ML19261C395
| ML19261C395 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1979 |
| From: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Jackie Jones CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7903220382 | |
| Download: ML19261C395 (5) | |
Text
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 M
g s t 4 - - 'r.(,I FEBPUARY 2 7 1979 Docket Hos. 50-325 and 50-324 Mr. J. A. Jones Executive Vice President Carolina Power & Light Company 336 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
Dear Mr. Jones:
The staff is in the process of reviewing additional information supplied in connection with the incomplete items identified in Table 3.1 of the NRC's Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which accompanied Amendment No.11 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-71' for Unit No.1 and Amendment No. 37 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-62 for Unit No. 2 of the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, issued November 22, 1977.
As noted in paragraph 3.2 of the SER, the staff is preparing a supplement to address the resolution of these incomplete items. To aid us in the completion of this supplement, we find that we need additional information.
Answers to the questions in the attachment to this letter will supply the necessary information.
Your attention is directed to questions 3,10,12, 'and 15 which concern modifications that we understand are being implemented on a schedule consistent with completion of the modifications identified in Section 3.1 of the SER.
If our understanding is correct, these particular questions will need to be resolved prior to return to power operation following the BSEP 1979 refueling outages. Our staff has requested a minimum 3-week lead time to properly assess your responses to these four questions.
For your information, the NRC's target date for completion of all modifica-tions related to fire protection is October,1980.
You should verify that your overall schedule is consistent.with this date.
Sincerely, r)- ChmL Thomas A,.
Ippolito, Chief E
Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Opera-ing Reactors g
Enciosure:
Fire Protection Program Safe Shutdown Analysis Questions
C'a r:l i r.3 Power & Ligh: Corpany cc:
Richard E. Jones, Escuire Carolina Povier & Light Company 335 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 George F. Trovbridge, Esquire Shave, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1830 M Street, fa' Washington, D. C.
20336 John J. Burney, Jr., Esquire Burney, Burney, Sperry & Barefoot 110 North Fifth Avenue Wilmington, North Carolina 28401 Southport - Brunswick County Library 109 W. Moore Street Southport, North Carolina 28461 g
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BRUi1SWICK 1 & 2 FIRE Ph? TECTI 0ft PROGRAF' REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWil AflALYSIS 50-324, 325 1.
"erify that cable trays, including non-safety related trays, and stored combustibles were considered in the safe shutdown analysis as "outside sources of combustion." (II.D.1:a and b) 2.
Describe what situations were considered "close proximity" and were analyzed in the cable study.
(II.D.1:C) 3.
For this item and others where the proposed modification is to install a fuse in the circuit, provide schematics, or a representative schematic, that shows how the fuse will remove the ground but still allow operation of the required equipment.
(II.D.2:3,33; II.D.3: 3,4,38) 4.
For these items and several others, the proposed modification is installation of a 3-hour fire barrier.
Provide details on the construction of thesc barriers.
(II.D.2: 8,64,66,67; II.D.3:
9,66, 68, 69) 5.
The proposed modification for numerous areas is to provide a sprinkler head in the area of the crossing or where redundant cables are in proximity to protect the redundant safe shutdown cabling in the area.
However, a sprinkler head may be delayed in actuating and allow damage to redundant equipment prior to the head opening. Additionally, if the sprinkler system fails to operate, the fire brigade may not respond soon enough to preclude loss of redundant cabling. To provide adequate pratection, in addition to the sprinkler head, the following should be provided:
1.
At cable tray crossings where a sprinkler head is to be provided, a fire barrier should be provided between the trays at the cross-over and extending beyond the cross-over.
This may be a "Marinite" or "Kao-Wool" type barrier; and 2.
Where conduit crosses or is in proximity to trays and a sprinkler head was to be provided, the conduit should be wrapped with insulation providing at least' 1/2 hour rated fire protection.
This may be a "Kao-Wool" or ' calcium-silicate type insulation.
The installation to be used to provide the above protection should be based on tests to demonstrate the adequacy of the p.rotection.
6.
Provide details on the re-routing of the cable for item II.D.2.13.
This snould be shown on sketches or drawings if in the same fire area as the redundant cable.
7.
For these items cable routing drawings appear to show that redundant cables are in close proximity to each other.
Provide details to justify be 'a:k of barriers and other protection for these items.
(II.D.2:
JC, ??
