ML19261B672
| ML19261B672 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/08/1979 |
| From: | Ahearne J, Gilinsky V, Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T, NUDOCS 7902280383 | |
| Download: ML19261B672 (85) | |
Text
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we ORIilNAL NUCLEAR REGULATO RY COMMISSION-
/
m IN. THE MATTER O F:
1 COMMISSION MEETING:
JOINT MEETING WITH ACRS Place - Washington, D. C.
Date - Thursday, 8 February 1979 Pages I-49
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e DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on 'Ihursdav, 8 Februarv 1979 The Commission's offices at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.
meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
. The transcript is intended solely for general infoma'tional purposes.
'(-
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.
Jo pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Co:nt.ission may authorize.
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2 CR2641 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA E.Shev all 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO!!
3
,~ '
COMMISSION MEETING i
4 l
5 l
JOINT MEETING WITH ACRS 6
7 Room 1130 1717 H Street, N.
W.
8 Washington, D.
C.
9 Thursday, February 8, 1979 10 i The Commission met with the ACRS, pursuant to II notice, at 2:00 p.m.
I2 BEFORE:
13 DR. JOSEPH M.
HENDRIE, Chairman
(
I4 JOHN AHEARNE, Commissioner 15 VICTOR GILINSKV, Commissioner 16 PETER A.
BRADFORD, Commissioner 17 ALSO PRESENT FOR ACRS :
l l
18 S.
LAWROSKI D.
OKRENT I
I9 M.
CARBON W.
MATHIS 20 H.
ETHERINGTON D. MOELLER 21 W.
KERR J.
RAY j
22 C. MARK k_
23 M.
PLESSET 24 P.
SHEWMON Aes Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 C.
SIESS I
I i
2-A l
I PROCEEDINGS CR 2641 2
.SHEV all CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The Commission meets this after-l 3l noon with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
I will 4
say we are very glad to see you a]1.
i 1
5 Let's see, we are missing at least one, aren't we?
I 6
Well, Max, I see we have an agenda between us.
Nhy l
l l
7 don't we start working our way down it.
8 DR. CARBON:
We are pleased to be here, and let me 9
suggest that there is a fourth item, and if time permits, we 10 I would like to discuss Commissioner Gilinsky's letter about II schedule for reviewing the research program, and then if time 12 still permits, about five minutes at the end of the session, 13 we would welcome bringing up several short points.
(,
I I4 Chet, with the letter her, we will call on Dr. Siess 15 to present the first topic, the report to Congress.
16 DR. SIESS:
Gentlemen, you have copies of this, but I7 I am still going to have to read most of it to be sure that I 18 express the consensus of the Committee properly.
I9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I have a lot of trouble like that, 20 too, Chet, I understand.
Go right ahead and read it all.
21 DR. SIESS:
I have got it divided up according to 22 chapters of the reports, and the first is the objectives and j
1 23
(
scope of our review.
2#
In our most recent review we chose certain areas co-Federal Reporters, Inc.,
25 j to review in greater depth than others.
We reviewed the large i
l
3 1
or important programs or projects.
This included LOCA-ECCS, 2
advanced reactors, waste management, earthquake-related researche 3
and risk assessment.
l 4
The reasons for selecting these areas are cited in i
l l
5 the report, and I will not repeat them.
l 6
For its review next year, we have proposed that we j
t 7
are going to try to develop a hierarchy of priorities within the 8
various program areas, or even across the entire safety 9
research program.
I 10 !
We have proposed some objectives by which the 11 priorities might be evaluated, and these are listed in the report, 12 and in the executive summary.
However, we do expect to dis-l i
13 cuss priorities with the various NRC officers, and perhaps
(
l 14 also with the Commissioners, if you so choose.
l 15 Now, with this introduction, I will mention some of i
16 the recommendations from the report that may be of special 17 interest to you.
First is LOCA-ECCS research, and this was i
18 selected for review for special review because of its costs, 19 ' its long history and projected future, and because of our 20 recent proposed changes in objectives and means for achieving 21 them.
j 22 It got a great deal of attention from both the ECCS l
23 subcommittee, and from the full ACRS.
As might be expected, 24 it got a great deal of attention among the ACRS members, but the.
m Feerel Rmorters, lm.
25 comments and recommendations in the report to Congress
4 1
represent the~ consensus, without the sense.
2 Regarding the program as a whole, we believe that l
3 LOCA-ECCS research should not continue to dominate the NRC 4
research program.
Nevertheless, we recommended that the large 5
scale tests be carried out, and the work of independent assess-6 ment of the best estimate codes be intensified.
This will j
i 7
require significant incr ease in funding in FY '80 because of 8
the operational costs involved.
The major reductions in 9
expenditures are expected in the next four to eight years.
10 !
Despite the fact that these recommendations repre-II sent a consensus, some concern has been expressed that continued !
12 funding of expensive projects, such as LOFT, might encroach l
13 upon the adequacy of the support of otner important safety
(
i 14 research programs.
15 We have recommended that the limits to be placed 16 upon the LOFT tests should be reviewed so that the scheduled 17 decommissioning of LOFT by the late 1980s need not be deferred.
18 Would you prefer that I go through completely?
I9 l CHAIRMAN HEMDRIE:
Why don't we let Commissioners 20 pop in as they feel the need.
I had a comment.
I understand 21 what the Committee is saying, but I think that we all have to 22 recognize that as long as these large and expensive experi-l 23 ments are on the program, then a desire the. ECCS-LOCA 4
24 research not dominate the research program may be a thought co Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 for the future, but there isn't much you can do about it.
l l
5 1
Indeed, as long as these large experiments are in 2
the program, they will consume, and they do take enough money 3
each year to keep them going, that inevitably, that item will I
4 dominate in dollars.
If you could get a factor of 10, or a i
l 5
factor of three, I expect you would cut the dependence, but i
i 6
it doesn't seem very practical.
I i
7 Well, please go ahead.
j l
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What is the right way to 9
formulate the attitude toward the LOFT tests that underlies that, l
10 I comment?
If we were starting from today, are you saying that 11 we shouldn't be going in that direction, or is it the feeling 12 that since we have gone that far in that direction, it is time j
t 13 to cut back?
l
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i 14 DR. SIESS:
To answer that, I guess I have to try l
15 to interpret the Conmittee, and I think there were differences 16 of opinion, and I can almost go back to a letbr that the 17 Committee wrote a number of years ago about LOFT to the Commis-18 sion and said that the Committee is of two minds.
One feels 19 1 that LOFT is a waste of time, and the other feels it is the l
20 l greatest thing since sliced bread, and the only thing that we 21 can agree on is, if you are going to do it, get on with it.
i 22 That was written about 10 years ago, and at this i
4 23 stage, I don't think anybody wants to terminate LOFT.
But that 24 is what the Committee said.
a.Fewal Rumr'ers Inc.
25 j DR. CARBON:
I think one other point shows up in I
t I
6 1
this first sentence, should not continue to dominate, and that 2
is pretty much in line with what Dr. Siess is saying.
I i
3 DR. PLESSET:
I think there is one throught that it I
I 4
is very likely that some of the scheduled tests might be omitted i
5 in the light of what is learned as one goes along with the l
l 6
program.
I think that was one of the thoughts.
7 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That depends on what, the 8
degree of confidence that wants to have?
9 DR. PLESSET:
No, it depends on what one learns from I
i 10 ! each test as one goes along.
A great deal was learned from the ;
11 first test, which encourages, perhaps, going to higher power 12 more rapidly, and omitting some of the intermediate power 13 tests.
(
i 14 I think that the staff also has similar ideas.
15 DR. SIESS:
Now, the program on fuel behavior i
16 research
.s the second most expensive progran, chiefly because 17 it involves the PBF, which is a.1other large, expensive tect 18 facility.
We consider the program and funding level for it 19 1 to be generally about right, and made only two specific recom-l 20 l mendations.
I 21 We questioned the high priority now assigned by the 22 staff to PBF experiments related to reactivity insertion i
23 accidents, chiefly in view of the low probability of such i
24 accidents.
And, let's take a look at the basis for those.
co Fede,al Reporters, Inc.
25 j We are concerned about planned reductions in the i
7 1
research on phenomena significant to a core melt accident.
i' 2
Shall I proceed?
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Our policy, Chet, is to allow I
l~
about three quarters of a second, and if you haven't had some-4 4
5 body on the table before then, why, plunge ahead.
6 DR. SIESS:
All right, the program on primary system i 7
integrity is small, not because the problems are unimportant, I
8 but because the staff take advantage of the large amount of re-l 9
search being done by others.
We have made a number of specific 10 ! recommendations about it, and one auestions the low priority I
11 given to environmental effects in pipe cracking, and the other 12 concerns the relation between the NRC's confirmatory research i
13 on steam generator tube integrity and the research being
(
i 14 conducted by the industry.
l 15 The program under the heading operational safety i'
16 is a small, almost ad hoc progran, carried out for the most 17 part by the support branch.
18 We believe it could profitably be expanded to 19 address more systematically the problems encountered, and the 20 lessons learned from the many operating reactors, and to provide 21 a broader and sounder data base for assessments of reliability 22 and risk.
23 And there are some specific suggestions for research 24 topics given in the report.
co Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I thin:: we are going to get some i
I
8 1
specific help from you, Dade.
I believe you recently formed 2
a group in response to Mr. Udall's recommendation for a trial r
3 I program, and the Commission's agreeing that that was a good I
t 4
idea.
It puts you in an organized way, in fact, tryingtolookl l
5 systematically at the things that have occur ed over the last 6
couple of years, that we know about, at any rate.
7 I think it would be very interesting, the recom-8 mendations that may flow then from a view that you will have, 9
and the Committee will have resulting from this work some 10 ! months down the line.
l l
11 DR. SIESS:
The program on advanced reactors was 12 another of our in depth reviews.
It received a areat deal of l
13 attention both from the subcommittee, and the full ACRS.
(
6 14 This is a unique area in that there is no " user 15 need" for research to support licensing actions, since there are 16 no licensing actions for advanced reactors now in progress, 17 except for For St. Vrain.
18 The Committee has recommended that this research 19 be continued in order to provide a basis for meetina future 20 needs, and has made several specific recommendations regarding 21 the program.
22 I would like to mention three of these.
One 23 relating to a study on commercial size LMFBRs; one relating to l
24 research on accident prevention, and the other to the SIMMER co Federal Retorters, Inc.
25 computer code.
9 1
We recommend that the NRC undertake a comprehensive 2
study of the safety questions that are likely to arise for 3
commercial size LMFBRs.
The current program concentrates on I
4 a few important topics, especially the CDA, and has been directed i
i 5
at plants of the general _ size of FFTF, or Clinch River.
i 6
We believe that there is a high priority need to j
l 7
review all possible sources of serious accidents, their proba-8 bilities, and their level of seriousness in plants of l
9 commercial size.
i 10 !
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Why do you feel this a high I
11 priority?
12 DR. SIESS:
I will let the subcommittee chairman 13 answer that.
Mr. Carbon.
i 14 DR. CARBON:
We feel that the research on this 15 should continue in a fairly methodical, planned, consistent i
16 basis, rather than some sort of up and down jumping, plus the 17 fact that we are concerned that in the LWR area, quite a bit of 18 safety research was done after the plants were well along, and 19 by the time the research was done, it was difficult to get 20 input made on a timely basis, and what we are really advocating 21 here is that this research of a general nature, the compre-22 hensive study sort of thing, be done at least along with the I
23 development, so it is not lost after the fact, so to speak.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You say that along with the Ace-Federet Reporters, Inc. l 25 development, do you have underlying this some sense of when l
10 1
the LMFBR may be commercialized?
2 DR. CARBON:
Well, I guess I personally don't have 3
a good feeling for it.
I think our words in the report, the I
l 4
detailed words were something to the effect that unless the i
I i
5 current program is to be deferred for some appreciable time, 6
then we recommend so and so, and I guess the President's current' 7
advanced reactor budget is on the order of $500 million, so 8
I guess it seems to be moving ahead.
I 9
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Not the commercialization t
10 ! part of it, that is more on the order of zero.
Il CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, if you need some lead time 12 on the research, it doesn't help you much to find that next 13 year, or the year after, or whatever, a decision to go is made,
+
i 14 and then you find that I wish I had known that five years ago, 15 so I could have had the safety research in place.
i 16 You have to lead the proposition, the case is being 17 made here that as long as the government has a substantial 18 development program in the area, a modest effort, I don't 19 know, our budget is currently on the order of what, $10 or 20 S12 million, something like that, on safety research to provide 21 an independent view to provide some independent bases for 22 licensing decisions, if those are ever to be made, as a prudent 23 thing to do.
24 l PROF. KERR:
I don't understand Commissioner Ahearne's co Fede,el Reporters, Inc.
25 statement when he said that zero is being spent on i
f
11 1
commercialization.
I think when we use the term developmental 2
work aimed at a commercial breeder, it is not necessarily that 3
we want to build one next year.
There is substantial invest-l i
4 ment aimed at the design of a commercial breeder, isn't there?
l l
5 COMMISSIONER h3EARNE:
There is a substantial l
1 6
amount of money in on the desian of a possible follow on 7
breeder.
