1 2.3 2.7 llVMAN INTERACTION ADVANCED SEISMIC DESIGN 0.3
- 0. II 1.0 SCOPING STUDIES 0. 11 0. 11 0. 11 IMPROVED METHODOLOGY 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 TOTAL ($M) 0.8 0.8 1.0 11. 11 11. 7 6.6 c.)
JJ ATTnewinT
STATUS OF IMEROVED REACTOR SAFETY RESEARCll TCPIC WORK SCOPE PROPOSALS GONTRACT l
CONTAINMENT VENTED COMPLETE SELECTED SANDIA OTHERS COMPLETE BEING SOLICITED DECAY llEAT REMOVAL US COMPLETE SELECTED SANDIA FOREIGN BEING DEVELOPED BEING EVALUATED ALTERNATE ECCS DRAFT IlUMAN INTERACTION HUMAN ERROR SENSITIVITY COMPLETE SELECTED BNL MONITORING AND DIAGNOSTICS DRAFT SELECTED PENDING INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS IlUMAN INTERACTIONS REVIEW COMPLETE SELECTED PENDING SAFETY INTERLOCKS DRAFT O
CLASS 9 SIMULATOR BEING DEVELOPED INFORMATION FLOW 6
g$
annennear
4 i
STATUS OF IMPROVED REACTOR SAFETY RESEARCH (CONT.)
WORK SCOPE P_ROPOSALS.
CONTRACT TOPIC SEISMIC DESIGN ENERGY ABSORBING DEVICES DRAFT BEING EVALUATED TOP 0 GRAPHIC MODIFICATIONS BEING DEVELOPED ISOLATION BEING DEVELOPED SCOPING STUDIES t
IMPROVED METHODOLOGY COMPLETE SELECTED PENDING I
y s.
's J9
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arrnanusar E z
,