ML19261B511
| ML19261B511 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point, Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1979 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902280106 | |
| Download: ML19261B511 (5) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES p maop
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FEB 2 1979 In Reply Refer To:
RII:JP0 50-335, 50-389 50-250, 50-251 Florida Power and Lighc Company Advanced Systems and Technology Attn:
Dr. R. E. Uhrig, Vice President P. O. Box 529100 Miami, Florida 33152 Gentlemen:
This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a It is expected that recipients vill possibly significant matter.
review the information f or possible applicability to their facilities.
this time.
If further No specific action.or response is requested at NRC evaluations so. indicate, an IE Circular or Bulletin will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions.
If you have questions regarding this matter, pizase contact the Director of the appropriate h7C Regional Office.
Sincerely,
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m=es P Reilly Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Information Notice No. 79-01 2.
List of IE Information Notices Issued in 1979 7902280106 d
IIB 2 1979 Florida Power and Lisz' Company cc w/ enc 1:
N. Weems, Assistant Q/. Manager P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, Florida 33450 C. M. Wethy, Piant Manager St. Lucie Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, Florida 33450 H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager Turkey Point Plant P. O. Box 529100 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33152 O
UNITED STATES FUCLEAR REGULATORY C0!dISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMDTI WASHINGTON, D. C.
20555 February 2, 1979 IE Information Notice No. 79-01 BERGEN-PATERSON HYDRAULIC SHOCK AND SWAY ARRESTORS (HSSA)
On December 4, 1978, Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station reported the failure of seven Bergen-Paterson HSSA (Snubber) units to lockup in the co=pret ton direction and the failure of one additional unit to lockup in tie extensic-direction. These failures were identified during surveillance testing nd the affected models included HSSA-3-6, USSA-10-6 and HSSA-20>6. When the units were disasse= bled, the licensee observed damage to the poppet valve and seat on the compression side of the valve blocks of the seven units that failed in the co=pression direction.
It vau also observed that five of the seven units had the poppet spring entrapped between the poppet and the seat. The licensee attributed the seven failures in the compression direction to abusive handling during co=pression of the units for installation following testing at the previous refueling outage. The cause of the single f ailure 'n the sxtension direction has not been determined.
In addition to exercising greater care in reinstallation, the licensee coc=itted to functionally test all Bergen-Paterson snubbers subjected to transient conditions which cause either physical damage to or significant movement of piping. This testing vill include verification of piston movement, lockup and bleed. The Bergen-Paterson Technical Maintenance Manual reco= mends that additional inspections should be made on units which may have participated in an unusual shock occurrence involving known damage to piping or equipment.
On January 3,1979, the licensee reported that the decay heat removal system had been sullected to a transient condition in the form of a
" water hammer." Sais transient, caused pipe movement great ene'tgh to damage two ris' pipe support vall attachments. The subsequen functional testing of t' e effected Bergen-Paterson units revealed that one of seven units failed the lockup test.
This unit (Model No. HSSA-3-6) was disasse= bled and damage to the poppet valve and seat was observed.
The damage to the poppet valves is presently being reviewed by both the licensee and Bergen-Paterson.
l.+ this tLee, the cause of damage has not been completely defined nor has nypropriate corrective action been determined. Other licensees have reported instances of poppet valve damage; however, the cause and extont of damage are not known at this time.
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IE Information Notice No. 79-01 February 2, 1979 This information is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter.
It is expected that recipients vill review the information for possible applicability to their facil1*.ies. No specific action or response is requested at this time.
If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular or Bulletin vill be issued to reco= mend or request specific licensee actions.
If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
s Page 2 of 2
IE Information Notice No. 79-01 February 2, 1979 LISTING OF IE INFORMATION NOTICES ISSUED IN 1979 Information Subject Date Issued To Notice No.
Issued An Information Notice is a new method of communicating items of potential interest to licensees. This item, Information Notice No. 79-01, is the first of this new form of communication.
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- n.. ember 16, 1976
' ' ' ' The Honorable Morrit X. Udall,
evaluate the quantitative validity of NUFIG 75/014 conclusions regarding accident consequences. Based on information currently available, the ACRS would assign a greater uncertainty to the results than that given in NUREG 75/014.
The ACRS believes that the past and current practice of trying both to make accidents very improbable and to provide ceans to cope with or ameliorate the effects of accidents has been the correct approach to nuclear reactor safety.
The' ACPS review of the Reactor Safety Study has not caused the ACRS to alter its judgment that operation of reactors now under construction or in oper-ation does not represent an undue risk to the hr.alth and safety of the public.
The ACRS believes that UURIG 75/014 has suggested =any fruitful areas for study and evaluation for potential i. provecents in light water power reactor safety. The ACPS also believes that the extension of such risk assessment methodology to the total spectrum of activities involved in the production of nuclear power and in the prcduction of electric pc rer by other means, as well as to'other technologim1 aspects of society, could add significantly to our overall understanding of risk.
Sincerely yours, O
V y
Dade W. Eteller Chai ~m e
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFLUARDS NUC1. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D. c. 20555 April 8, 1975 Honorable Uilliam A. Anders Chairnan U. S. Ituelear bgulatory Cc==ission Washington, D. C.
20555
Subject:
REAdTOR SALTrY SI"JDY, UASH-1400 Since the release of the draft Reactor Safety Study, UASH-1400 (ESS) in Au;ust 1974, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has been revieuing the considerable body of infor=ation presented in the report, its appendices, and the co-cents received on it, giving pri=ary attention to the potential inplications of the draf t report on the reactor licensing process.
In its revieu, the Co=mittee has had the benefit of Subcon=ittee meetings held on October 9, November 22, and Decenber 20, 1974, and !! arch 5,1975, and of full Co=aittee' ceetings held on October 10-12, October 31-november 2, November 14-16, December 5-7, 1974, and January 9-11, February 6-8, March 6-8, April 3-5, 1975.
The ACRS believes that the RSS represents a valuable contribution to the understanding of light uater reactor safety in its categorisation of hypothetical accidents, identification of potential ueak links for the tuo reactors studied, and its efforts to develop cocparative and quantitative rish assess =ents for accident sequences examined.
The Coc=ittee believes that a continuing effort and better data vill be required to evaluate the validity of the quantitative results in absoluta ter=s.
Special ecphasis should be given to quantification of the initiators, probabilities, ant' consequences of core celting.
The Cocnittee believes that the nethodology of the RSS should be applied to other types and desi;ns of reactors, other site conditions and other accident initiators and sequences, and that the current efforts to compile, categorize, and evalusta nuclear experience should be extended in breadth and depth to improve the data base for future studies of this type.
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The Cocnittee believes, further, that the RSS can serve as a codel for similar studies of the failure probabilities, consequences, anc resulting risks of other hasards (both nuclear and non-nuclear) to the health and safety of the public.
The Cocnittee believes that many of the techniques used in the RSS can and should be used by reactor desi,,ners to i= prove safety and by the NRC Staff as a supplement to safety assess =ent.
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Honorable Willian A. Anders April 8, 1975 The Co=::ittee's review of the RSS has not caused the Co=mittee to alter its judgecent that reactors now under construction or in operation do not represent undue risks to the health and safety of the public.
The Cocnittee vill continue "to review the RSS and will ce= ment furth'er on it in the future.
Sincerely, Criginal S!sned bz:
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ss Willian Kerr O
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