The Clinch River commercialization effort is in the 8
zero area, as I recall.
9 COltMISSIONER GILINSKv:
When you refer to plants of 10 ! commercial size, do you mean thousand megawatt plants, or what?,
1 11 DR. CARBON:
That order of size, yes.
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
And are there important 13 differences in the safety ct_racteristics in these other plants i
14 you referred to, Clinch River?
15 DR. CARBON:
Certainly there are some differences in 16 the safety aspects, and part of what we are recommending here 17 is to look at them, and find out what kinds of differences 18 there are so as to be able to anticipate them, and be prepared 19 1 for them, rather than to all of a sudden discover them way down l
20 l the road somewhere.
21 DR. OKRENT:
If I could try to give a perspective 22 back over some years in light water reactors, I would say the l
I 23 emphasis on problems in residual heat removal is in the 70s.
24 The emphasis on LOCA-ECCS came in the middle of the 60s.
Had co Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 we had WASH-1400 in 1965 or
'66, we might have started the two i
12 1
at the same time.
2 I think what we would like to do for LMFBRs is to 3
have the NRC staff take a broader look, not that the work they 4
are doing isn't in an unimportant area, but to see what are 5
the other potentially important areas for LMFBRs from the 6
NRC point of view, and then see how these change if you go to 7
a larger plant, or to a cooled type or a loop type.
8 DR. SIESS:
The second iten related to the accident 9
prevention, we feel that accident prevention and accident miti-l 10 1 gation both improve safety.
l 11 For the LMPBR, the industry and DOE appear to have l
12 directed their research chiefly toward prevention, waile the 13 NRC has placed more emphasis on understanding and or mitigation.
14 Although we aaree generally with this division of 15 effort, we have reccmmended that the NRC place more emphasis on ;
I 16 accident prevention reserach in order to be able to confirm l
17 the adequacy of the work being done by the industry and DOE.
18 And more emphasis, means more than I think is now being placed.
I 19 We believe that the development of the SIMMER code 20 will provide useful knowledge about the course of a CDA in an I
l 21 LMFBR.
However, we believe that the primary value of the code l-22 will lead to increased understanding of the event.
I 23 For this and other reasons, we do not believe that 24 work on code development and validation should carry a priority Aa-FMwal Recrters, tm 25 higher than other work, such as a comprehensive study of safety i
e
13 1
questions for commercial size LMFBRs, and the studies on 2
accident prevention just mentioned.
3 Under the heading of extreme external phenomena, k
4 we believe that the new Seismic Safety Margins Research Program 5
is important and should receive a high priority.
6 This program is similar to the LOCA-ECCS program in 7
importance and scope and to a very significant extent, in its 8
methodology.
However, it differs from the LOCA-ECCS program 9
in that, at least initially, 1.s objectives have been more l
l 10 I limited.
We-agree with these more limited objectives, and believethatthereissomechancetheycanbeachievedonatimel 11 12 scale and at a cost significantly less than those of the 13 LOCA-ECCS program.
And, we intend to follow this program quite i
14 closely.
l i
15 We believe that the research efforts in the radio'.ogical i
16 effects area generally are well 5.ocused an'd progressing satis-I i
17 factorily.
i 18 Increased attention was recommended in several areas,j i
19 and one of the more important was to have the NRC to arrange to 20 have the NRC data banks on occupational radiation exposures I
i 21 examined by qualified epidemiologists.
I 22 Dr. Moeller is the expert on this if you have any 23, questions about the specific recommendations 24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Could you expand on that a Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
I 25 little bit on t.he issue of having the data bank examined by i
14 1
qualified epicemiologists.
2 DR. MOELLER:
I'm sure you are aware that just in 3
the past several years, there has been considerable contro-4 versy about the studies of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard workers, 5
the workers at Hanford, the Mancuso study there, and so forth.
6 In due time, if it hasn't already been done, epi-7 demiologists and other investigators of the health effects of 8
low level radiation exposures are going to want to use the 9
NRC data bank.
In other words, the data on exposures at com-l l
10 I mercial power plants.
In order for those data to be of maxi-11 mum use to these people, you need information such as the age 12 and sex of the person being exposed, whether they smoke cigar-13 ettes, whether they are exposed to other carcinogenic agents, 14 in addition to radiation, and whether they are receiving other 15 sources of radiation, such as through medical X-rays.
i 16 We believe, and this is our most important recom-l 17 mendation in this chapter, we believe that you might be wise i
18 to have some people who are expert in using these types of I
l 19 data in epidemiological studies look at the data you are 20 recording, and make any improvements that are necessary.
j l
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So that your recommendation 22 isn't to try to extract from existing data, as it is to see 23 what way the collection mechanism may be changed?
l 24 DR. MOELLER:
Yes.
We are not suggesting that you Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
f 25 launch major epidemiological studies, but rather to be sure i
i e
i
15 I
that you can provide adequate data to people who request it.
2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
There are some related efforts 3
under way.
One of them mandated by Congress in the authoriza-4 tion bill for
'79, which amounts to taking a look at our 5
sources of information, and what other data are around, and 6
making some, I don't know whether you would call it calculations 7
estimates, as to what a careful analysis of that body of 8
information might yield.
9 The proposition had originally been to go full score l
10 1 on a great sweeping statistical study, but I think it comes
+
l 11 better this way, in which you first try to decide the character l 12 of the information out there, and what you are likely to get, 13 and what sort of bases you are going to try to shake it down 14 for a conclusion, and part of that fits well with the kind of 15 recommendation that you make here as regards the NRC exposure
\\
16 data.
l l
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Vou didn't have any specific i
18 list of immediate changes you recommend we examine, but rather 19 you recognize that this is something we ought to think about, and 20 have someone provide recommendations on?
21 DR. MOELLER:
Well, I believe that the Committee 22 would urge that you look at the data bank now, or have some l
l 23 experts look at it, and see how adequate it is.
I don't know, i
l 24 personally, but we do believe that it may not have all of these Ace Federal Fieporters, Inc.
25 factors within it.
i f
16 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Does it, Joe?
2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I have never seen one of these 3
enterprises go yet which you decide you will now look at what 4
you have got over here in the file cabinet and draw some con-5 clusions, but what you discover you wish there were about seven 6
more entries on every file card in it.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's what Dade is saying, 8
that is what you are recommending, isn't it, to see what is 9
there, and to see what other entries would we want to try to l
10 I have on there.
l 11 DR. MOELLER:
Correct.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Depending upon what the statis-13 ticians think, they might like to have some of these things 14 out eventually, why, we can also then become to grips with one 15 of the nagging problems in this area, and that is the inter-l i
16 section between the public interest, and being able to draw j
17 overall health effects inferences from a large body of data, 18 and the privacy rights of the individuals from whom all this i
19 data is perforce collected.
It could being to arise even as 20 early as the statisticians deciding that they would like to 21 know a number of things in addition to just the broad exposure I
22 data on people.
l 23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Could I ask a question about i
24 the third recommendation in the summary?
Aa-Feud Reporars,1N.
I 25 You have a research to develop and improve methods i
i
17 1
1 in the data base according to calculation of radiation doses 2
to population groups residing inthe vicinity of nuclear facilitie s.
3-DR. MOELLER:
Which page is that?
l 4
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That is page ll.
5 DR. MOELLER:
Yes, sir, we are very interested in 6
the area of decontamination and decommissioning in terms of 7
the public interest in this area, as well as the plants 8
which in due time will be coming up for decommissioning.
9 On that item, we believe that the methods, of i
l i
10 I course, can always stand improving, and that the data base l
11 supporting the calculations that you make can stand improving.
l 12 I must say, in this particular area, that you have 13 moved forward quite well, and certainly in your Appendix I 14 calculations, the supporting methodology and in the reg guides I
i 15 which you have recently developed, there has been considerable i
16 progress made.
I don't believe that that particular recom-17 mendation carries as high a priority as some of the others.
I 18 DR. SIESS:
That is elaborated on page 8-3.
i 19 We believe the the problems in waste management are j
20 important and will require significant amounts of research.
l 1
i 21 The current NRC program appears to be uncoordinated and unfocusep, -
22 and progress to date has been inadecuate.
This is due at least l
23 in part to similar deficiencies in the national program.
I 24 However, within the NRC program the deficiencies include a Am-FMwal Rmo,te,s, inc.
{
25 lack of systematic processes for identifying research needs, i
i
18 1
and for assigning priorities, and the lack of adequate inter-2 action and communication among the several NRC groups involved, 3
especially in communicating research needs to the Office of 4
Research.
5 The report list several areas we believe should 6
receive increased attention, and Dr. Moeller will be happy to 7
comment on these, if you wish, or will answer any cuestions 8
you may have.
9 I might emphasize that we believe this area should I
i 10 receive increased attention.
l 1
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I would comment, justasacenerall 12 note that, as you know, we have recently established a waste 13 mangement division under the Nuclear Materials and Safeguards 14 Office, and I have appointed a director to it, even more 15 recently appointed a director, and in fact, we have a new i
16 director in the NMSS offices, and I look to them to straighten l
l 17 some of these problems out with working with the Office of l'
18 Research, and will be interested down the line in the Com-I 19 mittee's views as to how that is working out.
20 MR. GOSSICK:
Mr. Chairma I might just mention, l
21 I told you the other day that we are in the process of estab-l-
t 22 lishing a comparable group to the star group which is used to l
l 23 coordinate the research and technical assistance in the safe-I l
24 guards area.
We are setting up a waste coordination group Am-FMwal Rmorters, lm.
l 25 which will make sure that our technical assistance and NMSS i
i
19 1
research work, standards and so forth is looked at in concert 2
and coordinated and make sure it is not duplicated work.
3 DR. CARBON:
I think it would be appropriate also if 4
Dr. Moeller made an additional comment on some other work that 5
we had done on waste.
6 DR. MOELLER:
Yes, thank you.
The Committee has received the report from the staff entitled, " Regulation of 7
8 Federal Radioactive Waste Activities."
This is the Office of 9
NMSS that has prepared a draft of January 15th, in anticipa-10 1 tion of preparing a report to Congrest on March 1st, I believe i
l 11 it is.
12 This has not been reviewed in a subcommittee 13 meeting, nor has it been reviewed formally by the full Com-(
14 mittee, but several members of the ACRS who are qualified l
I 1
15 in the waste management area have read this draft report, and I
16 all of the members who read it were highly critical.
l t
17 We discussed the report some this morning in open i
i l
18 session, and we suggest that perhaps the transcript, the i
19 verbatim transcript of that open session be made available to l
l 20 the NRC staff in terms of perhaps revising or changing certain i
l 21 portions of this report before it is submitted to you, and l
22 then to the Congress.
23 We would encourage the Commissioners, you, to 24 review this report very carefully before it goes forward.
We a-FewW Reorters, lm.
l I
25 would hope that our comments will be considered and we would i
20 1
urge that the draft be considerably revised before it is 2
forwarded.
3l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I'm delighted to hear you 4
say that.
5 COMMISSIONER GILIN5KY:
Could you give us a capsule 6
version of your criticism?
7 DR. MOELLER:
We can provide you with some of them.
8 We read in detail the charge to the Commission, as we under-9 stood it in the Senators' letter of several months ago.
The l
10 I charge asked that first of all you look at the interagency l
Il review group report, and evaluate the scientifica soundness of f
12 the recommendations given in it, and so forth, and then after 13 giving you that charge, the Senators went on to say, in 14 addition, we would like for you to look at the following five, I
I 15 six, or seven particular specific questions.
i i
16 In reviewing the report, we find the in addition l
1 17 questions being addressed, but I could not find the m.jor I
18 charge having been addressed.
Then, within the draft report, i
19 it is stated that a major portion of the effort of the MRC 20 staff in preparing the report, and responding to the Senators' l
21 request, was devoted to preparing an inventory of the waste l
l 22 buried at the various DOE sites.
23 I believe, personally, that that was an error, that l
l 24 in other words, your staff should have called the DOE officials Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 and said send us an inventory, send us a listing of what you
21 1
have, and where it is buried, and so forth, and then the staff 2
could have devoted more of their time to answering the 3, specific questions that were needed.
I 4
So, in general, those are examples of our criticisms.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Just principally, was the 6
lack of attention given to technical aspects of the IRG report, 7
that you found deficient?
8 DR. MOELLER:
Yes.
And, for example, they also-9 asked that you compare the risks of commercial waste to I
10 1 military or defense waste.
In that comparison, the staff has l
11 developed a group of scenarios in which they anticipate the l
i 12 members of the public coming to a waste disposal site, and some-13 how intruding into the site and being exposed.
14 Well, after carefully developing and explaining l
15 all these scenarios, the bottom line is they simply took the j
16 radionuclides that are buried there, and the quantities of l
17 each, and looked up their toxicity, and made an estimate of I
I 18 the risk.
Well, anyone could have done that without all of the I
19 scenario work.
l l
20 There is also a question as to how accurate these j
21 evaluations are relative to the toxicity of each nuclide.
22 We would say, simply, that the report, in our opinion,
23 needs considerable work.
I 24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
Did you have a chance l
Aa-FMwW Reporars, lm.