II.? 3: 2, 13, 17, 2E
_', 33, 7 7 )
8.
For these items, the description appears to indicate that redundant diesel generators could be lost in a single fire, however, no modi-fications are proposed.
Clarify why no modifications are required to preserve safe shutdown capability.
(II.D.2: 78; II.D.3: 83) 9.
For item 94 on page II.D.61, the proposed modification is to provide a 3-hour fire barrier.
Provide details to show that the barrier will adequately separate trays 37N/CB and 85A/CA where they cross and where they are routed adjacent to each other.
10.
For various items i.n sections III.D.2 and III.D.3, the proposed modification includes installation of isolation switches and some control switches for affected safety circuits.
The following information should be provided for these modifications:
(a) Verify that these new devices will conform to the design criteria (FSAR) that other electrical equipment in these safety circuits were required to meet; (b) Provisions for key-locking of the switches; (c) Provisions for periodic checks of switch position; (d) Schematics to shos.' use of the device in the circuit and identi-fication of location of equipment and wiring (e.g., portions of the circuit located in the cable spreading roon);
(e) Description of steps included in procedures to effect the alternate shutdown method; (f) Number of personnel required to perform the alternate shutdown functions; and (g) Provisions to periodically test operability of these devices, including technical specifications.
11.
The analysis for certain redundancies indicates that safe shutdown will not be affected if certain operator actions are taken.
These required actions should be included in appropriate operating or emergency procedures as described in the following:
(a) For items 13 and 14 in III.D.2 and items 11 and.12 in III.D.3, required operator actions to shed non-critical D.C. battery loads for fires in these areas should be included in procedures; (b) For items 33 and 34 in III.D.2 and items 33 and 34 in III.D.3, required operator actions to transfer switchgear control circuits to a different power supply for fires in these areas should be included in procedures; (c) For items V.C.l.a(3) and V.C.l.b(3), required operator actions to isolate the service water supply to the reactor building closed cooling weter heat exchangers should be included in procedures
where a fire may render inoperable the two diesels within a safety division.
12.
For items 58 through 63 of III.D.2 and items 57 through 62 of III.D.3 provide details on the redundant instrument loop and power supply, including the following:
(a) Verify. that these new devices will conform to the design criteria (FSAR) that other electrical equipment in these safety circuits were required to meet; (b) Schematics to show function of these circuits and identification of location of equipment and wiring (e.g., portions of the circuit located in the cable spreading room).
13.
Various items in III.D.2 and III.D.3 indicate that a new cable will be provided.
Verify that the new cable will be routed in-dependent of the cable spreading room.
14.
Items IV.C.l(f) and IV.C.2(e) indicate that 3-h'our barriers will be provided for the instrument racks in the Division II RHR rooms for each unit or the racks will be relocated. A tele-con with CP&L pe.rsonnel indicates that the racks are being relocated.
Provide details on the new location of the instrument racks to show that a fire in the Division II RHR rooms will not affect operation of the Hpr.I pumps for either unit.
15.
Items V.C.la(2) and V.C.l.b(2) indicate that manual transfer switches will be provided to transfer certain Division I motor operated valves to a Division II power supply.
The following information pertaining to this modification should be provided:
(a) Details to show that a single failure, such as failure of the manual transfer switch, will not incapacitate Division I and Division II power supplies; (b) Verify that these new devices will conform to the design criteria (FSAR) that other electrical equipment in these safety circuits were required to meet; (c) Provisions for key-locking of the switches; (d) Provisions for periodic checks of switch position; and (e) Scnematics to show use of the device in the circuit and identification of location of equipment and wiring (e.g., portions of the circuit located in the cable spreading room).
MEETING
SUMMARY
DISTRIBUTION ORBd4 Mr. Lowell E. Roe Vice President, Facilities Development Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652 Docket File g PDR V. Noonan L PDR P. Check ORBS 4 Rdg G. Lainas NRR Rdg G. Knighton H. Denton Project Manager E. G. Case OELD V. Stello 01&E(3)
- 8. Grimes R. Ingram T. Carter R. Fraley, ACRS(16)
R. Vollmer TERA A. Schwencer J. Buchanan D. Ziemann Meeting Summary File T. Ippolito Program Support Branch R. Reid NRC Participants T. Sullivan J. Rajan F. Cherny J. Knight D. Jeng R. Lipinski
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