ML19260D311
| ML19260D311 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001308 |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1974 |
| From: | Casey Smith GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Page R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19260D295 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-79-520 NUDOCS 8002080298 | |
| Download: ML19260D311 (2) | |
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G E N E P. A L Q@ E LE CTR I C NUCLEAR ENERGY DIVISION GENERAL EL IC COMPANY,175 CURTNER AVENUE, SAN JOSE. CAllFoRNIA 95125 Mall Code Phone (408) 297-3000, TWX No. 910-338-0116 PRODUCTS. DEPART!iENT
'T QJ' U D.hg, November 13, 1974
)
Y[*i-Mr. R.G. P4ge, Chief Materials and Plant Protection Branch A
Directorate of Licensing
(\\F U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D.C.
20545 m
Subject:
Morris Operation - Materials License SNM-12 ocket 70-Request For Revision of Amendment MPP-2
(
Dear Sir:
General Electric Company herein requests reconsideratior of the AEC's deter-mination that the Morris fuel storage basin is a vital area and deletion of Materials License SNM-1265 Amendment MPP-2, which is predicated on the basin being a vital area.
The fuel storage basin is not a vital area because it does not contain any " vital equipment," as defined by 10CFR73.2(i).
Vital equipment i~s defined as "any equipment., system, device, or material, the failure, destruc-
~
tion or release of which could 'directly or indirectly endanger the pu,blic health and safety by exposure to radiation."
General Electric has evaluated the consequences of all acts in the area of the fuel storage basin which could conceivably be considered to result in danger to the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
General Electric has found that:
Explosive rupture of the storage basin walls is accomplished only with difficulty, and if accomplished, the maximum consequence is the contamination of perched ground water with basin water; A one-hundred-pound charge of high-explosive material placed adjacent to fuel assemblies in the storage baskets will not produce enough aerosol sized fuel particles to reach the site boundaries at a significant concentration to pose a hazard to public health and safety;
..a The release of fission gases frem the plenum sections of fuel rods, damaged by an explosive charge would not cause a significant radia-tion dose at the site boundaries; g, m, s 1938 267
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8002080
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t R. G. Page 7::
Contrary to assumptions in this report, it would seem reasonable for h
purposes of sabotage analysis for design basis incidents to assume that
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filtered ventilation system will be inoperative and the building will 1.
the be. breached to permit escape of particulate matter.
[I In this report, it is concluded that particulate release is up to 127. of 10 CFR Part 100 equivalent guidelines.
Based on the foregoing comments, it is conceivable that this percentage a-tually could be greater.
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(-:.
We conclude that the spent fuel pool should continue to be protected as E
a vital area until further clarification of the analysis and substanti-ation of the assumptions (especially for Case Number 3, which should in-(
clude analysis of a zirconium / water reaction initiation and sustainment).
b p.7.
R. J.
o s, Acting Chief JJL Maty ia s Protection Standards Branch
]
Directorate of Regulatory Standards F.:.i t :.
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1938 268
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