25 to look at the conclusions?
I l
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22 1
DR. MOELLER:
No, sir.
Our copy did not contain 2
them.
3 DR. PLESSET:
Do we have those yet?
(
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I just got mine, yesterday or the 5
day before.
In the last few days. I trust the draft recom-6 mendations will go to the Committee.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I suspect you will have 8
similar comments on that.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think it would be interesting 10 I to get that transcript back to the Commission.
l 11 DR. SIESS:
Shall I proceed, Mr. Chairman?
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Please do.
13 DR. SIESS:
In the area of safeguards and security, 14 we believe that the current levels of activity and funding are i
15 adequate in this are.
However, the Committee believes that carej i
16 should be exercised to assure the usefulness of the computer l
17 codes that have been developed for assessing the probability of l l
18 intercepting an intruder, or a group of intruders.
There l
l 19 are some other suggestions.
l 20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Could you elaborate on that?
21 DR. SIESS:
I'd like to call on the Chairman of the 22 Subcommittee, Dr. Mark.
23 DR. MARK:
This was a feeling that some of us, l
24 certainly myself, developed in listening.
Am-FMwal Rmorars, lm.
I 25 There are computer codes, which I think can be j
I i
t
23 1
described as war game type scenarios, and these are being 2
worked up at Sandia, for example.
3 It is not fully clear to me what the staff propose 1
4 to do with these codes, und if they are not going to use them, 5
then why are they developed.
An applicant might or might not 6
use them, but this, I am perhaps giving a feeling that I think 7
they are useless.
I don't think it is at all clear, certainly 8
not clear uc me.
9 I do think that the progress we heard had to do with I
I 10 1 development of the code, and rather little with conclusions l
11 which people had worked up from using the codes.
That is 12 what is behind this last sentence, that if you are going to 13 make a code, that's fine, but if you are not going to use it, 14 then why did you make it.
l 15 There is quite a lisc of these things, and they are l
l 16 very complicated like two insiders and three outsiders and 17 five fences, and how quick can you get from here to there.
I l
18 Nice logical games.
Four defenders against six in i
19 an ambush.
Well, you can really have a lot of fun with those l
20 things.
l 21 DR. SIESS:
Okay, the next item is probabilistic 22 risk assessment.
We consider the research programs in this 23 area adequate for this stage in the development of probabilistic 24 risk assessment.
We have recommended that greater use be made I
Aa-FMwal Rmorars, lM.
25 of this methodology, especially in the planning of the NRC i
l I
i
24 1
research program.
2 However, we expressed some concern about the possible 3
concentration of risk assessment activity in the Probabilistic 4
Analysis Staff of the Office of Research.
We recommend that 5
a strong effort be made to spread the capability in this area 6
to a greater extent throughout all segments of the research 7
and licensing programs.
8 We note that the NRC has begun a study of accept-9 able risk, that is, how safe is safe enough, and this we 10 1 endorse.
However, we have suggested to the Congress that the i
11 many other federal agencies with responsibility for setting l
12 safety standards also should participate in a broadly based 13 study of acceptable risk.
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Do you have any thoughts on l
15 how to spread this capability beyond the Office of Research?
I 16 DR. SIESS:
Education.
I know they have been 17 training people in this methodology, as a part of the l
l 18 assessments staff activity.
Probabilistic risk assessment is I
19 a methodology; it should be a tool in the tool box of most l
20 safety related people, or engineers.
l 21 It isn't for most of them, unless they graduated 22 very recently, and I think it is mainly a matter of education, 23 and being sure that the operations are such that all the 24 expertise isn't just funnelled into one area of research, but Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 that the knowledge and the people are spread throughout.
i e
i
25 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is it education of the people 2
that are in place, or are you recommending bringing new people 3
in?
4l DR. SIESS:
I think if you bring new people in, 5
they will probably end up in the PAS.
It is like a lot of 6
other methodologies and new techniques, the next generation 7
of-engineers will be trained in it, that's why I think some 8
of it is just training.
9 PROF. KERR:
I don't think we know the best way to j
i 10 1 accomplish this, anyway.
I think we observed that we thought I
l 11 such a concentration does now exist, and we are simply sayinq l
12 that we believe it is a promising approach, and it should be 13 generally available to people who are in the licensing and i
14 assessing business.
I i
15 DR. SIESS:
If it isn't, then the PAS is going to I
16 be serving as a service bureau for a lot of people, and not j
l 17 working on research on improved safety.
l 18 Research on improved safety, we believe this program '
19 should receive a high priority,and we consider it unfortunate 20 that it could not be initiated in FY 1978, and that it is i
l 21 beging funded at only a relatively low level in FY 1979, and I l
22 believe I could add, has not been initiated yet.
23 More specifically, we have recommended funding at I
24
$1.5 million in FY 1979, by reallocation, if necessary, and Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 at levels in future years sufficient to complete all of the I
26 1
studies proposed in NUREG-0438 in a timely fashion.
2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, I'll tell you, the Com-3 mission didn't approve the reprogramming.
It would have put 4
$.8 million in the
'78, they would make it available for this 5
work in '79, until fairly recently, so I suspect the burden 6
of the slow start in '79 may rest on this side of the table 7
rather than out there some place.
8 DR. SIESS:
We are talking co you today.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think it is useful to have l
10 1 that well understood.
i 11 With regard to higher levels, the Office of Manage-l 12 ment and Budget has trimmed us back to $1 million in
'80, and 13 said stick to analysis, not to hardware experiments.
They 14 believe that some of the work that we would have proposed to i
i 15 do in what had been about $4.5 million for
'80, a proposed j
i 16 budget in this are, was more appropriately done by the Depart-I 17 ment of Energy.
And there is a budget for improved reactor 18 light water, improved reactor safety matters in DOE.
Seems i
19 to me it was specified at about $7 million, something like that.!
i 20 We, of course, will be discussing that matter as l
21 we go forward and talk to our authorization and appropriation i
22 committees, and we shall see how it all works out, but, if, i
23 indeed the '80 budget for this program remains in NRC at 24 about the $1 million level, why, then I think, if anything, Ace-Fs 1eral Reporters, Inc.
25 the funds that we have proposed to reprogram for this year,
'79, I
27 1
if anything, those funds are on the generous side.
2 If the program is going to come to steady state at 3
about $1 million a year, why, $.8 in year 1, especially with I
i k-4 a start along about midyear, is excessive.
So, I think the 5
overall size of the improved safety program in NRC looks as 6
though it is going to be smaller than we thought when we made 7
the program plan last fall.
If that is so, why, okay, we will 8
see that the rest of it is appropriately taken up on the DOE 9
side, and carried out with them.
l 10 i DR. SIESS:
What are the possibilities of seeing l
11 it is taken up on the DOE side?
l 12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think tolerably good.
With 13 the specific management decision made by OMB that really the 14 development work ought to be over there rathe:than over here, I
i 15 but that there is to be a program here to provide sort of l
l 16 lead thinking on it and identification of the best targets for 1
17 this kind of work, and so on, I think that gives us a pretty i
18 good basis for talking to DOE about their programs, and seeing 3
1 19 where it goes, speaking up if we think it isn't headed in ways i
20 that we might have taken it ourselves, at least in part, if I
l 21 we had had a larger program.
I 22 DR. SIESS:
I noticed in the DOE program, they have 23 got $1 million out of $3.9 million extended burn up fuel, 24 and I was having some difficulty seeing how that related to Am FMmt R@orms inc.
25 improved safety.
l i
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28 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I don't think it is part of the 2
improved safety, the so-called improved reactor safety program 3
at all.
I
(
4 DR. OKRENT:
But it is shown in the DOE budget, and 5
it is part of their_ continuing plan, as part of their improved 6
safety system program, and I think, if you look in detail 7
at some of the other items, they would not be what at NRC 8
we would label as research to improve reactor safety.
9 They may consider it that from their point of view, l
10 1 but sitting on this side -- one thing I have been wondering 11 is why it wasn't begun last fiscal year.
Is there a sudden l
12 hesitation both by the staff and by the Commissioners to do 13 this kind of research?
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The authority to carry out this l
l 15 kind of work became effective with the authorization bill, was j
l 16 it the '79 bill?
I i
17 MR. FRALEY:
The '78 bill.
The '79 budget was 18 already locked up by the time the '78 budget --
I i
19 DR. OKRENT:
But I find there is flexibility if i
20 one wants, for example, I have little doubt one could fiiA i
21 a-million out of the big LOCA-ECCS program we were talking aboutl, I
22 if one wanted to do more, even this year, if one wanted to 23 develop information to provide the guidance to DOE, if they i
24 will buy the OMB letter that they are suppcoe to look to you l
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 for guidance.
l i
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29 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I dare say you can always re-2 program dollars, but you would like to know where they are 3
going.
l
('
4 MR. LEVINE:
It's a little more complicated than 5
that.
The '78 authorization acked us to prepare a plan for 6
improved safety research.
It did not authorize us to spend 7
any money on the plan.
In our '79 budget, which was already 8
locked up by the time we prepared the plan, there was no money 9
requested for improved safety, because there just wasn't time.
l I
10 i So the '79 authorization bill had no money in it, so although l
11 we were ready with some small funds in
'78, we would have had l
12 to go to the Congress for reprogramming, and it was very 13 near the end of the year.
14 We are'now doing that in
',7 9.
We are trying to 15 plan to reprogram some funds, but we have to still go to l
l 16 Congress, because it is new work which is not authorized in l
17 legislation yet, so we have to ask them for approval, and we 18 plan to do that.
I 19 DR. SIESS:
If we are going to be limited to a l
20 million, or million and a half, and DOE has four, five, or i
21 seven, I see various figures, is there, or will there be some 22 formal liaison between NRC and DOE?
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I don't see any reason why not.
24 MR. LEVINE:
They were members of the research Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 review group that prepared the plan, and we have had further I
i
30 I
discussions with them about continuing to have liaison.
We 2
could easily establish a formal group.
There is no objection.
3 And I would also assure you there is no hesitancy, 4
at least at the staff level, in starting this research work.
5 It has been merely a question of getting authorization.
6 DR. SIESS:
Well ACRS is going to try to review 7
what the staff is doing and what DOE is doing to the extent 8
we can, but we don't think we should be the coordinating group.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I agree.
l 10 I DR. SIESS:
I'm not sure we necessarily want Congress!
l 11 to designate a coordinating group.
It would be nice if some-l 12 where in between, we could get one established.
13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, I think our relations are I
14 good enough with DOE so we can crank up whatever we need, and l
15 if the research staff will make a recommendation, I will call i
i 16 Dell Meyers, and I doubt that there will be any problem at all, l 17 including, I would think, offering reasonable access for the l
18 Committee to talk to the DOE people and hear about the program.
19 DR. OKRENT:
Let me mention two other things.
20 We did receive a communication from DOE as part of the prepara-I I
21 tion of the last report, indicating what they had in mind at 22 that time was not, I think, as extensive as our current 23 information, but I think they indicated, for example, they would i
24 not look at things like vented containment, which is part Am FWwel Rmorters, Inc.
25 of the NRC program, because it didn't fall, as they saw it, j
l
31 1
into a framework of licensing, or whatever.
2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think that point of view, 3
Dave, is somewhat recast by the recent decision at OMB to
(
4 reduce to sort of a low level the funding for this kind of effor 5
here, and to see the bulk of that work go on at DOE.
6 It seems to me that that decision establishes an 7
obligation on the DOE side, that, OMB says they have about 8
$7 million in the '80 budget over there.
Well, in a sense, 9
I regard $3.5 of that as ours.
So, I'm willing to have them l
10 1 say, wait a minute, we were going to do certain things that l
11 we think ought to be in here that were never part of your l
12 thing. Okay, I'd be willing to listen to that argument, but I 13 think we could reasonably take the view that about half of 14 what they are talking about in that activity is stuff that, l
15 other things being equal, we would be doing over here, and that ;
I 16 we have a considerable input on it.
17 I would be kind of surprised if they argued much with 18 that point of view.
On the other hand, I haven't talked to any-i 19 body over there about it.
l 20 DR. CARBON:
Mr. Chairman, are we ready to advance?
I l
1 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We are 55 minutes into the mission 22 Mr. Chairman, we had better be.
It is one and a half apiece I
23 for the next speakers.
24 DR. CARBON:
We would like to briefly discuss the Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
I 25 probabilistic assessment topic, and I call on Dr. Kerr to lead.
i i
32 1
PROF. KERR:
Let me put our discussion more in the 2
nature of a question.
In light of recent developme.its, we 3
would be interested in your comments on how you view future I
(-
4 use of risk assessment.
And secondly, we note that you have 5
asked the staff to prepare a report, paper, I believe, due 6
about June, making comments on the staff's view as to how risk 7
assessment might be used in the licensing process.
8 We are willing, if you wculd like us to, to review 9
the draft of that, and make input at the time the staff does l
10 I its preparation.
l 11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think it would be very useful l
12 for the Committee to see that proposal of the staff's, and 13 discuss it with them.
