ML19259C357
| ML19259C357 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000033 |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1979 |
| From: | Crocker H, Kinney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19259C356 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0033-79-03, 70-33-79-3, NUDOCS 7906140643 | |
| Download: ML19259C357 (12) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
70-33/79-03 Docket No.
70-33 License No.
SNM-23 Priority 1
Category UR Licensee:
Texas Instruments Incorporated 34 Forest Street Attleboro, Massachusetts Facility Name:
HFIR Project Inspection at:
Attleboro, Massachusetts Inspectinn conducted: March 5-8,1979
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InsDectors:
'k be UY
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W. W.
Kinney, Project Inspector date signed date signed date signed 7
Approved by:
6-d t//9/79 H. W. Crocker,%ief, Fuel Facility Projects
// cate signed Section, FF&MS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on March 5-8, 1979 (Report No. 70-33/79-03)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by a region-based inspector of licensee action on prevous inspection findings; organization; operations; nuclear safety; internal reviews and audits; procedure control; and safety conmittee activities.
The inspection involved 23 inspector-hours onsite by one region-based inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
22B2 176 7 900140 M3, Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- D. H. Conroy, Metal Systems Department Manufacturing Manager
- F. L. Sherman, HFIR Project fianager
- C. M. Hopper, Nuclear Safety Manager
- D. Talan, Nuclear Materials and Safety Officer
- R. H. Kinslow, Corporate Radiation Safety - Dallas The inspector also contacted two engineers and an operator during the course of the inspection.
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Insoection Findinas (Closed) Infraction (78-15-01): The MS0's posted at locations, 5, 8, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39 were not defined as listed in Table 1 of Appendix I, and MSQ's were not posted on two carts being used for SNii. The inspector verified that the work station locations and carts were posted with MSQ's and the MSQ's were in accordance with Table 1 of Appendix I.
The inspector also verified that the MSO's are inspected for compliance with Table 1 during the monthly criticality safety inspections conducted by the Nuclear Safety Officer.
3.
Scope of Operations The licensee manufactures fuel elements for national laboratories of the Department of Energy.
The licensee manufactures 12 core loadings,12 inner and 12 outer elements, for the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) each year for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
The licensee also manufactures approximately 120 box type fuel elements for the Oak Ridge Reactor (ORR) each year for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
For the Brookhaven National Laboratory the licensee manufactures approximately 120 box type fuel elements for the High Flux Beam Reactor (HFBR) each year.
4.
Orcanization The organizations at the Attleboro site as related to the manufacturing activities of the HFIR Project are given below.
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3 Vice President, Material and Electrical Products Group - W. Sick Asst. V.P., Metallurgical Materials Division - W. George Manager, Metal Systems Dept. (MSD) - W. Ouimby Manufacturing Manager, MSD - D. Conroy Manager, HFIR Project - F. Sherman The positions and personnel reporting to the HFIR Project Manager are:
Manager, HFIR Project - F. Sherman Manager, Nuclear Safety - C. Hooper Nuclear Materials and Safety Officer - D. Talan Manager, Nuclear Materials - C. Hopper Engineering Group - D. Collins R. Johnson A. Robl T. Rowland Foreman, Manufacturing - F. Campbell 15 Operators The licensee also has quality assurance inspectors working in the HFIR area. These people report to a different assistant vice president than the manufacturing organization report to, as shown below.
Vice President, Material and Electrical Projects Group - W. Sick Asst. V.P., Operating Services Division - T. Snyder Manager, Quality Assurance - H. Becker Manaaer, Quality Engineer - D. Jurdak Manager, HFIR Ouality Engineering - S. Roman OA Engineer, J. Heffner QA Technician - H. Vickers Group Leader, HFIR Inspection - C. Wallace 6 HFIR QA Inspectors 5.
Onerations Review Immediately after meeting with HFIR management, an inspection of the HFIR area was performed.
Since the licensee was packaging fuel elements for shipment, these operations were observed, a.
Packaaing of ORR Fuel Elements The inspector observed the packaging of Oak Ridge Reactor fuel elements in a Model No. UNC-1634 package with a package identi-fication no. USA /5274/4/B/FA stencilled on the side. The certificate of compliance number for the package is 5274.
Texas 2282 178
4 Instruments does not have a license to package material in this shipping container.
The packacing is supposed to be done by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (0RNL) in accordance with DOE requirements.
ORflL had a representative in the HFIR Project Area during the packaging of the fuel elements in the shipping containers, and this person was supposed to direct the packaging of the fuel elements to assure that the packaging was in accordance with DOE requirements.
The outer container of the specific container loaded under the observation of the inspector was badly dented, especially at the top. The ORNL representative stated that they will be using a different model container than the UtlC-1634 container to package the ORR fuel elements in June 1979 and this dented container would be taken out of service.
