ML19261C774
| ML19261C774 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1979 |
| From: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Pilant T NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7904020154 | |
| Download: ML19261C774 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES i
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY cOMMtsSION j _. (
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MARCH I 3 1973 Docket tio. 50-298 Mr. J. M. Pflant Director fiebraska Public Power District P. O. Box 499 Columbus, fiebraska 68601
Dear Mr. Pflant:
We have been reviewing your submittal of January 31, 1979 dealing with the cycle 5 reload for the Cooper fluclear Station.
As a resu't of our review, additional information is required.
This informatit n is identified in Enclosure 1.
Your prompt response to this letter is requested so that we can complete our review of your reload application in a timely manner.
Sincerely,
/n;/
h mas A.
polito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/ enclosure:
see next page 7904020157
Nebraska Public Power District cc Mr. G. D. Watson, General Counsel Hebraska Public Power District P. O. Box 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68601 Mr. Arthur C. Gehr, Attorney Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Center Phoenix, Arizona 85073 Cooper Nuclear Station ATTH: Mr. L. Lessor Station Superintendent P. O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska 68321 Auburn Public Library 118 - 15th Street Auburn, Nebraska 68305 9
ATTACHMENT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INF3RMATION COOPER NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 RELOAD 4 1.
The staff stated in Section 6.2.2 of its safety evaluation of the Generic Reload Fuel Application (which you have referenced in your reload application) that " Additional data ehould be submitted by GE to the sta ff for review, to justify the co. tervatism of the GEXL correlation for the second and subsequent cycles of operation of the retrofit 8x8 bundles, when local peaking factors may increase suffi-ciently to cause non-conservative CPR calculations." Your reload submittal has not addressed this issue.
Accordingly, we request you provide either directly or through reference, adequate information which speaks to this concern.
Your response should include:
The extent to which individual heater rods are instrumented in steady-state critical power tests for the retrofit fuel des.ign.
For each test bundle provide measured and predicted results in tabular form for the various test conditions.
Provide trend plots (measured critical power / predicted critical power vs blN G. P, critical power, te:t bundle)
Maximum R-Factor for each test bundle (new and old R-Factor definitions)
Thermocouple locations (rod-by-rod and axially)
Spacer-grid locations Provide power and heat flux for all plots of transient CPR tases.
2.
The staff stated in its evaluation of the Generic Reload Fuel Application that it is acceptable to reanalyze only a relative few limiting transient events as part of reload safety analyses.
The basis
'or the selected events stems in part from previous (e.g. FSAR) analysis results (consequences).
Furthermore, the relative consequences of all of the anticipated transient events considered (in the FSAR) is based on specific equipment performance characteristics and reactor protection system characteristics.
It is not known whether the proposed reduction in the low pressure main steam line isolation valve setpoint (from 850 psig to 825 psig) will cause the currently non-limiting pressure regulator failure event to become a limiting event. We require that you provide
. suf ficient infomation that shows the pressure regulator failure event remains non-limiting, even with the proposed setpoint change.
An acceptable response would be to provide the transient t.CPR (for each fuel type) for a pressure regulator failure transient analysis which models the proposed technical specification change.
3.
Provide the ACPR result for a fuel loading error consisting of mis-locating an 8x8R bundle in a 7x7 cell.
4.
It is the staff's position that adequate startup physics testing be performed following each plant refueling in order to assure that the core conforms to the design, i.e. that the actual (measured) reload core configuration is consistant with the analyzed reload core configuration.
The staff currently has a study underway for the purpose of genericall/
establishing requirements for mir.imum BWR rtartup physics test programs.
Although this effort is not yet complete, we have concluded at this juncture that, in order to be acceptable, BWR startup test programs, must include each of the following (or acceptable equivalents):
A.
A visual inspection of the core including a photographic or videotape record.
B.
A check of core power symmetry-by checking for mismatches be-tween symmetric detectors.
C.
Withdrawal and insertion of each control rod-to check for criticality and mobility.
D.
A comparison of predicted and measured critical insequence rod pattern for nonvoided conditions.
In view of the importance the staff places on the above four BWR startup physics program elements, we request that you provide a commitment to include them (or acceptable equivalents) in the Cooper Station Unit 1, Relcad 4 startup program.
Additionally, in order that we may adequately assess the characteristics of the Cooper Station Unit 1 Cycle 5 startup test program, we request that you provide the following information:
A description of the core loading verification (inspection) procedures to be followed for the core refueling) including the number of independent checks to be made of a the actual
, core loading, b) the intended core loading and c) the consistency between the two.
A description of each startup physics test (including those indicated above).
The acceptance criteria and basis for each test (including those indicated above) which provides assurance that the actual core conforms to the design.
- The actions to be taken for each test (including those indicated above) whenever the acceptance criteria are not satisfied.
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