I expect that it, that the procedures 14 and so on that the staff will lay out there will reflect the i
15 guidance prdvided in the memorandum to the staff from the Com-l 16 mission that followedonthepolicystatementwhichsaidineffept, 17 let us go forward, and use the methodology where it seems t
i 18 appropriate, and there aren't questions about the methods, l
4 19 use results of these techniques in those cases where there seems 20 to be an adequate data base and the methodology is appropriate l
21 and so on.
i 22 In using it, particularly where one comes to 23 overall risk numbers, make very clear the sorts of wide error 24 bands that there are attached to those things, and I would Am FMwal Rmorters, lm.
25 expect the staff's more detailed plans for use would reflect l
1
33 I
that general thrust.
2 It seemed appropriate for the Commission, on the 3
one hand, to provide an interim basis for the staff to use
(
4 risk assessment methods, and results.
There was no inten-5 tion on the Commission's part at declare this some sort of 6
forbidden, black art which we are never to touch again, but 7
rather to take a reasonable account of the findings and 8
recommendations of the Lewis report, which the Commission 9
accepted.
10 l So we provided interim quidance in what we felt i
11 was an appropriate way along those lines, but also felt that 12 rather than regard the words we formed on the subject as a 13 permanent embodiment of how these things ought to 'e done, that 14 it would be useful to let the staff think some more about it, i
15 and come back and tell us what they thought were a set of good j
l 16 ways to go about these things.
I i
17 And I think it would be useful if they would l
18 touch base with the Committee and hear your thoughts on those 19
- matters, j
l 20 I note the Committee has, in response to our request, i
I 21 made a brief summary of the way in which the Committee has 22 taken note of WASH-1400, and perhaps used it or not used it, 23 as the case may be, in its activities, and it seems to me that 24 stands as a reasonable statement by itself, which, unless the Am FMwal Rmonus, W.
25 Commissioners want to ask questions about it, why, I don't I
34 I
want you to feel compelled to discuss with us in detail with 2
us at this time.
1 Questions?
I 4
DR. CARBON:
We will move ahead then, to the third 5
topic, licensing event reports.
6 Dr. Moeller?
7 PROF. KERR:
Does he have a minute, or 30 seconds?
8 DR. MOELLER:
I will do it very rapidly.
We have --
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
This is the easy progress report I
10 1 Dade.
A couple months down the line, we will want to know l
l 11 what you have done, but at this point it is free clear.
l 12 DR. MOELLER:
We have received your letter; I think 13 we understand the charge.
We are searching out the literature 14 of what is available, obviously, the LERs, but we are talking 15 to a number of people both within NRC and outside to gain j
l 16 benefit on die best way to do the study.
We are considering j
17 a variety of approaches.
l l
18 One that I might mention, at the subcommittee meeting l 1
19 we had Wednesday, one of the recommendations of the sub-20 committee to the full Committee will be to tak e four sets of j
l 21 reactors, two for each of the four vendors, and search out 22 and study the LERs for all of those eight reactors.
23 We thought by doing this, we micht could cut it 24 down to a manageable size in terms of the trial study, the AwFewal Reponm, lm.
I 25 initial study you requested.
I believe that is adequate for i
1 l
35 I
the moment, unless you have questions.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Were you going to talk to 3
Hal Lewis?
4 DR. MOELLER:
Yes, sir.
We are going to talk to 5
him, and we haven't mentioned it, but we also understand 6
Dr.Hanauer may have some suggestions for us.
We will have him 7
in within the next month or so, long before we get too far, so 8
we can have the benefit of his counsel, and to tell him what 9
we plan to do, and ask him, is this going to do what you had 10 1 in mind.
i l
11 CHAIRMAN.HENDRIE:
Do you have a feeling for the l
12 number of individual events that the group of eight are 13 likely to mean you will have to look at?
l 14 DR. MOELLER:
Ne know there are 8500 total in the l
l 15 three years, and each reactor runs about 50 a year, so you l
i 16 are talking about 150 for eight react,rs.
150 events over the I
i i
17 three year period for each of eight reactors.
18 DR. MARK:
Except that the chosen reactors have l
1 19 higher than the average number of events.
I 20 DR. MOELLER:
We plan to look at, tohaveourvariousf i
i 21 Committee members look at all of the LERs for a given reactor 22 or pair of reactors.
23 In addition, we plan to request print outs, and have 24 already done so, of LERs by system and by component, and l
A&FMwal Rmorars, lm 25 perhaps call upon our specialists in each of these systems areas
36 1
to look at them.
That way, we will have all the LERs looked 2
at twice, independently by two different groups.
Each looking 3
at the LER from a different perspective.
t 4
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Is there anything to be 5
learned by talking with the Transportation Safety Board?
6 It was the analogy with that activity that suggested this one.
7 DR. MOELLER:
Yes, sir, I believe that has already 8
been done.
Mr. Fraley --
9 MR. FRALEY:
We did go over and talked to some l
10 1 of the people over there, I don't remember their names, off I
l 11 hand, some time ago, but it might be worth having the cub-12 committee meet with them.
That is an idea we haven't fully 13 explored.
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
They may have some ways 15 of going about this that might jog our minds.
l 16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You will be looking at something 17 like over a thousand, maybe if they are high occurrence plants, ;
I 18 1500 of these things.
I 19 DR. MOELLER:
Then we plan, if in looking at the 20 sample, we find a trend in a particular system, or something l
l 21 that bears further investigation, we can immediately request l
22 a print out of that segment for all of the LERs, for all of 23 the reactors.
So, we are going to do as comorehensive a study i
i 24 as we can, and yet, we want to bring it down to a manageable l
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 size so we can meet your deadling, and also recognize that I
t
37 1
it is a trial study, which in tu.n, may lead, of course, to 2
other studies that we will suggest be done.
3 DR. OKRENT:
Excuse me, Dade, weren't you actually t
4 going to supply the consultants with a a full set of compliance?
5 DR. MOELLER:
Yes, for all of them, yes, sir.
6 DR. OKRENT:
In a sense, there would be a larger 7
Population.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You want to take a m_nute or 9
two on the timing of your annual report question?
I think 10 I it is Dr. Siess --
l 1
f 11 DR. SIESS:
By law, we are advisors to the Com-12 mission.
In addition, we have also at times advisors to the 13 Congress, and certainly we haven't neglected the staff in 14 giving advice, and some of our letters to the Commission have
.I 15 been clearly addressed to the staff and the industry.
l I
16 In the report to Congress being prepared now, in 17 two years, we have tried to keep that as advice to the Congress, I
18 we have repeatedly taken out of it things that, where we said, l
1 19 that is something we ought to tell the research staff about I
20 how to do their work, and this is something we ought to tell 21 the Commission, so we will still be sending you so-called 22 reactor safety research letters.
23 The proposal that we get something in, in time to I
24 have an impact on the Commission's review of the budget is an Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
l 25 interesting one t us.
We haven't had too much chance to j
l i
38 I
discuss it, but I think the Committee is generally favorable 2
to the idea.
3 We do see some problems, particularly in timing.
(-
4 To be of some help to you, you would have to have something --
5 we can't write two reports, I don't think we could stand that.
6 We will have to have something to you about August, am I right?
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Before then.
It it is going to 8
be much good, the Commission will do its final mark ups in 9
the period between August 1 and August, say,actually the last l
10 1 week of July and the~first of August.
I Il DR. SIESS:
You would have to have something by 12 July.
Now, I don't know at what is the earliest date which 13 we can start getting budget materials --
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
How about now?
l 15 DR. SIESS:
Now would be too late.
It has taken l
l 16 us about seven months to do this report each year, from the 17 time we started to the time we got it off.
i i
i 18 Ne can probably expedite that some, but not a lot.
i i
19 You know how the Committee works.
We just can't meet every day.
l 20 We would have to have budget material from day one.
We would t
21 have to get it at the very earliest stage so we can start 22 looking at it and factor it into our review.
23 What's more, if you can provide us with that budget 24 material, it becomes a question of how open it is.
Our meetings!
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
I 25 are open meetings.
I don't know that we can close a meeting l
39 I
because we are discussing budget material that hasn't been 2
cleared by the 'ommis sion, or OMB.
3, We can't sit around a desk and look at papers and I
r
\\' -
4 deny them to the public in an open meeting, so, timing is one 5
thing, and the extent to which we would have to protect 6
material that would be essential for our review is the other.
7 We would be happy to explore those.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Just to add an additional 9
perspective, when I got your report, and went through it, my l
10 1 initial question was, Pow does this compare with what we have Il just finished submitting, and where it is different, and why 12 are we different, it was obvious that it is a very valuable 13 instrument, tool, to address are we doing the right thing.
14 I'm not necessarily saying that if we are not doing 15 what you recommended, that we are t ing it incorrectly or l
16 that we will change, butitisastandardtotakeapositionfroh.
17 DR. SIESS:
We have the same question, because this l
18 report is supposed to help the Congress in their consideration I
19 of the FY '80 budget.
When they asked us for this, we said, 20 please, can't we delay it.
Meeting a December 31 deadline l
I 21 was going to be a little hard when you saw it December 16.
~
22 They said, no, we want it by the first of the year 23 because that is when we will start looking at the budget.
l 24 But this report was almost completed before we had Am FMeel R@orters, inc.
l 25 the benefit of the final mark up of the FY '80 budget.
We l
t
40 I
think, wouldn't it be nice if we could hold this up til about 2
March to where it could commer.t to the Congress about the FY '80
- 3. budget.
I
,'(
4 Things don't move that fast in research, but the 5
Congress moves fast; they put things in and take things out, 6
and we don't really have much chance to input on the last steps.
7 So,- the timing and openness of the meeting problem, I think, 8
are the two areas we are going to have to explore on some level 9
to see what could be done.
l 10 I It may be too late this year, because we are already l
11 into February, but we would be willing to try.
12 From your point of view, getting it in in July 13 would be nice, and from our point of view, getting it in about 14 March of the next year would be nice.
15 The one thing we are not going to do is two reports. ;
i 16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
March is, the Senate for instance i-l 17 DR. SIESS:
They are having hearings this month.
i 18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, let's see, on both sides 1
19 they are fairly early dates to get basic authorization and 20 appropriations amounts laid down so the budget committees l
l 21 can decide what the overall package is gring to look like, l
22 and where it is going to have to squeeze, and so on.
23 DR. SIESS:
I think the Congress could get it a 24 little later than December 31.
l Au-Fewal RMmrwrs, inc.
25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
They could stand February 1, or l
l
41
\\
l maybe late in February, but that's beginning to press it.
2 I would guess, February 1.
3 DR. SIESS:
As a preliminary concern, Congress would 4
have no concern about getting it in July or August.
They 5
would be satisfied.
For the following year.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think it wottld be a big 7
help to us.
I 8
DR. SIESS:
That's flattering, you see.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, you end up having to 10 decide viether the Committee's effort is going to be timely l
11 with regard to the congressional review, in which case, it is 12 either six months too early, or six months too late, depending 13 on which year you are talking about from our standpoint, or, 14 if it is timely for us, it is going to be too --
i 15 DR. SIESS:
But, if we put out a supplemental number l 16 1 which addresses the budget that you actually approve.
I 17 MR. GOSSICK:
Just a comment, getting the report to l
l 18 the Commission in July, or in June, at the time the staff has 19 already put its budget together that it is going to be submitting i
20 to the Commission is almost a little late, because what you 21 are faced with then is a retrofit.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It is late from the staff's 23 point of view; it's not late from our point of view.
l 24 MR. GOSSICK:
But what I would suggest, is that we l
A&FewW Rmonus W.
25 are starting right now, we are in the process of developing the l
42 1
planning assumptions and the guidance for the '81 budget, and 2
we will be going out with our budget call about the end of 3
March, as I recall, so it seems that whatever comes out of
\\
4 this report, certainly is going to be very helpful to us at 5
the staff level with respect to the '81 budget.
6 I'm just asking whether, you know, it is possible 7
even by moving it ahead, to make it early enough to influence 8
the current year budget.
I certainly has, I think, a very 9
valuable input to our following year budget.
10 Isn't that right, Saul?
l 11 And, also with regard to any reprogramming that l
12 might be necessary during the course of the year, recognizing 13 that the '80 budget probably won't be put to bed until October 14 or later this year.
15 The problem is that if we start putting our budget l
l 16 for
'81, say, in April, and if the ACRS needs seven months for 17 that, I don't know how they are going to help you.
They would i
18 have to be able to work much faster than that.
It is a very i
l 19 difficult proposition.
l 20 DR. SIESS:
We would expect the FY
'78, the CY '78 21 report, perhaps to have some influence on the staff's FY '81 22 budget, and we will be looking at their '81 budget, but I 23 think giving advice to the staff has always been the preceding 24 year's advice.
Whether we could provide advice to the Com-I Aa-FMwas Rmorters, lm.
25 mission in time for their consideration, if your budget k
43 1
operations goes from April to July, it is just a question of whether ACRS can concentrate its effort into that same period.
2 i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKv:
Speaking for myself, I would 3l 4
find it very helpF-1, and even if it didn't impact the process 5
for the staff, it would certainly affect my thinking.
6 DR. SIESS:
It has been suqqested that we might come up with some interim recommendations directly to the 7
Commission, developed out of the early stages of our review 8
9 in the form of a letter, and the same report that goes to 10 Congress.