The inspector reviewed the route card for the packaging ooeration, Packing Box Type Fuel Elements, and compared the operations per-formed to those called for in the route card.
There were some discrepancies between the operations actually performed and the operations called for on the route card which are dis-cussed below.
The route card includes a page entitled Pre-use Insoection Check-list Shipping Containers - USA /5274/AF.
The operations performea as compared to the route card requirements were as follows.
Route Card
,0bservation Visually inspect cask exterior Licensee indicated the container for shipping damage, rust, and exterior to be poor.
general state of repair.
Visually inspect cask fill.
The inner container is filled Vermiculite to be within with molded rubberized hair.
3" of top of container.
Cellulose packing rather than vermiculite was used to fill the void space in the inner container.
(Note: Certificate of Compliance No. 5274 calls for void spaces within inner and outer containers to be filled with vermiculite.)
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5 Visually inspect gasket.
The container has no gasket, according to ORNL.
The licensee lined out this requirement.
Visually inspect closure bolts, The licensee inspected the bolts nuts, and lock washers for and nuts as required.
No lock condition and conformance to washers were used.
No lock 820.5-1 through 820.5-5.
washers were needed according to ORNL.
The licensee lined ou't this requirement.
The route card had five other pages of instructions.
The operations performed compared to selected route card requirements were as follows.
Route Card Observation Clean - inside of shipping con-The licensee used a vacuum tainer.
cleaner to clean out the cavities in the inner container.
Load element.
This operation The ORNL representative witnessed to be witnessed by customer the loading of the elements.
The representative.
Heat seal one elements were slid into a poly-end of polyethylene tube. Slide ethylene bags.
The top ends were element into tube.
Heat seal not heat sealed closed.
They were top end of polyethylene bag.
simply tucked inside the top of Use vacuum cleaner to pull air the elements.
The elements were out of bag.
HFBR fuel elements carefully placed in the cavities need not have air pulled out of of the inner container.
bags.
Place element in con-tainer.
Be certain the element is below the flat of the cover and that the polyethylene bag is tucked in properly.
No step for placing rubberized Rubberized hair pad placed in pads in space between molded space between the molded cavities cavities and lid of container and the container lid. About and filling void space with 1 inch void space present.
vermiculite.
No step for closing inner The licensee closed the inner container.
container.
No sealing gasket was used and no lock washers were used with the bolts and nuts.
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6 Venniculite Fill (Outer Con-The licensee placed a plastic bag tainer) - While hand packing containing vermiculite on top of and tamping, fill down with the inner container.
There was vermiculite.
about 1 1/2 inches of void space between bag of vermiculite and top of the container.
Close shipping drum - close drum The lid made a poor fit with the with lid and apply locking ring.
drum because of the dented con-Hammer tap the locking ring as dition of the drum and lid.
The the locking ring bolt is finnly locking ring was put in place as torqued to assure complete well as was poss ' ale.
No lid seating of lid - gasket and gasket was used to seal the lid prevent loosening during to the drum.
transit.
The inspector indicated to the licensee that they should revise the route card to define the correct packaging procedures.
The inspector also noted that the ORNL representative should sign the route card in appropriate locations to indicate that he had
" directed" the correct preparation of the package for transport in accordance with the applicable DOE requirements.
The licensee and the ORNL representative indicated they would take appropriate action.
b.
Location of Protective Clothing The licensee stores rubber overshoes and lab coats which have been worn in the potentially contaminated Fuel Manufacturing Area (FMA) on the " cold" side of the change line between the General Manu-facturing Area and the FMA. The inspector noted that a more acceptable practice would be to store the used protective clothing for re-use on the " hot" side of the change line.
This is espec-ially so because the survey meter is located in the " cold" side, and the potentially contaminated clothing is brought across the line and is not surveyed until after it has been brought across the change line.
The licensee indicated they would assess the situation further.
c.
Standard Operating Procedures The inspector reviewed five " Standard Operations," especially for instructions concerning safety.
The inspector then discussed the operations with an operator to assess the operator's knowledge of the operations, especially the safety requirements. The Standard Operations involved were:
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7 S.0. No. 6, Revision J, Blending, dated February 22, 1978; S.0. No. 7 Revision T, Press Compacts, dated February 22, 1978; S.0. No. 8, Revision X, Weigh Compact Changes, dated February 22, 1978; S.0. No. 13, Revision V, Anneal Fuel Plate Compacts, dated March 17, 1978; and S.0. No. 44, Revision J, " Sieve and Blend" As Received U 0 '
38 dated September 14, 1978.
The operator showed the copies of the Standard Operations avail-able to him on the floor to the inspector. The copies available to the operator were of the latest revision.
