ML19261C087
| ML19261C087 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19261C074 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7903140545 | |
| Download: ML19261C087 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES g"
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 e
t c
o
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.13 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-70 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY g
PHILADE'EPHT%'ILECTRIC COMPANY DELMARVA P0uER "O LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITi
'3TRIC COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1 i
DOCKET NO. 50-272 Introduction By letters dated December 21,1977, April 12, August 18, September 25, and October 17, 1978, Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) propossd changes to the Technical Specifications appended to Operating License No. DPR-70 for the Salti Nuclear Generating Station Unit No.1.
The proposed changes would (1).evise the organization charts as contained in Figures 6.2-1 and 6.2-2 of the Appendix A Technical Specifications and Figures 5.2-1 of the Appendix B Technical Specifications, (2) revise the membership of the Station Operations Review Committee (50RC) and Nuclear Review Board (NRB), (3) modify certain surveillance requirements for fire detection instrumentation, and (4) make miscellaneous administrative changes.
Background
The licensee has proposed to revise the organization charts in Figures 6.2-1 and 6.2-2 and Figure 5.2-1 of the Appendix A and Appendix B Technical Specifications, respectively, to reflect recent changes in the station and offsite organizations and to add a note with regard to Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) requirements. Specifically, these changes are:
i 1.
The Assistant to Manager at the Salem Station is now responsible for administration of the Safety and Security Programs in addition to the Training Program; 2.
The reassignment of the Station Quality Assurance Engineer from reporting to the Manager - Salem Generating Station to reporting to the Quality Assurance Engineer; 9
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Either the Chief Engineer or the Station Operating Engineer will meet the qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971 for the position of Operations Manager. All Senior Shift Supervisors shall report to an individual who shall hold a Senior Reactor Operator's license and have six years of responsible power plant experience of which a minimum of two years shall be nt : lear power plant evperience.
A maximum of two of the remaining four years of power plant experience may be fulfilled by satisfactory completion of academic or related technical training on a one-for-one time basis.
4.
The implementation of the environmental surveillance programs is now the responsibility of the Licensing and Environment Department in the Engineering and Construction Department rather than the Nuclear Licensing and Environmental Studies Group in the Mechanical Division of the Engineering Department.
In addition, the licensee has proposed the following changes for the SORC and NRB memberships:
1.
Revise the SORC Organization to designate the Assistant to Manager as Vice Chairman and designate the Maintenance Engineer as a member:
2.
Revise the NRB Organization to add the Manager -
Hope Creek as a member; 3.
Revise Paragraph 6.4.1 to indicate the Assistant to Manager is responsible for facility retraining and replacement training rather than the Chief Engineer.
The licensee has also proposed to revise the frequency from once per 31 days to once per 12 months for demonstrating operability of the circuits between the fire detection instruments and the control room.
Evaluation Organizational Changes We have evaluated the licensee's requests to update the offsite and station organizational charts to reflect recent organization changes and have concluded that these changes are administrative in nature
3-and do not involve revisions to personnel qualification requirements other than those allowed by ANSI N 18.1, as applicable, in addition, the changes to create the position of Quality Assurance Engineer in the offsite organization and to require that the Station Quality Assurance Engineer report to that individual rather than to the Manager - Salem Generating Station is acceptable in that the Quality Assurance Engineer position is a senior-level position within the offsite organization reporting to the Manager - Nuclear Operations.
50RC and NRB Membership Changes We have evaluated the proposed changes to the membership of the 50RC and NRB and have concluded that these changes are administrative in nature, do not involve any changes in the qualification requirenwnts of members, and are therefore acceptable.
It is further noted that the addition of the Manager - Hope Creek as a member of the NRB organization enhances the expertise of the staf f with regard to issues that may potentially involve Hope Creek as well as the Salem Station.
Fire Detection Equipment Surveillance Changes On February 14, 1978, we issued Amendment No.11 to the Salem operating license which implemented interim fire protection Technical Specifications.
Included in this amendment was the surveillance requirement that the circuits between the control room and the unit's remote fire detection instrumentation be demonstrated operable at least once per 31 days.
In its letter of April 12, 1978, the licensee indicated that in order to demonstrate that the 148 circuits involved are operable, the leads for each detection instrument must be disconnected because Salem is not equipped with automatic circuit checking devices or manual switches.
To avoid undue equipnent wear, the licensee requested that the surveillance interval be changed from once per 31 days to once per 12 months.