11 DR. SHEWMON:
It seems to me that the timing item is 12 a red herring, because we are talking about a last year's 13 budget, and Congress presumably finds this helpful to next 14 year's budget.
15 It seems to me a different kind of a question to 16 bring out would be if we were writing something to the Com-17 mission instead of what we wanted to put up for public laundry i
18 washing, we would write a different set of items.
i.
I 19 As Chet said, several things have come up, and whether 20 you guys put this away and open it up four months later, and i
21 all of a sudden it is special, I don't think the timeliness 22 is going to change that much, but I think what could get 23 covered in an internal letter as opposed to a public, well, I i
24 guess they are all public, could ocen uo a different set of A&FewW Reorms, lm.
l 25 questions that might be--
l l
i
44 1
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But still, doesn't it make 2
a difference whether you are talking about one year's budget 3
or the next year's budget?
4 DR. SHEWMON:
No, because they are the same programs, 5
and what we saw is not what went to Congress this time.
What 6
we really reviewed are the programs and achievements of last 7
year.
8 COMMISS?:ONER GILINSKV:
Sure, but the difference 9
is on the impact the 1980 budget, or the 1981 budget.
- Now, 10 1 accepting the fact that these program don't change radically, 11 still, it makes a difference.
I think it is important that 12 the Commissioners are well informed.
13 DR. SHEWMON:
I wouldn't argue against that state-14 ment, but I think there is some need to better define the 15 kinds of things you would find helpful.
I don't think the i
16 exact timing is the main point.
17 DR. OKRENT:
Can I make a suggestion.
I 18 It seems to me that it is probably of some use to have i
19 the staff write down in some some detail their reactions to the 20 Committee's report which they did last year, but perhaps which l
21 they might do in somewhat greater detail, perhaps indicating 22 how it might influence future programs, and if they did this, 23 let me say, in March or April, and if they gave the Commi~ttee 24 before the first of June, or some time like that, their plans, Am-FewW Reorters, lm.
I 25 in some form, for the budget for
'81, that might be then a l
45 1
basis by which the Committee prepared a letter to the Com-2 missioners commenting on such aspects of both the staff response 3
to its letter, and to the staff's plans for a budget, as it 4
felt it could, and it might not try to take the form of a 5
comprehensive report, it might limit itself as it felt was 6
meaningful.
7 So, it might be some compromise step of this sort 8
that could fit in, that didn't use the full amount of effort 9
that is involved here, and where we might in scrae cases, give 10 more detailed comments.
Then we would write in the report Il to the Congress as we used to in letters to the Commission, 12 on certain aspects of the safe'y research program.
13 But given the freedom, if we are unable to, we 14 cmit certain parts of the program from review for whatever l
15 reason:
it seems all right, or we just can't take the time 16 for this one, or whatever it is, within the means and time 17 and so forth, this kind of procedure might come close to giving 18 help, and be practical.
I I9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think something along that 20 line is the sort of possibility that exists.
The Congress l
21 says, make us a report the first of the year, so we will have 22 it in hand when we sit down with the agency's budget, it just, 23 you know, John says that is the staff's problem, but, you know, it would be helpful to us, but that is the staff's problem.
l 24 AwFMwal Rmonen, W.
25 At an earlier time, the Congress will say, let the l
46 1
Commissioners get whatever information they need.
We want the 2
report the first of the year, and that's that, and they write 3
it into law, and that gets to be the law of the land, so you k-4 do that.
5 I think if you are not to do that effort twice 6
a year, then I think in fact a sort of letter torm, based on 7
ynur discussions with the research staff is a perfectly reason-8 able way to have an input to the process.
9 DR. SIESS:
What you are really interested in is 10 major changes in budget increases, decreases, new directions.
11 I don't know what percentage of the dollars that 12 is going to affect, but if we can get those identified early 13 in the review process, I think we can have information that 14 would be helpful to you.
It may even go to Congress.
15 The Congress has not indicated that they would have i
16 any objection to getting this report early.
They didn't say 17 December 31, they said not later than December 31.
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
If it is going to sit down in I
19 the spring, and they are going to have a report like this up 20 here on the desk, they would like to have some approximate 21 relation.
The further out of whack you get between those two, 22 why, the more --
23 DR. SIESS:
As far as the budget, or figures,'this 24 thing probably stopped being heard about September.
Ne i
AwFenW Rmanm, W.
25 certainly didn't have OMB mark ups.
47 1
DR. CARBON:
Would it make sense for two or three 2
of us to meet with Commissioner Gilinsky and hash it out, 3
discuss some of these things in more detail?
( ~
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Oh, only if you are prepared to 5
meet with four other Commissioners on the same basis.
Or, 6
we might have a collegeal discussion.
It might be useful to 7
carry this on further and tab it for the next meeting.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
How long have you been in 9
the ACRS?
10 DR. CARBON:
I guess not long enough.
II DR. OKRENT:
Can I take 30 seconds to bring up one 12 other point that came up in our safety research meetings?
13 There was this question of safety research that 14 didn't have a user, and I don't want to deal with details of 13 it, but I think, personally, and I think members of the Com-10 mittee think that there is merit to having some aspects of the 17 safety research program which doesn't have a user, per se, 18 that seems to be a good idea, if you will, from the point of I
19 view of the people who have to think ahead in the research 20 area.
Il I can think of a time back in the times of the AEC II when that flexibility didn't exist, and we were at the ACRS, 23 and many other people were saying that was unfortunate.
- And, I4 now, suddenly, in a sense that flexibility could disappear Am-Empal pesarMrg, Mg, l
23 if everything had to be user.
l l
48 1
Now, speaking for myself, personally, one might 2
almost think that it pays to take a percentage of this free 3
money, and say that research itself should not decide it, but
(
4 let people propose from the outside, and if they have some 5
good idean, even if it didn't fall in one of their programs, 6
maybe there are some good ideas on F'e outside that the program 7
people can't think up.
8 Well, I'll leave it there.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think it would be useful to 10 develop the discussion than I am afraid I can allow it to go 11 this afternoon, because it is an item of some interest.
12 As time goes along, I notice, what I will call the 13 structural requirements on research projects in terms of their 14 support, and their justification, have become, that structure 15 becomes substantially larger and more cumbersome, and l
16 eventually one begins to wonder if you are perhaps damping out 17 some good ideas that ought to arise in the system, and -maybe 13 don't fit well within the particular licensing office per-l 19 ceptions of what they want done.
l l
20 I think it would be useful to have some further 21 discussion of that, and I would like to see some development 22 of that, but for a future meeting.
And I think that some further 22 discussion of the repor't and timing, o'r alternate means w'lould t
24 also be useful at a future meeting.
AwJwwW Roerwn, Ins, l
25 In view of the hour --
l
4 49 1
DR. SIESS:
Somebody should look at the question 2
of confidentiality of the budget.
3 CHAIRMAN HE!;DRIE:
I don't know.
Is that a big
(
4 problem?
I'm not sure that that is as much of a problem as you 5
might think.
As long as everybody understands that the basis 6
that you are talking about with the staff is maybe something 7
they haven't come to a final conclusion on; the budget review 8
committee hasn't worked on, the EEO hasn't put its stamp on it; 9
let along the Commissioners having walked on it.
10 The nature of the operation is that an awful lot II of the agency's paper is put on the sidewalk in any event, 12 and I hope people, by and large, understand the context of 13 the paper, but occasionally they get run around and misused, 14 and I can't help that.
It is the price you pay for having I3 that stuff out there.
10 As long as Congress thinks it's a fair trade, why, 17 that's the way we are going to run the business.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Max, you said that there i
II were a couple points you wanted to cover right at the end.
20 DR. CARBON:
I think one of them has been covered, 21 and there has been enough time covered.
II CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Thank you very much.
23 (Whereupon, at 3:45, themeetingwasadjourneI.)
24 Aes Pederal Meestvers, Ins, 23 l
&Qh. TO
- 2_-B - Q b M
@D.k ACRS/ COMMISSIONERS MEETING THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979 TABLE OF CONTENTS TAB 1 -- 1978 ACRS Report to Congress on the NRC Safety Research Program Executive Summary (Excerpt)
TAB 2 -- Use of Probabilistic Assessment in th (
Licensing Process R.F.Fraley Memo to Commissioners - subject:
Use Of WASH-1400 By The ACRS dated 1/llM 9 w/ attachments:
a) Applications of WASH-1400 Methodology or Conclusions By ACRS b) D.W.Moeller Letter to M.K.Udall dated July 14, 1976 c) D.W.Moeller Letter to M.K.Udall dated December 16, 1976 d) W.Kerr Letter to W. A. Anders dated April 8, 1975 TAB 3 - ACRS Review of Licensee Event Reports R.F.Fraley Memo to Commissioners - subject:
Review of Licensee Event Report for the Period January 1, 1976 - December 31, 1978 dated 1/10B 9 J.M.Hendrie Letter to S.Lawroski dated 12/28/78 M.K.Udall Letter to J.M.Hendrie dated 11/28/78 w/H.W. Lewis Letter to M.K.Udall dated 10/4/78
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
- ATTACHED ONLY NUR EG-0496 1978 REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SAFETY RESEARCH PROGRAM A Report to the Congress of the United States of America Manuscript Completed: December 1978 Date Published: December 1978 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
EXECLTTIVE StF4%RY 1.
Introduction and Reconnendations The first review by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) of the safety research progran of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission (NRC) was conducted in 1977 and a report submitted to the Congress in December 1977.*
As in its 1977 Report to the Congress, the ACRS has interpreted the words " reactor safety research" as used in Section 5 of Public Law 95-209 to include safety-related research in all phases of the nu-clear fuel cycle.
We objective of the NRC safety research progran has been broadened to include research on improved safety concepts in addition to con-firmatory research related strictly to the NRC's regulatory func-tion. The scope of the current progran is indicated by the estimated expenditures shown in Table 1.
Each program area listed in this table is the subject of a chapter in this report and of a section in the Executive Summary.
'Ihe following observations parallel and are similar to those made in the 1977 Report:
The research program amounts to about one-half of the total NRC budget.
This amount is not excessive in view of the importance and highly technical na ture of the questior.s being addressed.
Expenditures for FY 79 are expected to be about 18 percen.
higher than fer FY 78, but the major portion of this in-crease results from the transfer of operating expenses for the loss-of-Fluid-Test (LOPT) Reactor from the Department of Energy (DOE) to the NRC.
- Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, R_eview and Evaluation of the Nuclear Regulatory _ Commission Safety Researen Pr_o g n, NUREG-0392, December 1977.
l
TABLE 1 ESTIMATED RESEARCH EXPENDITURES FY 78 FY 79 (in nillions)
PROG.W1 SUPPORT S48.6
$67.2 LOCA/ECCS Fuel Behavior 24.1 23.6 Primary System Integrity 8.0 10.1 1.5 1.9 Operational Safety Advanced Reactors 15.7 15.0 Extreme External Phenomena 5.1 6.8 Radlological Effects 7.3 7.7 Waste Management 4.2 4.2 Safeguards and Security 6.6 6.2 Risk Assessment 3.1 3.4 Improved Reactor Safety 0.0 Subtotal
$124.2
$14 6.1 EQUIP 1EVP, PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRA-TIVE SUPPORT AND NON-SAFETY-REIATED RESEARCH**
14.3 17.4 Total
$138.5
$163.5 The NRC plans to reprogram approximately $0.8 million in FY 79 to initiate research in this area.
- Includes non-safety-related environnental and sacioeconomic re-search S-2
About 90 percent of the funds spent for research are for program support, that is, research contracted to outside organizations. We remaining funds are spent for personnel compensation and benefits, travel, equipnent and general aaministrative support.
We programs relating to the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) and to fuel behavior represent about 60 percent of the total ef-fort.
Rese programs involve the use of large and expen-sive test facilities such as U)FT and Power Burst Facility (PBF).
Specific connents regarding elements of each progran are presented in the subsequent sections of this summary and in the body of the report.
The more goneral findings and recommendations are sunnarized below for each progran area.
LOCA/ECCS. A significant increase in funding will be re-quired in FY 80 to cover the planned operation of LOFT.
However, major reductions in expenditures are expected to result from completion of various projects within the next four to eight years and from the decommissioning of LOFT in the late 1980s.
We ACRS concurs with the NRC decision that there is no need for the proposed ECC By-pass Test Facility, the large-scale multiple-purpose test facility, and a full-scale integral test facility.
An essential component of this research program is the in-dependent assessment of the best estinate s x3es and more definitive goals are needed for this effort.
Fuel Behavior.
The projects in this area are important and funding is at an appropriate level in view of the costs of operating PBF.
Since PBF is a unique and ex-tremely useful but expensive facility, the progran of tests in PBF should continue to be closely monitored to assure that it meets clearly defined and justified regu-latory needs.
Primary J stem Integrity.
he Heavy Section Steel Tech-nology (HSST) project should be completed as planned.
The remainder of the program takes advantage of the large amount of research done by others.
Research on piping integrity, however, should receive a higher priority than other new work being proposed.
S-3
Operational Safety.