S.0. No. 7 had initialled written changes because one of the constituents in the die cavity lubricant was changed on December 13, 1978.
All of the S.O.'s had a statement in the General section that, "All personnel must wear rubber gloves when handling exposed uranium.
Gloves to be discarded in contaminated containers."
The operator was well aware of this requirement.
S.0. 44 for seiving and blending of as-received U 03 8 called for cleaning all tools and equipment which was in contact with V3 8 with Kim-0 wipes and placing the Kimwipes in a contaminated container. The operator stated that this was not done because the tools and equipment involved are located in a glovebox and such cleaning is not necessary for contamination control.
He said that items removed from the glovebox were wiped down. This discrepancy was pointed out to the licensee.
The licensee indicated they would take appropriate action.
d.
Receipt of Material The inspector observed the unloading of the packages, of material from the transporting vehicle.
The Nuclear Materials and Safety Officer took smears of the inside of the transporting vehicle and the outsides of the packages received.
e.
Storage of Source The licensee now has the Ra 226 source stored in a 30 gallon drum shielded by lead and concrete. Accordina to the licensee, the radiation at contact to the drum is 0.7 mR/hr.
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8 6.
Nuclear Safety a.
Postina of MSQ's During the inspection of the facility, the inspector noted that the work stations were well posted with the approoriate Maximum Safe Quantity (MSQ) applying to the station for nuclear criticality safety. The MSQ for one station had fallen down. The operator working in the room was aware that the posting was down.
- Also, he was aware of the MSQ limit.
The posting was put back into position innediately by the licensee.
The MSQ sign for work station 32, welding station for box type fuel elements, and the MSQ sign for work station 33, machining station for ORR fuel elements, were changed to read as follows:
"One element cart, or 10 HFBR, or 10 ORR, or 1 HFIR inner, or 1 HFIR outer fuel elements.
Only one element per time to be removed from element cart for welding (or machining)." These postings were changed as a result of Inspection No. 70-33/78-15.
b.
Review of MSO Postinas to License Requirements The inspector compared the 87 MSO postings with Table I of Appendix I, MSO For_Various Arrays & Work Places, which was made part of License No. SNM-23 by Amendment No. 8.
The postings were the same except for the postings for locations 20, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 53, 59, 63, 69, and 70.
The new MS0's for these locations were either within the limits of the MSQ's given in Table I of Appendix I or the MSQ's were changed to include 1 lot of 1 24 plates or 1 468 grams U-235.
This MSQ, 1 lot of 5 24 plates or 1 468 grams U-235 is safe at any work or storage location.
c.
Criticality Monitors During the inspection, the four criticality monitors were physi-cally inspected. The alarm set points were noted to be set at 15 mR/hr. The green power licht was not on for the unit by the entrance to the Fuel Manufacturina Area. The licensee determined that the power was on and the unit was working.
The licensee indicated they would replace the burned out bulb.
The calibration records for the quarterly calibrations of the criticality monitors performed on September 29, and December 29, 1978, were examined.
In September the licensee used a 1 mci radium source for calibration and in December a 5 mci source 2282 183
9 was used.
The sources were set at the appropriate distances away from the detector to give readings of 10 and 15 mR/hr, and the readings given by the monitors were recorded. The distance the source was from the detector and the reading given by the monitor when the monitor alarmed was also determined and recorded.
The instruments were found to be adequately cali-brated and no adjustments were needed.
The records for the weekly criticality monitor tests for the period of October 24, 1978, through February 26,1979, were examined by the inspector. Silent tests were conducted each week except on November 28, 1978 and February 26,1979, when the sirens were tested on the quarterly basis.
The licensee also checked that proper responses were obtained at the HFIR Control Center and the Building No. 3 Security Center.
d.
Nuclear Safety Evaluations The inspector reviewed the Requests for Criticality Safety Analysis and the resulting Criticality Safety Analyses and Approvals prepared by the Nuclear Safety Manager which were done since Inspection 70-33/78-15.
The nuclear safety evalu-ations reviewed were:
Request No. 6, " Packing Fuel Element Type KM - Location 59,"
dated November 20, 1978, analyzed, reviewed, and approved November 20, 1978; Request No. 7, " Inspect Fuel Plates - Location 63," dated December 6, 1978, analyzed, reviewed, and approved December 11, 1978; Request No. 8, " Inspect Fuel Plates - Location 69," dated December 6, 1978, analyzed, reviewed, and approved December 11, 1978; Request No. 9, " Inspect Fuel Plates - Location 70," dated December 6, 1978, analyzed, reviewed, and approved December 11, 1978; Request No.10, " Machining of ORR Fuel Elements - Location 33," dated December 14, 1978, analyzed, reviewed, and approved December 18, 1978; 2282 184
10 Request No.11, " Welding of Box Type Fuel Elements - Location 32," dated December 14, 1978, analyzed, reviewed, and approved December 18, 1978; Request No.12, " Lift Truck Used for Moving HFIR Elements (Inners)," dated December 18, 1978, analyzed, reviewed, and approved January 10,1979; and Request No.13, " Lift Truck Used for Moving HFIR Elements (Outers)," dated December 18, 1978, analyzed, reviewed, and approved January 10, 1979.