By letter dated July 24, 1978, we advised the licensee that unless the Salem Station were to be equipped with fire detection circuits that fully meet NFPA Code 720 Standards for Class A supervised circuits, the proposed 12 month su: ;aillance interval would not be e
. acceptable. This was based on the fact that the current surveillance requirements for facilities meeting the above referenced standards include demonstrating that the fire detection instruments are operable once per 6 months and that the supervised circuits themselva> be demonstrated operable at least once per 6 months. However, since the Salem Station fire detector circuit design does include certain supervisory features such as monitoring for shorts or open circuits, and since too frequent disconnection of detector leads could cause undue equipment wear, thereby leading to less reliable fire detection equipment, we indicated to the licensee that a surveillance interval of once per 92 days for the fire detection circuits would be acceptable. By letter dated August 18, 1978 the licensee agreed to this change.
In our letter of July 24, 1978, we also indicated to the licensee that the Salem Station interim fire protection Technical Specifications issued on February 14, 1978 did not include the requirement to specifically test the fire detection instrumentation. The Technical Specifications, as issued, require that a channel functional test be performed at least once per 6 months, but since the definition of a channel functional test, as contained in the Salem Technical Specifications, does not necessarily include the detector itself, the detector should be included.
In its letter of August 18, 1978, the licensee proposed to modify the Technical Specifications to require that fire detection instruments which are accessible during operation be demonstrated operable at least once per 6 months by performance of a functional test which includes subjecting the detector to smoke or heat, as applicable. Fire detection instruments which are not accessible during operation would be demonstated operable by performance of this functional test during each cold shutdown exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> except that such demonstration need not be performed more often than once per 6 months.
The licensee requested that the reactor coolant pump heat detectors be exempt from this requirement because these detectors are of fie fusible link type and subjecting them to a test opens the link, necessitating replacement of the detector.
We agree with the licensee that testing of the reactor coolant pump detectors should not be required. We have further concluded that a shutdown outage need not be extended solely for the performance
. of the fire detection instrument functional tests and that the fire detection instruments within the containment are not required to be operable during the perfomance of Type A containment leakage rate tests. The basis fc-the latter of the above two findings is discussed below.
In accordance with the Technical Specifications of the Salem Unit 1 plant and the Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50, the Containment Building must be periodically pressurized and tested for leakage to verify that any leakage from the building under accident conditions will be within the limits assumed for the analysis of that accident. When the Containment Building atnosphere is pressurized, the fire detectors (ionization chambers) give false fire alarms because the ionization chamber current is affected by the density of the air. With the detectors in the alarmed condition, they are inoperable, i.e., unable to provide an alam to the operators in the event of a fire in that detector's zone. The existing Technical Specification requires that, when the number of operable fire detectors in the Containment Building falls below the minimum number specified, a fire watch patrol must inspect that zone within one hour and every four hours the, saf ter until the required number of detectors are returned to an operable status. During the integrated leakage test (when the detector can give false alarms) the Containment Building is pressurized to 52 psig and personnel are not allowed in the building for reasons of personal safety.
However, since for this leekage test the reactor is in the cold shutdown condition, the consequences of the effects of any fire on safe shutdown capability or release of radioactivity is greatly reduced.
In addition, during the performance of the leakage test, very sensitive temperature and pressure detectors are installed in various areas of the building to determina the building leakage rate. These detectors would serve in a backup capability to indicate the course of leakage test. For these reasons, we have concluded that during this period it is acceptable for the installed fire detectors (ionization chambers) to be inoperable.
. Considering all the factors involved, we have concluded that the changes to the fire protection system surveillance requirements, as discussed above, will result in an improved level of protection for the Salem Unit 1 facility.
Miscellaneous Administrative Changes In Amendment No. 6 issued on July 7,1977, we included a provision to Specification 6.3.1, Facility Staff Qualifications, which waived for one year, the requirement that the Maintenance Engineer have ut least one year of nuclear experience.
Since the one year period has evapsed, this provision is now being removed from the Technical Specifications.
Since the implementation of the environmental surveillance program is now the responsibility of the Engineering and Construction Department rather than the Mechanical Division of the Engineering Department as discussed above, Figure 5.2-2 in the Appendix B Technical Specifica-tions which. identifies the organization of the latter department, is no longer n(cessary and is being removed by this amendment.
In addition, Figure 5.2-3 in the Appendix B Technical Specifications which identifies the Salem Station organization is a duplication of Figure 6.2-2 of the Appendix A Technical Specifications and is therefore being removed by this amendment, with a reference to Figure 6.2-2 being added in Section 5.2.1 of the Appendix B Technical Specifications.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that this amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact, and pursuant to 10 CFR $51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
7-Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards coinsideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date: February 12, 1979
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