%is is a small program that could profitably be expanded to address the problens encoun-tered and the lessons learned from the many operating re-actors and to provide a broader and sounder data base for assessments of reliability and risk.
Advanced Reactor Safety.
%e projects in this area are important; the current levels of funding are marginal and modest increases for the next two or three years are ap-propriate.
Additional emphasis should be placed on iden-tifying and exanining basic safety problems related to commercial-sized plants.
Extreme External Phenomena.
Earthquake-related research, which dominates this program, deserves a high priority.
The current level of funding is appropriate but will have to be increased in the years to come to support the seis-mic safety margins research program.
Radiological Effects.
Wis program is generally well fo-cused and progressing satisfactorily.
Increased attention is needed, however, to the development of nethods for the compilation of data that can be utilized nore effectively in evaluating possible relationships between occupational radiation exposures and various health ef fects.
Waste Management.
We problens in this area are inportant and will require significant amounts of researc;. The cur-rent progran appears to be uncoordinated and unfocused and progress to date has been inadequate, at least in part be-cause of similar deficiencies in the national program. We immediate needs in this area are to establish a plan for the research and to improve internal management control.
Safeguards and Security.
%e current program addresses both physical security of plants and transportation, and methods for control and accounting of special nuclear material.
We current levels of activity and funding are adequate.
Risk Assessment.
We current research program is adequate for this stage in the developnent and use of probabilistic risk assessment.
The ACRS recorunends greater use of this nethodology, but is concerned about the possible concentra-tion of that use in the Probabilistic Analysis Staff.
Growth in this area might better be spread throughout all segments of the research and licensing programs.
S-4
Improved Reactor Safety. We ACRS considers this research improved safety concepts to be of high priority and on recommends substantial funding ($1.5 million) in FY 79, by major reprogramming of other NRC funds if necessary, and at multimillion dollar levels in both NRC and DOE for complementary programs in FY 80.
It is evident from the above summary that the ACRS has deemed no major program area to be of low priority.
his is not to say, how-ever, that each program and its elements are being carried out in the most efficient manner and that all of the specific questions being addressed are of equal or even of high priority.
%e ACRS believes that it would be possible in its 1979 review and report to develop a hierarchy of priorities within the various program areas and perhaps even across the entire safety research program.
In attenpting to do this, the ACRS intends to evaluate each program element or subelement in terms of its relation to objectives such as:
To confirm that a proposed design may be licensed.
To understand and characterize complex phenomena in order that better licensing decisions can be made.
To establish the margins that exist in approved or pro-posed designs, and the sensitivity of performance to specific system features.
To establish the reliability of important safety systems.
To disclose unexpected phenomena and interactions.
To exanine approaches for potential improvenents to re-actor safety.
To provide bases for the develogient of improved licens-ing criteria.
To maintain availabla a body of competent, knowledgeable experts to assist the NRC in its evaluation of complex technical proposals for licensing.
2.
Loss-of-Coolant Accident and Emergency Core Cooling Systems he loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) intended to mitigate its consequences continue to be important matters to the NRC, the nuclear industry, and to both the technical and lay public.
For licensing purposes, specific and con-servative rules for evaluating the adequacy of the ECCS were promul-gated after an extensive and exhaustive rulemaking hearing.
The research prograns are directed at producing a reasonable quantitative evaluation of the safety margins embedded in the licensing processes.
Research on LOCA/ECCS was begun under the Atomic Energy Commission and is continuing at an increasing level under the NRC.
The NRC has proposed major reductions in fundinq within the next four to eight years as various projects in the program are completed.
The ACR5 concurs with the decision by the tac that there is no need fo r the proposed ECC Bypass Test Facility, the large-scale multi-purpose test facility, and a full-scale integral test facility.
A cooperative program, involving large-scale test facilities, is being developed among the tac and similar agencies in the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan.
%e II)CA/ECCS program consists of two parts:
(1) experiments to study the physical phenomena involved in LOCA/ECCS, and provide input for mathematical models, and additional experiments for independent assessments, and (2) the development of relatively complex computer codes to predict the course of a postulated LOCA and the realistic performance of the ECCS.
Although primary emphasis is on the large LOCA, the codes being developed provide a basis for investigating a range of postulated LOCAs and other off-normal transients.
Considering the progress being made and the status of the conserva-tive licensing processes, the ACRS believes that the LOCA/ECCS research should not continue to dominate the NRC research programs.
Nevertheless, the ACRS recommends that the large-scale tests of the international program and those planned for the next few years in LOFT be carried out.
We ACRS recommends further that the work on independent assessment of the best estimate codes be intensified.
The predictions of computer codes will never be perfectly accurate, and any attempt to make them so will require an unending expenditure of time and money. What is necessary now is for the NRC to determine what level of accuracy--or what level of uncertainty--will be ade-quate for its regulatory function.
The ACRS recommends that a quantifiable decision on this matter should be made within the next year in order to provide a yardstick against which the results of the S-6
II)CA/ECCS research program can be measured and to provide a basis for deciding when the program has been completed.
A clear-cut schedule for termination of the WFT tests should be established.
Each major WFr test, where appropriate, should be preceded by blind predictions from best estimate codes; blind predictions should be made with the advanced code, TRAC, for the 3D-2D international test series.
3.
Fuel Behavior his program is concerned with the behavior of the uranium oxide fuel and the zirconium alloy tubes (cladding) in which it is encased.
Rese tubes provide the first line of defense against the release of radioactive fission products.
%e research on fuel behavior is both analytical and experimental.
The analytical research is devoted to the developnent of computer codes to describe the tehavior of the fuel under various abnomal conditions.
The experimental research involves tests on actual fuel rods (fuel plus cladding) in various test facilities, including the PBF in the U.S., the Halien Reactor in Norway, and the MRU Reactor in Canada.
The experimental program also includes studies of phenomena of potential importance to postu-lated core melt accidents including fuel-coolant interaction, re-lease and transport of radioactive fission products f rom molten fuel, and the interaction between concrete and molten fuel.
All of thess programs are important and producing valuable results.
The ACRS offers the following specific reconnendations:
a) The high priority now assigned by the NRC Staff to experiments in PSF relating to reactivity-insertion accidents should be reassessed in view of the very low probability of such accidents.
b) The research proqram on phenomena significant to a core melt accident is important and should continue.
4.
Primary _ System Integrity
%e primary system, comprised of the reactor pressure vessel, other vessels, and piping, r_,ntains the cooling water under high presrure.
This system constitutes the second line of defense against release of radioactivity to the environment.
Failure of the reactor pressure vessel is considered by the NRC to be of such low probability that it need not be postulated as a design basis accident.
Failure of the primary system piping, how-ever, is considered to be more probabic and is in fact assumed as the design basis loss-of-coolant accident.
S-7
%e objective of research in this area is to assure that the proba-bility of failure in the primary system is suitably low.
In prac-tice, the desired high quality of the primary system is sought by utilizing appropriately conservative procedures in design, fabrica-tion, inspection, and operation.
A large amount of research in all of these areas is being carried out by organizations other than the NRC.
Except for its sponsorship of the Heavy Section Steel Tech-nology (HSST) project, the chief requirements of the NRC are to maintain a high level of cognizance of what is being done by others in this country and elsewhere, and to sponsor a moderate amount of research of its own to provide confirmation of and confidance in the results obtained by others.
Wis program is important and deserves an overall high priority.
In general, it is being conducted in a manner suitable to the needs of NRC as mentioned above.
However, the following recommendations are made regarding relative priorities and emphasis within the program:
a) The HSST program should be completed as planned.
b) Research on quantification of piping reliability de-serves a high priority.
c) An expanded ef fo rt is needed to study the effects of coolant chemistry on the formation and growth of cracks in primary system components.
d) Additional effort is needed to evaluate the findings from operating experience relating to possible satura-tion effects in radiation embrittlement.
e) The research program on steam generator tube integrity should be reviewed to assure that it is appropriately confirmatory in nature and does not unnecessarily duplicate the industry programs.
5.
_ Operational Safety This is a small program, carried out chiefly by the Research Support Branch' to address safety questions related to the operation of nu-clear power plants.
We current program includes research on quali-fication testing of equipment that might be exposed to hostile environments in the event of a fire or an accident, fire protection, noise diagnostic procedures, and the role of human errors in reactor safety, including the question of control-room design and man-machine interaction.
S-8
All of these problems, and others like them that will arise from time to time as more operating experience is obtained, are important but will vary in priority on an ad hoc basis.
The ACRS believes that the question of man-machine interface deserves a high priority.
Both the adverse consequences of errors made by people and the fa-vorable aspects of man's adaptability and ingenuity need further examination with regard to reactor sa fety.
The advantages and disadvantages of a greater degree of computer-controlled automation should be explored, as should the potential for computer-aided guidance to operators during anticipated events.
In addition, a more systematic review and evaluation of operational experience and operational incidents in U.S. plants and in similar plants in other countries should be undertaken in order to provide a broader and sounder data base for assessments of reliability ai.; risk.
6.
Advanced Reactor Safety Advanced reactors include breeder reactors, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, and advanced converters such a t the spectral-shif t and heavy-water reactors.
Research on advanced reactor safety in unique in that no licensing actions relating to such reactors are now in pr 3ress.
- However, some form of advanced reactor is considered a viable source of power for the future.
Accordingly, it is prudent for the NRC to assune that such reactors will require licensing in the future and to be prepared to take such action when called upon.
This could involve the Clinch River Breeder Reactor at an early date, depending on decisions made at the national level, or could involve different types of reactors approaching connercial size, on a longer time scale.
Particularly for the latter case, it is important that basic safety research be pursued on a sound, logical, long-range basis which is devoid of sharp funding perturbations and which will lead to the necessary infomation in an efficient manner and on a timely basis.
'Ihe ACRS believes that a modest increase in funding of this progran for each of the next two or three years is needed in order to pemit implementation of reconnendations such as:
a)
A broad-scale study should be made of the liquid-metal fast-breeder reactor (LMFER) to determine which types of eccidents are the greatest contributors to risk in plants of commercial size.
Depending on DOE inten-tions in the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor and gas-cooled fast reactor areas, similar studies nay be needed for gas-cooled reactors.
S-9
b) Greater consideration should be given to measures for preventing U4FBR accidents and to means for mitigat-ing their consequences, c) Greater attention should be placed on keeping abreast of foreign safety research and foreign advanced-reactor licensing activities.
%e study of the core-disruptive accident and associated problems should be continued.
However, related code-developnent work should not carry a priority higher than that of other work such as in (a) and (b) above.
7.
Extreme External Phenomena Extreme external phenomena include natural phenomena such as carth-quakes, tornaioes, hurricanes, floods, tsunamis, and lightning, and man-mde phenomena such as aircraf t crashes, turbine-generated mis-siles, and explosions.
Research in this area is devoted chinfly to earthquakes, with a much smaller ef fort devoted to othei natural phenomena; none of the current effort is devoted to the effects of man-mde phenomena.
Because research on extreme external phenomena, and particularly earthquakes, addresses questions relating to the siting of all types of reactors and fuel-cycle facilities, it should be assigned a high priority in the NRC safety researcn program, and should be funded at increasing levels over the next few years.
8.
Radiological Effects Pesearch projects in this program include those related to the health ef fects of low-level radiation exposure, movement of radionu-clides through the environment, the control of accidental radio-nuclide releases, and the developnent of procedures for decontamina-tion and reentry.
%e ACRS believes that the NRC research effort in this prog ram generally is well focused and progressing satisfactority.
- However, the ACRS believes that increased attention should be directed to:
a)
Examination of the NRC data bank on human occupa-tional radiation exposures by qualified epidemiolog-ists, with a view toward developing data that can be utilized more effectively in evaluating possible relationships between radiation exposures and various health effects.
S-10
b)
Research to develop a better understanding of the basic factors that govern the buildup and cont ;ol of radionuclides in reactor cooling systems.
c) Research to develop improved methods for, and the data base supporting, the calculation of radi-ation doses to population groups residing in the vicinity of nuclear facilities.
9.
Waste Managenent
%e primary objective of the radioactive waste management progran should be to control and ninimize, to the extent reasonably achiev-able, both the naxinum individual doses and the collective population doses resulting from all aspects of the handling and ultimate dis-posal of radioactive wastes.
As a regulatory agency, the NRC has the responsibility to establish criteria to assure that the handling and disposal of radioactive wastes will be conducted in a safe manner.
The ACRS review of the NRC waste management program has shown that its efforts toward achieving the above objectives are uncoordinated and unfocused.
%is is due, at least in part, to similar deficien-cies in the national program. Within the NRC progran, there appears to be a lack of systematic processes for identifying research needs in this field and for assigning priorities for their acconplishnent.
There also appears to be a lack of adequate interaction and communi-cation among the several NRC groups involved.
Bis is particularly true in the comnunication of waste management research needs to the Of fice of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
There is a need also fo r better interaction and connunication between the NRC and other governnental agencies having responsibilities in this area.
The ACRS reconmends that the research on waste nanagement enphasize the following areas:
a)
Identification of the dominant contributors to risk in radioactive waste nanagement operations, and quan-tification of the uncertainties in the risk esti-mates.
b)
Continued development of criteria necessary for licensing the design and operation of radioactive waste facilities.
c)
Continued development of licensing criteria to facilitate the decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear facilities.