The approved MSQ's as a result of these requests were within the license approved limits.
e.
PVC Spacers The licensee has obtained new polyvinyl chloride spacers and has replaced all the polystyrene spacers with the polyvinyl chloride spacers.
7.
Internal Reviews and Audits a.
Quarterly Radiological and Criticality Safety Audits The license required quarterly radiological safety mdits are performed by Mr. Millspaugh from Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the license required quarterly criticality safety audits are performed by Mr. J. T. Thomas from Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
The inspector reviewed the reports for the June 20, September 12, and December 5,1978, radiological safety audits.
The inspector also reviewed the reports for the June 28, July 19, and December 14, 1978, criticality safety audits.
These audits disclosed no problems with radiological safety or criticality safety at the licensee's facility.
b.
Monthly Criticality Safety Audits The license required monthly criticality safety audits are now performed by the Nuclear Materials and Safety Officer.
In this audit the '.'uclear Materials and Safety Officer audits every work and storage station for compliance with the posted MSQ's.
The 2282 185
11 posted MSQ's are also compared to the license approved MS0's for each station. The inspector reviewed the reports for the audits conducted on November 22, 1978; December 22, 1978; January 19, 1979; and February 12, 1979.
The amounts of material found in all the stations were within the postings at the times of the audits.
c.
Informal Daily Audits On February 16, 1979, the Nuclear Materials and Safety Officer found 5 fuel plates on a table in the inspection area which was not an authorized work or storage location. There was some old yellow tape on the table which was misunderstood to be demarking an authorized location. The tape was removed and personnel were instructed not to use this table for special nuclear material according to the memorandum recording the situation.
8.
Procedure Control The licensee uses Route Cards and Standard Operations to give the instructions to personnel so they can perfonn the operations which will produce acceptable parts in a safe manner. The licensee uses Engineering Change Notices to document changes in a Route Card or Standard Operation. When a step in a Route Card or Standard Operation is changed, the step is marked with an asterisk.
Any salaried employee may prepare a Route Card or Standard Operation.
Generally, the Route Cards or Standard Operations are prepared by either a process or a quality assurance engineer.
When a Route Card or Standard Operation is issued, an Engineering Notice is used.
The Engineering Notice is issued by the HFIR Project Manager and Engineers.
When the Engineering Notice is distributed, the secretary hand carries the Engineering Notice to the various recipients and obtains and destroys any obsolete documents resulting from the issuance of the Engir.eering Notice and its related documents.
The inspector asked how the licensee knew that the operators or inspec-tors were made aware of any change in a Route Card or Standard Operation.
The licensee indicated that the operator or inspector initialed each step on the route card and this action signified that this step was done by the individual in accordance with the current requirements.
It was the operator's or inspector's responsibility to assure that the operations and inspections were performed in accordance with current requirements. Quality Assurance also performs audits to assure that the correct Route Cards and Standard Operations are in use by the operators and inspectors.
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12 9.
Safety Committees The licensee has no formal safety committees.
The HFIR Project has weekly staff meetings, and Progress Reports are issued for each meeting.
The subjects of Health and Safety, Security, Safeguards, and Training are included in the topics covered in the progress reports.
The inspector reviewed Progress Report Nos. 680 through 709 for the period from August 8,1978 through February 27, 1979.
There were no significant licensee-identified problems in health and safety, security, safeguards, and training documented in these progress reports.
10.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denottd in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 8,1979.
The inspector presented the scope and findings of the inspection.
The inspector nsted that the packaging of the ORR fuel element was not done completely in accord with the route card for the operation; the instructions on the route card did not correlate completely with the package used; and the route card was not signed by the ORNL representative in a manner showing he had directed the packaging effort.
The licensee indicated they would take appropriate corrective action.
(paragraph 5.a)
The inspector noted that contamination control practices in the HFIR Project appeared to be improved.
However, the inspector noted that the practice of storing used rubber overshoes and lab coats for re-use on the clean side of the change line between the FMA and the GMA is a poor practice from a contamination control viewpoint. The licensee indicated that room for storage of the used protective clothing on the hot side is a problem. They indicated they would assess the situation.
(paragraph 5.b) 2282 187