A-11
Increased funding above current levels will be required in order for this program to meet its current objectives on a timely basis.
Inasmuch as related research on this subject is being conducted in several foreign countries, the ACRS reconnends that the NRC Staf f vigorously pursue cooperative prograns with these groups.
- 10. Safeguards and Security
%e term safeguards refers chiefly to means to prevent the thef t of (StN) from fixed sites or during trans-nuclear material special The term security refers principally to the protection of portation.facilities f rom sabotage or takeover with a subsequent nuclear release or threat of release of radioactivity.
ost of the current problems related to safeguards and security are and much work has been done on them by the Departnent of not new, as well as by the NRC.
Be Energy and the Department of Defense, NRC's need for research in these areas is to provide the bases for the effectiveness of procedures proposed or employed by evaluating licensees for prever. ting theft of StN and for protecting naterials in transit or facilities against sabotage.
research audresses both physical security systems and Current material control and accounting methods.
The ACRS believes that this program is appropriate and adequate, and nakes the following specific recommendations:
a)
Plan fo r wo rk on safeguards and security should provide for a program at about the present level of effort for at least the next several years, with some allowance for the possibility that it may be necessary to increase the level should the national policy call for early adoption of new fuel cycles or new reactor types.
In one aspect of the current program, an attempt has b) been made to determine the minimum number of essential conponents in a nuclear power plant which, if fully protected, could enable the plant to be shut down safely even if all other components were sabotaged.
The ACRS believes that an extensive study of this matter is appropriate since, if successful, it could at less cost, lead to greater assurance of safety, for both old and new plants.
is recommen6ed that studies be made to determine c)
Itwhether the use of alternative fuel cycles would change significantly the nature or importance of the types of safeguards measures now being studied.
S-12
'Ihese studies should include also an estimate of how soon new questions night arise and how long would be required to solve then.
d)
In connection with the developnent of computer codes directed at security problems, the NRC staff should give careful prior attention to the type of question for which the code might provide answers, the use to which such answers would be put, and the amount of ef fo rt likely to be needed to obtain then.
- 11. Risk Assessment Research on probabilistic risk assessment methodology and the use of that methodology as a research tool is the task of the Probabilistic Analysis Staff (PAS).
In addition, the PAS provides guidanca, as-sistance, and instruction to other members of the NRC Staff in the uses of this methodology.
Because many of its activities are conducted in-house, the PAS is relatively large.
The anount of research being done by outside o rganizations is increasing but is limited to some extent by the number of people having the necessary skills.
The ACRS offers the following findings and reconnendations:
a) The current and proposed research prog rans are adequate for this stage in the developnent and use of probabilistic risk assessment.
b) The ACRS considers it especially important that the methodology of probabilistic risk assessnent, and the insights to be gained from its use, be utilized to the greatest extent feasible in the planning of the NRC safety research program.
This was suggested by the Risk Assessment Review Group *, it is being done now in some cases, and its expanded use is en-couraged.
The ACRS is concerned about the m sible concentration of risk-assessment activity in the PAS, and believes that a strong ef fort should be made to spread the capability and activity in this area to a greater extent throughout all se,nents of the re-search and licensing programs.
- H.W. Lewis, et al., Risk Assessment Review Gr_oup_ Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NUREL/CR-0400), September 197o.
S-13
c)
Effort to increase the use of this approach should have a high priority because of its potential in-fluence on a large range of research activities.
d)
The ACRS considers the investigation of acceptable risk imrortant. However, the ACRS reconnends that, in addition to the work being done within NRC, the many other Federal agencies with responsibility for setting safety standards also participate in a broadly based study of the question of acceptable risk.
12.
Improved Reactor Safety The basic purpose of this research is to investigate concepts that have the potential for improving safety of light-water reactors.
In respense to a request in the FY 78 Budget Authorization Act, the NRC sulnitted to the Congress on April 12, 1978 its P1_an_ for Resea_r_ch to Improve the Safetnf Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants (N UR D3-0438).
This plan recommended five projects for immediate or early initiation, identified several other topics for scoping studies, and proposed to develop improved methodology for evaluating re-search topics.
The ACRS endorsed tMs proposed research progran in a letter dated March 13, 1978 to NMC Chairman Joseph M. Hendrie.
In its 1977 report, the ACRS pointed out the distinction between the research on improved safety concepts that should be done by the NRC and the DOE, as follows:
"It is both desirable and appropriate for the NRC to conduct research on new se.fety concepts, but their development and implenentation should be carried out by the nuclear industry or the Department of Energy."
The ACRS believes that this research progran should be given high priority.
The ACRS considers it unfortunate that this NRC program could not be initiated in FY 78 and reconmends substantial funding
($1.5 million) in FY 79, by reprogramming of other NRC funds if necessary.
'Ihe ACRS reconnends that in subsequerit years this pro-gram be funded at the level needed to permit effective pursuit of all of the research projects and scoping studies proposed in NUREG-0438.
The ACRS recommends further that emphasis be given to the work on alternate containment concepts, on bunkered dedi-cated shutdown heat removal systems, on inproved in-plant response to accidents or potential accidents, on improved methodology for evaluating research topics; and to scoping studies on the topics relating to prevention or mitigation of offsite consequences re-sulting from postulated core melt accidents via liquid pathways and to possible design measures for protection against sabotage.
S-14
Ble ACRS believes that there are complementary roles for both NRC and DOE in research to improve light-water reactor safety, and that aggressive programs at multinillion dollar funding levels should be pursued by each agency with appropriate coordination.
S-15
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Hendrie Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Bradford Commissioner Ahearne FRCM:
R. F. Fraley, Executive Director, ACRS
SUBJECT:
USE OF WASH-1400 BY THE ADVISTY COMMITTEE OM REAC'IOR SAFD3UARDS
'Ihe Office of the General Counsel has notified this office that the Commissioners have requested information regarding the use of the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400 by its advi-sory canmittees, boards and panels.
Attached for your infomation and use is a brief summary of the nanner in which the ACRS has been making use of WASH-1400 in its activites.
Members of the Committee have contributed to and the ACRS Chairman has concurred in the attached.
R. F. Fraley Executive Director
Attachment:
Applications of WASH-1400 Methodology or Conclusions by ACRS dated 12/11/78 cc:
S. 0111k, SEEY, w/att.
W. Shields, OGC, w/att.
Contact:
R. Fraley, ACRS 4-3265
AppbCA
/,
1.' The Comittee observed in its reports of April 8,1975, July 14, 16,1976 (attached) that the methodology of 1976, and December WASH-1400 is useful for purposes of identifying important acci-dent sequences and for attempting to develop comparative and quan-titative risk assessments for low probabil ty high-consequence It noted, however, that the methodology cannot guar-accidents.
antee that all major contributors to risk will be identified and a considerable element of judgment is cequired in assigning many of The Committee concluded that a substantial the input parameters.
effort would be required to develop and apply dependable methods for quantitatively accounting for the very large number of multiple correlated or dependent failure paths and to obtain the necessary failure rate data bases.
WASH-1400 did not cause the Cociittee to alter its judgment that reactors under construction or in operation do not represent an undue risk to the health and safety of the public nor did it result in any relaxation of ACRS conclusions or practices concern-ing Reactor Safety.
WASH-1400 provided increased insight into containment failure modes 2.
following a postulated core melt and provided an improved basis for evaluation of the possibility of Class 9 accidents and the rar.ge e
O sw 7"*
.2-ric This reinforced ACRS interest in the G e
7 floating and land-based nu-of consequences.
i Liquid Pathway Study which comparedIt led al sible clear facilities.
inment as an improved deve'iopment of the filtered vented conta I
safety system.
further development of the More recently the Committee endorsed CRAC is a compu-l tions.
CRAC code for use in certain site eva uad in W 3
tation model developed for, and usebut does not directly invo consequences of serious accidents h ique, nor the system relia-the basic fault-tree / event-tree tec n bility findings in WASH-1400.
times used WASH-1400 as a Individual Committee members have some ents, or suggestio point of departure for questions, comm 4.
For example:
ing safety related matters.
i i n m3 king process It was suggested that the backfit dec s o -0 methods would be improved by using WASH-140 a.
i reliability of alternate system des gns.f ATWS study (N Preliminary comments on a recent staf s between p i
were aimed at making direct compar son 1400 (appa b.
and the reliability goals in WASH-basesofthereport)moredirect.
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3-tial basis The ACRS has used some results from WASH-1400 as a pa t-ific for requesting further evaluation of the adequacy of spec S.
in For example, the ACRS has had a long-time interest s
iderable loss of systems.
the capability of plants to survive safely a consWASH-all AC power for an extended period.
ligible. The probability of a loss of all AC power was nonneg evaluation of ACRS has asked the NRC staff for a comprehensive With odifications.
matter, including the possible need for design m data, the ACRS was the availability of WASH-1400 methodology and d quacy of the able to request an NRC Staff evaluation of the a e t rs of current reliability of auxiliary feedwater and other sys e.
design.
itional background The consequence studies in WASH-1400 providea add rations.
6.
information for ACRS consideration of cmergency prepa Ltr. to W. A. Anders dtd. 4/8/75Ltr. to M.
Attachments:
1.
2.
Ltr. to M. K. Udall dtd.
3.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS L
g WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 July 14, 1976 The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515
Dear Congressman Udall:
At its 195th meeting on July 8-10, 1976, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) considered the points raised in your June 14, 1976, letter on the Reactor Safety Study (RSS, WASH-1400, NUREG 75/014). The ACRS reviewed the draft version of the Reactor Safety Study in late 1974 and early 1975 and submitted a report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on April 8, 1975.
A copy of the ACRS report is attached.
Your letter identified eleven issues on which you requested comment and the Committee is pleased to respond to issues 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9 and 10. However, extensive time and effort would be required by the ACRS to respond adequately to the other topics and the needed effort would have to be factored into overall considerations of other ACRS functions, including mandatory review of applications for construction permits and operating licenses for commercial nuclear power plants.
The Committee's responses follow:
1.
The extent that the UUREG 75/014 fault-tree analysis adds to under-standing of the likelihood of major nuclear reactor accidents."
The ACRS believes that the fault-tree methodology used in the Reactor Safety Study to develop comparative and quantitative risk assessments for postulated accident sequences represents a v.aluable contribution to the understanding of the likelihood of major nuclear reactor accidents.
- 3. " Adequacy of data base for NUREG 75/014 type fault-tree analysis."
As noted in our report of April 8,1975, the ACRS believes that a better data base will be required to evaluate the validity of the RSS's quantitative estimates of the likelihood of low probability high consequence events, and recommends that current efforts to compile, categorize and evaluate nuclear and other applicable industrial experience be extended in breadth and depth to improve the data base for further studies of this type.
,(
The Honorable Morris K. Udall July 14, 1976 4.
" Sensitivity of NUREG 75/014 conclusions to differences in reactor design, in site characteristics, in local meteorological conditions and in population distributions."
All of the factors noted above will have some effect on the probability or consequences of a serious accident. The Committee has reco mended that the methodology of the Study be applied to other types and designs of reactors, other site conditions and other accident initiators and sequences.
If this is done, it will provide greater insight into the sensitivity of differing reactor designs and safety features.
6.
" Adequacy of ITJREG 75/014 methodology to take account of gradual degradation of plant safety over plant lifetime."
The Committee believes the methodology is capable of taking into account wear out of components and degradation of equipnent over the lifetime of the plant but an appropriate data base needs to be developed.
8.
"Need for periodic updating of ifdREG 75/014 to take account of new data."
The Committee believes that a continuing effort is desirable in the application of the methodology developed by the Reactor Safety Study not only to factor in new data but also to consider design variations and new concepts.
9.
" Nerd for continuing analysis of MJREG 75/014 for purposes of delineating areas of research and data collection."
The Committee believes that the NUREG 75/014 methodology should be used to aid in delineating areas for further research. Special emphasis should be given to quantification of the initiators, probabilities, and consequences of core melting.
- 10. "The extent to which NUREG 75/014 can be used to aid developnent of regulatory policies concerning design, construction, and operations."
The Committee has recommended to the NRC that many of the techniques used in the Study can and should be used by the reactor designers to improve safety and by the NRC Staff as a supplement to their safety assessment.
Sincerely yours, 5
Dade W. Moeller Chairman Attach,nent:
Ltr. to Hon. W. Anders from D. W.
Moeller, dtd 4/8/75 re: mSH-1400
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December 16, 1976 The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515
Dear Congressman Udall:
At its 200th meeting, December 9-11, 1976, the Advisory Committee on Re-actor Safeguards (ACRS) continued its consideration of the points raised in your June 14, 1976, letter on the Reactor Safety Study (RSS, h%SH-1400, NUREG 75/014). The ACRS had previously considered these matters at its 196th and 199th meetings and had responded to issues 1,3,4,6,8 9
and 10 in its letter to you dated July 14, 1976. In its further con-sideration of the remaining four issues, the Comittee had the benefit of meetings of its Reactor Safety Study Working Group with the Nuclear Reg-ulatory Comission Staff in Washington, DC, on October 12, 1976, and November 10, 1976.
The ACRS is continuing to evaluate the considerable body of information presented in the RSS report, its appendices, and the coments received on it, giving primary attention to the potential implications of the report for the reacter licensing process. This letter provides the Comittee on Interior and Insular Affairs a brief resume of current ACRS thought on issues 2, 5, 7 and 11.
"2. Adequacy and appropriateness of analysis used in NUREG 75/014 for purposes of estimating the likelihood of low probability, high con-sequence events."
The ACRS believes that the mAhodology of NUREG 75/014 is useful for purposes of identifying important accident sequences and for atterpting to develop comparative and quantitative risk assessments for low prob-ability, high-consequence accidents. However, the ACRS believes that considerable effort by more than a single group over an extended period of time will be required to evaluate the validity of the results in NUREG 75/014 in absolute terms. Among the matters which will warrant emphasis in such an evaluation are the following:
improved quantification of acci-dent initiators; the identification and evaluation of atypical reactors; the influence of design errors; improved quantification of the role of operator errors; improved quantification of consequence modaling; and the development of improved data for systems, components and instrumnts under f
normal and accident-related environmental conditions in a nuclear reactor.
L s
The Honorable Morris K. Udall December 16, 1976 The ACRS believes that NUREG 75/014 represents a very considerable con-tribution to the understanding of reactor safety and provides a point of departure for quantitative assessment.
"S.
Adequacy of NUREG 75/014 methodology to take account of multiple, correlated errors in procedures, design, judgment, and construction such as those leading to the Browns Ferry fire."
The ACRS believes that the methodology of NUREG 75/014 is useful in ac-counting for that portion of the risk resulting from identifiable potential common mode or dependent failures, and can be used to search out the pos-sibility of multiple correlated errors. However, the nethodology cannot guarantee that all major contributors to risk will be identified, and a considerable element of subjective judgment is involved in assigning many of the quantitative input parameters. Both for nuclear and non-nuclear applications, for complex systems, where multiple, correlated failures or comron cause failures may be significant, the record shows that investi-gators working independently will frequently make estimates of system unreliability which differ from one another by a large factor. At this stage of its review, the ACRS believes that a substantial effort may be required to develop and apply aependable methods for quantitatively ac-counting for the very large number of multiple correlated or dependent failure paths and to obtain the necessary failure rate data bases.
Whether multiple, correlated errors will dominate the overall rink, how-ever, is subject to question, particularly if simpler postulate accident sequences are generally the dominant contributors to the likel. hood of system failure.
"7.
Extent to which the final version of NUREG 75/014 takes into account comments on the draft version."
The ACRS is in the process of reviewing the disposition of selected comments received by the Reactor Safety Study Group, particularly as they have impli-cations for short or long-term improvements in reactor safety. The ACRS plans to continue this type of activity; however, it is beyond the scope or available working time of the ACRS to review in detail the extent to which the final version of NUREG 75/014 takes into account the comments received.
"11.
Validity of NUREG 75/014 conclusions regarding accident consequences."
As stated in its report to you of July 14, 1976 and as indicated in its response to other questions in this group, the ACRS believes that consi-derably more effort on the part of various contributors is needed to E
g.
The Honorable Morris K. Udall December 16, 1976 evaluate the quantitative validity of NUREG 75/014 conclusions regarding accident consequences. Based on information currently available, the ACRS would assign a greater uncertainty to the results than that given in NUREG 75/014.
The ACRS believes that the past and current practice of trying both to rake accidents very improbable and to provide means to cope with or ameliorate the effects of accidents has been the correct approach to nuclear reactor safety.
The ACRS review of the Reactor Safety Study has not caused the ACRS to alter its judgment that operation of reactors now under construction or in oper-ation does not represent an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
The ACRS believes that NUREG 75/014 has suggested rany fruitful areas for study and evaluation for potential improvements in light water power reactor safety. The ACRS also believes that the extension of such risk assessment methodology to the total spectrum of activities involved in the production of nuclear power and in the production of electric power by other means, as well as to other technological aspv.: cts of society, could add significantly to our overall understanding of risk.
Sincerely yours, 9a%%A Dade W. Moeller Chairman t
ADVISORi C.OMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFLvUARDS NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 April 8, 1975 Honorable Uillian A. Anders Chairnan U. S. Muclear Regulatory Connission Washington, D. C.
20555
Subject:
REACTOR CAFETY STUDY, UASH-1400 Since the release of the draft Reactor Safety Study, UASH-1400 (RSS) in August 1974, the Advisory Connittee on Reactor Safeguards has been revicuing the considerable body of information presented in the report, its appendices, and the connents received on it, giving prinary attention to the potential inplications of the draft report on the reactor licensing process.
In its revieu, the Connittee has had the benefit of Subconnittee neetings held on October 9, Novenber 22, and Decenber 20, 1974, and March 5, 1975, and of full Co=nittee neetings held on October 10-12, October 31-Novenber 2, November 14-16, Decenber 5-7, 1974, 6-8,1:c ch 6-8, April 3-5,1975.
and January 9-11, February The ACRS believes that the RSS represents a valuable contribution to the understanding of light uater reactor safety in its categoriestion of hypothetical accidents, identification of potential ueak links for the tuo reactors studied, and its efforts to develop conparative and quantitative rish assessments for accident sequences exanined.
The Connittee believes that a continuing effort and better data vill be required to evaluate the validity of the quantitative results in absolute terns.
Special emphasis should be given to quantification of the initiators, probabilities, and consequences of core celting.
The Connittee believes that the methodology of the RSS should be applied to other types and designs of reactors, other site conditions and other accident initiators and sequences, and that the current efforts to compile, categorize, and evaluate nuclear experience should be extended in breadth and depth to inprove the data base for future studies of this type.
The Connittee believes, further, that the RSS can serve as a model for sinilar studies of the f ailure probabilities, consequences, and resulting risks of other hazards (both nuclear and non-nuclear) to the health and safety of the public.
The Connittee believes that nany of the techniques used in the RSS can and should be used by reactor designers to improve safety and by the MRC Staff as a supplement to safety assessment.
Cg Y
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4 April 8, 1975 J
Ronorable Uilliam A. Anders
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s 2ittee's review of the RSS has not caused the Committee The Co:a:
to alter its judgenent that reactors now under construction or in operation do not represent undue risks to the health and safety of the public.
2ittee vill continue to review the RSS and will co= ment The Co=:
further on it in the future.
Sincerely, OriginalSigned by;
.5V.Ee:r#}
Willia:a Kerr G
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January 10, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Hendrie Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Bradford Commissioner Ahearne FROM:
R. F. Fraley, Executive Director, ACRS
SUBJECT:
ACRS REVIEW OF LICENSEE EVEffr REPORTS FOR THE PERIOD OF JANUARY 1,1976 - DECD4BER 31,1978 In response to your request of Decmber 28, 1978 for a review of Licensee Event Reports as noted above, the Committee has assigned this responsibility to an ad hoc subcommittee on Licensee Event Reports which is chaired by Dr. Dade W. %3eller.
'Ihe Committee expects that a report, possibly an interim report, will be provided to the Commission by September 1979. 'Ihe Com-mittee will keep the Commission infcrmed of progress with respect to this matter during the periodic meetings of the Commission and the Committee to discuss ACRS activities.
R. F. Fraley Executive Director
Contact:
R. Fraley, ACRS 4-3265
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...., j RIG n e'E ADVISORY COMMITTI.E ON FE ACTOP SAFEc'JA"D$ U.S. h Ri Dr. Stephen Lawroski Chairman gg g 9 jg7g Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards W
,f U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7tSOOklD, 2WI Washington, D. C.
20555
- t Dear Dr.
ski M)
In a recent letter to the Commission, Congressman Morris Udall has recommended that a review be conducted on a trial basis of Licensee Event Reports for a period of three years (January 1,1976--December 31, 1978) to identify those events which have implications for improved reactor safety.
Congressman Udall has suggested that this review might be conducted by an NRC contractor or a subgroup of the ACRS.
The Commission believes such a review should be undertaken. The Commission has considered the alternatives and has concluded that this review could best be accomplished by the ACRS through a Committee subgroup such as the Subcommittee on Operating Reactors.
It is requested that the ACRS undertake this task and provide a report to the Commission.
In organizing ACRS activity to conduct this review, the Committee may find it necessary to obtain additional support from its consultants and technical assistance type contracts.
The Commission would support such increased effort to the degree considered necessary by the Committee.
In scheduling the conduct of this review the Commission believes that a report within 6-12 months would be appropriate. We would be interested in Committee response as to the length of time the Committee anticipates will be required to complete this assignment.
In connection with the scope of the Committee's review, the Commission feels that if the Committee finds it appropriate to examine LER's beyond the time frame indicated in order to provide a more meaningful evaluation of the significance of reported events and related corrective actions, such an extension should be made.
Also, other sources of information pertinent to the task should be used as appropriate.
Dr. Stephen Lawroski December 28, 1978 The Commission requests that it be kept informed regarding the progress of this activitv.
The periodic meetings of the Committee with the Commission offer useful opportunities for discussion of Committee pro-gress in this area.
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Honorable Joseph Hendrie Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
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Dear Chairman Hendrie:
This is in regard to Dr. Harold Lewis' suggestions for the creation of a nuclear accident review board.
You responded on August 7, 1978 to our initial inquiry and since them Dr. Lewis has had a chance to review both your reply and that of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
Dr. Lewis made some comments on your reactions, a copy of which is enclosed.
I believe the merits of a review group in the nuclear field similar to the National Transportation Safet'y Board (NTSB) are likely to be more substantial than your letter implies.
In particular, I do not think adequate consideration has be'en given to the benefits that might result from analysis of " abnormal occurrences" -- or small accidents and events which could be precursors to more serious accidents, by whatever definition -- by a review group independent of the NRC regulatory staff.
I would like to recommend to the Commission that it institute a trial review of this nature to determine whether information might be obtained which could lead to increased reactor safety.
A subgroup of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, or some other group under separate contract with the Commission, could review licensee event reports submitted between January 1, 1976 and December 31, 1978 for incidents whose analysis might enhance reactor safety.
Incidents could be selected using the " abnormal occurrence" criteria, or some other criteria which may be more suitable.
These incidents could be reviewed by the independent group to determine whether they have implications for improved reactor safety.
TT729778TWEDO to prepare reply for signature of Chairman.
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Due Date to Comm.
December 12 ggg5 78-1701
Honorable Joseph Hendrie Page 2 Dr. Lewis has noted, and it seems reasonable to me, that in analyses of relatively minor incidents it is not the investigation of facts, but the determination of cause and the opportunity to make recommendations for improvements, that is central to the role of the independent reviewer.
It seems, then, that with respect to fact-finding, the techinical assistance of NRC staff, or use of data previously collected by them, would not dama productivity of the revieu group.ge the independence or Thank you for your attention.
Sincerely, Y;'
g40RRISK..UDALL Chairman Enclosure S
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,p DEPART.M E.NT OT PHYSICS SA.NTA BARB ARA, CAurORNIA 93106 October 4, 1978 The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
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Dear Congressban Udall,
I now have copies of the replies of the Euclear Regulatory Commission and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards to your letter of January 27, 1978, about my suggestion for an "NTSB" for reactor safety.
May I make a few comments on these replies?
In the first place, both NRC and ACRS are concerned that any new agency would intrude upon their turf, NRC because it already investigates abnormal occurrences as part of its regulatory job and ACRS because it is statutorily independent, and has the power to do so in the appropriate circumstances.
NRC does, however, recognize the enhancement of credibility that might flow from the activities of an independent agency, and would consider establishing an independent review group for a major accident.
(In fact, Browns Ferry was well studied by an internal review group, and was also the subject of extensive hearings by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.)
Both replies reflect a concern about having outsiders poking around in their business, and NRC specifically raises the question of whether there are any knowledgeable outsiders.
There is more than a small hint of parochialism here.
A much more important question raised is that of whether such a new board would have anything to do, since there have never been any major nuclear accidents leading to injury to the public.
This, it seems to me, reflects a misunderstanding of the point of the proposal, which was directed toward the enhancement of reactor safety through the analysis of the precursors to major accidents.
NRC reports a total of nineteen " abnormal occurrences" in FY 1977, culled from a total of many hundreds of licensee event reports, and asserts that each of these is appropriately investigated by NRC itself.
I cannot quarrel with the selection
The Honorable Morris K. Udall 2
of those nineteen, chosen as. "significant from the standpoint of public health or safety", nor can I validate the selection.
In fact, the whole point of the proposal revolves around the meaning of the word "significant" in the statement above.
There are certainly p'lenty of scare stories around.
My overall reaction is that;' leaving aside questions of turf, I would still like to have someone look at the last couple of years of licensee event reports with a view toward selecting incidents which may not have threatened the public health and safety, but whose analysis might enhance the public health and safety.
I suspect that different criteria might produce a richer harvest than is projected by NRC ar.d ACRS, but remain open-minded until it is tried.
I hope that thic is helpful to you.
Sincerely
- ours, H. W.
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